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
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**ESSAYS IN MODERN THEOLOGY
AND RELATED SUBJECTS**

I

POLYTHEISM IN GENESIS AS A MARK OF DATE

BY CRAWFORD H. TOY

IN the Old Testament, omitting Genesis, the denunciations of polytheism appear to be all directed against foreign cults. Certain passages in Amos and Hosea may refer to worship at shrines which, though nominally devoted to Yahweh, was, in the opinion of these prophets, really treason to him; * and it may be that Deut. 6⁴ is a protest against a popular view that there were many Yahwehs in the land.† In any case this poly Yahwism was probably regarded by the prophets as not essentially different from the Canaanite polybaalism, as in fact the Yahweh at any place was simply the local baal. But the people of a given community, in worshipping their local Yahweh, were not conscious of devotion to more than one god—that is, poly Yahwism was not exactly polytheism.‡ The historical books, however, and the prophets of the seventh and sixth centuries definitely charge the people with polytheistic practices. Later books, secure in the conviction of Yahweh's supremacy, ridicule idolatry and calmly relegate foreign gods to a subordinate place in the world.§ The probability appears to be that down to the latter part of the sixth century, and perhaps after this, the Israelites worshipped foreign deities whenever they came into close contact with them; and there is nowhere in the Old Testament doubt as to the real existence of such deities.|| The teraphim, apparently native Israelite, form a class by themselves.

* Am. 8¹⁴; Hos. 5⁶, 8¹¹⁻¹².

† Cf. W. F. Bade, *Der Monojahwismus d. Deut.*, in *Zeitschr. alttest. Wiss.*, 1910.

‡ Cf. the various shrines and titles of Zeus and Jupiter and other deities.

§ Is. 40, 44; Ps. 96⁴ ¹, 7, 97⁸, 115; cf. Briggs, *Psalms*.

|| The "not-God" of Deut. 32¹⁷, Jer. 5⁷, *al.* means simply relative impotence; cf. Hos. 1⁹.

But, while thus there seems to be no recognition of native polytheistic practices (except that every family or clan had its teraphim) in the books referred to above, it has been supposed that Genesis assumes a native polytheistic system which, as antedating Yahwism, indicates a date for the composition of this book. It is generally held that Genesis contains early material, traditions, and ideas going back of the time of David, and possibly, in some instances, back of the settlement of the tribes in Canaan. The question of the historical value of the traditions must be kept distinct from the question when our Genesis was put into shape. The two questions doubtless are closely connected with each other: one's estimate of the historical worth of the stories of Abraham and Jacob will be affected by his opinion as to the date of these stories in their present form. Still, the two questions may be kept apart—or rather, so far as polytheism is concerned, we may ask whether or how far its occurrence in Genesis reveals a stratum of religious thought different from and cruder than that which appears in clearly historical times. For convenience the various supposed polytheistic statements and expressions may be considered under different heads.

1. The plural predicates found in connection with Elohim in 6¹², 18¹⁵, 20¹², 31¹², 35⁷ hardly throw light on the question under discussion. The great majority of Septuagint MSS.* and of the other ancient versions ignore the plural form in these passages; this fact, however, is not important, for monotheistic translators would naturally interpret such statements monotheistically. It is more to the point that the plural form is ignored in the Hebrew context. In 6¹² the מְשֻׁחִיתֵם may be read as plural participle, the preceding הִנְנִי being changed to הִנְנָה, and then the flood will have been sent by the "gods." But with this reading the variation of numbers becomes strange: "Elohim said, The end of all flesh is come before me . . . we are about to destroy. . . . I am about to bring the flood . . . I will establish my covenant." It seems more probable that the writer intended the participle in v. 12 to be taken as singular. The following אֶת הָאָדָם then makes a difficulty; the אֶת may be understood as preposition (so Sept. and most moderns), but the statement that man is to

* See the Cambridge text of Brooke and McLean.

be destroyed "with" the earth does not suit the general line of thought of the paragraph, in which not the earth in itself but man is the offending thing.* Comparison with vv. ¹². ⁷ suggests the reading מַעַל instead of מֵאֵת (so Olshausen)—man is to be destroyed from off the earth; the emendation requires a not too violent change.† However the text may be dealt with, it does not appear that we are warranted in seeing in it a polytheistic conception.

In 18^a. ⁹ the three men, Abraham's visitors, appear to speak as if they were equals in dignity: together they accept or permit his hospitality: "they said, so do." This is not unnatural, since all three are guests; but in v. ⁹ the three call for Sarah with a tone of authority: "they said, Where is Sarah thy wife?" This association of the two with the one will be considered below (under division 4)—here only a word respecting the plural form of the verb. Again the contextual use suggests doubt: "they said, Where is Sarah? . . . and he said, I will return." While, as will be pointed out below, the use of plurals in the narrative is intelligible, in this particular instance there seems to be no propriety in the variation of number except on the supposition of a monotheistic revision of the text. A scribal slip of the pen is possible. Codex A of Sept. has the singular in v. ⁸. ⁹, but in v. ⁸ not a few cursives and a couple of uncials have the plural.

In 20^a Abraham says to Abimelek: "when Elohim caused me to wander" (הִתְעַו); the versions have the divine name and the verb singular, and elsewhere in the chapter the Hebrew has singular verbs with Elohim. The plural in v. ¹² seems to be a scribal slip; it is hardly due to the fact that Abraham is speaking to a polytheist (Dillmann), for in that case he would more probably have used the article with Elohim: "the gods," etc.; nor does it seem likely that the plural is employed to secure agreement between the subject and the verb—we should not look for such grammatical nicety in a scribe, and besides, if here, why not frequently elsewhere? In 35⁷ the article is prefixed to Elohim and the verb is plural; but this passage will be considered

* "Earth" is here the world as a mass of human beings, = "mankind."

† The ρ may have fallen out from preceding σ ; κ and ν are often interchanged; λ and π are not very different. An emendation to $\rho\sigma$ is less probable.

below. In the other cases mentioned above it appears, for the reasons given, improbable that polytheistic statements are intended. The supposition of scribal error is supported by the occurrence of a plural verb in Ps. 58¹² ⁽¹¹⁾, where there is nothing in the rest of the psalm to suggest that the writer had in mind a plurality of gods. In 31⁵⁸ the plural verb is justified by the fact that two deities, the god of Abraham and the god of Nahor, are mentioned; the conception may be polytheistic—it is not clear from Genesis what Nahor's cult was. Several cases of plural predicates, besides that of Ps. 58, occur outside of Genesis, particularly in Deuteronomic diction, Deut. 5²⁸ ⁽²⁰⁾, 1 Sam. 17²⁶. ²⁶, Jer. 10¹⁰, 23³⁶, Josh. 24¹⁹, and so perhaps 2 Sam. 7²²; * the use of such forms is not in itself a sign of early date.†

2. In regard to the form הָאֱלֹהִים it is sufficient to say that it is used in Genesis alongside of the anarthrous form apparently at random; see 20⁶. ¹⁷, 27²⁸, 35¹. ². ⁷, 45⁷. ⁸, 48¹⁵, and for הָאֵל and אֱלֹהִים 46³. The arthrous form may be significant in certain connections—every occurrence must be examined separately.

3. Other gods besides Yahweh are mentioned by name in Genesis: El Elyon 14¹⁸⁻²⁰. ²²; El Shaddai 17¹; Teraphim 31³⁰. ³⁴; to these may be added Gad and Asher 30¹¹. ¹³. The Teraphim in this case are the gods of the Aramean Laban, carried off by Rachel, apparently to secure the protection of her ancestral household divinities. They represent a very early cult, found now in half-civilized communities (for example, in Samoa, and, till lately, in Hawaii). They appear to be recognized as deities by Jacob, though no such cult is attributed to him.‡ But, as they continued to be worshipped by the Israelites, forming a recognized part of the private and the public cults, till a late period (1 Sam. 19¹³, Hos. 3⁴, cf. Zech. 10²), the reference to them is not a definite mark of date.

Elyon occurs in only one section of Genesis and there as epithet of El. The name is found alone not earlier than the seventh century (Num. 24¹⁶, Deut. 32⁸), and all its occurrences but the two just mentioned are still later. That the Melkisedek

* Cf. Ges.-Kautzsch, § 124^{r-1}, 145^l.

† Ex. 22¹⁰ may show early polytheism.

‡ The putting away of foreign gods, 35², belongs to a late stratum of the narrative.

story is very late* appears from the use of the late poetic name Salem for Jerusalem (cf. Ps. 76³ (2)). Elyon, if we may trust the statement of Philo of Byblos (Elioun) was an ancient Phœnician deity, and not, improbably, therefore old Canaanitish also. The combination El Elyon appears to represent not a coalescence of two independent divine names, but rather, as is suggested above, a reduction of the second name to an epithet—a natural procedure. In the mind of the Old Testament writers El Elyon (and also Elyon alone) is identical with Yahweh.

The origin and meaning of the name Shaddai (as it is pointed in the Masoretic text) are uncertain.† In Genesis it is always attached to the name El: 17¹, 28³, 35¹¹, 43¹⁴, 48³, 49²⁶ (read לַאֵל for לַאֵל). It is found in the Pentateuch outside of Genesis in Num. 24^{4, 16}, Ex. 6³; other occurrences are of the sixth century or later. The obscure poems in Num. 24 are certainly not earlier than the regal period, and v. 16 appears to be much later than this period. Gen. 49 appears to have been composed in the regal period (so v. 10). The name Shaddai does not suggest an early date or a polytheistic point of view; in Ex. 6³, for example, it is a designation of Yahweh. This latter passage leads us to expect a more frequent use of the name in Genesis than is actually the case. Yahweh there says that he appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob under the name El Shaddai, and that he was not known to them by his name Yahweh (or, as the Greek has it, did not make his name Yahweh known to them). Yet Shaddai occurs only once in the history of Abraham (17¹), once in that of Isaac (28³), and four times in that of Jacob. Possibly in the course of various recensions some occurrences of the name have disappeared.

Gad and Asher are divine names,‡ and the tribal names may have been derived from the names of the deities, but there is no consciousness of such relation in Genesis; the popular etymologies in ch. 30 proceed in a different direction. The derivation in question, if it be correct, was hardly in the minds of the

* It may be kept apart from the preceding portion of ch. 14; the critical considerations in the two sections are different.

† See Driver, *Genesis*, Excurs. I.

‡ For Gad see Is. 65¹¹. Asher probably appears in Phœn. אַשְׁרֵי. Cf. Ass. Ashur (see Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. Ass.*, English and German editions).

Old Testament writers. Worship of Gad appears only very late (Is. 65¹¹).

4. The deity is sometimes associated with other superhuman beings. It is generally recognized that in Gen. 1²⁶ Elohim, an individual figure, takes counsel with other beings respecting the creation of man, and those beings are necessarily divine—they belong to the Elohim class (the B'ne Elohim), or, what amounts to the same thing, they are angels. The conception here is definitely polytheistic, but, though Gen. 1 may contain very old ideas, it does not appear that this particular polytheistic representation can be taken to point to an early date for the chapter. Substantially the same sort of conception of divine beings is found in the Job prologue, where these Elohim beings are associated with Yahweh in the administration of the affairs of the world, and one of them, there called the Adversary, but not the less a trusted agent of the supreme deity, is particularly concerned with human life. The prologue is later than Zech. 3, and, though it may rest on a popular story, it must embody a conception current in the sixth century or later. If a divine lieutenant of Yahweh could deal with the moral development of men, similar beings might have a part in the original creation of the race. The general conception of creation in Gen. 1 is a noble one—it belongs to a period of reflection,* not to a crude stage of national life. The polytheistic tinge, with headship for Yahweh, continues late in the history, and the conception in 3²², 11⁷ would in all probability be not unnatural for an intelligent and pious man of the eighth century. The same thing may be said of the picture in ch. 18—precedence for Yahweh, and a substantially divine rôle for his two companions. If it be supposed that in the original form of the story there were three equal gods, still the present form belongs after the establishment of the primacy of Yahweh.

Under this head we may consider the serpent of Gen. 3. The story in Gen. 2, 3 is an ætiological myth—it accounts for the loss of paradise and other things. Ch. 3 appears, however, to be composite; there is the story of the temptation and the story of the

* So the explanation of the sacredness of the Sabbath is superior in dignity to that given elsewhere in the Pentateuch; omitting national experiences and ritual details, it bases the law on the method of the divine creative work.

curse. In the latter the serpent is a mere beast, in the former he belongs in the Elohim circle, he knows what will be the consequence for the human pair of eating the forbidden fruit. So far as regards the conception of a serpent god we have the statement of 2 Kg. 18⁴ that a bronze image of a serpent was worshipped in Jerusalem down to the end of the eighth century.* But the serpent of Genesis is apparently hostile to Yahweh. The element of hostility may be an echo of the old cosmogonic dragon myth, here reduced in proportions and socialized: the supreme deity has become the owner of a private garden, and the serpent god is a plotter in anthropomorphic style, appealing to the woman in terms of human logic; such humanizing of deities was not uncommon in the ancient world. The whole story shows interest in sociological philosophy, while the conception of supernatural agencies is not out of keeping with the ideas of the regal period.†

5. A certain polytheistic coloring appears in passages in which Yahweh or Elohim is spoken of as a god of limited relations, seeming thus to be one of many. Yahweh is the god of Shem (9²⁶) or of Abraham and Isaac (28¹³); ‡ Jacob calls him "the God of my father" (31⁶), the father being sometimes Abraham, sometimes Isaac (in 31⁵⁸ the "Fear of Isaac"). Laban invokes the God of Abraham and the God of Nahor, as if they were different deities (31⁶⁸), and he is represented as being acquainted with Yahweh by name (24⁵⁰); throughout ch. 24 Abraham's servant styles Yahweh "the God of my master"; Elohim in a vision announces himself to Jacob as "the God of thy father" (46⁸), or (in Sept.) "the God of thy fathers." In 33²⁰ we should read, with Septuagint, "he called on the God of Israel" (an altar could not be called, as the Hebrew has it, *El Elohe Israel*). The larger title "the God of heaven and earth" occurs in 24³ (and v. 7 in the Greek). Similarly Jacob cites Yahweh as calling himself the God of Bethel (31¹⁸). More definitely a deity is described as the one who appeared to a man at a certain time: "the Elohim who appeared to thee"

* The seraphim of Is. 6 perhaps represent original serpent gods elevated or subordinated to the rank of attendants on Yahweh.

† Cf. the crude ideas in 1 Kg. 16³⁴, 2 Kg. 3¹⁵, Is. 8⁹.

‡ Omit, with Sept., the second Yahweh.

(35¹), "the Elohim who answered me" (35²); Jacob built an altar and called the place Bethel,* because there the Elohim revealed themselves (plural verb), apparently with reference to the angels (ch. 28), here called gods, but perhaps the plural of the Hebrew is scribal error (Sept. has singular).† There are, further, epithets: El roi (16¹⁸), perhaps "the god who is seen" (theophany) and El olam (21²⁸) "the god of olden times" (the god handed down by tradition).

These designations of deities reveal an atmosphere of polytheistic thought. Such descriptions are found abundantly outside of Israel, in Babylonia, Assyria, Phœnicia, Greece, and Rome. In ancient society every clan was an independent unit, and had its own god or gods, and any place in which a deity was supposed to reveal himself might furnish a name for him. A man inherited his god from his fathers, and cherished him as a part of the family possessions; and he valued any spot where he became aware of a divine presence. These conceptions survived outside of Israel into comparatively enlightened times—are there traces of them in the Old Testament in the historical books and other records of opinion? The naturalness of the titles God of Shem, God of Israel, is obvious: according to Deut. 32⁸, Yahweh, having divided the world out among the peoples, chose Israel as his portion, thus leaving other nations to other gods; he was specifically the God of Israel, and hence, in the later genealogical construction, the God of the ancestor Shem, who is marked off from other early ancestors. The value of the tradition of the fathers is expressed in Deut. 32¹⁷. The nearer great ancestor, Abraham, is naturally prominent—throughout the Old Testament times his name is employed to describe the relation of Yahweh to his people: so in Ex. 3⁶, Deut. 9²⁷, 1 Kg. 18³⁸, 1 Ch. 29¹⁸, 2 Ch. 30⁶, Ps. 47¹⁰ (⁹), cf. Is. 51².

Designations of a deity by a shrine are rare in the Old Testament; some of these may have disappeared in the course of the revision of the text. Am. 8¹⁴ speaks of the gods of Samaria, Dan, and Beersheba, and Samaria may here include Bethel—cf. Hos. 10⁵: "for the calf [so Sept.] of Bethaven [probably =

* So Sept.; El Bethel, as in the Hebrew, is an impossible name for a place.

† In 27²¹ there seems no ground for seeing a distinction between Yahweh who blesses a field and Elohim who bestows fatness.

Bethel] the inhabitants of Samaria shall tremble." Bethel is the only place from which an Elohim is named in Genesis. It was a prominent shrine down to the destruction of Samaria (1 Sam. 7¹⁶, 2 Kg. 2²³), but was denounced by Amos and Hosea as hostile to the Yahweh cult (Am. 4⁴, Hos. 4¹⁵); after the fall of Samaria the worship of Yahweh was resumed at Bethel (2 Kg. 17³⁸), but the place, according to 2 Kg. 23¹⁵, was destroyed by Josiah—it reappears, however, in Nehemiah's time (Neh. 7³²), though, naturally, it is not then spoken of as a shrine. Down to the middle of the eighth century, then, it was esteemed a sacred place, and the traditions of that time connected it with Jacob (Hos. 12⁴); there is no reason why the story of his relation to the place might not have been redacted in the ninth or eighth century—as a matter of course God would appear to him on this sacred spot. The theophanies appear to be legendary traditions that grew up as explanation of the name Bethel.* The place, it is said, was originally called Luz. The date of the change of name is uncertain; it may have been at the conquest of the city, as is suggested in Jd. 1²² †.—the conquerors might desire to stamp it with a name of their own devising, in this case a name expressing its character as an old shrine, and legend would then connect it with the tribal ancestor.

Of the precise origin and significance of the epithets in El roi and El olam we have no information beyond the statements in Genesis. The latter name appears to refer to the ancestral deity. The former name would be appropriate for any theophany. It here belongs to a shrine or sacred place in the Arabian desert, and its mention, it may be supposed, springs from the local interest that led the narrator to give so much space to the story of Hagar.†

6. In certain passages in Genesis the term Elohim appears to denote "divine being" in general, and thus to belong to the polytheistic circle of ideas. Abraham is declared by Yahweh to be a "fearer of Elohim" (22¹²), a God-fearing man, and Joseph refuses to "sin against Elohim" (39⁹). No particular deity is mentioned—the word Elohim expresses a standard of conduct

* There are two accounts of the origin of the name, in Gen. 28 and 35.

† The name Hagar appears to represent a desert tribe to which the border Israelites felt themselves to be akin; cf. art. "Hagar," in *Encycl. Bibl.*

resident in a superhuman person.* Whatever the precise force of the term in such cases, the usage is not confined to Genesis: the expression "man of God," of frequent occurrence in the Old Testament (Deut. 33¹, 1 Sam. 2⁷, 2 Kg. 1-8 *al.*) means a man devoted to God, standing in intimate relation with him, and the Elohim may be any god to whom the man is devoted. Since an abstract expression for deity is out of the question for this early time, it is possible that Elohim in such cases as those just mentioned meant originally the local god or the god of the individual man concerned; but if so, the persistence of the usage makes it impossible to regard it as a mark of date.†

In this connection may be mentioned the statement in 19²⁰—the destruction of the cities of the plain by Elohim. As the destruction is described at length in the preceding part of the chapter, this verse is generally regarded as belonging to a separate document, Elohim here doing what Yahweh does above. The statement of the verse is introduced in a peculiar way in Am. 4¹¹: Yahweh says: "I have overthrown among you like Elohim's overthrowing of Sodom and Gomorrah." It is strange that Yahweh does not say "like my overthrowing"—he seems to distinguish between himself and Elohim. The text may be in disorder; or the scribe, forgetting for the moment that it is Yahweh that he represents as speaking, simply puts down the account familiar to him, and fails to perceive any inconcinnity. The Elohim in Gen. 19²⁰ may be the local god, later identified with Yahweh, or may be the God of Israel, whom the writer, for whatever reason, chooses so to call.

7. We have, finally, to consider the rôle played by angels in Genesis. The familiar fact is that the angel sometimes speaks as if he were an independent god, and there is sometimes a quiet identification of the angel of Yahweh with Yahweh (16^{10, 13}, 22^{11 f.}), or of the angel of Elohim with Elohim (31^{11, 19}). The Elohim of 35⁷ (if the verb be taken as plural) are the angels of 28¹², and the "man" of 32²⁴ (called "angel" in Hos. 12⁴) is later revealed as Elohim. The natural inference from these representations is that the angels are old gods. We are thus introduced to a period in Israelite history when the land was full of

* Cf. the use of Elohim as a superlative, as in 1 Sam. 14¹⁴.

† It is employed by writers who habitually use the name Yahweh.

native gods, as was the case with other ancient lands. Probably every shrine had its local deity or deities, around whom stories would grow up. Such a shrine was Peniel ("face of God"), the origin of which name is given in the story in ch. 28, and there is added the explanation of why the Israelites did not eat a certain sinew.* In the course of time these figures were subordinated to Yahweh or to the supreme Elohim, and the two systems were sometimes mingled in the later narratives, a given act being attributed now to the angel, now to the supreme god.

The "angel of Yahweh" is a distinct figure from Yahweh—a god cannot be his own messenger or agent—but his procedure is sometimes of the same character as that of Yahweh. Nor is the rôle of the angel of Yahweh different in nature from that of any other angel—the "man" of ch. 28 acts with the same independent masterfulness as the angel of ch. 16; the "angel of Yahweh" is merely the angel who happens to act for his divine principal on any particular occasion. The nominal interchange between the two in a narrative is probably not due to a desire on the part of the narrator to indicate their functional identity; this identity he assumes—what is said by the angel he means to be taken as the word of Yahweh—but the fact was understood and no demonstration was needed. Possibly the explanation of the interchange is to be sought in the supposition that in the original story the actor was a local god who later became an angel, and that the divine name was introduced in the course of redaction; in such a case the redactor would not be conscious of inconcinnity, holding, as he did, that the act of the angel was virtually the act of Yahweh.

If this view of the origin of the angel as an old native god be correct, the question arises as to when the new name arose, when, that is, the old god was converted into a *mal'ak*, a messenger or agent of Yahweh or Elohim. The paucity of data for the early history makes it difficult to give a definite answer to this question. In the earlier Old Testament documents angels are a part of the popular scheme of supernatural beings: Jd. 6¹¹ ^a, 13^a ^c, Num. 22²⁸, 2 Sam. 24¹⁶, 1 Sam. 29⁹ (the Philistine Akish), 2 Sam. 14¹⁷ (the woman of Tekoa), 1 Kg. 13¹⁸—they belong to folk-lore. They are kept distinct from spirits (which have not the form of

* Cf. J. G. Frazer, in *Anthrop. Essays Presented to Tylor*.

gods proper) and from baals (who are non-Israelite deities). The employment of the term "angels" tells nothing about the date of its introduction; once adopted, it would be used generally by the editors of the documents. The process of transformation would naturally go hand in hand with the elevation of Yahweh to supremacy, of which one effect would be to reject or subordinate the inferior gods. The prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries, engaged in a struggle for the sole worship of Yahweh, appear to have ignored these latter. The only occurrence of the word angel in those prophetic writings, in Hos. 12⁴, is in a folk-story, and its employment perhaps indicates the path of transformation: the "man" of Gen. 32²⁴ becomes an "angel." Local gods have always had a peculiarly strong hold on the affections of the people. If that was the case in Israel, the religious leaders would wisely seek not to banish but to incorporate these figures—a method that has prevailed in all religions. The term "messenger" was a natural name for them—they were the agents of the supreme deity.* How soon this process began we have no means of determining with exactness, but it seems to have been virtually completed by the eighth century. The later history of angels does not belong to the present inquiry.

The preceding investigation appears to show that, while the Book of Genesis contains conceptions that may go back to a very early period, the present form of the book points to a time near the eighth century, or later, for its redaction. The subject is confessedly obscure (as is true of all attempts at the reconstruction of remote times), and proposed explanations are to be understood as hypotheses that must be constantly tested. The outcome of the Israelite theistic development is clear, the history of its growth is full of difficulties. It is particularly hard to decide what part of the development is common Semitic and what part is specifically Israelite, and in this latter how much is to be attributed to outside influence. On these points future discoveries may throw light.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
May, 1910.

* So the Assyrian Nusku and the Greek Iris.

II

THE MEANING OF HEBREW *BITHRÔN*

(2 Samuel 2²⁰)

BY WILLIAM R. ARNOLD

THE word בתרון occurs only once in the Old Testament (2 Sam. 2²⁰), in the account of Abner's retreat to Mahanaim after his disastrous trial of strength with David's army at the pool of Gibeon. The Masoretic text is: ואבנר ואנשיו הלכו בערבה כל הלילה ההוא ועברו את הירדן וילכו כל הבתרון ויבאו מחנים.

The King James Version renders this verse, "And Abner and his men walked all that night through the plain, and passed over Jordan, and went through all Bithron, and they came to Mahanaim." Except for the correct substitution of the proper name "the Arabah" for "the plain," and the incorrect substitution of "went" for "walked," the Revised Version retains substantially the rendering of the Authorized.

In the view that הבתרון—whether descriptive, appellative, or proper name—stands for some geographical or topographical quantity, some route, district, or region lying east of Jordan, between the ford which was crossed by Abner and the city of Mahanaim, our English versions follow the prevailing tradition of translators and exegetes, both ancient and modern. But a considerable degree of uncertainty, as to the more exact character of this term, seems to have existed, nevertheless, from the earliest times.

The Alexandrian Greek texts have: *καὶ διέβαινον τὸν Ἰορδάνην καὶ ἐπορεύθησαν εἰς τὴν παρατείνουσαν, καὶ ἔρχονται εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν*. There are no variants worth mentioning.* Wellhausen, forty years ago, wrote: "בִּיתְרוֹן wird auch der

* See Holmes and Parsons, *ad loc.* Ἐἰς παρεμβολὰς Μαδιαμ of the "Lucianic" manuscripts is both conflate and corrupt.

LXX vorgelegen haben als ברתן = *παρὰτελνυσα*. Bei Ortsnamen ist dergleichen am ehesten begreiflich, vgl. Chaifa Kaiphas, Milano Mailand, Mars la Tour Marsch retour u. a.”; * that is, the Greek construes the word as a proper name and renders by a punning Greek equivalent. That such fanciful phonetic equations were not foreign to the Alexandrian translators, Wellhausen has sufficiently well shown.† But the assumption of a reading ברתן is far-fetched, and would perhaps not be maintained by Wellhausen himself at the present time. *παρὰτελνυ* occurs in the Greek texts of the Old Testament some half-dozen times,‡ always with the meaning *to extend, to stretch out, to be outlying*, and prevaillingly in topographical contexts.§ The Greek rendered our passage, *And they crossed the Jordan, and traversed the entire outlying region, and arrived at the camp (Mahanaim)*. Whether the translator construed ברתן as a proper name or as an appellative remains, to be sure, uncertain. But it is apparent that no derivative of Hebrew בתר will support his rendering. The interpretation ἡ *παρὰτελνυσα* is, in my judgment, obviously based on Aramaic בתר, *after*, or some derivative thereof, such as בתראה or בתריתא, *posterior, postremus*; cf. Syriac ܒܬܪܐܝܬܐ, *posterioritas*.|| בתר (or באתר) occurs already in Daniel 2^{ss}, 7st. Possibly the translator supposed the word to have been the Aramaic proper name of a trans-Jordanic territory; or he may have adopted the rendering as a counsel of despair, though construing the word as a Hebrew appellative. At all events, since Aramaic בתר is itself compounded of the preposition ב and אתר *spot, place, track*, to account for the Greek interpretation is to reject it.

Of the later Greek versions, we know only that Aquila rendered הברתון as a proper name, *Βεθωρῶν*.¶ The usual Greek spelling of Hebrew בית חורון being *Βαυθωρῶν*, it is extremely

* *Der Text der Bücher Samuelis*, p. 156.

† *L. c.*, pp. 10 f., note.

‡ See Hatch and Redpath, *Concordance to the Septuagint*, p. 1065.

§ With *παρὰτελνυ* ἐξ ἧς ἡ *ἐκτείνω* the Greek correctly renders הניסקך על פני הים of Numbers 23^{ss}, against the current and misleading “that looks down upon” of modern interpreters. Balak took Balaam to the head of a ravine (פסר) that *extended to* (or *looked out upon*) the ישיבן.

|| See Payne Smith, *Thesaurus*, *ad voc.* ܒܬܪ.

¶ Field, *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt*, I, p. 550.

improbable that Aquila had a different reading from our בתרון. In construing it as a proper name, he merely followed the rabbinical exegesis of his day.

The text of Aquila evidently suggested to Jerome the pronunciation *Bethoron* for the word which he, too, understood as a proper name: *et transierunt Jordanem et lustrata omni Bethoron* (some manuscripts and the official Vulgate have *Beth horon*) *venerunt ad castra*; for there is no trace of a Hebrew בית חורון in any text of this passage. Vercellone* quotes the opinion of Clericus to the effect that later scribes, and not Jerome, should be held responsible for the Vulgate reading *Beth horon* instead of *Bithron*. But Jerome's *Onomasticon* contains, under the rubric *Interpretationes secundi libri regum*, the definition *Bethoron domus iræ*,† showing that, whether Jerome wrote *Bethoron* or *Beth horon*—more probably the former—he identified the word with the Hebrew proper name בית חורון. Evidently he, too, was more confused than informed upon the subject.

The Peshfta seems to have taken the bull by the horns, avoiding the difficulties of translation by means of a bold paraphrase:

مَحْصَنٌ مَذْنُجٌ مَأْوَاهُ خَامٌ رَحْمَةً لِّمَنْ خَفَا

And they crossed the Jordan, and marched in the direction of Geshur, and reached Mahanaim.‡ The only light this version sheds upon our problem is that the translator admittedly did not quite understand his Hebrew, and had manifestly never heard of such a locality as "the Bithrôn."

Jewish rabbinical tradition has followed the most comfortable course by explaining the הבתרון as a geographical proper name. So the Targum of Jonathan: ויעברו ית ירדנה ואולו כל בתרון ואתו למחנים. Similarly the mediæval commentators,§ who do not linger upon the subject. Rashi contents himself with two words, שם מחו, *name of a locality*. David Qimhi: שם מחו ונביל, *name of a town and territory lying beyond the Jordan, and named accordingly, after the familiar*

* *Variae lectiones vulgatæ Latinæ Bibliorum editionis*, II, p. 326.

† Lagarde, *Onomastica sacra*,* p. 68.

‡ I cite from the London polyglot; the Urūmiah edition has the same text.

§ See the Rabbinical Bibles.

meaning of the word [having reference not to Hebrew, but to Aramaic בִּתְרָן, and understanding the name as designating the country *behind* or *beyond* Jordan].

The solitary non-topographical explanation of הַבְּתָרוֹן which I have found is that of the mediæval lexicographer, Ibn Parhon, whose dictionary (A.D. 1160)* has this definition: יִלְכוּ כָּל הַבְּתָרוֹן פ': סוּף הַחֵיל תִּרְגֹּם אַחֲרֵינִים בְּתָרָאִין בֵּין תִּבִּין הַבְּתָרוֹן: *The meaning of הַבְּתָרוֹן is the rear guard, בְּתָרָאִין being Aramaic for אַחֲרֵינִים, (the last) of the retreating troops.* Ibn Parhon obviously construed the word as subject of יִלְכוּ, and, like the Alexandrian Greek version before him and David Qimhi after him, took it for a derivative of Aramaic בִּתְרָן. The interpretation is nothing more than a curiosity. But it is interesting to find one scholar to whom the construction of הַבְּתָרוֹן כָּל as object of יִלְכוּ was not the most natural one.

Coming to more modern authorities, Gesenius† interpreted הַבְּתָרוֹן as an appellative: "*regio montibus vallibusque dissecta, vel vallis montes dissecans*"; rendering, *et peragrata tota valle venerunt Machanaim*. He held that it makes little difference whether the word be construed as a proper name or as an appellative, since even the proper name will have originated from the character of the place; the trans-Jordanic country being exceedingly mountainous.

Recent lexicographers and commentators invariably explain הַבְּתָרוֹן as a geographical term, some construing it as an appellative, but most as a proper name. Gesenius-Buhl: "*N. pr. einer Schlucht an d. Ostseite d. Jordans.*" Brown-Driver-Briggs, more cautiously: "*prob. n. pr. terr. (cleft, ravine) E. of Jordan.*" Siegfried and Stade: "*n. pr., Ort am Jordan.*" Of commentaries and critical translations, Wellhausen has already been cited. Kittel‡ renders: "*durchschritten die ganze Schlucht und gelangten so nach Mahanaim.*" Löhr§: "*Ein Ort des Namens findet sich sonst nicht; es muss (sie setzen über den Jordan) eine Oertlichkeit jenseits des Jordans sein; eine bestimmte Bergschlucht welche vom Jordansufer nach Mahanaim*

* *Maḥbereth ha'arāch*, edited by S. G. Stern, Pressburg, 1844, p. 11 a.

† *Thesaurus*, s. v.

‡ In Kautzsch's *Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments*.

§ *Die Bücher Samuelis*, p. 130.

gerade emporführt." Henry Preserved Smith *: "Abner and his men *marched in the Arabah all that night and crossed the Jordan and went through the whole Bithron* or Ravine, doubtless the proper name of one of the side valleys up which Mahanaim was situated." Nowack † renders: "zog durch die ganze Schlucht, und kam nach Mahanaim," and remarks, "כל הַבְּתְרֹן ist fraglich, nur so viel ist klar, es muss eine Oertlichkeit jenseits des Jordans sein, seiner Bedeutung nach wäre es 'Kluft, Schlucht.'" Finally, Budde ‡: "הַבְּתְרֹן, nur hier, *die Kluft, Schlucht, Klamme*, muss das Seitenthal sein, an dessen oberem Ende Mahanaim liegt, also nach unserer Annahme . . . der heutige *W. el-ḥimâr*." §

The works on the geography of Palestine naturally conform to the current interpretation of בְּתֹרֶן. George Adam Smith ||: "Abner, after crossing Jordan, came through the Bithron or Gorge, a name which suits the narrow central portion of the Jordan Valley, to Mahanaim." Incidentally, it may be observed that Smith fails to follow the narrative; the northward portion of Abner's journey, which lay through that gorge (הַעֲרֵבָה), had been accomplished before crossing the Jordan—unless we are to maintain that הַעֲרֵבָה and הַבְּתֹרֶן were two mutually exclusive sections of the Ghôr, with Mahanaim situated immediately on the eastern edge of the latter. Buhl ¶ is more in accord with recent commentators, "Das 2 Sam. 2^o genannte *Bitron* (entweder *nom. propr.* od. *appell.*, etwa 'Kluft'), durch welches Abner auf dem Wege nach *Mahanaim* hinaufging, kann man wohl am besten mit *W. 'aḡlûn* zusammenstellen; jedenfalls lief später, wie es scheint, ein Römerweg von 'aḡlûn nach *Mahanaim*."

Now it can be shown that all the interpretations and opinions cited above are fundamentally mistaken. The expression הַבְּתֹרֶן is not a geographical or topographical term, whether descriptive, appellative, or proper name. The words כל הַבְּתֹרֶן are not the direct object of the preceding וַיֵּלֶכְ, but constitute an adverbial clause indicative of the *time during which* the march continued.

* *Commentary on the Books of Samuel*, p. 273.

† *Handkommentar zum A. T.*, p. 159.

‡ *Kurzer Handkommentar zum A. T.*, p. 207.

§ Driver, *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, passes over the troublesome passage without comment.

|| *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 586, note 2.

¶ *Géographie des anciens Paléstitine*, p. 121.

וילכו כל הבתרון cannot be the direct object of הלך. It is true that an accusative—without preposition—is sometimes used with הלך in the Hebrew of the Old Testament; but such accusative is almost invariably an adverbial modifier, and not the direct object of the verb. That such is the construction in the case of accusatives of time will be readily conceded. So הלכו כל הלילה, in the verse we are discussing and in the following v.⁸². But the construction of הלך in בדרך אשר הלכו (Gn. 35⁵) differs in no respect from that in הימים אשר הלכו (Dt. 2⁴). A demonstration, perhaps superfluous, is furnished by the text of Je. 52⁷: ויצאו דרך שער בין החמתיים וילכו דרך הערכת; as דרך cannot be the direct object of יצא in the first case, it is not the direct object of הלך in the second; they “go out by” such a road, and they “travel by” such a road. In the same way presumably must we construe such expressions as הלך דרך of Is. 35⁶, ילכו ארחות and even הלכי נתיבות of Judges 5⁶, although, since the accusatives are indeterminate, one case would not be prejudiced by admitting them to be direct objects. The passages in which הלך must be given the transitive meaning *traverse, march through*, are, as far as I can discover, only two: Dt. 1¹⁰, ונסע מחרב ונלך, את כל המדבר הגדול והנורא ההוא אשר ראיתם, *and we left Horeb and traversed the whole of this great and terrible wilderness which ye have seen*; Dt. 2⁷, יהוה ידע לכתך את המדבר הגדול הזה, *Yahweh was aware of thy march through this great wilderness*.^{*} These two passages are adduced by H. P. Smith in support of the current interpretation of וילכו כל הבתרון of 2 Sam. 2⁹.† But a closer study would have convinced him that they refute rather than support his conclusion. The accusative is determinate in the one case (כל המדבר, כל המדבר) as in the other (כל הבתרון). But in the Deuteronomy passages the particle את shows we are dealing with a direct object, whereas in the other, כל הבתרון, being determinate, the absence of את proves that we are not dealing with a direct object.

^{*} Driver, in Brown-Driver-Briggs, *s.v.* אמ, holds that in these passages we have a peculiar use of אמ rather than a transitive use of הלך; but it is easier to assume the latter than the former in so transparent a context. The case is different in Dt. 9⁵ (accusative of time). On the other hand, ויחזו ביה יהוה of Jud. 19¹⁸ is unintelligible and certainly corrupt; see Moore's *Commentary*, pp. 415 f.

† *L. c.*, note.

But if *כל הבתרון* is an adverbial accusative and nevertheless determinate, it can have reference only to *time*, and not to space; for while *הבתרון* as an adverbial accusative, indicative of the route taken, would perhaps be possible,* *כל הבתרון* would be entirely impossible. The expression *וילכו כל הבתרון* of 2²⁰ is exactly parallel to *וילכו כל הלילה* of 2²² in the narrative of our author. In v. ²⁰ Abner and his men travel all the *bithrôn* and arrive at Mahanaim; in v. ²² Joab and his men travel all the night and arrive at Hebron. *הבתרון* is the name of a certain part of the twenty-four-hour day.

On the question as to what part of the day it designates, etymology and the narrative of the author we are interpreting combine to leave no doubt whatever. After the battle (2¹⁷) between the forces of Abner and those of Joab at the pool of Gibeon (2¹⁸), the Israelites fled before the pursuing Judeans eastward toward the Arabah or Gorge of the Jordan Valley. The course of this flight naturally led through the *מדבר נבעון* (v. ²⁴), that is, that part of *The Wilderness* (*המדבר*, stretching all along the cultivated and inhabited country and separating the latter from the Arabah) which lay parallel with the city of Gibeon.† At sunset, the fugitive Israelites reach a site in the *מדבר* called *נבעת אמה*, so little known to his readers that the author locates it as *lying opposite ניה on the road through the מדבר נבעון* (v. ²⁴).‡ There they effect a rally of all their forces, and take their

* Note, however, that our author says *הלכו בערבה*, not *הערבה*.

† *מדבר נבעון* is not "the pasture land of Gibeon," which, the commentators in their bewilderment correctly point out, could hardly be the rallying-point for the Israelites at sunset, after their long flight away from the pool of Gibeon; but that part of the common wilderness, *המדבר*, which lies alongside of Gibeon. So *מדבר חקע*, *מדבר ירמל*, *מדבר סעון*, *מדבר זית* refer to those sections of the great wilderness lying between civilization and the Arabah which faced these several towns respectively. The expression is in all respects analogous to *ירדן ירחו*, *the Jordan at Jericho*. And *המדבר*, *par excellence*, is as much of a proper name as *הערבה*.

‡ It is not at all to the point that to us *ניה* is as little known as *אמה* itself. The author was not writing for us, but for his contemporaries; and defeated troops are frequently content with a very insignificant village in sight of which to come to terms with their pursuers. For the rest, it would be hard to find a passage in the Old Testament where learning has done more to make confusion worse confounded. The most nearly correct rendering of 2 Sam. 2²⁴ which I can find is that of the English Authorized Version. The Septuagint, Vulgate, and Luther all misconstrue at one or more points; but

stand upon a single knoll (v.²⁵), while Abner implores Joab to call a halt to the baneful slaughter (v.²⁶). Whereupon Joab withdraws his followers from the pursuit, and the two armies march back to their respective headquarters, Abner to Mahanaim, and Joab to Hebron. The author tells how long it took each army to reach home. Leaving נבעת אמה (east, or perhaps east by north, of Gibeon) at sunset (v.²⁴), and stopping first on the route of the pursuit to recover his brother's body, then, late at night, at Bethlehem to inter the body in the tomb of his fathers (v.³²), Joab continues his march through the night and reaches Hebron at sunrise of the next day (v.³²). Abner, on the other hand, marches northward through the Arabah, along the west bank of the Jordan, all through the night, crosses the Jordan in the morning, and, marching all the בחרון, arrives at Mahanaim. It is clear from this narrative that החרון is less than twelve hours, for there is no mention of sunset or evening of the ensuing day. החרון is therefore a fraction of the (twelve-hour) day.

If now we turn to the following chapter 4, we may see how much time, in the estimation of this our author, the journey between the Jordan and Mahanaim ordinarily consumed. There the two assassins of Ishbaal travel in the reverse direction. They commit the murder in the palace at Mahanaim *at noon* (כחם היום), while Ishbaal is *enjoying his noon siesta* (והוא שכב את משכבו) (הצהריים)*. Then, carrying with them the head of Ishbaal, they hasten to David at Hebron, spending the whole night in travelling southward through the Arabah (וילכו דרך הערבה כל הלילה). The character of their burden would admit of no delay. The author does not tell us at what point of time on the ensuing day

all come nearer to a correct understanding of the Hebrew than do modern scholars, who, following Wellhausen in one of the moments when he nodded, have continued to wrestle vigorously with difficulties of their own creation. If we but perceive that ירך is adverbial accusative and construct to the compound מירר נבען, we have no difficulty whatever with the Masoretic text, which there is no reason to believe the Septuagint's Hebrew differed from materially. There was a well-known road running through the מירר, where the latter was known as the מירר נבען, down to the Arabah, and called ירך נבען. Along this road lay the town or village of ניה, and across the road from it, perhaps some distance back, the height called אמה, on one of whose knolls or foot-hills Abner rallied his men for a final stand.

* 2 Sam. 4²; the authentic text is continued with the word ויכרו of v. 7; v. 6 and v. 7 to משכבו are palpable marginal annotations.

they reached Hebron; but it is clear that he wishes us to understand that the time from noon of the first day, when the assassination took place, to evening, when they began their all-night journey through the Ghôr, was spent in traversing the distance between Mahanaim and the Ghôr, where they would presumably cross the Jordan by the same ford that Abner used on his retreat. The time consumed in covering the distance from the Jordan to Mahanaim was, therefore, in the opinion of our author, *half a day*.

Judging from the context of the narrative, then, הכתרון is *the half-day*, and, in this particular context, *the forenoon*.

The root of the word כתרון would of itself have led to the same conclusion. For the verb כתר does not mean to *cleave asunder*, as is assumed in the interpretation *cleft, ravine,* valley*, but very distinctly to *cut into two symmetrical halves*: Gn. 15¹⁰, Abram cuts (יכתר) the various animals *straight through the middle and lays each half (כתר) over against its mate (רעהו)*; Je. 34^{18f.}, the calf which they divided into two (כרתו לשנים) and passed between its halves (בתרו) . . . all the people of the land that passed between the halves of the calf (כל עם הארץ העברים בין כתרי) (הענל). This covers all the occurrences of the root כתר in the Old Testament but one, which will be mentioned below. Etymologically, therefore, הכתרון will be a period of time characterized as *the symmetrical half* of something. But *forenoon* and *afternoon* were the only two such periods known to the calendar of the age, which lacked our artificial midnight.

As regards the form כטלון, I need but point out that it is precisely that which we should expect, by analogy, for such a derivative with specific connotation. Compare חסרון *deficit*, from חסר *lack*; יתרון *surplus*, from יתר *remainder*; חיצון *exterior*, from חוץ *outside*; תיכון *interior*, from תוך *inside*; אחרון *last*, from אחר *hinder part*; ראשון *first*, from ראש *head*. כתרון is accordingly essentially an adjectival denominative, derived from כתר (*symmetrical*) *half*. With the article it becomes idiomatic for *the half-day*.

* The exact Hebrew for *cleft, ravine*, is נקבה. That הנקבה, whenever it occurs in the Old Testament, is a *ravine* and not a *mountain*, I hope to show in a future paper.

As an appellative with this sense בִּתְרוֹן should accordingly be added to our Hebrew lexicography. And 2 Sam. 2⁹ should be rendered: *And Abner and his men marched through the Arabah all that night, then crossed the Jordan, and, marching all the forenoon, arrived at Mahanaim.*

It should be noted, in passing, that the Hebrew has no other means of expressing the idea of *forenoon* or *half-day*. As is correctly emphasized in Brown-Driver-Briggs, בֹּקֶר is never equivalent to our English *morning* in the sense of a period of time.

With this result achieved, some light may perhaps be thrown on the only remaining Old Testament passage that contains the root בִּתֵּר, Song of Songs 2¹⁷, which, in spite of some fanciful conjectures, has remained completely enigmatical. הָרֵי בִּתְרִי of this passage is seen to be exactly analogous to הָרֵי נֶשֶׁף of Je. 13¹⁶. If in the latter case we have *mountains of twilight*, in the former we probably have *mountains of the (completed) half* = *mountains of noon day* = *mountains at noon time*. The lover is besought not to hurry away, but to linger motionless like the hart upon the mountains in the noonday heat.

Finally, if our conclusions have been correct, we have one important datum toward determining the site of Mahanaim. We know for a certainty that it was a half-day's journey from the Jordan. If Joab took about twelve hours to journey from נִבְעַת אֲמָה, in the מִדְבָּר facing Gibeon, to Hebron, a distance of some twenty-five to thirty miles, Mahanaim was situated some twelve to fifteen miles on the other side of Jordan, probably in a north-easterly direction from the ford commonly crossed by those journeying thither. The ruins of *Mahne*, as far as I can judge of their location from Brünnow's map,* would comport very well with this conclusion; for, if Abner travelled all night up the Arabah before crossing the Jordan, Mahanaim certainly lay north of the Jabbok.†

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* In Brünnow and Domascewaki, *Die Provincia Arabia*.

† Cf. Gn. 32³. 2.

III

EXEGETICAL NOTES ON JEREMIAH

BY JULIUS A. BEWER

1. *The Date of the Vision of the Almond Tree*, 1^{11. 12}

THE genuineness of chap. 1, which was denied by Duhm, has been so successfully defended by Stade and Cornill that it need not again be proved. Its authenticity may therefore be assumed without further argument. In regard, however, to the date of vv. ^{11. 12} a reconsideration appears to the present writer to be in order.

The verses are usually taken together with the immediately preceding inaugural vision and with the following vision of the boiling caldron and dated from the same time. Yet it is clear, as soon as the attempt is made to interpret them psychologically, that they cannot come from the same time as vv. ^{4 ff.} or vv. ^{13 ff.}, for they presuppose a period of doubt and disappointment. The essential point in the vision is that Yahweh is waking, watching to fulfil his word, though all appearances may be against it. Was there any reason why Jeremiah should doubt this at the very outset? Did he need this kind of encouragement then? Hardly! The kind of doubt and scruple he really had at that time is described in v. ⁶. Moreover, what is the content of the word that Yahweh is to fulfil? How could Jeremiah know it? So far it had not yet been given, up to this time he had received nothing more than vv. ^{5-9 (10)}! Must we suppose that he divined it all? But even if he did divine it, what reason can be given why he should need this kind of a message at this time? It was surely not customary for prophets to doubt that Yahweh would carry out his word, at the beginning of their prophetic career!

No, the vision presupposes a time of disappointment and must be the result of great and bitter soul-struggles. Jeremiah had proclaimed Yahweh's word for some time, but it had not come to pass. The Scythian storm had passed by without harming Jerusalem. Things had settled down quietly; there seemed to be no reason for Jeremiah's dark prophecies. He appears discredited, and yet he knows himself to be a true prophet of Yahweh. He cannot doubt the reality and genuineness of his prophetic experiences. But how can it be that Yahweh's predictions remain unfulfilled? The problem grows ever darker, the stress ever greater, until at last he suddenly sees the solution clearly in his soul in an ever memorable vision: Yahweh had not forgotten his word, he was waking, watching to fulfil his purpose.

Now, is it possible to suggest when Jeremiah had this vision? Erbt,* who is the only one besides the present writer† to perceive that vv. ^{11, 12} presuppose a period of activity on the part of the prophet, places them "perhaps shortly before Josiah's reformation." To the present writer the year 605 B.C. seems the most probable date for such an experience. Not indeed for the time of doubt but for the time of vision. We know how memorable that year was for Jeremiah. It was then that he felt constrained to write down his oracles. In chap. 36 we have Baruch's report of it. Here in the narrative of this vision, ^{11, 12}, Jeremiah himself tells us of the underlying spiritual experience that made him so certain that the long proclaimed word of Yahweh whose fulfilment men had doubted and denied was yet to be fulfilled. Yahweh was watching after all. As the almond tree wakes when other trees are still asleep in their deep winter's sleep, so Yahweh was waking when others could not discern the great movements of history, watching to fulfil his word. The Scythian danger may have passed by without doing any harm: Yahweh's word is nevertheless true, and will certainly be fulfilled. The enemy from the north is coming: the Babylonian King Nebuchadrezzar!

It is clear now why Jeremiah put this little section before vv. ^{13 ff.} in which he narrates the vision that announces the coming

* *Jeremia und seine Zeit. Die Geschichte der letzten fünfzig Jahre des vor-exilischen Juda*, 1902. The Preface is dated September 25th.

† Cf. *A. J. Th.*, July, 1902, p. 516.

of the enemy from the north. This first chapter is an *apologia pro prophetia sua* intended to present the credentials of his prophethood, and so when he dictated in 605 B.C. the story of his divine call and commission, he wrote directly after the inaugural vision this later vision, in order to make it quite clear that he was sure that Yahweh's word would be fulfilled. The King and princes and people may not yet see it, Jeremiah knows that Yahweh is watching over his word. And he wrote it before the vision of the announcement of the northern enemy, in order to anticipate the objection that the Scythians had, after all, not come. The enemy from the north is coming, not the Scythian, indeed, but the Chaldean army. Thus the insertion here at this point is justified, and goes back to Jeremiah himself.* Cornill is quite right when he says that there exists in any case an inner connection between Jeremiah's call and the two following visions. But as regards the first, it is not a connection in time but in inner experience.

2. Interpretation and Date of 2¹⁴⁻¹⁸. 26. 27

The problems connected with Je. 2¹⁴⁻¹⁸ are well known. But though much thought has been spent on the interpretation of this most difficult passage, no altogether satisfactory solution has been arrived at.

One point, however, seems to be reasonably well established. It was first seen by Ewald that vv. 14-17 do not originally belong to the present context, which they interrupt. With this point we may start. The whole chapter deals with the religious apostasy of the people, except in vv. 14-18 and in vv. 26. 27, for in these verses Israelitish politics are treated. Elsewhere the lovers who are causing the people to forsake Yahweh are the local deities, in these latter verses the lovers are the nations on the banks of the Euphrates and of the Nile. In subject-matter therefore vv. 14-18 and vv. 26. 27 belong together and they must originally have stood together, so that besides vv. 14-17 (Ewald, Cornill) also vv. 18. 26. 27 are not original in their present connection. They owe their

* Erbt believes its insertion here was due to an editor who placed the two visions, vv. 11. 12 and vv. 13. 14, together because they have the same literary form "What seest thou?" (*Stichwort* theory).

present position to a redactor, but not their composition, for they are doubtless of Jeremian authorship. As Hosea and Isaiah before, so Jeremiah saw in foreign alliances a defection from Yahweh.

It is apparent that vv. ²⁶. ²⁷ do not continue the immediately preceding verses, for they treat of something different. It is equally apparent that v. ¹⁸ belongs with vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁷, however difficult and enigmatical the passage may seem to become by this connection. Indeed, here is the *cruz interpretum*. Yet if it is recognized that vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁸ and vv. ²⁶. ²⁷ belong together and that vv. ²⁶. ²⁷ continue the thought of vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁸, the difficulties will to a large extent, if not altogether, disappear. This can best be demonstrated by reproducing the original passage and elucidating it by a brief paraphrase.

¹⁴ Is Israel a servant? is he a home-born (slave)?
Why then is he become a prey?

¹⁵ Against him the young lions roared,*
they uttered their voice;
And they made his land a desolation,†
without inhabitant.

¹⁶ The children also of Noph and Tahpanhes
shaved off ‡ the crown of thy head.

¹⁷ Has † not procured this to thee
thy forsaking of Yahweh thy God?

¹⁸ And now, §—what is the use of going to Egypt
to drink the waters of the Shihor?
Or what is the use of going to Assyria
to drink the waters of the River?

²⁶ How exceedingly easy it is for thee
to change thy way!
Thou shalt be put to shame by Egypt also,
as thou wast put to shame by Assyria.

* The perfect is to be read here.

† The Hebrew text adds here "his cities are burnt up." Duhm places this at the end of v. 14.

‡ The perfect is to be restored here also.

§ Not temporal but logical use of "and now," cf. Ps. 2¹⁰.

²⁷ Thou shalt go forth from him also,
 with thy hands upon thy head:
 For Yahweh has rejected thy confidences
 and thou shalt not prosper in them.

Is not Israel Yahweh's son? Of course he is! How is it then possible that he should be in slavery? (v. ¹⁴). And yet it is so. The Assyrians attacked him and devastated his land (v. ¹⁵). And the Egyptians have subjected him also (v. ¹⁶).^{*} Do you not know that these ignominious experiences were due to your defection from Yahweh (v. ¹⁷)? Since this is so, what is or has been the use of your political policy of turning to Egypt or to Assyria for help (v. ¹⁸)? Ha! how vacillating that policy of yours is! How quickly and easily you change it! Only a little while ago you trusted in Assyria to help you (against Egypt). The folly of it! And now you trust in Egypt to help you (against Babylonia)—with any better result, do you think? No, you will see, your present alliance with Egypt will end in humiliation and despair just as your friendship with Assyria did before. They cannot help you, because Yahweh has rejected them (vv. ²⁶, ²⁷).

There is nothing forced in this interpretation. Everything has its full and natural significance. Vv. ¹⁴, ¹⁵ refer to the Assyrians, as is generally recognized. V. ¹⁶ refers to the defeat of Josiah by Pharaoh Necho at Megiddo in 608 B.C., and is a past experience just as v. ¹⁵, not a present or future. V. ¹⁸ is general; it speaks of the whole political policy of the nation, not of a particular episode. And vv. ²⁶, ²⁷ draw the conclusion. Bitterly Jeremiah ridicules their quick and easy changing from one to the other of the great powers. Before it was Assyria, just now it is Egypt. But soon they will learn by bitter experience the folly of relying on human powers.

The date of the verses is plainly indicated by this. It is the time of alliance with Egypt for the final rebellion against Babylon which ended in Jerusalem's destruction in 586 B.C.

The reason why the redactor connected these verses with chap. 2 appears to be that to him the two sets of lovers, the one the nature gods, the other the Assyrian and Egyptian empires, seemed to belong together.

^{*} Shaving off the crown of the head was a sign of slavery.

How vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁸ and vv. ^{36, 37} became separated we cannot tell. Perhaps accidentally by being written in the space between the columns, vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁸ in one row, vv. ^{36, 37} in the following.*

3. *The Two Lamentations in 9¹⁶⁻²³*

These verses contain not only one but two lamentations. They were originally not connected but independent of each other, and even seem to come from different periods in Jeremiah's ministry. The first section, vv. ¹⁶⁻¹⁸ (E. V. vv. ¹⁷⁻¹⁹), is not an introduction to the second, vv. ¹⁹⁻²¹ (E. V. vv. ²⁰⁻²²), as is usually thought, but an independent piece, complete in itself. Vv. ¹⁹⁻²¹ (E. V. vv. ²⁰⁻²²) is a different piece, also independent and complete in itself.

In vv. ¹⁶⁻¹⁸ Jeremiah summons the professional mourning women to come and sing a moving dirge. Let them hasten and sing! In his imagination he sees them coming, and so he calls out: "Hark,† wailing is heard out of Zion!" Then follows directly the song of the women:

"How are we spoiled! we are put greatly to shame!—
for we have forsaken the land,
for we are flung out of our dwellings!‡

Here the song ends. Dirges are usually brief.

In the following verse something new begins. It is not connected with the preceding, though an editor joined both together by "for" which must be omitted with Duhamel and Giesebrecht. Jeremiah calls the Jewish women and teaches them a lamentation, which they in turn are to teach their daughters, so that all Jewish women may know how to sing it. It is not the profes-

* This was written before the writer knew that Erbt also separates vv. ^{14, 18} and vv. ^{36, 37} from their present context and that he also connects vv. ^{36, 37} with v. ¹⁴. But Erbt makes two oracles of them, vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁸, omitting v. ¹⁷ as secondary, and vv. ^{19, 36, 37}. He tries thus to evade the difficulty of v. ¹⁸ in connection with v. ¹⁶ by regarding v. ¹⁸ as belonging to a different piece. His dating no less than his interpretation differs from the one given above. But the point that vv. ^{36, 37} are connected with v. ¹⁸ reached independently by both of us heightens its probability.

† Omit יָהּ at the beginning of v. ¹⁸. Rothstein omits הָיָה for metrical reasons.

‡ M. T. has "for they have flung down our dwellings." Better read with Cornill, *SBOT*, הָשַׁלְנוּ מִבְּנוֹתֵינוּ, cf. 6.

sional mourners who are called and instructed here, but the women in general.* After this brief introduction (v. ¹⁹, E. V. v. ²⁰) Jeremiah sings to them that mournful song of awesome beauty, the song of the harvester Death, vv. ²⁰. ²¹ (E. V. vv. ²¹. ²²).

It is only when it is realized that there are two independent pieces, vv. ¹⁶⁻¹⁸ and vv. ¹⁹⁻²¹, that the whole passage can be interpreted easily and naturally. Cornill has felt the difficulty of the usual interpretation, for to his mind "this נָחַי [in v. ¹⁸] weakens, yea destroys even, the impression of the wonderful קִינָה vv. ²⁰. ²¹." And so he takes the radical step of omitting v. ¹⁸ (E. V. v. ¹⁹) as secondary. But surely this is going too far. Giesebrecht tries to obviate the difficulty by transposing v. ¹⁹. He clearly sees that this extra introduction coming in between the two parts of the one lamentation which he assumes is awkward and impossible. Rothstein, in the third edition of Kau., *Heilige Schrift des A. T.*, 1910, is the only one who seems to have seen the way of the true solution, for he says concerning vv. ²⁰. ²¹, "perhaps they give a separate little dirge." But he does not follow out his suggestion.

One other point may be noticed. The situation of these two lamentations does not appear to be the same. At first it may seem as if it were, and that was evidently the reason why the editor joined them together. In reality the first anticipates—not presupposes, since both are prophetic—the fall and ruin of Jerusalem, and also the exile, "for we have forsaken the land."† This excludes the Scythian period and shows that it belongs to the Babylonian, though precisely at what particular date it is to be placed we cannot tell. The second lamentation, on the

* Duhm has noticed this, without however perceiving its full significance. The other commentators think that the professional mourning women are still meant.

† Duhm omits this clause somewhat arbitrarily as a later addition. He says: "The sentence, *for we have forsaken the land*, is an uncommonly stupid insertion; he who has forsaken can no longer lament in Zion; our present or future would surely not have been expressed by the perfect. And anyhow one does not call mourning women when one goes into exile." But the song is, of course, prophetic and the sentence, *Hark, wailing is heard out of Zion!* does not belong to the lamentation itself, but is introductory to it. The mourning women are singing now. Jeremiah hears them singing in Zion where his imagination places them. He calls attention to their song which speaks of what the fate of the Judeans will soon be.

other hand, would fit the Scythian period very well, though it must be admitted that there is nothing in it that would militate against the Babylonian period. But even if both come from the same time—the date is not a very important point in our argument—we may and must insist that they are two different lamentations.

4. *The Parable of the Rotten Girdle*, 13¹⁻¹¹

The story is told in such a way that we think at once of it as a description of an actual event. But it is very doubtful whether any of his hearers took Jeremiah literally. The difference between our Western mind and the picture-loving Eastern mind must not be overlooked so as to deny the parabolic character of the story. The arguments against the interpretation which takes it as the story of an actual double journey to the Euphrates are, to the mind of the present writer, convincing.

The main point of the parable is that the girdle was corrupted by the influence of the Euphrates. Jeremiah desired to illustrate the corrupting effects of the power of the Euphrates valley on Judah. It is evident that it is not the Babylonian exile which is referred to here, but the moral and religious influences which had such a debasing effect on Judah.

Cornill has rightly seen all this, but has then drawn the conclusion that the interpretation which is appended in vv. 8-11 is not genuine because it misunderstands the parable of vv. 1-7. There is an element of truth in Cornill's argument. But the solution of the difficulty may be attempted in another, less radical, manner. It will probably be admitted that after reading vv. 1-7 we expect an interpretation of the parable by the prophet himself. The explanation which is given in vv. 8-11 does indeed, as Cornill rightly says, not bring out the essential point of the symbolism correctly. But this can be remedied by a small textual emendation which makes vv. 9, 10 read as follows: "After this manner *have* the excellence of Judah and the excellence of Jerusalem *become marred* * and have become † as this girdle which is profitable for

* Read לְפָסֶהּ for לְפָסֶהּ. אִם is due to dittography and was then repeated before the second לְפָסֶהּ to bring it into conformity with the first.

† Punctuate וְיָדִי for וְיָדִי.

nothing." V. ^{10a} from "this evil people" to "worship them" is an editorial expansion* which explains not incorrectly the meaning of the corruption. The Greek Version did not yet have the clause "that walk in the stubbornness of their heart."

If this suggestion is adopted, we can retain with good conscience not only vv. ¹⁻⁷ as Jeremiah—thanks to Erbt's and Cornill's valiant defense—but also vv. ⁸⁻¹¹, which Cornill feels compelled to give up as secondary. And it will be noticed that vv. ¹² ² follow with much appropriateness and force, bringing out the thought of the punishment that was so sure to come as the result of this corruption.

5. *The Lesson from the Potter*, 18¹⁻¹²

The lesson which Jeremiah learned from the potter is this: As a potter who moulds and fashions the clay into a vessel on the wheel does not throw the clay away when the vessel for some reason or other is marred, but tries again to mould and fashion it until it becomes a vessel such as he wants, so does Yahweh deal with his people Israel. Israel has indeed thwarted Yahweh's plan and has become spoiled, but Yahweh does not therefore throw it away as utterly useless, but takes it again and tries to mould and fashion it once more, according to his plan.—It is not the sovereignty of the creator and ruler of the world which is illustrated by the work of the potter, but the persistency of his purpose. The potter may be unsuccessful for a while, but he does not give up his endeavor. He tries again until his purpose is accomplished.

It is impossible to miss this point, when one reads only vv. ¹⁻⁶. And it is a very beautiful truth indeed. But unfortunately, vv. ⁷⁻¹² which immediately follow are usually taken as the interpretation and application of vv. ¹⁻⁶ ⁽⁶⁾, and thus one of the finest passages of Jeremiah has usually been misinterpreted. For vv. ⁷⁻¹² are not Jeremiah's interpretation of vv. ¹⁻⁶, they speak of something entirely different, their theme is the moral condition of every prediction, and they do not belong to the story of the potter's vessel at all. If they did not happen to stand directly after vv. ¹⁻⁶ nobody would ever have thought of regarding them

* So also Erbt.

as the explanation of the story. The editor put them there probably because they have the element of hopefulness in common with vv. ¹⁻⁶. Originally they had no connection whatever.

Cornill, who of modern writers has brought out best the real meaning of the lesson, unfortunately takes vv. ⁷⁻¹² as the intended explanation, but is consistent enough to declare that this explanation misses the essential meaning of vv. ¹⁻⁴, and so rejects them as well as vv. ⁵⁻⁶ as secondary. But he has to admit that there is no other reason for regarding them as secondary but that they interpret vv. ¹⁻⁴ wrongly.* When it is once seen that vv. ¹⁻⁶ and vv. ⁷⁻¹² are independent of one another, there is no reason for rejecting either vv. ¹⁻⁶ or vv. ⁷⁻¹² †, or both, as Duhm does, as non-Jeremian.

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* Cornill's treatment of this passage is similar to that of 11¹ 2.

† Erbt regards vv. ¹⁻⁶ as genuine but interprets them as referring to Israel's rejection by Yahweh. Vv. ⁷⁻¹² he assigns to the redactor.

IV

THE RETURN OF THE JEWS UNDER CYRUS

BY EDWARD L. CURTIS

THE true course of events, when data concerning the past are both meagre and unreliable, is very difficult to determine. This is the situation in regard to the question of the return of the Jews under Cyrus. This return has usually been received as an unquestioned fact of history. The first doubts of an impressive character cast upon the event were those of Kusters.* He argued very strongly, especially from the silence of the books of Haggai and Zechariah, that there was no such return of the Jews. But his conclusion has met with no general acceptance. Wellhausen, Edward Meyer, George Adam Smith, not to mention others, have been unconvinced, and have written strongly in favor of the return.† But now more recently Prof. C. C. Torrey has not only come forward maintaining the position of Kusters, but also proposes a far more radical reconstruction of Jewish history. He says: "There was no return of the exiles, no scribe potentate Ezra, no wholesale expulsion of Gentile wives and children," and maintains that the Jewish community in the

* *Het Herstel van Israel in het Perzische Tijdvak*. 1894. Translated by Basedow, *Die Wiederherstellung Israels in der Persischen Periode*. 1895.

† Wellhausen, *Die Rückkehr der Juden aus dem Babylonischen Exil*, in *Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*. 1895. Meyer, *Die Entstehung des Judenthums*. 1896. G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, ii, 1898, chap. xv. Bertholet, *Kurzer Hand Commentar* (Mart.), *Die Bücher Esra und Nehemia*. 1902. Siegfried, *Handkommentar* (Nowack), *Die Bücher Esra-Nehemiah*. 1902. Guthe, *Israel, Encyclopedia Biblica*. 1901. Driver, *Century Bible*, Haggai, 1906, and scholars generally. H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History*, 1903, and Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, 1910, reject the return.

Persian period was no narrow and legalistic one, but endowed with the spirit of the earlier prophets, their religious life being a continual development of that of the monarchy.*

The account of the return of the Jews under Cyrus is given only in the combined books of Ezra and Nehemiah. In the latter it is only mentioned incidentally (Ne. 7^{6 f.}), while in the former (chapters 1-6) the subject is treated somewhat in detail: We have the decree of Cyrus whereby the movement was inaugurated, the list of the restored furniture of the Temple, the list of the people who returned, and an account of the setting up of the altar at Jerusalem, of the laying the foundation of the Temple, and of the frustration of the work of the building through the opposition of the people of the land until under the impulse of the prophets Haggai and Zechariah the work was renewed and in spite of renewed opposition, under royal patronage caused by the discovery of a decree of Cyrus, the Temple was finally completed in the sixth year of the reign of Darius.

The appearance of this narrative with all these details in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah compels at once careful scrutiny, because these books are a composition of the Chronicler, and the Chronicler, judged from the Books of Chronicles, is a thoroughly untrustworthy historian. Indeed, he is scarcely worthy of being called a historian, because while making use of ancient narratives he did not hesitate to modify them, and he drew upon his own imagination very largely for his pictures of the past. The Books of Chronicles, taken as a whole, are an ecclesiastical romance. Thus the Chronicler glorified David's career by creating for him at Ziglag an army of most surprising warriors, and making him the provider of an immense mass of costly material for the building of Solomon's Temple, and the organizer of the personnel of its service. The Chronicler fabricated numbers and lists of names, letters and speeches. His narratives, when especially concerned with the worship of Yahweh, are always open to suspicion, and for acceptance need the confirmation of other testimony. From this point of view, then, the record of the return of the Jews must be examined.†

* *Op. cit.*, pp. ix, 311 ff.

† For the Chronicler as a writer of history see *International Critical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles*, pp. 7 ff.

The account opens with the decree of Cyrus in which he is called the king of Persia (Ezr. 1²⁻⁴), but in the authentic decrees of Cyrus the term king of Persia is not used *; and there is also no reason to believe that Cyrus ever revered Yahweh after the words of this decree, saying: "All the kingdoms of the earth hath Yahweh the God of Heaven given me." Cyrus might, however, have had an interest in the rebuilding of the Temple. According to his inscriptions he took an interest in restoring heathen deities.† But this decree is clearly the composition of the Chronicler.‡

The list of gifts of Cyrus which follows (Ezr. 1⁷⁻¹¹) likewise bears no marks of historicity. Such an enumeration, "thirty platters of gold, a thousand platters of silver, nine and twenty knives, etc.," is characteristic of Old Testament legend. An interesting parallel may be seen in the offerings for the tabernacle by the princes of Israel in Nu. 7. This list, then, has every mark of the Chronicler's imagination.

Next in the narrative is the roll of persons and families who are said to have returned with Zerubbabel (Ezr. 2). This list, if genuine, would confirm the return. It appears also in Ne. 7^{7 ff.}, where it is said to have been found by Nehemiah when he was searching for the genealogies of the people. Its connection there with the memoirs of Nehemiah (Ne. 1-6) suggests authenticity. In favor of this also may be mentioned the enumeration of beasts of burden (Ezr. 2^{66 f.}), and the disallowment of the claim of Hakkoz for the priesthood (Ezr. 2^{61 f.}); a claim apparently later recognized (Ne. 3^{4. 21}). On the other hand it bears far more the stamp of a list of settlers in the land than of immigrants entering. The places mentioned are clearly those of the Jewish province. Some of the persons or families mentioned seem to have Persian names, which only could have been acquired later.§ One family is expressly called the house of Jeshua (Ezr. 2³⁶), and since Jeshua flourished in the reign of Darius Hystaspis, his house, numbering nine hundred and seventy-three, must have belonged

* Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, New York, 1908, p. 546.

† Bertholet, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

‡ As far as I am aware this is disputed by no one.

§ Marquart, *Fundamente israelitischer und jüdischer Geschichte*, p. 35. Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*, Vierte Ausgabe, p. 167.

to a later period. This list, then, is one in all probability of the period of Nehemiah, taken from his memoirs, and in his memoirs labelled by the Chronicler as a list of the returning exiles, and glossed with an enumeration of beasts of burden. Such an appropriation by the Chronicler would not have been strange. In his history of David he constructed monthly captains of David's army out of David's mighty men recorded in the Books of Samuel (I Ch. 27² ff.). Hence the Chronicler, finding this list at hand, might readily have used it for a roll of the returned. No proper evidence then can be drawn from this list for the return under Cyrus.*

The narrative of the laying of the foundation of the Temple in the second year of the return, *i. e.*, the third year of Cyrus (Ezr. 3), is wholly from the pen of the Chronicler, and may well in all its detail, be a product of his imagination; a supposition which is confirmed by the testimony of the books of Haggai and Zechariah, for according to them, the founding of the second Temple took place in the reign of Darius (Hag. 1¹⁴ ff., 2¹⁸, Zec. 4⁹).

The episode of the opposition to the work of rebuilding the Temple, with the letter of complaint and the decree which caused its cessation, together with the story of its renewal, under the prophets Haggai and Zechariah, and of the renewed opposition with another letter of complaint, resulting in the discovery of the decree of Cyrus, and thus leading to a decree by Darius favoring the building of the Temple, which is said to have been completed in the sixth year of his reign, is written, with the exception of the introductory verses, in Aramaic (Ezr. 4-6¹⁸), and this Aramaic material, especially in the letters and decrees, is universally recognized as taken by the Chronicler from some source. These letters and decrees, if genuine, would confirm in large measure the

* The Chronicler may indeed have fabricated this list. This would be in line with artificial enumerations of Nu. 2²⁶. The twelve leaders (Ezr. 2², Ne. 3⁷), the combination of names of men and of places, and the introduction of priests, Levites, singers, and gatekeepers all suggest the composition of the Chronicler. The text also abounds with many of his expressions. Hence it has been inferred that "we have here (and in Ne. 11, which is the immediate and necessary sequel) tables compiled by the Chronicler according to his usual purpose and method, with the aim of giving the exact statistical basis of the restored community." Torrey, *The Composition and Historical Value of Ezra and Nehemiah*, pp. 39-42.

story of the return. But, whether they are genuine or not, in this connection is given a glaring illustration of the Chronicler's utter ignorance or unconcern of the actual course of events of which he is treating. Having written that the Jews returned and laid the foundation of the Temple in the reign of Cyrus, he speaks of the opposition to them continuing during all the days of Cyrus even until the reign of Darius, and of an accusation written in the reign of Xerxes, and then again in the reign of Artaxerxes (Ezr. 4th). He thus confused Darius I., Hystaspis, in whose reign the second Temple was built with Darius II., Nothus, of a century later, whose predecessors were Xerxes and Artaxerxes.

The authenticity of these letters and decrees has been especially defended by the historian Eduard Meyer, and through the weight of his authority has been widely accepted.* His argument is derived from internal evidence, but is far from convincing. The language, he thinks, from the occurrence of Persian words, points to an original Persian document here rendered into Aramaic, but as Wellhausen has well pointed out, in this manner one could prove that half of Daniel, and a great part of the Syrian literature, were originally written in Persian.†

A striking evidence for genuineness in the decree of Cyrus, Meyer finds in the fact that the decree is said to have been discovered in Ecbatana instead of Babylon (Ezr. 6th). A fabricator he thinks would surely have placed it in the latter city. But why so? A fabricator might well have imagined the roll in Ecbatana as well as in Babylon. If in Babylon, why so easily forgotten?

"If fabricated, the fabrication," says Meyer, "is wonderfully skilful and entirely different from the patent inventions of the Chronicler and like-minded writers." The Chronicler's inventions are often patent, but yet often not more seemingly so than these letters. The correspondence between Hiram and Solomon, derived, it is true, in part from I. Kings, is well done (II. Chr. 2nd-16th). But we are not confined to the Books of Chronicles for such inventions; they appear in other Jewish literature—the Books of Maccabees and the works of Josephus. And, moreover, Meyer's skilful fabrication does not appear in these letters and decrees as they now stand. He only finds it by removing the plain marks

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-70.

† *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1897, p. 90.

of fabrication. He says they have been tampered with and are no longer in their original form. The date, for example, is lacking in the letter of Darius. "It is called 'a roll in which was written.'" "It may," says Meyer, "have been more or less abbreviated." Meyer brackets 6^{12a}, saying "those words are of a later hand of Jewish zeal." (Why not then a mark of the entire decree coming from such a source?) And the letter written for Ezra (Ezr. 7¹²⁻²⁶), which he also considers authentic, is of such Jewish coloring that Meyer is forced to the explanation that Ezra and his friends prepared the original draft for the king.* These concessions greatly weaken his arguments for authenticity.

Meyer also says he cannot comprehend for what purpose any one would take the trouble to fabricate such documents.† But the purpose is close at hand—to teach a lesson of providential care, and to magnify the Jews. This appears in the dramatic force and unity of the letters and decrees. A letter of complaint is written against the Jews, with a call for a search of royal records to determine whether the city had not been rebellious, and therefore its rebuilding should cease. Such search is made, such records are found, and the rebuilding is prohibited. This is the first act. The adversaries, or the wicked, triumph (Ezr. 4).

Then comes the second act when, under the inspiration of the prophets, the work is renewed, and a second letter of complaint is written, with another call for search of records to determine whether Cyrus had ever decreed the rebuilding of the Temple. This search is made and such a decree is found, and as a result great favor, by royal decree, is shown to the Jews, while their adversaries are completely discomfited and commanded even to assist them (Ezr. 5-6¹⁶). Thus the righteous triumphed. This story with its letters and royal decrees and climax resembles those of Esther and Daniel, and suggests a similar origin.‡ And finally, through the recently discovered Assuan-Elephantine

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 49, 51, 65.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

‡ Dramatic unity, however, is not found in the actual events if the documents are genuine, because in that case the first letter, since addressed to Artaxerxes, referred not at all to the building of the Temple, but to an assumed attempt to rebuild the walls one hundred years later, and has its present position and reference through the misunderstanding of the Chronicler. In favor of this interpretation is the fact that the Temple is not specifically mentioned in the first correspondence (Ezr. 4¹¹⁻²²) but only the city and its walls.

papyri linguistic evidence seems to be at hand proving conclusively that this Aramaic section was written near the period of the Chronicler.* The genuineness then of these letters and decrees is certainly so doubtful that they have little or no place as evidence for the return of the Jews under Cyrus.

We turn now from the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, whose testimony is so unsatisfactory, to those of Haggai and Zechariah, written some twenty years after the beginning of the reign of Cyrus. These speak clearly of the building of the Temple under Jeshua and Zerubbabel in the reign of Darius, and thus confirm the Chronicler's statement of that event (Ezr. 1^{1f.}, 6⁴; indeed probably from these books the Chronicler or his Aramaic source obtained the information), but in no other particular do they confirm the Chronicler's story. The books are entirely silent concerning any return some seventeen years or more previous. The people are addressed, not as though they had lately entered the land, but as though they were a remnant left in the land. They are called "the remnant of the people," "the people of the land." This is in sharp contrast to the language of Ezra and Nehemiah, where the community who built the Temple are called "the children of the captivity," and are put in contrast to "the people of the land." Not a word also is said of any previous laying of the corner-stone of the Temple, or of any opposition which hindered its construction, or of any royal patronage favoring the work. This silence is certainly very remarkable if these events happened.

The story of the return of the Jews under Cyrus, then, may be pure fiction; a tale which early grew out of the feeling of gratitude for Cyrus's conquest of Babylon, and was especially provoked by the allusions in II. Isaiah to Cyrus as a Messiah and builder of the city (Is. 44²⁸, 45¹⁻¹²). The form of the story, remembering that it was written two centuries after the events which it describes, when there was bitter hostility between the Jews and Samaritans, has a ready explanation. The one fixed fact of history incorporated into it, drawn from the Books of Haggai and Zechariah, is the building of the Temple in the reign of Darius. This Darius, as already mentioned, was held to have been Darius II., Nothus, who reigned more than a century after

* Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, pp. 161 ff.

Cyrus.* Hence if the Jews started the Temple, as in the Chronicler's conception they surely would have, immediately on their return, how did it happen that the building was so long delayed? The answer is at hand. It was through the hostility of the Samaritans. Thus the tale took its appropriate dramatic form.

Yet in spite of all these facts certain things suggest the reality of a return. The preservation of prophecies mentioned concerning Cyrus, suggest that they had been fulfilled in some such way.† The poverty-stricken remnant left in the land would seem to require an impulse from without for the revival of interest in the Temple culminating in the movement inaugurated by Haggai and Zechariah.‡ The return need not have been mentioned in the short discourses of those prophets. The spirituality of their appeal may have caused silence in reference to royal patronage and hostile efforts.§ What also was more inevitable than a return if, according to the Books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the choicest portion of Israel was in captivity? Could the men whose passion for Jerusalem was that of Ps. 137 have been restrained from returning to Jerusalem? Cyrus, from all that is known of Persian policy, would not only have permitted, but probably have favored, such a return. Thus it is not impossible that there was some sort of a return of the Jews under Cyrus, but the evidence for it is very slight, and we have no reason to believe that the Chronicler's account is anything else than imaginary.

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL,
July 26, 1910.

* Darius I. Hystaspis probably had been confused with or transformed into Darius the Mede, mentioned in Daniel and placed before Cyrus.

† Kuenen.

‡ Wellhausen.

§ George Adam Smith.

V

THE SONS OF KORAH

BY JOHN P. PETERS

IN dedicating this brief Biblical essay to him who has reached the Biblical age, I have taken as my theme a topic suggested by the study of a book on which he has been the last great commentator, the Book of Psalms.

The Psalter of the sons of Korah is "on the whole the choicest collection in the Psalter from a literary point of view." * Who are the sons of Korah?

According to the genealogy of the Priest Code,† Korah was a descendant (grandson) of Kohath. According to this genealogy, further, while Kohath was the second son of Levi (Gershon or Gershom being the eldest son), yet the Kohathites were the important *gens* of the Levites, to which both Moses and Aaron, and consequently the priesthoods of both the temple of Dan and the temple at Jerusalem, belonged. It is to be noted, further, that in the genealogy Korah is the father of Abiasaph, *i. e.*, the great ancestor of Asaph. If this Asaph is to be connected with the singing guild of Asaph, as is, I think, intended, the Korahites would then be the ancestors or prototypes of the Asaphites.

Turning now to the later lists of Chronicles, we find first in the brief general list of the priestly genealogy (I Ch. 5²⁷ ff.) the Kohathites recorded as the gens from which Moses and Aaron, and through the latter the Zadokite priesthood of the Jerusalem temple from Solomon on, were descended. In the more detailed list (I Ch. 6^{1ff.}) Samuel the prophet appears as a Kohathite. In the list of the singers, contained in the same chapter (v. 31 ff.), where the object is to show that all the original Levitical gentes

* Briggs, *The Book of Psalms*, p. lxvi.

† Ex. 6¹⁶ ff. Also in the second numbering, Num. 26⁵⁷ ff.

were represented in the service of the Temple, Heman, a descendant, through Samuel, Elkanah and Abiasaph, of Korah, represents the Kohathites; Asaph the Gershonites; and Ethan * the gens of Merari. Similarly in I Ch. 26¹⁻¹⁰, supposed to represent the organization of the Temple service in David's time, the three gentes are represented as guardians of different parts of the Temple, the Korahites (Kohathites) and the sons of Merari being doorkeepers, and the Gershonites in charge of the treasury. (But here there is a curious confusion in that Korah is the son of Asaph, and Gershom the son of Moses.) With this list agrees the list of the first inhabitants, in I Ch. 9, in so far that the Korahites (v. 19) are keepers of the gates of the tabernacle, their fathers having been keepers of the entry of the camp. But in this list the Korahites (v. 23) are also included among the singers. In I Ch. 16, Asaph is prominent among the musicians, when David brings in the Ark, and the leader in the song then sung (v. 7). But in II Ch. 20¹⁹, when the good Jehoshaphat organizes his army on a Levitical basis, it is the Korahites, of the Kohathites, who are the singers, singing the self-same thing (v. 21).

Turning to what may be regarded as more nearly contemporaneous documents, representing the organization of the second temple, the identical lists in Ezra (2⁴¹) and Nehemiah (7⁴⁴) of those who returned with Zerubbabel, the singers (128 or 148 in number) were sons of Asaph, and there are no Korahites at all.

Through the more or less conflicting statements of these lists it is apparent that in the later period the name of Asaph was particularly connected with the temple music, but that the tradition persisted of an earlier Korahitic guild of singers, antedating Asaph, and from whom Asaph was in fact descended, belonging to the great Kohathite gens of the Levites.

The Korahites are further mentioned in the Priest Code in two curious stories, now combined with one another, and with the story of Dathan and Abiram the Reubenites, contained in the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters of Numbers. According to

* An interesting comment on this is the headings of Psalms 88 and 89, in which these Psalms are ascribed respectively to Heman and to Ethan the Ezrahites. With this cf. I K. 5¹¹, and II Ch. 2⁶, from which it would appear that Heman and Ethan are the names of traditional wise men, afterwards incorporated in the genealogies of Chronicles. Elsewhere Ezrahite signifies aboriginal, and the title Ezrahite is therefore a designation of antiquity.

one of these stories, which is regarded as belonging to the original Priest Code, the Ḵorahites rebel against the whole system of Levitical caste; * according to the other, which belongs to the later additions to the Priest Code,† they rebel against the special privileges of the Zadokite or Aaronic priesthood, claiming equal privileges for Levite with Aaronite. For this they are consumed with fire. But that this destruction by fire is theoretical, not actual, is stated later in the same book.‡ The obvious connection of these two stories is (a) with the statement (1 K. 12³¹) that Jeroboam "made priests from the whole of the people which were not of the sons of Levi"; and (b) with the efforts of the reformers of Josiah's time to associate the Levites of the high places with the priesthood of the Jerusalem temple on an equal footing. These two stories, later combined in one, represent two moments in the struggle of the priesthood of the Jerusalem temple to assert and maintain its claim to exclusive privilege. They are the anathema directed primarily against the priests of the rival temples of Bethel and Dan, and secondly against the Levites of the high places, and cast in the form of a story of a rebellion against Moses and Aaron, and a condign and terrible punishment from God therefor.

But one naturally asks: Why should the Ḵorahites be singled out from all the other Levites as the forefront of the offence?

We have in the Psalter a collection of Psalms ascribed to the Sons of Ḵorah, to which reference has already been made, consisting of Psalms 42-49, and a supplementary collection, of somewhat later origin, and differing from the former in several important particulars, consisting of Psalms 84-89. Indeed all of the Psalms of this supplementary collection are not ascribed in their headings to the Sons of Ḵorah. Psalm 86 is connected by its heading, "Prayer of David," with the collection 51-72. Psalm 88 is ascribed both to the Sons of Ḵorah and to Heman the Ezrahite, and Psalm 89 to Ethan the Ezrahite, named in the lists of Chronicles as heads of the singers of the Ḵothath (Ḵorahite)

* Nu. 16¹⁰, 26-7^a, 18-24, 27^a, 22^b, 28, also vv. 41-50 (Heb. 17¹⁻¹⁵).

† Nu. 16^{7b-11}, 16, 17, also vv. 26-40 (Heb. 17¹⁻⁵).

‡ Nu. 26¹¹: "The sons of Ḵorah died not." Later in the same chapter, in the second numbering, the Ḵorahites are mentioned as one of the great families of the Levites, Nu. 26^{57a}.

and Merari gentes of the Levites. Exactly speaking this collection is a supplement to the three preceding collections of the 2nd and 3rd books, but as its special connection is with the Korahite collection, we may regard it for our present purpose as supplementary to that collection.

Professor Briggs has shown in his commentary that Psalm 89 is composite. To one of the hymns out of which it was composed belong, according to him, vv. 2, 3, 6-16, which contain the semi-mythological references to the "sons of gods," and the victory over Rahab the monster of the deep or underworld. In this section of the Psalm we find the words (v. 15):

"North and South, Thou didst create them,
Tabor and Hermon in Thy name ring out joy,"

where Tabor and Hermon are manifestly the synonyms of south and north. This is one of those incidental topographical allusions which cannot be imitated and which fix definitely the place of composition of the Psalm. It was evidently composed at some place from which Tabor and Hermon were respectively the landmarks of south and north, i. e., in eastern Galilee. To every one who has travelled in that region and oriented himself by these two striking landmarks, it bears the unmistakable earmarks of its origin. But if it originated in this region, it is also unquestionably pre-exilic, an old song, justifying the heading "of Heman, the aboriginal"; for that title, I take it, belongs properly to this part of the composite psalm.

Turning from the supplementary collection to the original collection of Psalms of the Sons of Korah, we find there at least two Psalms with topographical allusions which unmistakably connect them with a definite locality. All commentators, I believe, agree in locating the 42nd Psalm by the sources of the Jordan, at the foot of Hermon. So Professor Briggs: "Description of the condition of the exiles looking back to Jerusalem from the region of the upper Jordan." Verse 7 leaves no doubt as to the locality of its composition: "from the land of Jordan, and Hermons, from Mount Mizar"; and the following verse (v. 8) is a vivid description of the impression made on the mind by the rushing torrents, with their roaring sound, which overflow at

times the whole surrounding region.* At both Banias and Tel Qadi you hear what seems at first to be the roar of a cataract, but is in reality the sound of the fountains of the Jordan springing out of the deep beneath. But most impressive of all is the great fountain Leddan at Tel Qadi, the ancient Dan, where, with a mighty roaring as of a distant cataract, a river springs full born from the ground.

But if the place of origin of this Psalm is unmistakable, so I think is its ritual purpose. In somewhat strange technical or archaic phraseology the 5th verse tells us of a temple procession-dance, with its song and sacrifice, and the throngs of pilgrims making festival (*haj*) at some great shrine.† Why, having recognized that the place of composition of this Psalm was Dan or its neighborhood, commentators should have then proceeded to connect it with some supposed exile from the Jerusalem temple, making a supposititious sojourn in that region, and longing for the temple services at Jerusalem, instead of connecting it with the singers of the Temple at Dan, I do not comprehend. It would seem to me that as it is clearly connected in locality with Dan, so also it is connected with Dan in purpose, having been originally a festival hymn of that Temple, served by a Qohathite priesthood as we learn from Judges 18³⁰, for one of the *haj* festivals, presumably the great *haj* of Tabernacles.

Psalm 46 also contains in its first stanza a vivid description of

* On my first visit to this region, in July, we floundered for an hour through a flood which often rose to the horse's belly. The words of this Psalm (v. ^{3b}) were a most exact description of our situation. The great deep beneath seemed to have poured itself forth upon us.

† If the precise translation is uncertain, the general meaning of the verse is clear. I would suggest some such reading as this: "This let me celebrate (*אזכרה*, indicating the commemoration or celebration of a festival day or time) and pour out my soul; for I pass on (over) in the *סל* (something to do with the feast of Tabernacles, the booths or boughs then used, or perhaps the Tabernacle, meaning the Temple itself, parallel with the following *בני*), I lead them in procession (or dance, unless we read with LXX. *אזכרם* instead of *אזכרם*) to the house of God, with the voice of merry-making and thank-offering, a multitude making pilgrim-feast (*haj*).” The seventh and eighth verses I would read: “My soul is bowed down, therefore I make memorial to Thee, from the land of Jordan and Hermon, from Mount *Mizar* (or small). Deep calleth unto deep with the thunder voice of Thy water floods; all thy waves and billows have passed by (or over) me.” Is this Mount *Miz'ar*, or little mountain, possibly the hill now known as Tel Qadi, on which the fountain and shrine were located?

the conditions of the country about Dan, where, owing to the peculiar configuration, an immense mountain area draining into a relatively small basin, you appear to be standing in that basin immediately over a great deep. The earth bogs and shakes beneath, fountains well and springs ooze everywhere, the waters roar and are troubled, and the very mountains round about seem to rest upon a great unstable sea beneath, and to shake with the swelling thereof. And as though to make the allusion to the sanctuary of Dan more certain, the second stanza proceeds:

“(A river) Its streams make glad the city of God,
The shrine of the dwelling of the Highest.”

Surely this does not describe nor apply to the Temple at Jerusalem, nor to any other sanctuary in Palestine except Dan, which it fits exactly.

While no other of the Ẕorah Psalms, either in the main collection, or the supplement, demand Dan or its neighborhood or even eastern Galilee as their necessary setting to explain their allusions, there are, nevertheless, allusions in several of the other Psalms of these collections which are best satisfied by such a reference, as for instance “sides of the north” (48^s), and perhaps also such phrases as “place of springs” (84⁷); “all my places of springs in thee” (87⁷). It is worthy of note, further, that it is the God of Jacob who is the especial God of the Ẕorah Psalter,* and the land of these Psalms is the “Heritage of Jacob.” The Ẕorah Psalter, proper, moreover, is Elohistie, just as the Pentateuchal narrative of Israel (E) is Elohistie in contrast with the Yahawistic narrative (J) of Judah.

It is not meant, of course, to suggest that the Ẕorahitic Psalms in their present form were sung at the Temple of Dan, but these glimpses through the present form of those Psalms into what lies behind, justify, I think, the conclusion that the Ẕorahitic psalms had their origin in northern Israel, and more specifically at the temple of Dan, at an early period, before the captivity. The Ẕorahites, a great Levitical family of the gens Ẕohath, serving at Dan, gave their name to these Psalms. When they were, at a

* Cf. the fact, noted by Professor Briggs, that the Psalms of Asaph make prominent especially the land of Joseph.

later date, adopted and adapted for use in the Jerusalem temple, the tradition of their origin was preserved in the intitulation "of the Sons of Korah." The genealogical lists of Chronicles are dependent for their information regarding the Sons of Korah, so far as that information was not derived from the lists of the Priest Code, upon the preservation of the name of Korah in connection with these Psalms, traditionally of ancient origin, and yet not ascribed to David.

It is the prominence of the Korahites as an important, presumably in that time the dominant, family of the Kohathite gens of the Levites, as represented at the temple of Dan, which led to the direction against them of the anathema on the part of the Jerusalem priesthood, contained in the original Korah story of the Priest Code (Numbers 16, 17), because, as claimed, they admitted to priestly service in their temple those not of the tribe of Levi.* By natural accretion, when the real Korahites had actually passed away, the same name was used in the addition to the original anathema by which, with increasing claims of exclusive rights, the Jerusalem priests opposed the admission into their number of the Levites of the high places.

ST. MICHAEL'S CHURCH, NEW YORK,
May 7, 1910.

* Cf. on Korah's ancestry also I Ch. 2³, and Gray's comments thereon, *Numbers*, pp. 193 f. The late gloss of the suspended *nun* in Judges 18³⁰, by which Moses is turned into Manasseh, the founder of the Samaritan schism, as first high priest of the temple on Gerizzim, seems to point in the same direction.

VI

THE ANTI-SACRIFICIAL PSALMS

BY KEMPER FULLERTON

Is the Psalter primarily a Temple hymn-book or a religious anthology for private devotion? Is the speaker who appears in so many of the Psalms an individual, or the community personified?

These two nearly-related questions have been much discussed in recent years. In this discussion the Fifty-first Psalm has played a prominent part. The title, of course, has been responsible for the popular interpretation of the "I" of this psalm as an individual, though as early as Theodore of Mopsuestia it was interpreted collectively. Theodore referred it to the people in the Babylonian Exile. But when once the authority of the titles of the Psalms was broken down, a new impetus was given to the interpretation of the "I" as a collective. The defenders of this interpretation pointed triumphantly to vv. ^{20, 21} with their pronounced community interest in proof of their view. In these verses, they claimed, the personification is dropped and the true nature of the "I" is revealed. On the other hand the champions of the individualistic interpretation of the "I" pointed to the apparent discrepancy between vv. ^{20, 21} and vv. ^{18, 19} as evidence that vv. ^{20, 21} are a later accretion to the psalm and hence are not to be utilized to determine the original meaning of the "I." Further, they ask, how could vv. ^{18, 19} be incorporated in a psalm which was originally designed for the Temple worship? Would a Temple choir use a song that deliberately undermined the sacrificial ritual for the conduct of which the Temple was built? Manifestly not. But if vv. ^{18, 19} are inconsistent with the use of the psalm in the public worship of the Temple, it would naturally

follow that we are not dealing in this case with a community psalm, but with a psalm of personal experience, and the "I" would accordingly represent an individual.

"But do vv. ^{18, 19} really repudiate the sacrificial system?" ask the advocates of the collective theory in reply. Are they inconsistent with vv. ^{20, 21}, and must the latter verses be rejected as a gloss? Upon the answer to these questions no consensus of opinion has as yet been attained, and hence a renewed discussion of them does not seem to be superfluous.

At first sight these two pairs of verses seem to be in irreconcilable antagonism. Is this first impression due to superficial observation, or is it the natural impression which the words would make upon an unbiased mind? According to vv. ^{18, 19} God takes no pleasure in material sacrifices; what He desires is the spiritual worship of the heart. According to vv. ^{20, 21} God will take pleasure in material sacrifices. Are not these two statements absolutely contradictory? No, it is claimed, for there are two qualifications which must be taken into the account, namely, the phrase "sacrifices of righteousness," and the temporal particle "then."

But as far as the first qualification is concerned, it distinctly suggests difference of authorship. According to vv. ^{18, 19} God will not accept material sacrifices; what he desires is heart-religion. These words do not really mean what they seem to mean, says the first qualification. They must be taken *cum grano salis*. God does not unconditionally reject all outward forms of worship. He only insists that the outward form should be the expression of the inward spirit. Sacrifices must be "sacrifices of righteousness," that is, not only formally correct, but the expression of the religious life within. The phrase "Sacrifices of righteousness" is thus clearly seen to be a dogmatic qualification of the absolutely expressed statement in vv. ^{18, 19}. This qualification is, no doubt, theologically correct. It is even probable that the author of vv. ^{18, 19} would have subscribed to it himself.* But the question is whether the author

* It is doubtful whether even an Isaiah ever imagined a national religion apart from *all* forms. Such an idea would hardly have been intelligible to antiquity. This must be remembered in interpreting those statements of the prophets which seem to repudiate all sacrifice. It is just possible that the estimation of these statements by German criticism has been somewhat influenced by the peculiar character of German Protestantism.

of these verses which are spoken with all the emotional absoluteness of the older prophecy, would have felt called upon in the present connection to file down the grandly unconventional character of his thought to the precise and scientific accuracy demanded by theology. In other words, the phrase "sacrifices of righteousness" has every indication of being a dogmatic gloss, whose timid correctness stands in strong contrast to the daring paradox of the preceding verses. This conclusion is confirmed by the demands of the meter. V. ²¹ is metrically too long by just these words.

It is the second (historical) qualification suggested by the temporal particle "then" which is mainly relied upon to defend the unity of the two pairs of verses. Let us give the argument in the words of two of its ablest exponents. "At present," says the Psalmist, according to Robertson Smith,* "God desires no material sacrifices. But does the Psalmist mean to say absolutely and in general that sacrifice is a superseded thing? No; for he adds that when Jerusalem is rebuilt, the sacrifices of Israel will be pleasing to God. He lives, therefore, in a time when the fall of Jerusalem has temporarily suspended the sacrificial ordinances . . . but has not closed the door of forgiveness to the penitent heart." The exact implications of this statement come out more clearly in Matthes' formulation.† Matthes expressly amplifies the argument of Jacob.‡ "It is certain," says Matthes, "as Jacob saw, that it was the situation in which sacrifice was impossible, in no case a disinclination toward sacrifice, which was the occasion of the singer expressing himself as he does in this passage. God has, no doubt, pleasure in sacrifices when they are possible, but now when one is not in position to bring them, Jahwe does not demand (*fordert*) them. Sorrow, repentance, fulfilment of the remaining laws now suffice. For so long as misfortune lasts Jahwe will content himself with what is attainable."

This explanation of the difference between vv. ^{18, 19} and vv. ^{20, 21} cannot be regarded as satisfactory. 1. In the first place the meaning of the passage educed by these expositors is barren and unfruitful. Expressed very baldly, it is simply this: that God will make a virtue of necessity and content himself with a purely spiritual worship so long as any other kind is impossible.

* OTJC, 440.

† ZAT, 1902, p. 78.

‡ ZAT, 1897, p. 278.

(Cf. especially Matthes' formulation of the argument.) 2. Again the phraseology of vv. ^{18, 19} does not bear the interpretation which Robertson Smith and Matthes put upon it. According to these writers, God does not demand sacrifices at the present time in concession to the situation. But what is really said is that God does not delight in (חפץ) or accept (רצה) sacrifices, which is a very different proposition. To secure the meaning proposed by these writers, some such word as שרר (cf. Mi. 6⁸), or צוה (cf. Jer. 7²³), or לא (cf. Ps. 40⁷) would be necessary.

3. In the next place the situation of the singer is not clearly indicated until we reach vv. ^{20, 21}. Vv. ^{18, 19}, when read in the light of the preceding context, do not suggest at all that the reason why God did not demand (accept) sacrifices was because of the inability on the part of the people to offer them. We can only infer this from the verses that follow. But if obscurity is to be avoided, vv. ^{18, 19} in themselves or by reason of the preceding context ought to suggest a situation in which sacrifices were impossible. 4. On the contrary, and finally, the phraseology of v. ¹⁸ in its most natural interpretation implies that sacrifice is possible. This view is suggested by the verbs "delight in," "accept," which would have little sense if sacrifices were impossible. It is necessitated by the verb וְאֶתֵּן. This verb is usually construed as the apodosis to v. ^{18a}.* This is metrically bad. It is really the protasis to what follows: "and if I give it, thou wouldst not accept it." (Cf. Duhm *ad loc.*) The preceding context (v. ^{18a}) also suggests that the speaker is in the Holy Land,† and therefore presumably able to offer sacrifices.

Smend long ago saw clearly ‡ that vv. ^{18, 19} could not refer to a situation (*e. g.*, the Exile) in which it was impossible to offer sacrifices. Yet he still maintains that there is a contrast between the present and the future. But it is a contrast not between the present exile and the future Restoration to the Holy Land, but between the sinful community of the present *in* the Holy Land, and the justified community of the Messianic Future. God will

* So LXX, cf. A.V. and R.V. text. R.V.^{ms} follows Jerome's translation, but this implies an unnecessarily harsh construction.

† This phrase is regularly employed of banishment from the Holy Land, cf. 2 K. 13²², 17²⁰, 24²⁰, etc.

‡ ZAT. 1888, p. 112.

not accept the *propitiatory* sacrifices of the present because of the sinful condition of the people. What he desires is true repentance. This is not inconsistent with his acceptance of *thank-offerings* from the purified community of the Messianic future. Thus the contrast is not only between the present and the future, but between the different spiritual condition of the people in the present and the future, and between the propitiatory sacrifices of the present and the thank-offerings of the future. But where such entirely different things are referred to in vv. ^{18, 19} and vv. ^{20, 21}, it is improper to speak of a contradiction.

This view of Smend avoids the main objections to Smith's and Matthes' explanation, but it creates new difficulties. 1. It is assumed that the reason why God does not accept sacrifices at present is because the people is sinful. If the "I" of this Psalm is a collective, as Smend maintains, the people is indeed sinful, but it is as certainly penitent, and it is hard to see why God would refuse propitiatory sacrifices of a truly penitent people if he was willing to receive thank-offerings from a completely purified people. 2. Again, Smend's view requires that a figurative sense be given to vv. ^{20, 21} (they must refer to an ideal restoration) for which there is absolutely no warrant except the exigencies of Smend's defense of the unity of the passage. 3. Further, while this view would resolve the contradiction into a harmless antithesis, it would still fail to save the original unity of these verses. Smend must admit that the absoluteness of the old prophetic proclamation as expressed in vv. ^{18, 19} would be toned down (*abgeschwächt*) in vv. ^{20, 21}. But we have already seen in the case of the phrase "sacrifices of righteousness" that such a qualification would almost certainly imply in this connection a different writer. The conclusion seems to be inevitable. Vv. ^{18, 19} and vv. ^{20, 21} cannot have originated from the same pen. The first impression made by these verses has been shown to be correct.

But which of the two pairs of verses is original? It has been assumed as a matter of course by those who deny the common authorship of these verses, that vv. ^{20, 21} are secondary. At first sight this seems to be the natural conclusion. The motives which would lead to such an addition are at once intelligible. The gloss would be due partly to the desire to qualify the very

strong statement in vv. ^{18, 19}, which might give offense to a scrupulous conscience, partly to a wish to adapt an original, individualistic psalm to use in the Temple worship. Is our first impression again to be trusted? In the present case, simple and attractive as the explanation of vv. ^{20, 21} is, there are weighty objections to it. 1. It is a singular fact that in the three other cases in the Psalter where we meet with statements parallel to 51^{18, 19}, viz. 40⁷⁻⁹, 69²² and Ps. 50, there is no evidence of any such redactional qualification as is assumed in the present case. But if it was thought to be necessary in Ps. 51, why not in these other psalms? 2. The abruptness of the ending of the psalm, if vv. ^{20, 21} are omitted, has often been felt and even urged with considerable force in defense of the originality of the disputed verses. 3. Of still greater moment is the observation that vv. ^{18, 19} are really inappropriate in their present connection. What is the force of the "for" at v. ^{18a}? How are vv. ^{18, 19} an explanation of or reason for the statement in v. ¹⁷? It is difficult to say. After v. ¹⁷ we expect an expression of gratitude, not of the inadequacy of sacrifice as *contrasted with true sorrow for sin*. This inappropriateness of vv. ^{18, 19} in their present context has been felt at times by others, though no sufficient attention has heretofore been paid to it. Baethgen, for example, construes v. ¹⁸ as a reference to thank-offerings, admittedly because of the demands of the preceding context. But v. ¹⁸ must take its coloring from v. ¹⁹, and that clearly demands a reference to propitiatory offerings (cf. Smend *supra*). Baethgen himself does not seem to feel quite easy in his interpretation, for he cites Hupfeld to the effect that, after all, it is possible "that no strictly logical sequence of thought is to be found here, and the poet, in silently taking זִבְחִים in its general sense (*i. e.* of sacrifices rather than of peace-offerings specifically) returned to the means of the forgiveness of sins." The sharp eye of Duhm has also observed the non-sequitur. "One could think," he says, "that the poet had got off the track a bit and had considered the sacrifices, not as an antithesis to the praise of God in which he could express his gratitude, but as a means of salvation which would stand in antithesis to penitence and sorrow, since a broken heart does not seem to harmonize with expressions of joy, but rather describes the present mood before the deliverance." In order to meet this difficulty, Duhm

makes the suggestion that the poet, mindful of Is. 57¹⁸, regarded the broken spirit "as the mark of the truly pious man which still remains even when he has personally experienced salvation and is singing songs of praise." This explanation is not convincing. It is no doubt true that penitence is not banished even when gratitude and praise are aglow, but the logical sequence between vv. ^{18, 19} and vv. ^{16, 17} indicated by the "for" does not at all favor so subtle a thought. What we expect is: My mouth will declare thy praise *for* Thou dost not delight in sacrifices but in a *grateful* heart (cf. 69³²). What we get is: My mouth will declare thy praise *for* Thou dost not delight in sacrifices but in a *penitent* heart! 4. If, now, we ask ourselves which of the two pairs of verses fits into the thought of the Psalm as a whole more exactly, it will be found that the doubts of the originality of vv. ^{18, 19} are greatly increased, and the claims of vv. ^{20, 21} to be regarded as original proportionately strengthened. At first sight again, vv. ^{18, 19} seem to have the stronger claim. Do not they supply, it may be asked, the last perfecting touch which would turn this Psalm into one of the most classical expressions of spiritual religious experience? It must be admitted that the appeal which these verses make to our religious sympathy is very forcible. But in deciding such a question the emotional appeal which a passage may make to *us* is not necessarily the controlling factor. At this point the course of thought and the nature of the "I" in vv. ²⁻¹⁷ must be examined:

The Psalm may be divided into the following clearly marked paragraphs: (a) In vv. ²⁻⁷ after an opening appeal to God's mercy, there is an all-inclusive confession of sin; (b) In vv. ⁸⁻¹² there is a prayer for pardon and for spiritual renewal. (c) In vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁷ there is a prayer for deliverance from the present misfortunes, which must be regarded in this connection as the consequences of sin, together with vows of service and gratitude. Observe that while the thought of deliverance (עֲצָרָה) so characteristic of vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁷ is probably anticipated at v. ¹⁰, the thought of sin and pardon which dominates vv. ²⁻¹² does not recur in vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁷.*

* It is not permissible, as Dr. Briggs points out, to translate דָּמָיִם v. ¹⁶ by "blood-guiltiness." Ezek. 18¹³ and I Sam., 25^{26, 28} are not sufficient to justify this translation. It is interesting to notice that, though the word frequently

Let us next inquire as to the nature of the "I" in vv. 3-17. The following arguments, when taken together, seem conclusive for the collective "I." (a) V. 6 is much more easily interpreted of the nation than of the individual. When the speaker exclaims: "Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned," he seems to be unconscious of any wrong done to man. This is more easily understood of the nation than of the individual. The nation recognized the justice of its sufferings as due to its religious apostasy, its sin against God, but maintained its innocence as against its enemies who were immediately responsible for its sufferings. This simultaneous consciousness of guilt and innocence, guilt toward God and innocence toward man, of which Ps. 38 is a classical illustration, can be best explained on the nationalistic interpretation of the "I." 51⁶ read in the light of Ps. 38 becomes clear at once.* (b) Similarly, v. 7 lends itself far more readily to the collective than to the individualistic interpretation of the "I." On the individualistic interpretation v. 7 naturally suggests either the sinfulness of the marriage relationship in itself, or the illegitimacy of the speaker's birth. The phrasing is too strong to express only the general sinful origin of man. The verb יחמתי is found again only at Gn. 30⁴¹ and 31¹⁰, and it suggests the animal origin of man. If the speaker were an individual the coarse expression could hardly fail to deflect the attention from the sin of the speaker, which is the thought to be emphasized, to his mother. On the collective

occurs, it is never translated in A.V. by blood-guiltiness except in this one place. The translators seem to have been led to so translate it in Ps. 51 by the title. Incidentally the above analysis of the psalm furnishes new evidence that vv. 18, 19 and vv. 20, 21 cannot both be original. The logical analysis is in all probability the strophical analysis as well. Vv. 3-7 and vv. 8-12 each give a twelve-line stanza. In vv. 14-17 we have eight lines. This suggests that there were but four lines in the remainder of the psalm. Hence one of these final pairs of verses is to be rejected. This strophical analysis is based on the view that the two 17 at vv. 7, 8 do not justify the combination of these two verses into the same stanza. V. 7 certainly goes with the preceding confession of sin. V. 8, whatever else it may mean, is as certainly not a part of this confession. As a matter of fact v. 8 has been corrupted probably beyond the possibility of recovery.

* Cf. Smend's article cited above for this argument. It is not maintained that this argument alone is conclusive for a collective "I." In the case of a profoundly religious nature the ethical conception of sin is sometimes absorbed by the religious conception of sin. Hence, if 51⁶ stood by itself, theoretically, it might be interpreted of an individual.

theory the mother is the nation and in pointing to the sin of the nation ("mother Israel," cf. Dr. Briggs) the collective "I" emphasizes in a striking way its own sin and the very strong expression used is entirely appropriate.

(c) Lastly v.^{18b} makes very strongly in favor of the nationalistic interpretation of the "I." The reference to the Holy Spirit is found again in the Old Testament only at Is. 63^{10, 11}, where it is used of the providential guidance of the nation. As enduement by the Spirit is not ascribed to individuals in the Old Testament except for the exercise of some theocratic function, and there is no hint of the speaker of this psalm exercising such a function, the individualistic interpretation at this point is in great straits. Witness Duhm's conjecture here. *

If we have been correct in our view of the course of thought in vv. ¹⁸⁻¹⁷ and of the collective nature of the "I," it will be seen at once that vv. ^{20, 21} make a very strong claim to be the original conclusion of the psalm. Vv. ^{20, 21}, which contain a prayer for the community, give the appropriate logical conclusion to the psalm if the "I" is a collective. It is not necessary, yet very natural, that at the end the personification should be dropped.

(b) These verses explain the exact nature of the misfortunes alluded to in the preceding part of the psalm. If the "I" is collective, the misfortunes must be national, but without vv. ^{20, 21} it would be impossible to say specifically what they are. On the individualistic theory there is no indication whatever of the real nature of the misfortune. V. ^{10b} by itself furnishes no clue.

(c) Further, vv. ^{20, 21} supply just the conclusion which we are led to anticipate from the general movement of the poem. The thoughts of sin, penitence and pardon have been dropped since v. ¹³. Vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁷ lead us to expect a reference to gratitude. And this is what we get in vv. ^{20, 21} but not in vv. ^{18, 19}. (d) Finally, vv. ^{20, 21} correspond to and admirably elucidate vv. ^{16, 17}. V. ²⁰ is the interpretation of the "violence" from which the speaker prays to be delivered in v. ¹⁶ and v. ²¹, which must refer to thank-offerings, is the fulfilment in deed of the promise of praise in v. ¹⁷.

Thus far I have tried to show two things: first, that the first impression of the incompatibility of vv. ^{18, 19} and vv. ^{20, 21} is, on

* In the above I have given only those arguments which seem to me to be really decisive.

closer examination, found to be justified; secondly, that the first impression, that, as between these two pairs of verses, vv.^{18, 19} have the greater claim to originality, is not justified. It is vv.^{20, 21} which stand in organic relationship with the rest of the psalm. Vv.^{18, 19} do not do so.

But has not the course of our argument led us into a *cul de sac*? While an intelligible reason can be found (*vid. supra*) for the later addition of vv.^{20, 21} on the supposition of their secondary character, can an equally convincing reason be given for the addition of vv.^{18, 19}, if they are regarded as secondary? Here lies the real crux of the situation. If a probable explanation of vv.^{18, 19}, considered as a gloss, cannot be given, the argument which we have followed must be considered to be a blind trail.

Here I would hazard the conjecture that as there are undoubtedly some originally individualistic psalms which have been revised for the public service of the temple, so there may be some originally temple psalms which have been revised for a collection for private devotion. If Ps. 51 stood alone this conjecture would have nothing to support it except the inherent difficulties of the psalm itself in its present form. But happily Ps. 51 does not stand alone. As a matter of fact it immediately follows a psalm (Ps. 50) which expresses practically the same attitude toward the ritual as is found in Ps. 51^{18, 19}. In the case of Ps. 50, it is true, we cannot speak of a temple psalm revised for private use. It was rather designed from the start for private devotion. Even if the favorite theory of the present time be adopted which understands תודה in vv.¹⁴ and v.²⁸ of the thank-offering, and if, accordingly, no absolute rejection of sacrifices can be inferred from this Psalm (cf. also v.⁶ and v.⁹), it still remains inconceivable that the language employed in vv.⁹⁻¹² could ever have been employed in a psalm *originally* designed for the Temple worship.* The writer of Ps. 50 may tolerate the sacri-

* Cf. Kittel, PRE, Bd. 16, 192. The fact that Ps. 50 is an Asaph psalm and therefore belonged at one time in its history to the temple choir cannot alter the deduction drawn from its forcible language but only serves to suggest the long and obscure history of the individual psalms that lies back of our present collection. As Kittel observes, the theories of Matthes and Jacob cannot demonstrate the original temple character of these psalms but at most they illustrate the process by which these psalms may have been interpreted as temple psalms when they were adopted into the present collection.

ficial system as a long-established custom, but he has lost all vital religious interest in it. It might be thought that 51^{18, 19} were due to a glossator who was much impressed by Ps. 50 and who accordingly retouched the next following psalm in accordance with the teachings of Ps. 50. But another theory, less simple, but critically sounder, is to be preferred. The position of Ps. 50 is anomalous. It is an Asaph psalm, but separated from all the other Asaph psalms. How did this happen? Ewald conjectured that the Davidic psalms of the Second Book (Pss. 51-72) originally stood at the beginning of the Book. With these removed Ps. 50 would come immediately before the other Asaph psalms (Pss. 73-83). This conjecture does not help matters much. Apart from the difficulty of accounting for the supposed transfer of Ps. 51-72 to the general position which they now occupy between the Korah and Asaph psalms, no reason is forthcoming to explain why the Davidic psalms were awkwardly thrust into the Asaph group. The Davidic psalms could have been interpolated between the Korah and Asaph psalms without the necessity of disturbing the latter collection. It is the anomalous position of Ps. 50, not of the group of Davidic psalms (Pss. 51-72) which demands explanation. It would seem probable that the peculiar position of Ps. 50 is due to the fact that it had a different history from its companion Asaph psalms. If we suppose that Ps. 50 and Ps. 51 both belonged at one time to a collection of psalms for private use, we may be able to account for the present position of Ps. 50, and at the same time derive confirmation for our conjecture that 51^{18, 19} is a gloss. The reason why Ps. 50 is in its present position is because it was attached to Ps. 51 *in a previous collection*. This collection was presumably a collection for private devotion, for Ps. 50 is not adapted to the worship of the Temple. But Ps. 51 was a Temple psalm. When it was adopted into the supposed private collection, vv. ^{18, 19} were added. On the theory of a private psalter in which Ps. 50 and Ps. 51 once stood together, the present anomalous position of Ps. 50 and the gloss at 51^{18, 19} can both be accounted for.*

* It may be asked why vv. ^{20, 21} were not dropped when vv. ^{18, 19} were added? Probably because the reviser did not wish to omit the devout and patriotic prayer in v. ²⁰. A later glossator, however, was more sensitive to the conflict

But our evidence is not yet exhausted for this thesis. If we turn to Ps. 40, we find in vv. 7, 9 a quatrain remarkably similar to 51^{18, 19}. Is this quatrain original in Ps. 40? It is notorious that this psalm has come down to us with various accretions. Vv. 14-18, in which the singer prays for deliverance, are the duplicate of Ps. 70. They cannot be original in Ps. 40 as they are incompatible with vv. 2-6 in which the singer is already delivered. V. 19 must be a "seam" (cf. Cheyne, Duhm, Briggs), as it can hardly belong to what follows (cf. its omission at Ps. 70) and it has no force as a conclusion to what precedes. Vv. 10-13 are full of needless repetitions and vv. 10, 11 are metrically out of order, all of which suggests the presence of further accretions. In view of these generally admitted facts it would not be astonishing to discover that vv. 7, 9 may also be due to revision. If the connection between vv. 1-6 and vv. 7, 9 be examined, it will be found to be very suspicious. Vv. 1-6 are an expression of thanks-giving for deliverance out of misfortune. The singer, however, is overcome at the thought of the wonderful works of God which are too numerous for his grateful tongue to proclaim. Then, suddenly, we have the great prophetic utterance vv. 7, 9. It is usually assumed that the gap between vv. 1-6 and vv. 7, 9 is bridged by an implied question: "How can I properly express my gratitude?" to which vv. 7, 9 give the answer: "Not by sacrifice but by service." But v. 7 cannot be the answer to such an implied question, for the simple reason that the reference to the sin-offering (חטאת) forbids us to take these sacrifices as representative of thank-offerings. To imply a question with which the phraseology of the sentence supposed to furnish the answer is inconsistent is a more than doubtful proceeding.*

between the two pairs of verses, and it was he who inserted the most recent element in the text, the dogmatic clause, "sacrifices of righteousness," in order to blunt the edge of the contrast.

* Duhm feels this difficulty and attempts to delete the last clause of v. 7, with resulting reconstructions of the most violent and unconvincing description. Jacob (ZAT, 1897, p. 279) and Dr. Briggs urge that חטאת cannot mean sin-offering. They point to the fact that in the seven places in which the word is found again, it means sin, not sin-offering, and that the regular word for sin-offering (זבח חטאת) is not found in the Psalter at all. Hence, they claim, the ordinary meaning of חטאת must be adhered to and v. 7b be translated "Burnt-offering with sin thou didst not desire." In support of this construction Is. 1¹⁸ and 61⁸ are adduced. Strong as these arguments are, I

There is thus strong evidence that 40^{7, 9} are also secondary. As these verses embody the same sentiment as 51^{12, 19}, the thought is at once suggested that these glosses came from the same hand in connection with the adoption of these psalms into a psalter for private devotion.* This theory would imply that Ps. 40 was originally a temple Psalm, as was Ps. 51. It must be admitted that the proof for a collective "I" in Ps. 40 is not so clear as in the case of Ps. 51, and vv. ^{10, 11} might be thought to require a differentiation of the speaker from the community (the great congregation). This last consideration is of little importance. If once the existence of a personified "I" is granted in the Psalter, vv. ^{10, 11} would refer to the community in its formal public worship. That we are dealing with an originally temple psalm in the present instance is probable from the following

cannot consider them convincing. As far as the Isaiah passages are concerned, the latter is certainly corrupt (LXX, Syr. and Targ give a different reading, which even the R.V. follows), and the former is probably corrupt (cf. LXX and Duhm *ad loc.*). But even granting the possibility of this translation, it is improbable in this connection, as it violates the parallelism, and gives a sense inappropriate to the context. Isaiah might appropriately preach against the hypocrisy of his hearers who combined "folly with festivals" (Is. 1¹², if M.T. is retained) but a man full of devout gratitude to God and desirous of praising him in an acceptable manner would hardly feel called upon to say that God takes no pleasure in sacrifices accompanied with sin. חטאת cannot be eliminated from the present context, and in this context can only have the meaning of sin-offering (cf. LXX). That this meaning is linguistically possible is clear from the use of חטאת for sin and sin-offering (cf. also the analogous double use of תורה).

* I have purposely refrained from taking v. ⁸ into account. The interpretation of this verse is only guess-work at best. Yet may I add one more guess to the long list of conjectures? If vv. ^{7, 9} are cut out, v. ¹⁰ does not attach very well to v. ⁶. In v. ⁶ God's works are too many for the poet to describe. But in v. ¹⁰ he proposes to proclaim them anyway. An indication of antithesis is needed. Read נא for the unintelligible נא, and understand נאמי of entering the Temple courts (cf. 100⁴). Possibly שערית or שערית has been omitted. V. ¹⁰ will then be a late gloss, alluding, not to the Pentateuch, or Deuteronomy, or to the Prophets generally, as has been variously supposed, but to an earlier collection of psalms in which possibly Ps. 100 stood (cf. especially 100⁴). Thus understood v. ⁸ furnishes a connecting link between v. ⁶ and v. ¹⁰, and also a basis to which the gloss in vv. ^{7, 9} could become attached. For when the original poet proposed to praise God in the Temple, the anti-sacrificial glossator could easily add that sacrifices of any description were out of place as compared with a life of thankful service. The glossator could naturally include a reference to the sin-offering in order to express his slighting appreciation of the ritual system generally, where such a reference would have been entirely inappropriate in the original psalm.

consideration when viewed in the light of other similar psalms where the data are more pronounced. In vv. ^{10, 11} the righteousness of God as well as his mercy is referred to. In view of the preceding context this righteousness must have been displayed in the deliverance of the speaker from his distress. But could an individual feel so sure that God was righteous in espousing his cause? The silent implication of vv. ^{10, 11} is that it is again the community which is speaking, and which feels conscious of its innocence as contrasted with its enemies. This view is borne out by the accretions which follow, which were evidently attached by some one who understood the "I" of the original psalm as a collective. Only so can the alternation of the consciousness of sin (as against God, v. ¹³) and of innocence as against the speaker's enemies be understood.*

Finally, there remains to be considered Ps. 69³². Ps. 69, as has long been recognized, shows the closest affinity with Ps. 40. It is noteworthy also that it is followed by Ps. 70, which is the same as 40 ¹⁴⁻¹⁶. It can hardly be doubted that Pss. 40 and 69 (70) were exposed to the same influences, and lived at least a part of their literary life in common. But further, the close of Ps. 69 offers a remarkable parallel to the close of Ps. 51. In both there is a repudiation of sacrifice. In both there is a reference to restoration (Jerusalem, the cities of Judah).† Is Ps. 69 a temple Psalm, and is v. ³² a gloss? Space forbids an adequate discussion of the first point, as it involves the discussion of a whole group of psalms, notably Pss. 22 and 38. I can only express my own belief that in spite of the strongly individualizing traits in this Psalm (cf. especially v. ⁹) the proof that the "I" is collective is conclusive. But is v. ³² a gloss? The contextual proof in the present case is not so strong as at 51^{15, 19} and 40^{7, 9}, for the reason that Ps. 69 is so loosely put together that it is difficult to discriminate the glosses from the original elements. Yet any one can feel the abruptness of vv. ^{31, 32} in their present context.

The data bearing upon our subject have now been reviewed.

* Cf. Smend and especially Ps. 38

† Cf. 69³² with 51^{15, 19}, and 69³⁰ with 51³⁰. The phrase כִּרְבִּי רַחֲמֶיךָ is also found only in these two psalms (cf. 51³ and 69¹⁷) though little weight need be attached to this fact.

Pss. 51^{18, 19}, 40^{7, 9} and 69^{21, 22} contain expressions highly inappropriate in psalms originally written for use in the temple service. To these must be added Ps. 50 in its entirety. The first three passages are, however, found in psalms in which the "I" is almost certainly a collective, in other words in psalms that were after all intended for the temple worship. This incongruity cannot be explained away by exegetical devices. What is to be done? If these passages are examined in relation to their contexts they are found to stand in no organic relationship to their contexts. The question at once presses: Are they not glosses? But how then did they come to be intruded into these temple psalms? At this point the curious position of Ps. 50, which was not originally a temple psalm, and its intimate relationship to 51^{18, 19} suggest that these psalms, and therefore also in all probability the allied psalms, Pss. 40 and 69, were taken from a psalter which was collected for private devotions, and these verses which are so hostile to the temple ritual may, therefore, be best explained as additions which were made to these originally temple psalms at the time when they were incorporated in this private song-book. One further remark must be made. Ps. 69 is not only intimately connected with Ps. 40^{22, 23} but also with Ps. 44. This latter psalm is one of the surest Maccabæan psalms. If Ps. 69 were dependent upon Ps. 44, and if the theory advanced in these pages were adopted, it would mean that a considerable literary history would have to be interjected between the Maccabæan period and the present form of the Psalter. This at once opens up the whole vast, unsettled question of the relationship of the Psalter to the history of the Canon, into which it is impossible to enter in the present connection. I would only add that the priority of Ps. 44 to Ps. 69 is by no means a settled question. Ps. 40 is probably pre-Maccabæan as Ben Sira seems to be dependent upon it (cf. the occurrence of the *ἀπ. λεγ* *עֲשֵׂה כִּיב* 40⁶ at Ben Sira 51⁷). But Ps. 69 is even more closely allied to Ps. 40 than it is to Ps. 44.

VII

THE DECLINE OF PROPHECY

BY FRANCIS BROWN

THE prophetic writings of the Old Testament mark one of the great religious movements of the human race,—probably the most significant of all, with one single exception. They also present a literary phenomenon which it is by no means easy to explain or understand. The rise and decline of any literature we can observe, as a matter of history, but we are seldom able to account for it any more than we should be to predict it. Antecedents and concomitants shew themselves; sometimes they look like causes, sometimes like occasions, sometimes like secondary influences. Who shall analyze a literary situation,—especially one of the rare, creative periods,—and tabulate its forces? Genius refuses to be analyzed. The essences whose combination gives the delicate flavour of a masterpiece, the insight and the unconstrained ardour that command the spirit, cannot be followed back to the lurking-places they emerge from, nor is the formula of combination to be set down by chemical symbols. And if we cannot tell how genius awakes, neither can we give adequate reasons for its decline into slumber. We can do hardly more than gather more phenomena and establish a series, which, in a given case, attends the process at one end or the other, offering hypotheses, if we like, as to possible effects produced by what seem to have the efficiency of causes. When the literature is religious literature, and its substance is the life of the soul in its highest relations, we are least of all in a position to deal with its phases by scientific process, for there is always mystery in religion.

The prophetic literature of the Hebrews, which the Old Testament has preserved to us, emerges suddenly, runs a long course, and gradually dies away. Its most brilliant period

stretches over three centuries, and it appears at intervals, with diminishing splendour, for two or three centuries more. If we compare it, for duration, with the Greek drama, or philosophy, or the whole classic literature of the Romans, it is the persistence of it, and not the final disappearance of it, that challenges inquiry. Of itself, this is also a more interesting question, since the problems of life have a fascination beyond the problems of death. And yet the long continuance of prophecy adds force to the inquiry why it was not longer, and as a study in Hebrew religious history, this does not lack significance. And although the effective causes may elude the investigations of the student, a survey of the circumstances and fundamental conditions will perhaps be rewarding.

For our purposes it will be assumed that the prophetic writings of the Old Testament Canon arrange themselves chronologically and for substance,—leaving out of account the more debateable matters,—as follows: In the eighth century B. C. Amos (without 1², 9¹⁰⁻¹⁵ and some other passages), Hosea, Isaiah (as far as genuine) and Micah 1-3; in the seventh century, and down to 586, additions to Micah, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, Nahum, Habakkuk, early Ezekiel; in the sixth century, after 586, late chapters of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Isaiah 40-55, 13-14²³, with Jeremiah 50, 51, Haggai, Zechariah 1-8; in the fifth century, Obadiah, Malachi, Isaiah 56-66; in the fourth century, Joel, Jonah, Isaiah 24-27, Zechariah 9-14.

This leaves the third century bare of any prophetic writing that can with confidence be assigned to it, and exhibits Daniel, a late-comer, born of the Antiochian anguish, for the first half of the second century,—born after such an interval that expectation of fresh offspring in the prophetic family had ceased, and the prophetic canon had been closed.

A different aspect would be given to this picture if we could believe, with Duhm and Marti (often Duhm's echo here), that the second century, to the very end of it, and even the beginning of the first century, must be looked to for a large number of prophetic utterances, fragmentary or supplementary and some even of considerable extent, which have been incorporated into our Old Testament. Among these passages are: Is. 19¹⁶⁻²⁵ (c. B. C. 160), 24-27 (not earlier than John Hyrcanus, c. B. C. 128), 33 (B. C. 162,

Duhm, 163, Marti), 34, 35 (late in second century, before 128); Je. 23¹⁶ ^a. (second century), 30, 31 (id.), 32¹⁶⁻⁴⁴, 33¹⁴⁻²⁶ (end of second century; hence the whole, Je. 32, 33, cannot have reached its present form before about 100 B. C.), 46²⁻¹² (apparently depends on Is. 34, and must therefore fall in the second half of the second century); Zec. 9-14 (Maccabean). This list is not at all exhaustive, but if the case is made out as to these passages there can be no serious objection to increasing their number. And in that case "the decline of prophecy" has a somewhat different significance from that usually ascribed to it. These critics admit,—and indeed make it one of their *criteria*,—a less original, less ethical, less intelligible and effective prophecy in these late passages, so that there is a real decline in quality, as well as in sustained force, but there is no entire cessation;—the interval between Je. 32, 33 and John the Baptist is no greater than that between Joel and Daniel, and perhaps less. Our problem would still exist, but its form would be changed.

The difficulties in the way of this extension of Old Testament prophecy are, however, serious enough to preclude haste in accepting it.

It is a necessary condition of these dates that there should still have been, as late as B. C. 100, great freedom in adding to the older prophecies, and modifying them. But attention has been repeatedly called to the barrier erected against this hypothesis by the history of the Old Testament Canon. The testimony of Ben Sira is very clear. Not only do we have specific mention of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and The Twelve (Sir. 48²⁶⁻²⁸, 49⁶. s. 10), shewing the existence of a collection of these books in the order and limits of our prophetic canon as early as the beginning of the second century B. C., but the Prologue of the Greek Ben Sira uses the term "Prophets" of an authoritative collection parallel with "The Law," and distinguished from "the other writings." Duhm and Marti do not squarely meet the issue raised by these facts. Duhm, by a side remark,* casts suspicion on the evidence of Ben Sira, but without any apparent reason except the exigencies of his own theory, and both he and Marti endeavour to break the

* "Indessen beweist sie (i. e., the passage Sir. 48²⁶⁻²⁸) nicht allzu viel, weil es keineswegs sicher ist, dass der Siracide sie verfasst habe." Duhm, *Jessaja*, Einl. vii.

force of it by claiming that whatever canonicity attached to the prophetic writings in the second century was not such as to prevent later modification. It is true that we do not know precisely what degree of significance should be ascribed to canonicity at its beginning. A certain amount of fluidity in the material may be admitted. But it is not permissible to deny *all* significance to canonicity even in its early stages. Paragraphs might be added, here and there, to a canonical work, but that editors had a free hand with it, incorporated what they pleased, carried on, indeed, the whole work of compilation, so as to constitute books that did not exist before, is too violent a supposition. If this were possible, what reason is there why the Book of Daniel should not have found a place in the canon of the prophets?

Nor is there any such complete proof of the connection between any one of the prophecies under discussion and the historical conditions of the second century B. C. as to justify such a *dictum* as this of Marti's: "Wenn es sich nämlich zeigt, dass das Buch Jesaja Stücke enthält, die erst um 100 v. Chr. entstanden sein können, so hat dasselbe eben seine jetzige Gestalt erst nachher erhalten" (Marti, Jesaja, Einl. xiv). It is sounder argument to say: "If it appears that the Book of Isaiah was included in a collection of prophets, having canonical value, as early as B. C. 200, it cannot have been put together at a later date, nor contain long passages from the year 100 B. C."

There is, no doubt, in certain cases, a weakening of style, and an absence of precision and vigour of thought in the passages in question, which mark them as probably late, but the problem is as to the range of time within which such additions are likely to have been made. The most plausible ground for the second century as a field for these additions is afforded in the cases where an historical situation seems to offer a suitable occasion, as when Zec. 12¹ ff. is connected with the murder of Onias in 170 (v. 10), or Is. 33 fitted into the year B. C. 163, or Is. 24-27 made to reflect the attack of John Hyrcanus on Samaria in 128. But we do not know the history of these centuries well enough to allow ourselves to be shut up to these identifications in the face of the obstacles already named.

Besides, in no one of the passages in question is there anything approaching the Hebrew of the Book of Daniel, to say

nothing of Ben Sira. The decline in style is such as one observes in other literatures. When a new vein is struck the first workers in it are fresh, vigorous, and often compact in style. They are impelled by a force within them. They have no models; they themselves establish the standard. There is no suggestion of imitation in them, for they have none to imitate. They may be abrupt, daring, lacking finish, but they are themselves, and their own strength carries them, without self-assertion or display. The late-comers, even when equally sincere, and of dimensions as large, are of necessity somewhat dominated by the standard already set. Their style has something secondary in it. It grows diffuse. It may grow weak, or, if its thought is still too noble to lose power of expression, it may lose restraint and take on exaggeration. The prophetic style suffers in these ways in the later centuries.

It will be freely allowed that, but for the evidence of the existence of the prophetic canon, including books bearing these names, before the occurrences of the second century, these occurrences would fairly demand consideration as possible settings for some of the prophecies. But it is not clear, at all, that they should then be preferred to other settings. Even if they were more plausible than any others, the history of interpretation as illustrated by the titles of the Psalms ought to warn us against attaching too much weight to any set of ingenious combinations, when we are so ignorant as to long periods of time in the last four hundred years of Israel's life before the birth of Christ. There was much more reason, from the postulate that the Psalms were composed by David, for ascribing Ps. 51 to the time "when Nathan the prophet came unto him" than, from the postulate that certain portions of the books of Isaiah and Jeremiah were not written by the prophets whose names they bear, for fixing their date by certain historical situations in the second century.

We may look at some specimens of the alleged evidence:

Zec. 9-14 belong to late prophecy, and 11⁴⁻¹⁷ is a passage among the most striking in the prophetic books. Marti understands the ruthless shepherd of vv. ¹⁶. ¹⁷ to be Alkimus (161 or 160), and the three shepherds cut off "in one month" (11⁸) to be earlier high-priests, Lysimachus (c. 171), Jason (170), and Menelaus (170)—this after Rubinkam. The interpretation re-

quires a liberal stretching of the "month," but this is not really difficult. One would expect, however, a more substantial appreciation of Stade's work on Zec. 9-14 (ZATW, 1881-82), in which the date is given as between 306 and 278 (ZATW, 1882, pp. 293 f., 305). On the various theories of the "three shepherds," 11^a, see (*inter al.*) Driver, Minor Proph., ii: New Century Bible, 254.

As to the reference of Zec. 12¹⁰ to the murder of Onias III in 170 B. C. (Rubinkam, Marti), this is only one among many theoretical possibilities. Most recognize that the attempt to identify the person originally referred to here is hopeless. Was Onias the only public man unjustly killed in Jerusalem, from B. C. 400 to 100? No process of exclusion can force us to the event of B. C. 170, when we are wholly ignorant of what we may be excluding.

Consider Isaiah 33, of which Duhm speaks as follows: "Dem apokalyptischen Charakter der in Vierzeilern abgefassten Dichtung entspricht der zerhackte, künstliche Stil; die Sprache ist die der spätesten Psalmen. Der Feind, der noch vergewaltigen darf, das freche Volk, das 'zählte und wog,' kann nur das Heer der Seleuciden sein, dessen Söldner, aus aller Welt zusammengeweht (vgl. 1 Mak. 6²⁸) eine unverständliche Sprache reden. Wie es scheint, ist Jerusalem vom Feinde eingenommen und verrätherisch behandelt worden. Der Eroberer scheint Antiochus Eupator gewesen zu sein und demnach unser Gedicht etwa in das Jahr 162 a. Chr. zu fallen" (Duhm, Jesaia, *ad loc.*).

Of the arguments contained in this passage from Duhm it is enough to say:

1. The apocalyptic character of the chapter is not strongly pronounced. The author does not hide his thought under obscure symbols, nor dwell on distant outcomes. The apocalyptic touches are of the earlier kind. A comparison with Daniel proves this.

2. The disconnected and artificial style is peculiar to no post-exilic century, as far as we know, and may be a personal idiosyncrasy.

3. The language shews many post-exilic relationships, but, again, is fixed by nothing as late as the second century. The most careful examination of the language has been exhibited by Cheyne, *Intr. to the Book of Isaiah* (1895), who, in view of it,

says (p. 171): "On the ground of the vocabulary alone, one could not venture to claim chap. xxxiii as post-exilic,—it might conceivably belong to the last century of the kingdom of Judah."

4. Why *must* the foe be the mercenary army of the Seleucids, on account of their unintelligible language? Does Is. 28¹¹ refer to the mercenary army of the Seleucids?

On the other hand there is a possible indication in Is. 33¹⁴⁻¹⁶ that its date is a good deal earlier than the second century. There is a strong suggestion in these verses of Ps. 15, and even if a large part of Is. 33¹⁵ be a late amplification,—too detailed and precise to be likely in the impassioned context (which is the opinion of Duhm and Marti, and considered, as an hypothesis, by Cheyne, Intr., but by no means certain),—still the suggestion remains, although less definite. But if literary dependence exists, it is surely not a dependence of the vigorous, poetic outburst of Is. 33¹⁴ on the sober, moralistic Ps. 15. Now Ps. 15 belonged to the relatively early collection of Psalms known by the name of "David," made certainly not later than the third century, B. C., and perhaps in the fourth. If, then, Ps. 15 depends on Is. 33, the latter might fall naturally into the fourth century.

The arguments for placing Is. 34, 35 late in the second century (but before 128 B. C.) are of a vague character, and make the impression of being largely subjective. In fact Is. 34 suggests Joel, Malachi, and, notably, Zephaniah, although less concrete than these, especially the last two. It is probably later than Zephaniah, and post-exilic. It may be later than Malachi, or even than Joel, but need not be much later. The evidences of dependence "on very late passages of Isaiah" (Marti) either are imaginary, or raise more questions than they answer. The phrase *סִפֵּר יְהוָה*, 34¹⁶ ("einer der sonderbarsten Sätze in allen Prophetenschriften," Duhm) does not lose its strangeness by being placed in the second century, if it be a designation of the writer's own work, as Duhm's own explanation on this theory should convince any reader. Why, however, may not the reference be to Je. 50³⁸ (not Jeremiah, but from the middle third of the sixth century), with a reference to *מַעַל הַסֶּפֶר* of Je. 36¹¹, or even, possibly, to Is. 13²⁰⁻²², and the sense be that all the desolation usually predicted by the writings of Yahwe's servants for presumptuous nations shall befall Edom? O. C. Whitehouse,

Isaiah: New Century Bible, has still another theory, comparing Ps. 139¹⁰.

Isaiah 35, again, has striking resemblances with chaps. 40-55, but is probably later than this writing; a few generations, however, will answer all the requirements of the case.

Isaiah 24-27 is ascribed by Duhm and Marti to the times of John Hyrcanus (135-105) and Alexander Jannæus (104-78); this latter date applies to 25⁹⁻¹¹, whose exultation over Moab is connected with Alexander's reign by the slender thread of a line of Josephus, *Ant.* xiii, 13. 5: "He also overcame the Moabites and Gileadites, who were Arabians, and made them pay tribute" (Marti assigns this with less confidence than Duhm to Alexander's time, and gives the later years of John Hyrcanus as an alternative). The symbolic designations of hostile peoples, 27¹, are identified with the Parthians, the Syrians and the Egyptians—the Parthians appearing on the scene as a plundering horde, about 129. Jerusalem had already been besieged by Antiochus Sidetes, who insisted on severe terms (*Jos., Ant.* xiii, 8. 2-4), and this is reflected in 24¹⁰⁻¹². The city destroyed, in 25¹⁻², is Samaria, reduced by John Hyrcanus; the "strong nation, city of peoples" (25³) is Rome. All this is ingenious and plausible, but in no detail compelling—as it ought to be, to overcome the mighty presumption of the completed canon of the Prophets,—and the combination of plausible but not conclusive details does not make a convincing whole.

The deeper reason for looking into the second century for these chapters arises from the apocalyptic character of them, which suggests the influences that produced the Book of Daniel, and from such an advanced theological idea as that of resurrection (26¹⁹). But even this proves, on examination, not to be decisive—if this kind of argument could ever be decisive;—it rather leads to an opposite conclusion, because the apocalyptic of Daniel is much more developed and sustained, probably therefore later, and the teaching of resurrection in Dn. 12², including bad as well as good, is a distinct advance on Is. 26¹⁹. We should be led thus to the third century, and might go back as far as the fourth, where also historical settings have been found for our chapters. Whether we can settle upon any one with confidence is, in the present, still meagre, condition of our historical knowledge of

these centuries, not important (on particular theories v. Cheyne, *Intr. to Isaiah*, cf. Stade, *ZATW*, 1882, pp. 298–306).

Space will not permit even so brief a summary as the foregoing of the arguments concerning the other passages which are ascribed by Duhm and Marti to the second century. But it is worth while to illustrate the defective method of argument by which the claim is sometimes propped up.

Duhm grants that Je. 30^{8a} imitates Jeremiah, but argues for its very late date on the ground that יָלַד, v. 8, means “bear a child,” while the same word in the older literature means also “beget.” This would be absurd here, and the ambiguity would forbid its use, according to Duhm. יָלַד does, of course, mean “beget,” sometimes, in the older literature, although this meaning is relatively uncommon; but it has the same meaning occasionally in the later language, as well. The passages are: 1 Ch. 1¹⁰, 11¹², 18¹⁸, 20²⁰ (|| Gn. 10), Pr. 17²¹, 23²², 24²⁴, Dn. 11⁶—quite enough to shew that this sense of the word was familiar in the third and second centuries. Ambiguity then did not forbid its use, and in Pr. 17²¹ we have the pt. יָלַד, as here. In each case it is the context that relieves the ambiguity. The author of Je. 30⁸ passes rapidly from יָלַד זָכָר to the phrase פִּיּוּלָדָהּ, which interprets the preceding. Absolutely nothing is gained by making this late.

Again, in v. 7, Duhm makes יַעֲקֹב a mark of late date:—“Jakob . . . wie die späteren Schriftsteller gern die ganze Judenheit in und ausser Palästina nennen (vgl. zu Ps. 59¹⁴).”

In Ps. 59¹⁴ we have: וַיֵּדְעוּ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מִשָּׁל בְּיַעֲקֹב לְאַסְפִּי הָאָרֶץ, on which Duhm (Marti, *Kurzer Handkomm.*) says: “Die Enden der Erde kommen desshalb in Betracht, weil ‘Jakob,’ oft ein Ausdruck für die ganze Judenheit, über die ganze Erde zerstreut ist.” This makes no progress, for it does not prove that “Jacob,” as national name, is *peculiar* to the time when Jewry was scattered over the earth, and is therefore a sign of late date.

In fact, who does not recall Is. 40²⁷, 41⁸, 14¹⁴, 42²⁴, 43¹, 22²², 28²⁸, 44¹, 5⁵, 21²¹, 45⁴, 46³, 48¹³, 49⁵, 6⁶ (in all of which יַעֲקֹב is || יִשְׂרָאֵל); “King of Jacob,” 41²¹, “Mighty One of Jacob,” 49²⁶, “seed of Jacob,” 45¹⁹ (but possibly personal here), “house of Jacob,” 48¹, Ez. 20¹ (|| “Israel”), “Jacob” Ez. 39²⁵ (|| “house of Israel”), La. 1¹⁷, 2², 3³; but also earlier still: “house of Jacob,”

Is. 2⁶, cf. 8¹⁷ and (all || "Israel"), Dt. 33¹⁰, Nu. 24^{5. 18}, 23⁷, Mi. 3^{1. 8. 9}.—יַעֲקֹב therefore appears to be no mark of date at all; it could be used of the people compact in their own land or of the same people widely dispersed, as the case required.

Once more, on Je. 30²¹, Duhm remarks: "Es fällt auf, dass der Verfasser den Herrscher mit dem Ausdruck bezeichnet [מִשְׁל, מַלְכִּי], der in den späteren Schriften (Neh. Chr. Psalmen) für die Notablen der Gemeinden gebraucht wird, aber das Wort König vermeidet. Vielleicht erwartet er die Aufrichtung des Königthums noch nicht für die nächste Zeit. . . . Er hat wohl die Zeit eines Alexander Jannæus noch nicht erlebt."

—But מַלְכִּי is used of the "notables" as early as Ju. 5^{13. 26}. And did Ezekiel write in Hasmonean times because he avoided the word "king" and spoke of the future "prince" (נָשִׂיא, Ez. 34²⁴, 37²⁵, 44^{3. 8} + 16t.)? נָשִׂיא, נְשִׂאִים are used much more often than מַלְכִּי for the "notables of the congregation" in the later literature: Ex. 16²², Lv. 4²², Nu. 1^{16. 44} and often (more than 70t.) in P; also 1 Ch. 2¹⁰, 4²⁸, 5⁸, 7⁴⁰, 2 Ch. 1², 5². As for מִשְׁל, this is a good Isaian word for "notables" of the people, Is. 28¹⁴. And why might not Jeremiah use מַלְכִּי and מִשְׁל, as well as Ezekiel נָשִׂיא, or Deutero-Isaiah נָגִיד, נְגִידָה and מְצִיָּה? Duhm himself (Nowack, Handkomm.) gives a Messianic interpretation to Is. 55⁴, and נָגִיד, also, has abundant early attestations in the required sense.—Moreover, מוֹשֶׁל בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל is said of the future deliverer in Mi. 5¹, which Marti places no later than B. C. 500.

One of the most attractive arguments for the Hasmonean date of Je. 30²¹ is based on the clause: מִי הוּא־זֶה עָרַב אֶת־לְבָבוֹ לָנֶשֶׁת אֵלַי נָאָם י' v. b; the whole sentence reads: "And I will bring him [the ruler] near and he shall approach unto me; for who is he who hath pledged his heart to approach unto me? saith י'." "Pledged his heart" means "given his heart in pledge," a figure equivalent to "taken his life in his hand"; "who hath ventured, at the risk of his life, to approach unto me?" The conception of great peril in approaching deity is not a token of late date in itself (Gn. 32³⁰, Ex. 33²⁰, Ju. 6²², 13²², Is. 6⁵; in all these *seeing* God is spoken of). But the ritualistic interpretation is suggested here, as (also + אֶרֶץ) Ex. 19²². This, however, does

not necessarily prove a late date, for Ex. 19²² is from J. In fact Ex. 19²² is the only passage where 'נָשָׂא אֶל־י' is used with כֹּהֵן as its subject, so that this clause in Je. does not suggest Hasmonean times. הִקְרַבְתִּי, preceding, is more characteristic of priestly documents; הִקְרַב occurs with Aaron, or other priests or Levites, as its object, Ex. 29^{4, 8}, 40^{12, 14}, Lv. 7²⁵, 8^{6, 12, 24}, Nu. 8^{9, 10}, 16^{5, 6, 9, 10}. In Nu. 16, and only here, does it appear with י' as subject, or followed by 'אֶל־י.* Thus there is no recurrence of this construction later than P, in the fifth century. If it proceeds from the second century in Je. 30²¹ it stands alone there. The only reason for thinking of the second century at all lies in a supposed reference in this passage to a ruler who was at the same time, like the Hasmoneans, the high-priest. The sense would then be: I have given him access to me, as true high-priest, and woe to the man who assumes to be high-priest without my permission! Various usurping claimants of the high-priesthood might be in mind.

It may perhaps be worth observing that the phrase is never used elsewhere with reference to specifically high-priestly functions. Nu. 16^{9, 10} it is employed of Yahweh's allowing non-priestly Levites to approach him for their subordinate duties. This somewhat reduces the probability of a reference to the high-priesthood in Je. 30²¹. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an author who was greatly concerned with the high-priesthood of the Hasmoneans would emphasize also the fact that the ruler was one of the people themselves (מִבְּנֵי, מִקְרִבֵּי). He would have been likely to think this too suggestive of Jeroboam, who made Israel sin, and appointed priests מִקְצֹת הָעָם (1 K. 12³¹, 13³³), "from the ends (=whole) of the people," from the people at large.

The position of Messianic ruler was of itself a sacred one without his being a priest, (cf. Ps. 2, and Hg. 2²³, Zc. 6^{12, 13}, where rd. וְהָיָה [יְהוֹשֻׁעַ] כֹּהֵן מִיְּמִינוֹ with We Now GASm, C. F. Kent, v. LXX.) cf. Giesebrecht, Jeremiah. And of course, if the Messiah

* In Lv. 7²⁵ no subj. is expressed. Baentsch proposes י' as subject here also, but the presumption is strongly against it, both from the fact that לֵבִי follows, and because of the presence of מִשָּׁה as subject in Ex. and in Lv. 8^{6, 12, 24}.

was sometimes conceived as a militant priest, it might be after the order of Melchisedek (Ps. 110⁴).

An argument for the very late date of Je. 31³² is found by Duhm in the clause אֲשֶׁר הָסְמָה הַיּוֹם. He queries whether אֲשֶׁר refers to "day" or "covenant," "oder ob es, wie die LXX annimmt, so viel wie יָעַן אֲשֶׁר, weil, sein soll. Die letztere Annahme ist wohl die natürlichste, führt dann aber auf die Sprache der späteren Zeit." How אֲשֶׁר = "because" can be a token of post-Jeremian, to say nothing of Hasmonean, date is not clear. It occurs Gn. 30¹⁸, 31⁴⁰, 34^{13, 27}, Dt. 3²⁴, Jos. 4^{7, 28}, 22³¹, Ju. 9¹⁷, 1 S. 2²⁸, 15¹⁶, 20¹², and many other passages. Even יָעַן אֲשֶׁר, with which Duhm compares it, is not a sign of so late a date (Ju. 2²⁰, 1 S. 30²², Dt. 1⁸⁶ +).

In discussing Je. 31³⁴ Duhm says: "Mit der Erkenntniss Jahves kann nur die Kenntniss seiner Thora v. ³² gemeint sein, die lehrt, was in Jahves Augen recht ist, und die klüger macht, als alles andere in der Welt (vgl. Ps. 119⁹⁸ a.)." But this is only a part of Duhm's endeavour to belittle the spiritual value of the "new covenant" of Je. 31³¹ a., and exegetically is a begging of the question. Furthermore, the usage of the term "know י" is against him: Ex. 5³ (J), Ju. 2¹⁰, 1 S. 2¹³, 3⁷, Ho. 2²³, 5⁴, 8³, Jb. 18²¹, Ps. 79⁶; so with the noun יָעַת Ho. 4^{1, 6, 6}, 6⁶, Is. 11³, 58³, Je. 22¹⁶, Jb. 21¹⁴, Pr. 2⁵ (|| יראת י). The purely ethical sense of "knowing י" appears distinctly in Ho. 4¹; 2^{21b, 22} is worth quoting: ". . . I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness, and in justice and in kindness and in mercies; I will even betroth thee unto me in faithfulness: and thou shalt know י." Ho. 6⁶ teaches precisely the reverse of that which Duhm understands in Je.: "For I desire kindness, and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings."

The ceremonial law and all scribal pedantry are excluded here. "To know Yahweh" has had a long and noble history in the mouth of the prophets. A determination to empty this prophecy of its heart and its spiritual life may disregard this, but the process is not exegesis.

Every Old Testament scholar must recognize his enormous debt to Duhm, whose independence and vigour have done so much to re-vitalize Old Testament exegesis and criticism, but his opinions on the points under discussion are certainly misleading.

It may be understood, then, that our prophetic canon was, in all probability, complete about B. c. 200, in such a sense that no substantial additions and no radical reconstruction took place after that time. Nor was any prophetic work issued after that date which later collectors thought worthy of receiving normative authority, except the Book of Daniel. Before 200 the prophetic force had been long dwindling, the prophetic personality receding, and the prophetic style shewing artificiality and decay. The decline and the cessation of prophecy are, then, actual phenomena.

This being so, how far can we assign specific reasons for the fact? What, at least, are the chief coincident phenomena which may have tended to produce it?

1. The coincidence of a long period of national enfeeblement and subjection with the period during which the decline of prophecy went on is obvious enough. The aim of the faithful prophets had been the moral life of the nation, and the result of moral awakening was, or was to be, national strength and prosperity. The political depression of the people, involving loss of independence and, for many, of national ambition, did not correspond with the conditions under which prophecy had grown up. The hopes of the greater prophets had not been primarily material, but they had been distinctly national. The contrast between this and the post-exilic situation tended to increase, as the dependence of Israel on Persia and Greece grew into a habit. Deutero-Isaiah, Haggai and Zechariah could expect national revival more readily than a prophet of the fourth or third century could do. What was statesmanlike in the prophet found little scope, and expectation of radical change grew dim. National aspiration had little nourishment to share with religion. The Maccabean revolt, with its associated national spirit, vigorous for a time, was needed to evoke even the one prophetic book of Daniel.

The situation must not be exaggerated. There was, of course, a communal life without interruption after the exile. There was genuine religious power in Malachi and Jonah and Zechariah 9-14, although national independence was in a past increasingly distant. And when prophecy at length revived, in John the Baptizer and in Jesus, the national life was a petty affair.

And if it be said that it was the individualistic note in the preaching of John and of Jesus that stirred the conscience, and the thought of individual need that impelled the speakers themselves—and we need not for the moment stop to inquire how far this statement needs to be qualified—one may ask why the prophets had not drawn from individualism, centuries before, a like inspiration?

2. We are thus led to consider the growth of individualism. The increasing prominence of the individual in prophetic eyes was natural, and necessary. To assail the moral corruptions of their nation was long their principal message, and these corruptions inhered in individuals. The nation was corrupt by reason of its corrupt members. The prophets were therefore, in fact, working, at least from the beginning of their literary period, for the actual promotion of individualism. In the seventh century and the sixth, in Micah 6, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, a conscious individualism appears, alongside the national point of view, and independent of it. After the exile, as we know, individualism had a large development, especially in the moralists.

But while prophecy could regard the individual as a constituent part of the nation, and subsidiary or injurious thereto, and even, occasionally, consider the individual by himself, there were reasons why, as a movement, it could not readily adapt itself to the new individualism,—the outgrowth largely of its own rebukes and exhortations. There is, of course, no intrinsic difficulty in preaching God's will to individuals, as such, when you see them in their large relations. But the prophets were not at once in a position to see the individual in his large relations, when the conception of nationality was dwarfed. You must consider the large relations of an individual either in space or in time. You may conceive him as a member of a great, and important, community, present in reality or in thought, and as getting his importance from that membership. Or you may conceive of him as a being with seeds of immortality in him, working out his long destiny, and getting his importance from his immeasurable duration. Now the personal hereafter was a shadowy and ineffective idea to most of the prophets of the Old Testament. Therefore, when the communal importance of the individual

dwindled, with the community itself, there was no conviction of his endless existence to take the place of his communal importance in the prophet's mind. There might still be kindly interest and a desire to do good, but nothing to stir deep convictions and arouse passionate enthusiasm such as was needed to sustain the prophetic vocation. Reflection, moralizing, ethical precept—shrewd, sagacious, epigrammatic—took the place of fiery denunciation and impassioned appeal. The prophet gave place—not wholly, but largely—to the sage, the living message to the ingenious aphorism, and the wise utterance of the careful preceptor became the main resource in the training of personal life. The era of the moralists gave place to the personal messages of John the Baptizer, and Jesus, only when the life of the individual was seen continuing into a new dispensation in the realized kingdom of God.

3. The rise of the moralists was in itself an influence unfavourable to any revival of prophecy. They reasoned out the principles that should govern human conduct. Calmness was a mark of them, quiet rationality as opposed to impetuous fervour. It was the reign of careful judgment and not a rush of scorching fire. Their teaching of righteousness was in large measure a thing of rules and maxims. An atmosphere of temperate wisdom was created, in which prophetic ardour perhaps found difficulty in breathing. Thus, notwithstanding many evidences of various and contrary schools of thought and qualities of temper in the Jewish people in Palestine, the wide spread of the moralizing temper formed a natural, though partial, barrier against the readjustment of prophecy to the new conditions. The moral precept was more at home than the prophetic appeal, at a time when the individual was simply a human unit, whose life was of a few years only.

4. A kind of cosmopolitanism, also, was growing up, which was, to some extent, an enemy of zeal, and tended toward indifference in religious matters. How strong this was appears from the importance of the Hellenizing party under Antiochus Epiphanes. It appears there as indifferentism in matters of ritual. But it was not marked by strenuous effort after personal righteousness according to any prophetic standard. It was probably not without its influence on the moralizers, as appears in those maxims

which are rather shrewd than saintly. It was no natural soil for the growth of the prophetic spirit.

5. One kind of prophecy, indeed, persisted, but it was an exception that proves the rule. The *apocalypse*, or exhibition of the future in symbolic pictures, had been used sparingly, if at all, by the early prophets. Their minds had not moved in such channels. They abound in figure, but their expectation is definite and their portrayal clear. The apocalyptic interest appears in Ezekiel, of course, who dwelt on a future whose conditions must be different from those of the sad and evil present. Joel illustrates it. Daniel is largely given over to it. There are post-canonical books, like Enoch and its kin, whose symbolic visions are wild and vague. The apocalypse, for its real value, needs more even than any other kind of prophecy to keep in close touch with the ethical, and to be connected with the personal life of its time. To an increasing degree this was not so with the Jewish apocalyptic. Under the form of prediction it cut loose from life. It abandoned to the sages the care of the individual in his present moral concerns and perils, as well as the care of immediate communal interests, and flung itself with unrestrained imagination upon the future. Thus prophecy forgot its true concern for men. Even life after death took on conditions remote from those of life before. In this development, the prophetic habit impaired the power to prophesy, and became a specific cause, one may well think, of the disappearance of the prophets,—a habit made sterile by its own excesses,—perishing at length for lack of ethical content and touch with the vital problems of men.

6. Probably chief among the phenomena which synchronize with the decline of prophecy, was the increasing domination of the religious life by ritual. There is clear proof that prophecy was affected by this phenomenon. Ritualist and moralist lived easily side by side, and at length united by amalgamation, as ritual came to be regarded as of the essence of morals. Not so with the ritualists and the prophets. The early prophets had been foes of the ritual. A brave attempt to ethicize the ritual and so unite these religious forces was made in the Book of Deuteronomy. This appeared to be failing even before the great cataclysm of the exile. What might have happened if the nation

had lived on, we do not know. But in the narrower conditions of post-exilic life, with the opposition between prophecy and ritual broken down by Deuteronomy, and with Ezekiel shewing prophecy fairly within the framework of ritual, the domination of ritual might almost have been foreseen. Ritual was much better qualified to govern the community as a provincial fragment of the Persian empire than prophecy could be. And ritual, no doubt, had its real service to render. But it is not easy to see how, under the best post-exilic conditions, prophecy could have flourished by its side. Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi breathed its spirit, but their work was done in view of circumstances which did not recur. Jonah ignored ritual, and stands isolated. Joel and Daniel united ritual and apocalypse, and were sporadic appearances due to special emergencies. It would not be easy to shew how a permanent mating of prophecy and ritual could have come about. Certainly the revival of prophecy, in John and in Jesus, lends no colour to any such probability.

With all this it must be borne in mind that, to a large degree, the work specifically aimed at by the ethical prophets was ultimately accomplished. Their hope for a re-established nation of wide dominion and ideal glories was not realized. The Maccabean era, splendid as it was, did not fulfil their expectations, still less did the outbreaks and revolts that followed, down to the second century A. D. But their belief in one only God was established, and this belief was more effective in producing moral life among the people at large, in the post-exilic centuries, than anything we know of or can imagine in the times of Amos and of Isaiah. The work of such men as these lived after them, as it always does, and the Old Testament prophets had thus, through the succession of generations and by the influence of their written words, a great share in the revival of religion, and the institution of a new and diviner spiritual order, which appeared among men as the local life of the nation they loved and struggled for was passing away.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
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VIII

MAN AND THE MESSIANIC HOPE

BY THOMAS FRANKLIN DAY

I

THE writer wishes in the following pages to present a study of the human aspects of the Messianic ideal; to show its relation to the needs and hopes of generic humanity; and to set forth the racial significance of Israel and the Christ.

The basis of the Messianic hope lies in the intrinsic worth of man as a rational being made in the image of God. Therefore, while the Messianic hope in its distinctive sense had its historic origin among the Hebrew people, none the less it belongs to man as man. It was Hebraic only because it was first of all human. It sprang primarily out of the heart of humanity, although it took its initial form from the divinely nourished self-respect of the Israelitish people. The Hebrews, as a representative people, first and most fully apprehended the truth of man's essential dignity as God's offspring. While the rest of the world was still groping in darkness, the secret of man's larger destiny based upon his divine lineage was made known to the chosen people.

The difference between man as he is when left to himself and man as the subject of special revelation is strikingly presented in the Book of Daniel (7¹³) where, the world-powers having been represented as beasts, the Hebrew people are designated as "one like unto a son of man." It is as much as to say that the Hebrews had reached the human level while the other nations had not yet attained thereunto. This is more than a mere assertion of superiority due to race prejudice. It is based upon a judicial estimate of the characteristics of the respective peoples, and history justifies the comparison. For, in the centuries before Christ, humanity had attained its best estate religiously in Judæa. The highest human ideals had there found their worthiest ex-

ponents. What man ought to be, what he may and can become, received illustration and enforcement on every page of Hebrew history. For this reason the Hebrew people were in a position to become the spokesmen for the rest of the world. It was the entire race that uttered itself through Israel. The hope of Israel was the hope of mankind.

Hebrew literature is at its best when it strikes this universal, racial note. The eighth Psalm contains one of the classic expressions of Israel's conception of the intrinsic worth of man as man:

"When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers,
The moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained;
What is man, that thou art mindful of him?
And the son of man, that thou visitest him?
For thou hast made him but little lower than God."

It took centuries of divine teaching to make the Hebrew people realize this truth. When they learned it, it was not for themselves alone, but for all peoples to whom their message should come. It is through fellowship with God that man comes to himself and realizes to the utmost his innate possibilities. By the interplay of these two ideals—man's inherent worth and God's unstinted favor—the Messianic hope became a definite and potent factor in human history.

We may say then that the Messianic hope is instinctive in humanity; that it is based on an inherent sense of the worth of man as man; that it came to its classic expression in the experience of the Hebrew people; and that it did so only because they, in a degree far surpassing any other people, were the recipients of the free grace of Yahweh who took them into fellowship with himself and, identifying himself with them throughout their history, made them his co-workers through the truth that enlightened and the love that redeemed them.

II

The Hebrew word **כֹּהֵן** is not often used in the Old Testament. It refers usually to the priest or the theocratic king, both of whom held official positions as representatives of the nation and servants of Yahweh. It is used perhaps figuratively of the

patriarchs or, as some think, of the nation (Ps. 105¹⁸). The term is never used in the Old Testament of an ideal person of the future, whether prophet, priest or king. Nor is it used in the absolute sense of *the* Messiah. The references are uniformly to historical personages. This is true even in the case of Cyrus, who had already begun his victorious career when the great prophet of the exile hailed him as Yahweh's "anointed" (Is. 45¹). Not until after the Old Testament canon was completed was the term Messiah used as a designation of the expected One of the future.

Although the term Messiah was applied for the most part to individuals, the covenant idea which underlies it embraced the nation as a whole. Such terms as "my son," "my chosen," possess the Messianic quality as truly as the more distinctive term, "mine anointed"; and these terms are unquestionably applied to the nation. There is no mistaking their connotation: they are signs and seals of Israel's intrinsic worth in the eyes of Yahweh. They constituted the very soul of the covenant relation by which the Hebrew people were lifted above the indistinguishable mass of humanity to a place of distinction. God loved the Hebrews and therefore chose them to be his people; but he loved them because they were men, he chose them because they were his sons.

In the strictest sense of the term, therefore, the Hebrews became the Messianic people. By this phrase, more is meant than that Jesus the Messiah was born of the stock of Israel. It has, as we shall see, a real application to the chosen people. But because the covenant was not for Israel only, but for the world, all Messianic titles may be transferred to humanity as a whole. The human race is the Messianic race in the sense that God has chosen it in love to be the subject of eternal redemption. As Messianic individuals represented a Messianic nation, so a Messianic nation represented the Messianic race of mankind. In this view, the term "Messianic" has a wide meaning. In its most generalized sense, it embraces the total of humanity. In its more specific sense, it points to "Jesus only." The life-history of the Hebrew people forms the connecting link between the two.

III

Why did God choose Israel to be the nation which should represent the race in the preliminary stage of the redemptive process? Undoubtedly it was, in part, because the Hebrews had the Semitic genius for religion. But this of itself would never have set them forward on their remarkable career as world-teacher in the things of religion. We must add to their native aptitude the touch of divine grace through special revelation. There was something peculiar in the religious experiences of Israel. We are content to call it the whisper of God in the spiritual consciousness of an Abraham or a Moses, the response to which ratified the divine choice and opened a clear pathway for unbroken spiritual communion with the divine.

Thus Israel became a representative people; its spiritual history presents in miniature what the race-history would have been under like conditions. The results of its experience remain valid for all time as a life-asset for the race. This was God's method of awakening and developing the latent hopes of mankind. He selected a nation which should serve as pupil and teacher in one.

When a people acquire self-consciousness, they take their place in the world as a factor to be reckoned with. Soon or late they achieve prestige and power; they create a literature which enshrines their characteristic spirit and ideals. It was so with the Hebrews. Through the covenant they awoke to self-consciousness as Yahweh's elect people. Their literary development waited upon their political unification, and when the literature began to take shape, it embodied the buoyant and confident and joyous hope which never ceased in the darkest periods of their history to strike its resonant and inspiring note.

In the representation of the future which is given us in the earlier literature, no human figure stands out in isolated grandeur as the distinctive Messiah. We see only the ordinary human functionaries who were the natural representatives of the nation, viz.: The kings in their orderly succession (II Sam. 7¹²⁻¹⁶); the prophets (Dt. 18¹⁸⁻¹⁹); and the priests (Dt. 18⁵). The central figure is Yahweh himself who shall come to dwell

on Zion as Israel's judge, law-giver and king (Is. 33²³). He will be his own administrator; he will umpire the causes which are brought to his judgment seat; he will speak peace to the nations; he will make Jerusalem the center of the world's religious life; the instruments of war shall be turned into the implements of peaceful industry (Is. 2²⁻⁴).

IV

All this brings us close to the universal world-life. We see how the welfare of the race is bound up with the destinies of the chosen people. Israel, we have said, lived a representative life. Let us note here some specific instances in which this vital fact appears:

In the first place, it is prophecy that paints the picture of the world-future. And Hebrew prophecy is characterized by breadth of sympathy for all human needs and by a ready adaptation to all human conditions. Everywhere it strikes the universal key. Even when it speaks to present conditions, it utters truths of dateless significance and value. The greatest of the prophets apparently were conscious of being called to a universal ministry. When they summoned heaven and earth as witnesses, they seemed to claim for their message a world-wide application. When, as with a voice of thunder, they denounced approaching doom upon guilty nations, they seemed to feel that the universal moral sense would ratify the judgment. When they voiced the hope that was in them—hope for Israel and for the world—they expressed it in language so lofty and with a conviction so compelling that subsequent ages have been content to accept their words as expressive of their own highest hopes and aspirations.

Secondly, the experience of Israel was representative in its consciousness of sin. Sin as a fact of consciousness appears nowhere so vividly in the ancient world as in the experience of the Hebrew people. This was due to their tuition under the law. But Hebrew law as a code of ethical requirements brought to light only the sins which mankind in general commit: offences against justice, purity and love. There would have been no variance between Greek philosopher and Hebrew prophet in

their estimates of moral conduct, if both had drawn their knowledge of ethical principles from the same source. Despite the disadvantage under which the pagan conscience labored, its sense of sin was often remarkably clear. The difference between Hebrew and non-Hebrew at this point was chiefly this: The former saw deeper into the meaning of sin; he had a clearer conception of it as a moral barrier between himself and God; he strove more steadily and earnestly to remove the barrier; and if at times he mistook ritual for righteousness, he found the very law in which he trusted to be at last a "schoolmaster to bring him to Christ." He learned that the divine election was an election of grace and that there was no difference between Israel and the rest of mankind in point of merit, but only in priority of experience of salvation. What he learned of the "plague of his own heart" the Gentile will learn too; and, making due allowance for variety in the divine propædæutic, both will learn in essentially the same way how the plague-spot may be healed.

Thirdly, Israel was representative in its experience of suffering. From the beginning men had known what suffering was. Suffering as punitive, the pagan mind could understand, but suffering as cleansing and redemptive was not in all its thoughts. Much of the world's sorrow and suffering had without doubt been vicarious, but the principle of vicarious suffering waited for elucidation in the light of Hebrew experience. It was not the quantity of suffering which "the servant of Yahweh" endured that gave it its peculiar character; rather it was the perception of its quality that gave pathos and pungency to the prophet's description of it. It was suffering for a beneficent purpose. It held in its bosom the secret of salvation. It foreshadowed the crucifixion. It showed that suffering endured in patient love, though in itself a thorn, will bear fruit to eternal life in the hearts of its beneficiaries. The principle of vicarious suffering has vital significance for all mankind. The Hebrews learned it and applied it in their own experiences in advance of their fellows. The cross of Jesus is its supreme example.

Thus far we have dealt with the national features of the Messianic ideal. Israel, as the Messianic nation, lived its unique life not for itself alone. It sounded the depths of the moral life and

rose to the heights of spiritual exaltation in order that the whole world might attain spiritual insight and enter upon its divine inheritance. And in large part the Hebrews directly influenced other nations along the line of their peculiar experience. Hebrew thought and Hebrew faith permeated the civilized world through the diaspora. The proselytes of the gate were frequently among the choicest spirits of the time.

But it was not the divine intention that the world should receive its spiritual education wholly at the hands of the Hebrews as a people. The best and most vital things could be known only from the lips of him in whom the Hebrew ideals and spirit should at length reach their perfect efflorescence. Between Messianic Israel and the personal Messiah ran various connecting lines on which were threaded, so to speak, various Messianic individuals—prophets, priests and sages, royal personages and men gifted in song.

V

The Messianic ideal which was latent in the nation's organic being could be expressed in its variety only through individuals. For the prophetic ideal "men of spirit" were needed, and for the kingly, "men of valor." At length the individuals stood as the concrete realization of the ideal, but even so no single individual realized it in its fullness, but only in part. Moreover, prophet, priest and king, even at their best, were never considered apart from the nation. As they derived their position and their meaning from the organism, so they reflected back upon the organism the honor and prestige which they severally acquired through their personal worth and achievements. Thus nation and individual co-operated to produce the image of perfected humanity in which the general and the particular each found its place.

Just as the national experience revealed generic relationships, so each Messianic individual embodied some essentially human trait which every man ideally considered should possess.

The principal emphasis was laid upon the royal function. There was a reason for this. While prophecy is the living voice that speaks for the conscience of mankind, and priesthood that which promotes the culture of religion on its æsthetic or its moral

side, kingship is the embodiment of the human will; not the lawless self-will of the natural man, but the will as enlightened by divine truth and swayed by divine power that persuades but does not compel. The king must be the first subject of the realm. He must enforce the law and be himself a pattern of righteousness. Saul was rejected because he had not learned to obey. David was a man after God's heart because he recognized that he was but the representative of Yahweh on the one hand and of the nation on the other. That David did not always live up to this high ideal was painfully evident, but nothing more signally proved the reality and imperativeness of the ideal than the judgment that fell upon David's house. Chastisement, defeat, or impending dethronement warned the occupants of the throne against placing too low an estimate upon the divine requirement.

There was danger in making the royal type too prominent. The current expectation regarding the Messianic king was a constant embarrassment to Jesus. More than once he refused the proffered crown, knowing that for him the royal idea included elements of which the people had no conception. Long ago prophecy had presented two ideals which tended greatly to shade the splendor of the royal type, viz.: the portrait of the ideal man and that of the patient sufferer. Both rest on something more fundamental than royalty, something which belongs to man as man, and which glorifies the common man as truly as it does the king. Either would serve as model for any of the sons of men.

Jesus betrayed his unerring consciousness of his Messianic vocation when he perceived that all these various elements were necessary to the true Messiah and in his matchless way combined them in his own strong and simple personality. The individualizing of the Messianic function was unified and perfected in his person. He was in reality all that his forerunners were in type. He exhibited in fullness what they performed in part. In him all the Messianic forecasts were personalized and made eternally sure. Henceforth we look not for another.

VI

The perfection of Jesus' character lies in its absolute human-ness. That he lived a normal human life; that he was tempted in all points like as we are; that he learned obedience by the things which he suffered, we gather from the story of his earthly career. That he lived his life without sin is also of record, and the burden of disproof is upon him who would show the record false.

We are fain to believe that Jesus chose the title "Son of Man" because of its simple human connotation. He was very man of very man. In him Israel flowered and humanity came to its own. Generic humanity took fresh root in him. He epitomized in himself the race as it was destined to become.

In his teaching he worked constructively on the human plane. He magnified the worth of the individual man. He held the soul, the self, which is the core of personality, to be of more value than the whole material world. He was the friend of sinners, and in his intercourse with the lowest we can see what must have been his constant feeling as he moved among the throng that pressed him. Rank, wealth and culture, and the privileges of birth were as nothing in his eyes compared with the simple fact that men and women were born of the earth-mother and had God for their father. Everywhere he felt the human touch, and it drew from him the virtue of his unspent sympathy. Whether to Zacchæus the extortioner or to the woman taken in adultery, his appeal was to the best that was in humanity and the appeal was always made in faith.

The story of the temptation throws a flash of strong light upon Jesus' habits of thought. We are told that the devil showed him all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. The vision itself probably was not new to Jesus. The world as a whole had been present to his mind before. He repelled the suggestion of Satan, but he retained the panoramic vision. Out of his deep brooding over it came his "weltanschauung." His eye was fixed upon the total of humanity as the sphere of God's present and future working. He expected that when he should be lifted up from the earth, he would draw all men unto himself. His out-

look and his hope, and his invincible purpose, were universal, racial.

Thus far we have been moving among things essentially human. And, not only his death, but his resurrection and ascension,—were they not as truly stages in his human career as were his birth, his circumcision and baptism? Was he not exalted to the right hand of God because of what he had done as man when he lived his life in the flesh? Was it not as the ideal man that the divine benediction was bestowed on him—"This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased"? And when we think of Jesus as divine, is it not because his divinity is the irrefragable conclusion of the argument which his total life presents?

Our vision still is of man; man on the way to a predestined salvation. We have seen humanity as a whole rising through Israel to a sense of its worth in the sight of God. We have seen it come to maturity in Jesus in whom the divine Word was made flesh. We have seen it made perfect through suffering and exalted to a place within the Godhead. The task of Jesus which he began on earth he completes from his theanthropic throne. He sends forth his Spirit, which is the Spirit of sonship, to reproduce in all the sons of men a character like his own, thus making them partakers of the divine nature. We see not yet what man shall be; but we hear the footfalls of an unnumbered host, and catch the strains of an ascending song—the processional of redeemed humanity.

SAN ANSELMO, CALIFORNIA,
July, 1910.

IX

NOTES ON TWO PASSAGES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT APOCRYPHA

BY A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON

It may be somewhat hazardous for a non-specialist in Biblical and Semitic subjects to enter among the ranks of contributors to this volume, but I remember the kindness with which Dr. Briggs, the first president of our little Oriental Club in New York, used to call upon me, as the only Indo-Iranian member, to present something after the papers of the evening were read, and how graciously the Biblical colleagues received such communications, though not directly in their line. For that reason I count it a privilege and a pleasure to add the accompanying notes from the field of Iranian studies in connection with two passages in the Old Testament Apocrypha as a memento of kindness on the part of a friend and as a mark of regard for the scholar whom I have long admired.

1. *A Note on Ragau (Avestan Raghā, Old Persian Ragā) in Judith* 1^{5,16}

Owing to my interest in Zoroaster I have always felt an attraction for the history of ancient Raghā, the modern Rai, whose ruins lie about five miles south of Teheran. Raghā is supposed by tradition to have been the home of Zoroaster's mother, and appears as 'Rages' or 'Ragau' in Tobit and Judith.* On each

* A description of the ruins of Raghā and a sketch of its history, by the present writer, will be found in *Persia Past and Present*, pp. 428-441, New York, 1906, and in the *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, pp. 237-245, Bombay, 1908. For the tradition about Zoroaster's mother see *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, pp. 17, 192, 204, New York, 1899.

of the three visits which I paid to Persia in the years 1903, 1907, and 1910, I was particularly struck by the aptness of a local allusion in Judith to the plain and mountains about Rai, whatever may be the inaccuracy of other allusions in this non-canonical work.

The well known passage (Judith, 1¹⁻¹⁵) describes how Nebuchadnezzar marched against '(1) Arphaxad, who reigned over the Medes in Ecbatana, . . . (5) and made war with King Arphaxad in the great plain: this plain is in the borders of Ragau, (13) and he set the battle in array with his host against King Arphaxad in the seventeenth year, and he prevailed in his battle and turned to flight all the host of Arphaxad, and all his horse, and all his chariots; (14) and he became master of his cities, and he came even unto Ecbatana, and took the towers, and spoiled the streets thereof, and turned the beauty thereof into shame. (15) And he took Arphaxad in the mountains of Ragau, and smote him through with his darts, and destroyed him utterly, unto this day.'

I shall not enter here into the question of the historical or pseudo-historical identity of Arphaxad,* but I wish to emphasize the appropriateness of the references to the plain and the mountains in connection with Raghā, a matter that might be included with the local names regarding which Schürer remarks that 'der Verfasser seine Erzählung nicht geographisch in die Luft gebaut haben wird.' † In whatever direction one approaches Rai (Ragau, Rages), whether from the south or from the north, or when journeying to and from Khurasan, one is struck by the impression of plain and mountain alike. The photographs which are here reproduced will bring out that point more clearly; and, as I have noted elsewhere,‡ the mountains in question may either be a part of the Alburz range, as is generally thought, or

* See Cheyne, 'Arphaxad 2,' in *Encycl. Bib.* 1. 319, and W. Max Müller's 'Arphaxad,' in *Jewish Encycl.* 2. 137 and Prásek, *Gesch. der Meder und Perser*, 2. 35, n. 1. Gotha, 1910; and compare, O. Wolff, *Das Buch Judith*, pp. 51-56, Leipzig, 1861, and especially André, *Les Apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament*, pp. 153-154, Florence, 1903.

† Quoted from Löhr in Kautzsch's *Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen*, p. 148, Freiburg i. B., 1898.

‡ See *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, p. 239.



MOUNTAINS OF RAI, ANCIENT RAGHA
(Zoroastrian White Tower of Silence on the Hillside)





RUINS OF RAL, ANCIENT RACHA



they may rather be the spurs which form a minor ridge curving around ancient Raghā and giving an elevated effect, which the photographs show.

By way of supplement it may be added that 'the plain of Rai' is referred to, for example, by the Persian writer Mustufi; * while Ibn Haukal speaks of 'the mountains of Rai,' † Yakūt alludes to 'the bare and arid mountain' which dominates it, and Strabo speaks in a similar manner of the district as mountainous. ‡ It is worth observing that the old Latin (Itala) versions of Tobit state that 'Rages is built on the mountain, but Agbatana in the plain,' and that they are 'two days' journey' apart, see Neubauer, *Book of Tobit*, pp. 34, 53, 75. Knowing the topography of Rages makes the apocryphal narrative seem at least more vivid.

2. *An Iranian Parallel to the Story of Bel and the Dragon*

In the apocryphal story of 'Bel and the Dragon' a touch of Persian color, beside the Babylonian and Hebrew tinges, is given by the references to Astyages and Cyrus, in the favor of which latter monarch the prophet Daniel is represented as standing. The sequel of the discovery of the fraud of the Babylonian 'idol called Bel,' and its overthrow (vv. ¹⁻³), is furnished by the fabulous tale of the dragon destroyed by Daniel through an artifice. The passage is familiar, but I repeat it for convenience in the Revised Version (vv. ²²⁻²⁷).

(23) 'In that same place [as the idol] there was a great dragon, which they of Babylon worshipped: (24) And the king said unto Daniel, "Wilt thou also say that this is of brass? lo, he liveth, and eateth, and drinketh; thou canst not say that he is no living god; therefore worship him." (25) Then said Daniel, "I will worship the Lord my God: for he is a living God. (26) But give me leave, O king, and I shall slay this dragon without sword or staff." The king said, "I give thee leave." Then

* For Mustufi, see Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, p. 218, Cambridge, 1905.

† Ibn Haukal, ed. De Goeje, 2. 249, l. 2, and 2. 289, l. 9; cf. also Ouseley, *The Oriental Geography of Ibn Haukal*, London, 1800.

‡ For Yakūt, see tr. Barbier de Maynard, *Dict. Géog. de la Perse*, p. 274, Paris, 1861, and cf. Strabo, *Geog.* 11. 13. 7, Casaub., p. 524.

Daniel took pitch, and fat, and hair, and did seethe them together, and made lumps thereof: this he put in the dragon's mouth, so the dragon did eat and burst asunder.'

The Iranian quasi-parallel, to which I would call attention, is found in the Pahlavi work, *Kārnamak-i Artakshshēr Pāpākān*, a romantic sketch of the fortunes of the first Sasanian king, Ardashir Babagan (224-241 A. D.). The work itself, which is written in Sasanian Pahlavi and is to be dated about 600 A. D., describes, among other things, how Ardashir destroyed the dragon of 'Haftan Būkht, the Lord of the Worm (Kirm),' or 'ruler of Kirman,' by an artful device.

Ardashir, after failing in an attempt to storm the fortress of the dragon and its lord, is advised by two devoted followers to resort to a clever piece of strategy in order to accomplish the destruction of the monster. I translate the passage from the Pahlavi, having at hand three editions of the text with versions, and also a German rendering.* The counsel of Ardashir's confederates is as follows:

'When the time comes for the dragon to devour its food, arrange so as to have molten brass ready to pour into the dragon's jaws (*rūi i vītakhtak pa zafar i ān drūj rēzishn*). That fiend in spiritual form can be slain through worship and prayer to God, and in its corporeal shape that fiend can be slain by molten brass.'

Accordingly, Ardashir, accompanied by the two trusty comrades, goes in disguise to the castle of the dragon, with gifts in his hands as an conciliatory offering, and gains entrance on the plea that he desires to worship and serve the monster.

'The idol-worshippers admitted Artakshshēr with his two manly men, and gave them a place in the abode of the dragon. For three days Artakshshēr made show of worship and devotion to the dragon in this manner, and presented dirhams and dinars and clothes to the worshippers, and so deported himself that all who were in the fortress admired and blessed him. Thereupon Artakshshēr said: "It would thus seem good if I might give the

* See Nöldeke, *Geschichte des Artakshshēr i Pāpākān*, in Bezenberger's *Beitr. zur Kunde der idg. Spr.*, 4. 55-56, Göttingen, 1878; Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, *The Kārname i Artakshshēr i Pāpākān*, 33, 36, Bombay, 1896; Kaikobad Adarbād Dastur Noshērwān, *Kārnamak*, pp. 13-14, Bombay, 1896; Edalji Kersāspji Antiā, *Karnamak*, pp. 29-31, Bombay, 1900.

dragon food for three days." The worshippers and those in command of affairs consented unanimously.* . . . On the day appointed, he himself had molten brass ready, while [his companions] Būrjak and Būj-ārtarō occupied themselves in worship and prayer to God. When eating time arrived, the dragon, according to his daily habit, made a roar. Artakhshēr had previously to this, at breakfast, made the idol-worshippers and those in command of affairs drunk and unconscious. He himself went with his companions into the presence of the dragon and carried into the presence of the dragon the blood of bulls and sheep, just as it received every day. As soon as the dragon opened its jaws in order to devour the blood, Artakhshēr poured the molten brass into its jaws; and when the brass came into its body, the dragon burst in twain, and such a roar came from it that all the men in the fortress came to the spot, and confusion prevailed in the fortress. Whereupon Artakhshēr laid his hand on his sword and shield, and wrought mighty havoc and slaughter throughout the fortress.'

The date of this prose romance, as already stated, appears to be about 600 A. D., and the same story is told in verse with some variations and added touches by the Persian epic poet Firdusi, 1000 A. D., when describing the events of Ardashir's reign. This latter version is easily accessible in a French and an Italian translation, if any one wishes to examine the question further.† In any event the quasi-parallel of the Pahlavi story to the Apocrypha seems worth recording, even without going into the question of possible influence from the Biblical side or through the common stock of dragon myths, such as Tiamat, Vritra, Python, Hydra, the St. George legend, or the Siegfried saga.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
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* I omit here a brief paragraph that explains how Ardashir had arranged a signal which his soldiers outside the fortress should recognize as soon as he killed the dragon.

† See Mohl, *Le Livre des Rois*, 5. 259-262, Paris, 1877; Pizzi, *Il Libro dei Re*, 6. 51 Turin, 1888.

X

THE DEFINITION OF THE JEWISH CANON AND THE REPUDIATION OF CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES

BY GEORGE F. MOORE

AT the beginning of the Christian era, lessons from the Pentateuch were read in the synagogue on the Sabbath, the book being for this purpose divided in such a way that it was read through in course in three years. This first lesson was followed by a second, selected from the Prophets, under which name the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings are included. These scriptures were given by God; their authors were divinely inspired, and divine authority resided in their every word.

Besides the Law and the Prophets there were several books to which the same character was ascribed: the Psalms—whose author, David, was, indeed, a prophet—Job, the Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Esther, Daniel, and others. These books, for which no specific name existed, were not read in the synagogue; it was not necessary, therefore, that the synagogue should possess a complete collection of them, and perhaps few private scholars had copies of them all. What books belonged to the Law and the Prophets every one knew; that was determined by the prescription of immemorial liturgical use and by long-standing methods of study in the schools. What books were comprised in the third class, "the scriptures," was not so determined. In regard to most of them there was, indeed, unanimous agreement; but others were not universally accepted: Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, and Esther, in particular were antilegomena; and on the other hand some reckoned Sirach among the inspired books. The question had, however, no great practical importance, and it does not appear that any attempt was made to settle it by drawing up a list of the 'scriptures.'



In the Christian church it was not the differences about anti-legomena, such as the smaller Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse, that compelled a definition of the canon of the New Testament, but the rise of heresies, particularly gnostic, whose writings, pretending to the authority of scripture, disseminated doctrines at war with catholic tradition and in the eyes of the catholic leaders subversive of the foundations of religion—writings doubly seductive because they professed to present the perfection of Christianity. The orthodox bishops were constrained, therefore, not only to unmask these insidious errors, but to publish for the guidance of the faithful lists of the books which the Church received as its inspired Scriptures, and to denounce as spurious the writings of the heretics.*

The so-called Muratorian canon is peculiarly instructive here, not only because it is the oldest list of this kind which has come down to us,† but because the specification of rejected writings shews clearly what were the heresies which gave its author the greatest concern. Thus, at the end of the enumeration of the Pauline Epistles we read:‡ *Fertur etiam ad Laudecenses alia ad Alexandrinos Pauli nomine finctae ad heresim Marcionis, et alia plura, quae in catholicam ecclesiam recipi non potest; fel enim cum melle misceri non congruit. Epistola sane Iudae et superscriptio Iohannis duas in catholica habentur, et Sapientia ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta. Apocalypses etiam Iohannis et Petri tantum recipimus, quam quidam ex nostris legi in ecclesia nolunt. Pastorem vero superrime temporibus nostris in urbe Roma Herma conscripsit, sedente cathedra urbis Romae ecclesiae Pio episcopo fratre eius, et ideo legi eum quidem oportet, se publicare vero in ecclesia populo neque inter prophetas completum numero neque inter apostolos in finem temporum potest. Arsinoi autem seu Valentini, vel Mitiadis [?] nihil in totum recipimus. Qui etiam novum Psalmorum librum Marcioni conscripserunt una cum Basilide, Assianum cataphrygum constitutorem. . . .*

The text is in more than one point obscure, but the names of

* This motive is set forth at some length by Athanasius at the beginning of the 39th Festal Epistle (A.D. 367).

† Drawn up probably in Rome near the close of the second century.

‡ The text is based on Preuschen, *Analecta* (1893), p. 129 ff., with correction of manifest orthographical errors and the introduction of the punctuation.



Marcion, of Valentinus and Basilides, and of the founder of the cataphrygian heresy, suffice to render the situation clear.

Similarly in the Jewish church: it was not the diversity of opinion in the schools about Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs that first made deliverances about the 'scriptures' necessary, but the rise of the Christian heresy and the circulation of Christian writings. Older than any catalogue of the canonical books which has been preserved* are specific decisions that certain books are not inspired scripture, and among these repudiated books the Gospels stand in the front rank.

The earliest deliverance of this kind is in the Tosephta,† Jadaim, 2^u:

הגליונים וספרי המינין אינן מטמאין ‡ את הידים. ספרי בן סירא וכל ספרים שנכתבו מכאן ואילך אינן מטמאין את הידים:

"The Gospels § and the books of the heretics are not holy scripture; || the books of the son of Sirach and all books that have been written since his time are not holy scripture."

To the same effect is the decision in Tos. Sabbath, 13 (14)⁶. The question here under consideration is: What things may be rescued from a burning building on the Sabbath? ¶ The general principle is that holy scriptures (expressly including the hagiographa) should be saved; ** but "the Gospels and the books of the heretics may not be saved"—they are not holy scriptures. The passage is so important that it must be quoted entire.

הגליונים וספרי מינין אין מצילין אותן אלא נשרפין †† במקומו הן ואזכרותיהם. רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר בחול קורע †‡ את האזכרות וגו' ושורף את השאר. אמר רבי טרפון אקפה את בניי שאם יבוא לידי

* The oldest (before 200 A.D.) is a Baraitha in Baba Bathra, 14^b, on the proper order of the Prophets and the Hagiographa.

† Ed. Zuckerman, Pasewalk, 1881.

‡ Ed. מסמאות.

§ That *gilion* here and in the following quotations is *εὐαγγέλιον* will be proved below.

|| Literally, "do not make the hands unclean"; the principle being, "All holy scriptures make the hands unclean." See below, p. 119.

¶ It being under ordinary circumstances a breach of the Sabbath to carry anything out of a building on that day; Tos. Sabbath, 1, Mishna Sabbath, 1.

** M. Sabbath 16ⁱ.

†† הן Ed.

‡‡ So Jer. Sabb. 16ⁱ (ed. Venet. f. 13^c). Zuckerman, with cod. Erfurt., קירא: other mss. and edd. of the Tosephta, Bab. Sabb. 116^a, Sifrè, Num. § 16 (on 5^a) קירר; Tanchuma, Buber, Korah, App. 1, קירט.

שאני שורפן הן ואזכרותיהן שאלו הרודף רודף אחריי נכנסתי לבית עבודה זרה ואיני נכנס לבתיהן שעובדי עבודה זרה אין מכירין אותו וכופרין בו הללו מכירין אותו וכופרין בו ועליהם הכתוב אומר ואחר הדלת והמזוזה שמת זכורנך. אמר רבי ישמאל ומה אם לעשות שלום בין איש לאשתו אמר המקום שמי שנכתב בקדושה ימחה על המים ספרי מינין שמטילין איבה וקנאה ותחרות בין ישראל לאביהם שבשמים על אחת כמה וכמה שיפרקו הן ואזכרותיהם ואליהם הכתוב אומר הלא משנאיך יי אשנה ובתקוממך אתקוממ תכלית שנאה שנאתים לאויבים היו לי. וכשם שאין מצילין אותן מפני הדליקה כך אין מצילין אותן מפני המפלוגות ולא מפני המים ולא מכל דבר המאבדן:

"The Gospels and the books of heretics are not to be rescued, but allowed to burn where they are, names of God and all.* Rabbi Jose the Galilean says:† On a week day one should tear out the names of God and put them away in safe keeping, and burn the rest. Rabbi Tarphon said: May I lose my children,‡ but if these books came into my hands, I would burn them, names of God and all! If a pursuer were after me, I would take refuge in a heathen temple and not in their conventicles; for the heathen deny God without knowing him, but these know him and yet deny him. Of them the scripture says: "Behind the door and the door post thou hast set up thy memorial."§ Rabbi Ishmael said: || If, to make peace between a man and his wife, God commanded, 'Let my name, which is written in holiness, be wiped off into the water,' how much more should the books of the heretics, who bring enmity and jealousy and strife between Israel and their father in heaven, be put out of the way, names of God and all. Of them the scripture says: "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? Do not I loathe them that oppose thee? I hate them with perfect hatred; I count them my enemies."¶ And as they are not to be saved from a fire, so they are not to be

* A pious man might scruple to allow the divine names to be destroyed, even in a context that richly merited destruction.—The same rule applies to written prayers and to amulets: "though they may contain the letters of the divine name and many sentences of the law," they are to be left to burn. Tos. Sabb. 13^a; Jer. Sabb. 16^a; Sabb. 61^b, 115^b.

† In Sifrè, Num. § 16, the view here attributed to Jose is maintained by Ishmael; Akiba says, One should burn the whole of it, because it was not written in holiness.

‡ A favorite oath of Tarphon; see *e. g.*, Tos. Hagiga 3^a.

§ Isa. 57^a.

|| See also Sifrè, Num. § 16.

¶ Ps. 139^a 1.

saved from the fall of a building, or from flood, or from any other destroying agency."

The whole passage is repeated—with minor variations which do not affect the sense—in Jer. Sabbath 16' * and in the Babylonian Talmud, Sabbath 116*.† In the latter the question is thereupon raised whether the books of "Be Abidan" fall in the category of heretical writings which may not be saved; and further (a propos of Tarphon's violent words about the conventions of heretics), whether it is proper to visit the "Be Abidan" and the "Be Nizrephi."‡ Rabbi Abbahu, to whom the inquiry was addressed, was not certain; precedents are quoted on both sides.

After this digression the Babylonian Talmud resumes the subject of the Gospels. In the current editions, since that of Basel (1578–1581), the text has been so mutilated by the censors that neither the connection nor the significance of the passage is recognizable. The subjoined text is that of the first complete edition of the Talmud, published at Venice by Bomberg in 1520.§ The most important variations of the Munich manuscript (M) and of an Oxford manuscript (O) are noted after Rabbinowicz, *Dikduke Sopherim*.

רבי מאיר קרי ליה און גיליון יוחנן קרי ליה עון גליון. אימא
שלום דביתו דרבי אליעזר אחתיה דרבן גמליאל הואי הוה ההוא
פילוספא דשיבבותיה דהוה שקיל שמא דלא מקבל שוחדא בעו לאחוכי
ביה אעיילה ליה שרגא דדהבא ואוול לקמיה אמרה ליה בעינא דניפלני
לי בנכסי דבי נשי אמר להו פלונו אמר ליה כתיב לן דבמקום ברא
ברתא לא תירוד אמר להו מן יומא דגליתון מארעכון איתגמלית אורייתא
דמשה ואיתהיבת עון גיליון וכתיב ביה ברא וברתא כחדא ירתון
למחר הדר עייל ליה איהו חמרא לובא אמר להו שפילית לסיפיה דעון
גיליון וכתיב ביה אנא עון גיליון לא למיפחת מן אורייתא דמשה אתיתי
אלא לאוספי על אורייתא דמשה אתיתי וכתיב ביה במקום ברא

* In his edition of the Midrash Tanchuma, Buber inserts the passage—which is not found in the common recension—at the end of the Paraasha Korah, from a Roman codex, in which, as Buber shows, it is derived from the lost Midrash Jelamedenu.

† Quoted in full from the Babylonian Talmud in Jalkut, II, § 488, on Isa. 57.

‡ What these assemblies were is a question that need not detain us here.

§ From a copy in the library of Union Theological Seminary, New York. The text of this edition is reprinted by L. Goldschmidt, *Der Babylonische Talmud*, 1897 sqq., with *variae lectiones* and translation.

ברתא לא תירות אמרה ליה נהור נהורין כשרנא אמר ליה רבן גמליאל
אתא חמרא ובמש לשרנא:

○ והיה לה דינא בהרי דרג ואחא קמיה דהויא + * M שמעון בן + * M רבי + *

4 * O נשיא * M > * M ואולה *

7 * M באורייתא * M אורייתא אורייתא Modern edd.—O reads: איחשולית אורייתא דמשה

מינטון ואיחיהבת לטון אורייתא דען גליון

* ולא Modern edd.

¹⁰ The three preceding words > M and earliest edd.

"Rabbi Meir called it *'awen gilion*, Rabbi Johanan called it *'awon gilion*."

Imma Shalom, the wife of Rabbi Eliezer and sister of Rabban Gamaliel, had in her neighborhood a certain philosopher † who had the reputation there of not taking bribes. They wished to bring him into ridicule, so she brought him a gold lamp, appeared before him and said: I want to have a share in the division of the patriarch's estate.‡ He said to them, Divide it, then! Rabban Gamaliel replied, It is written for us that where there is a son, a daughter does not inherit.§ The judge answered, From the time when you lost your independence the law of Moses was done away, and the gospel (*εὐαγγέλιον*) was given; and therein it is written, 'Son and daughter shall inherit alike.' On the following day, Rabban Gamaliel brought him a Libyan ass. The judge said to them, I have looked further down to the end of the Gospel, and there it is written, 'I, Gospel, did not come to take away from the law of Moses, but to add to the law of Moses I came'; || and it is written in it, 'Where there is a son, a daughter does not inherit.' Imma Shalom said to him,

* *און* and *עון* are both words of evil association in the Old Testament, especially connected with religious defection; *בית און* is Hosea's opprobrious name for Bethel (4¹⁵, 5⁸, 10⁴); for *עון* cf. Hos. 5⁴, 14², etc.

† I. e., heretic. Jebamoth 102b, "A heretic (*בניא*) asked R. Gamaliel," etc.; in Midr. Tehillim on Ps. 10 near the end, the questioner is a 'philosopher.'

‡ The estate of their father.—Cf. the request addressed to Jesus, Bid my brother divide the inheritance with me, Luke 12¹³.

§ See Num. 27⁸.—The Sadducees (*Tosephta*, "Boethusians") held that a daughter could inherit from her father, inasmuch as a granddaughter whose father was dead inherited from her grandfather. Tos. Jadaim 2³⁰, Baba Bathra 115^b.

|| Cf. Matt. 23¹⁸. The reading *אליא* is original; it was changed to *וליא* by editors, who made the superficial observation that the following quotation from the Gospel is identical with Gamaliel's from that law.

May thy light shine like the lamp! Rabban Gamaliel rejoined, The ass came and kicked over the lamp!" *

The story of Imma Shalom has no pertinence to the subject of Sabbath 16; it is brought in here because the judge in his decisions cites the *'awon gilion*. That this name is a perversion of *εὐαγγέλιον* † is put beyond question by the quotation of an utterance of Jesus which we read in the Gospel of Matthew, 5¹⁷. ‡

The rabbinical puns attach themselves to the word *gilion* in the preceding passage—"R. Meir called it *'awen gilion*," etc. *Gilion* itself, § as a name for the gospel, is another example of the same kind of wit; the word properly signifies a *blank*, writing material not written on, as the margins of a manuscript or blank spaces in one; || the *εὐαγγέλιον* is nothing but a *gilion*, a blank.

Constantly coupled with the gospel in the passages we have before us are the חסידים. *Minim* is the common name in the Talmuds and Midrashim for heretics; that is, Jews who maintained opinions or practised rites and customs at variance

* Substantially the same story, without any names, is told in Pesikta, Echa (ed. Buber, p. 122^b), and from the Pesikta in Jalkut on Isa. 1 (§ 391), as an illustration of the venality denounced in Isa. 1²³. The bribes are respectively a *silver* lamp and a little *golden* ass (asses colt); the last words are כפה פיה אם הסורה. This apparently proverbial expression occurs in another story of the venality of the priests of the second temple in Jer. Joma 1¹, Sifrè, Num. § 131 (on 25¹⁴), Pesikta, Aharè (ed. Buber, f. 177^a, Wayikra Rabba 21^a, Jalkut, Aharè, near the beginning.

† Cf. Rashi on Sabb. 116 (in uncastrated editions) מאיר קרי ליה לספרי חסידים (in uncastrated editions) מאיר קרי ליה לספרי חסידים (Evangile).

‡ Imma Shalom's words: "May thy light shine like the lamp," not improbably contain an allusion to Matt. 5¹⁶, "Let your light so shine before men," etc. Gùdemann (Religionsgeschichtliche Studien, 1876, pp. 79 ff.), comparing the groups of stories about bribery cited in note* above, conjectures that in the original version Gamaliel's present was not an ass (חסיד) but a measure (חסר) of gold—an allusion to the lamp under the bushel, Matt. 5¹⁵.

§ Cod. M consistently גיליון (sing.); Tos., and edd. in Sabb. *l. c.* have the plural.

|| E. g. M. Jadaim 3^a.—It is evident that the Babylonian Amoraim who discuss the Baraitha in Sabb. 116^b were ignorant of the origin of the name; they know only the ordinary meaning of the word, 'blank, margin.' But the contradictions which this involves bring them very close to the true explanation: The sense must be, the books of the heretics are like blank pages. The mutilation or perversion of names as a testimony of pious abhorrence is common in the Old Testament, and is explicitly enjoined, e. g. in Tos. Aboda Zara, 6^a.

with the standards of the community at large and the teaching of its recognized authorities.* The term conveyed the same reprobation as its Christian equivalent, and was as freely applied. The vexatious questioners who bring up the difficulties of scripture are called *minim*, even when their questions betray no tendency more dangerous than a disposition to pester the rabbis.† It may be suspected that they are sometimes fictitious interlocutors, put on the stage only to give the doctors an opportunity to show how easily such captious questions can be disposed of; the audience of pupils not infrequently intimate their dissatisfaction with the evasive answer, and ask for themselves a serious solution.

The heretics with whom the rabbis of the first centuries of the Christian era had to do were not a single school or sect, much less were they exponents of a coherent and consequent system of thought; they represent all the varying tendencies which in that age led individuals or groups to diverge more or less widely from the high road of sound doctrine and correct usage.‡ There are heretics who deny the resurrection of the dead, or at least that the belief has any foundation in scripture; and to the same class belong those who affirm that there is only one world.§ Some deny that there is any divine retribution; others, at the opposite extreme, deny that God receives the penitent.

There are heretics who deny revelation—"the law is not from heaven." In the damnation of these infidels the rabbis include those who impugn a single word in the written law or the most subtle point in the deductions of the learned.|| Those who ignore "the seasons and equinoxes"—that is, the rabbinical determination of the calendar, are also heretics; singularities in the form of the phylacteries or the manner of wearing them are "heretical ways"; turning the face to the East in prayer is a heretical custom. In particular, certain peculiarities in the

* Cf. Rashi on Gittin 45b: יחרי שאני מאמין לדברי ר'ל.

† Sadducees, Samaritans, Romans—especially emperors—philosophers and unbelievers, miscellaneously play the same rôle and propound the same questions.

‡ See Jer. Sanhedrin 10^a (Johanan): "Israel was not exiled until there were formed twenty-four sects of heretics."

§ M. Berakoth 9^a.

|| Sanhedrin 99^a, cf. Tanchuma, Ki Tissa 17.

slaughtering of animals are condemned as the practise of the heretics.

A heresy of a different type was the recognition of "two authorities," or powers (שני רשויות), or, as it is sometimes expressed, of more than one divinity (אלהות), especially in the creation of the world. According to Tosephta Sanhedrin 8', Adam was created at the end, "in order that the heretics might not say that God had a helper in his work." * These allusions do not disclose the meaning or motive of the heretical contention. It is only enveloping obscurity in confusion to label their error with names so charged with foreign connotation as dualism or gnosticism.† That they were influenced by conceptions of a godhead too exalted to do things himself—conceptions which were then everywhere in the air, and, as we see in Philo, found acceptance among Hellenistic Jews—may reasonably be surmised, but cannot be proved. No less uncertain is the common assumption that the heretics to whom the Tosephta and Mishna refer in the places quoted were Christians. Nothing that we know about the Jewish Christianity of the second century would lead us to think that the part of Christ in creation was a salient feature of their apologetic, nor is there anything distinctively Christian in the belief that God had a helper in creation.

From a much later time—the second half of the third and the first quarter of the fourth century ‡—are the discussions in which the *minim* bring a long array of biblical texts to prove a plurality

* Adam was not created an ordinary man, but a being of superhuman dimensions and intelligence. Cf. M. Sanhedrin 4'; Adam was created single (i. e., only one man was created), "in order that the heretics might not say that there is more than one power in heaven" (הרבה רשויות בשמים). Bereshith Rabba 1': all agree that the angels were not created on the first day, that it might not be said that Michael and Gabriel assisted in stretching out the heavens. Therefore angels are not to be adored.

† Elisha ben Abuya (Aher) is said to have been led to believe in "two authorities" by seeing, in one of his raptures, the "Metatron"; but we are none the wiser for this information (Hagiga 15a). The restrictions put on the study of the first chapters of Genesis and Ezekiel (M. Hagiga 2') imply that secret cosmological and theosophic speculations, perilous for common minds, were rife.

‡ The rabbis who take part in these controversies are Johanan (d. ca. 279), Simlai, and Abbahu (d. ca. 320). See Sanhedrin 38b; Jer. Berakoth 9', and parallels; and for Abbahu, the passages collected by Bacher, *Agada der Palästinschen Amoräer*, II, 115 ff.

in the godhead, such as the plural אֱלֹהִים in Gen. 1; "let us make man in our image" (Gen. 1st); "let us go down and confound their speech" (Gen. 11th); the plurals in Gen. 35th, כִּי שָׁם נָגַל, אֱלֹהִים; "thrones were set" (Dan. 7th), and similar expressions. That the disputants who cite these passages are Christians is altogether probable. Johanan, the respondent in the earliest of these controversies, had studied in Caesarea under Hoshaia, who may very well have been acquainted with Origen during his residence in that city.* Abbahu, the most distinguished pupil of Johanan, taught in Caesarea, where he was for a time contemporary with Eusebius; his familiarity with Greek is repeatedly attested. Simlai's school was in Lydda, which was a Christian bishopric certainly in 325 and probably earlier. We seem to hear a distinctively Christian note when the *minim* ask R. Simlai the significance of the *three* divine names אֱלֹהִים יְהוָה in Jos. 22nd and Ps. 50th.† The Christians in these controversies are, however, not representatives of Jewish, but of Catholic, Christianity.‡ The discussions are, in any case, much too late to throw any light on the beliefs of the heretics whose books are condemned in the Tosephta.

That among the heretics of the second century Jewish Christians had the place of eminence is proved by many stories of the relations of distinguished rabbis to them. Rabbi Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus),§ the brother-in-law of Rabban Gamaliel II, was once arrested on the ground of heresy (that is, as the sequel shows, on the charge of being a Christian), and brought before a Roman magistrate, who said to him, An old man like

* Origen was in Caesarea for two or three years from 215, and from 231 on it was his home. He frequently consulted Jewish teachers about points of exegesis. It has been surmised that the "Patriarchus Huillus" whom he quotes as authority for certain interpretations was Hillel II.

† Unmistakable is also the point of Abbahu's polemic (against unnamed opponents) in Shemoth Rabba 29^a: An earthly king has a father or a son or a brother; but God is not so (Isa. 44th): "I am the first"—I have no father—and "I am the last"—I have no son—"and beside me there is no god"—I have no brother.

‡ As in the second century Jewish Christianity was *the* heresy, the name *min*, 'heretic,' was ordinarily equivalent to Christian, and later was applied to Gentile Christians as well. Occasionally Christians of the uncircumcision are distinguished, as in Aboda Zara 65^a: a proselyte who lets twelve months pass without being circumcised is כִּסְיָן שְׁבַעֲסָרָה; cf. Hullin 13^b.

§ Tos. Hullin 2^a.

you occupying yourself with these things! Eliezer replied, One whom I can trust is my judge! The magistrate applied these words to himself (whereas Eliezer meant his father in heaven), and said, Since you show confidence in me, very well. I thought perhaps these errorists had seduced* you in these matters. You are acquitted. When he was dismissed from court he was much distressed because he had been arrested for heresy. His disciples came to console him, but he refused to be comforted. Then Rabbi Akiba came and said, Rabbi, may I speak without offence? He replied, Say on! Akiba said, Is it possible that one of the heretics repeated to you some heretical utterance and you were pleased with it? Eliezer responded, Heaven! you remind me. Once I was walking in the main street of Sepphoris, and met [one of the disciples of Jesus the Nazarene]† Jacob of Kefar Siknin, who repeated to me a heretical saying in the name of Jesus ben Pantera which pleased me well.‡ I have been arrested for heresy, because I transgressed the injunction of scripture, "Remove thy way far from her, and come not near the door of her abode; for she has laid low many slain" (Prov. 5^a + 7^{2a}).§

In the corresponding passage, Aboda Zara 16^b-17^a, the conversation between Jacob and Eliezer is reported by the latter, as follows: [Jacob asked] It is written in your law, "Thou shalt not bring the hire of a harlot into the house of thy God" (Deut. 23¹⁹). Is it permissible to use it to build a privy for the high priest? I had no answer for him.|| He continued: Thus did Jesus the Nazarene¶ teach me, "From the hire of a harlot she gathered it; to the hire of a harlot they shall return" (Mic. 1⁷). From a filthy place they came, to a filthy place they shall go.

* Reading by conjecture, הסיח; the text has הסיח. Cf. Sanhedrin 43^a, 107^b (of Jesus) הסיח ימסיה.

† These words are found in the parallel text, Aboda Zara 17^a.

‡ The curious *halaka* quoted below was perhaps not the only saying of Jesus that pleased Eliezer well. His words in Sotah 48^b, "A man who has a piece of bread in his basket and says, What shall I eat tomorrow? is one of them of little faith," sound like an echo of Matt. 6³¹.—My attention was called to this saying some years ago by Professor G. Deutsch.

§ The warning of the proverb against harlotry applied to heresy. Similarly Eccles. 7^{2a} is interpreted in Koheleth Rabba.

|| In Koheleth Rabba (on 1^a) Eliezer gives the opinion that it is prohibited.

¶ In Koheleth Rabba "So and So," as frequently to avoid the name Jesus.

Rabbi Eleazer ben Dama,* a nephew of Rabbi Ishmael, was bitten by a serpent, and Jacob of Kefar Sekania† came to cure him in the name of Jesus ben Pantera, but Rabbi Ishmael would not permit him, saying, You have no right to do it, Ben Dama.‡ The latter replied, I can bring you a verse to prove that he may heal me; but he died before he had time to adduce his proof-text. Ishmael exclaimed, Blessed art thou, Ben Dama, that thou didst depart in peace, and didst not break through the ordinance of the sages, etc.

The heresy that could bring so eminently conservative a teacher as Rabbi Eliezer into trouble had plainly a perilous fascination.§ Beside Ishmael's nephew, Eleazer ben Dama, several other rabbis are named who had singed their wings in fluttering around it.|| To guard against its seductive attractions, it was forbidden to enter into discussion with the heretics or have any intercourse with them.¶ The ordinance is introduced in the Tosephta in connection with the prohibition of a certain mode of slaughtering animals (bleeding them over a hole in the ground), which is said to be in accordance with the ritual rules of the heretics. The edict then proceeds:**

"It is permitted to derive profit from flesh which is in the possession of a gentile (גוי), but forbidden in the case of a heretic (סוֹרֵר); flesh from an heathen temple is the flesh of sacrifices to the dead. For the authorities say: The slaughtering of a heretic is heathen (עבודה זרה), their food is Samaritan food, their wine is libation wine,†† their fruits are treated as untithed, their books are books of magic (ספרי קסמים), and their children are bastards (בְּמוֹזֵרִין). It is forbidden to sell to them or to buy

* Tosephta Hullin 2^a*, immediately preceding the story of Eliezer ben Hyrcanus; Jer. Aboda Zara 2^a, Jer. Sabbath 14, end; Aboda Zara 27^b.

† So in Aboda Zara 27^a. The Palestinian tradition, כפר סכא, "Poison Town."

‡ It is forbidden to employ heretics as healers either for man or beast (Tos. Hullin 2^a). The Mishna allows them veterinary practice.

§ So it is expressly said in Aboda Zara 17^a.

|| See Koheleth Rabba on 1^a; Weiss, Dor wa-Dor, I^a, p. 222; Bacher, Agada der Palästinschen Amoräer, III, 711.

¶ Tos. Hullin 2^a; cf. Sanhedrin 38^b. The rabbinical prohibition of discussion with Christians is cited by Trypho in Justin's Dialogue, c. 38.

** Tos. Hullin 2^a*, cf. Hullin 13^{a-b}.

†† Wine of idolatrous libations.

from them, to enter into argument with them, to teach their children a trade, to allow them to heal man or beast."

The stringency of this interdict and the violence of the language in which it is couched show how critical the situation was felt to be. To emphasize the danger of having anything to do with the heretics, the Tosephta proceeds to narrate the stories of Eleazer ben Dama and Eliezer ben Hyrcanus which I have translated above; and these examples show plainly that the heresy which gave the authorities the greatest cause for apprehension was Christianity.

The heretics are excluded from the society of the good not only in this world but in the other. Their torment in hell is eternal: * "The wicked of Israel in their bodies and the wicked of the gentiles in their bodies go down to hell and are punished there for twelve months. At the end of twelve months their souls cease to be; their bodies are consumed, and hell spews them out and they turn to ashes which the wind scatters and strews beneath the feet of the righteous (Mal. 3¹). But the heretics and the apostates and the informers and the Epicureans,† and those who deny the scriptures, those who separate themselves from the customs of the community, and those who deny the resurrection of the dead, and every one who sins and makes others sin, like Jeroboam and Ahab, and those who create a reign of terror in the land of the living, and those who lay hands on the temple—hell will be locked on them, and they will be punished in it for all generations (Isa. 66⁴)."‡

Beside the interdict on all intercourse with the heretics, another measure adopted to check the spread of heresy was the insertion in the Eighteen Benedictions of a prayer for the perdition of the heretics. The Palestinian recension of this petition, in the oldest form in which it is preserved, runs as follows:§ "For the apostates let there be no hope, and may the proud

* Tos. Sanhedrin 13⁴⁻⁵; see also Rosh ha-Shana 17^a.

† There is reason to suspect that this catalogue of candidates for hell has been amplified in the course of time; but the beginning is indubitably authentic, and that the heretics take precedence even of apostates to heathenism is significant.

‡ Rosh ha-Shana adds: "Hell shall come to an end, but not they!"

§ Schechter, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, X (1898), pp. 654-659; from manuscripts found in a *geniza* in Cairo.

kingdom be speedily uprooted in our days. And may the Nazarenes and the heretics perish in a moment." In the Babylonian tradition:* "For the apostates let there be no hope; and may all the heretics and the informers perish in a moment; † and may the proud kingdom be uprooted and demolished speedily, in our days."

To the use of this prayer Jerome in all probability refers in a letter to Augustine (Ep. 112 § 13): *Usque hodie per totas Orientis synagogas inter Judaeos haeresis est, qui dicitur Minaeorum, et a Pharisaeis nunc usque damnatur: quos vulgo Nazaraeos nuncupant, etc.*

The introduction of this petition is ascribed to the Patriarch Gamaliel II and his college at Jamnia; the formulation, to Samuel ha-Katon.‡ The motive was perhaps not so much to relieve the pious feeling which the orthodox of all creeds and times have cherished toward misbelievers as to serve as a touchstone for heretics;§ for we learn in the sequel of the passage just cited from Berakoth,|| that if the leader in public prayer made a mistake in reciting any of the other petitions, he was allowed to proceed, but if he stumbled in the petition against heretics, he was called down, because it was to be suspected that he was himself a heretic.

The "books of the heretics" which, according to Tosephta Jadaim 2¹², are not holy scripture, and, according to Tosephta Sabbath 13⁶, so far from being rescued from fire on the Sabbath, are rather to be burned on a week day, may therefore be—or at least include—Christian scriptures ¶; and the standing association with the gospel suggests that Christian scriptures were primarily aimed at in these deliverances.** The violent antipa-

* See Dalman, *Worte Jesu*, 1898, pp. 301 f.

† Compare the constellation of heretics, apostates, and informers in Aboda Zara 26^b.

‡ Berakoth 28^b–29^a; cf. Megilla 17^b.

§ Like the recitation of a creed in the liturgy.

|| The authority is Rab, quoted by Rab Judah.

¶ The Christians were, of course, not the only sect that had books.

** Taken by themselves, the words ספרי חסידים might mean manuscripts of biblical books copied by the heretics, as ספרי כותים in Sanhedrin 90^b (Sota 33^b; Sifrè, § 112, on Num. 15²¹; cf., however, Jer. Sota 7ⁱ, ספרי כותים, and see Levy, *NHWb.* I, 530) are Samaritan copies of the Pentateuch, which the Samaritans are accused of falsifying. According to Gittin 45^b a Pentateuch

thy which Tarphon and Ishmael manifest toward these writings and their possessors reminds us of the hostility toward the Christians and their books which breathes in every line of the interdict in Tosephta Hulin 2²⁰⁻²², and makes it reasonable to infer that this intensity of feeling was aroused by the same danger.

In Mishna Sanhedrin 10¹ the classes of Israelites are enumerated who have no lot in the world to come—the man who denies that the resurrection of the dead can be proved from the law; * he who denies that the law is from heaven; and the ‘Epicurean.’ † “Rabbi Akiba says, Also he who reads in the outside books (ספרים החיצונים); and he who murmurs as an incantation over an ailment the words of Exodus 15^{20b}.”

On the words ספרים החיצונים the Babylonian Talmud comments: תנא בספרי מינים. רב יוסה אמר בספר בן סירא נמי אסור למקרי. “Tradition ‡ says, the books of the heretics. Rab Joseph § said, It is also forbidden to read in the book of Sirach.” In the corresponding passage in the Palestinian Talmud we read: “‘Also he who reads in the outside books,’ such as the books of Sirach and the books of Ben Laana.” || Koheleth Rabba, on Eccles. 12¹², declares that he who brings into his house more than the twenty-four canonical books brings in confusion, “for example, the book of Sirach and the book of Ben Tigla.” ¶

copied by a heretic is to be burned; one that had been in the possession of a heretic is to be carefully preserved (נזק), but not used. The greater severity of these regulations as compared with those concerning a copy made by a gentile (Tos. Aboda Zara 3⁷; Jer. Aboda Zara 2², end; see also Menahoth 42^b, top) are probably attributable to the suspicion that the heretic might falsify the text in the interest of his errors, while the gentile, who made copies only to sell to Jews, presumably had no such motive.

Rashi (on Sabbath 116^a) understands ספרי מינים in this sense—copies of Old Testament books made by heretics. So also L. Löw, *Graphische Requisiten*, II, 19, and many others, among whom Bacher is to be especially mentioned. But for the reasons indicated above this interpretation is improbable.

* The oldest statement probably was: “he who denies the resurrection of the dead.”

† The Epicurean in this context is perhaps a man who denies providence and retribution; cf. Josephus, *Antt.* X, 11, 7.

‡ That is, authoritative Palestinian tradition earlier than 220 A.D.

§ Rab Joseph bar Hiyya, Babylonian Amora; died ca. 330.

|| On the whole passage, see below, pp. 116 f., where it will be shown that the inclusion of Sirach in this condemnation is the result of a scribal error.

¶ The first vowel is uncertain. See further below, p. 117^a.

In the light of these passages the words of Akiba have commonly been taken to mean, "books outside the Jewish canon," more particularly, as the mention of Sirach suggests, books of the class which we call apocrypha. In support of this explanation is cited the analogous phrase *משנה דריוצונה* (Bamidbar Rabba 18¹⁷) the Hebrew equivalent of the common *Baraita* (*בריתא*), a Mishnic tradition outside the Mishna of the Patriarch Judah.

This interpretation is, however, beset by grave difficulties. Why should the reading of a book like Sirach be condemned in this fashion? The question was discussed in the Babylonian schools; * Abbaye quotes some sayings in the book to which objection might be raised, but has no difficulty in discovering good biblical or rabbinical parallels to them. The one indefensible utterance he singles out ("The thin-bearded man is crafty; the thick-bearded man is stupid; he who blows the foam from his cup is not thirsty; from him who says, What shall I eat for a relish with my bread? his bread shall be taken away; the whole world is no match for the man with a forked beard") shows how hard he was put to it to explain why Sirach should be on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum. In fact, the objections made to Sirach on internal grounds are far from being as serious as those which are brought up against the Proverbs of Solomon, † not to speak of Ecclesiastes.

Rab Joseph, who attests the fact that Sirach was on the Index, himself says in the course of the discussion, "We make homiletical use of the excellent sayings that are found in this book," and adduces many such. Authorities of unimpeachable correctness in all periods—including Akiba himself—quote Sirach without suspicion that it is an interdicted book. Mediaeval quotations, and the recovery in recent years of a considerable part of the Hebrew text from fragments of several manuscripts, prove that the popularity of Sirach continued unabated.

To remove this evident contradiction it has been suggested that what was condemned was not private reading, but the public reading of passages from Sirach and other Apocrypha in the synagogue, whereby the distinction between inspired and uninspired writings was obscured. The principle seems, however,

* Sanhedrin 100^b.

† Sabbath 30^b.

to have been early established that even the acknowledged hagiographa should not be read in the synagogue; * and if the public reading of uncanonical books had become in the second century an evil that needed to be checked, we should expect to find somewhere an express prohibition of the practice.

It is to be noted, further, that Akiba couples with the reading of the "outside" books the use of Exod. 15²⁶ as a charm. He excludes from the world to come "the man who murmurs (שחח) over an ailment the words, 'None of the diseases which I inflicted on the Egyptians will I inflict on thee: I am the Lord, thy healer.'" † The use of verses of the Bible in connection with medication or with what we should call magical healing was common and pious practice; the most orthodox rabbis had no scruples about it. Akiba does not condemn biblical incantations in general, but a specific formula, and one which in itself appears to be wholly unobjectionable. Why should the use of this particular verse deserve eternal perdition?

The hypothesis which seems best to account for Akiba's abhorrence is that this formula was employed by a class of healers whom he deemed especially pernicious. We know that in his time the Christian healers gave the authorities much trouble. ‡ The employment of these heretics to practice on man or beast was prohibited; yet only Ishmael's prompt and positive intervention kept his nephew Eleazer ben Dama from letting a Christian cure him of a snake bite in the name of Jesus; and he might, in spite of his uncle's protests, have broken through the ordinance of the sages with a proof-text in his mouth, if timely death had not saved him from mortal sin. In the same context in the Palestinian Talmud in which Ben Dama's case is reported, another instance is cited, from a time a century later, in which a Christian healer was called in to the family of one of the most

* Tos. Sabbath 13ⁱ; cf. M. Sabbath 16ⁱ. The different reasons for the rule in the two codes warrant the inference that the rule itself was not a new one.

† Tos. Sanhedrin 12¹⁰ adds the words, "and spits" (a magical aversion). R. Johanan (Sanhedrin 101^a) sees in the spitting a profanation of the divine name; in the recitation of the verse itself he finds no sin. See Blau, *Altjüdisches Zauberwesen*, 68 f.

‡ Precisely as the healers of certain modern sects give concern to the conservators of ecclesiastical order.

famous teachers of his generation.* “A grandson of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi got something stuck in his throat. A man came and murmured a charm (לחש) to him in the name of Jesus Pandera, and he recovered. When the healer came out, he was asked, What did you murmur to him? He replied, A word of So and So (Jesus). Joshua exclaimed, It would have been better for him to die than to have such a thing happen to him!” It is not a remote surmise that certain of these Christians may have made use in their incantations of Exod. 15³⁶, combining it in some way with the name of Jesus—perhaps even inserting his name in the efficacious part of the formula, so that it sounded, I am the Lord *Jesus*, thy healer.

This is, of course, pure guessing; but independent of all guesses remains the strong probability that Akiba’s twofold anathema was launched against heretical books and heretical practices, rather than against liturgical irregularities or abuse of scripture in orthodox circles. This conclusion, so far as the books are concerned, is in conformity with the old Palestinian tradition as recorded in the Babylonian Talmud, according to which the “outside” books are the “books of the heretics.”

The impossibility of identifying the “outside books” with apocryphal books such as Sirach appears conclusively when the context in Jer. Sanhedrin is considered. The whole passage is as follows:

רבי עקיבא אומר אף הקורא בספרים החיצונים כגון ספרי בן סירא
וספרי בן לענה אבל ספרי הסרים וכל ספרים שנכתבו מיכן והילך
הקורא בהן כקורא באיגרת:†

“Rabbi Akiba says: ‘Also he who reads in the outside books.’—Such as the books of Sirach and the books of Ben Laana; but the books of הסרים, and all books that have been written since then, he who reads in them is as one who reads in a letter.—What does this mean? ‘And as to what is beyond these, my

* Jer. Sabbath 14⁴; cf. Jer. Aboda Zara 2⁷; Koheleth Rabba 10⁷. The text of the current editions is castrated out of respect for the censorship; see Aruch s. v. גלע.—In Koheleth Rabba the sufferer is a son of R. Joshua b. Levi; the rabbi himself fetches the healer—“one of those of Bar Pandera.” In answer to Joshua’s question what charm he used, he replies: “A verse of So and So after So and So” (Jesus).

† For a reconstruction of the text, see below, p. 121.

son, be warned' (Eccles. 12¹³); they were given for reading merely, not [like the scriptures] for laborious study."*

If any demonstration were needed that the text is in disorder the labors of the interpreters would furnish it. With Tosephta Jadaim 2¹³ before us, it is manifest that *בן סירא* and *הסירים* have exchanged places; the last clause should read: "But the book[s] of Sirach and all books that have been written since—he who reads in them is as one who reads in a letter"; † that is, they are purely secular writings (cf. Tosephta, "they are not holy scripture"), which may be read as such, but are not a proper object of that reverent and laborious study—a religious observance and a meritorious work—which is the prerogative of the scriptures.

The dislocation of *בן סירא* and *הסירים*, which must have occurred very early, ‡ is the root of all the difficulties in which Babylonian Amoraim and modern scholars have found themselves to explain why Sirach should be so signally damned. § With the restoration of the true order the only colorable ground for interpreting *היצוניים*, 'books outside the canon, apocrypha,' vanishes.

In Mishna Megilla 4⁸ the word *ההיצוניים* is used of persons, and stands in close connection with *מינות*, 'heresy.' If a man wears his phylacteries on his forehead or on the palm of his hand, this is the way of heresy (*הרי זה דרך המינות*); if he covers his phylacteries with gold and puts them on his sleeve, *הרי זה דרך*

* In Koheleth Rabba the midrash plays on *קָהָה-קָהָה*: Every one who brings into his house more than the twenty-four canonical books brings in confusion, for instance, the book of Sirach and the book of Ben Tigla.—From the following words, *ולא הרבה יגיע בשר* (E. V. "much study is a weariness of the flesh") the midrash extracts: *להט נחת ליגיע בשר לא נחת*, "they were given merely to read; for a weariness of the flesh (*i. e.* for severe study) they were not given."—Cf. Berakoth 28^b, among Eliezer's counsels to his disciples: "Restrain your sons from mere reading" (of the scriptures). In Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 1⁸ (ed. Buber, f. 5^a), Ps. 19¹⁶ is explained: David prays that his words may endure to remote generations, and that men may not read them as they read *בספרי סרים*, that is, as secular books, but may study them as scripture. The dependence on Jer. Sanhedrin 10¹ is evident.

† Joel, *Blicke in die Religionsgeschichte*, I, 72 ff., brought Sirach over into the right company; but left "הסירים" ("*Tagebücher*" = *μύτρας*, after Grätz) unmolested.

‡ It is presupposed in Koh. Rabba on 12¹³. The transposition is probably a transcriptional error of a common kind, due to the frequent occurrence of *סירא*.

§ See Dei Rossi, *Meor 'Enayim*, Wilna, 1866, p. 83 ff.

החיצונים.* The term is here in effect synonymous with מינים, but evidently carries a stronger reprobation. The *Minim* took Deut. 6^a literally, disregarding the prescriptions of scribes (Menahoth 37^b); † whereas the חיצונים had no authority for their practise either in the written or the oral law ‡—it was, as the Munich manuscript has it, מינות והונה חיצונה, ‘heresy and extraneous speculation.’ So also the Talmud (Megilla 24^b): “What is the meaning [of דרך החיצונים]? We suspect that he is inoculated with heresy (מינות).” The *Hisonim* are, therefore, persons wholly ‘outside’ the fences of orthodoxy, heretics of the most radical type. In the same sense the word is used by Akiba in Mishna Sanhedrin 10ⁱ: ספרים החיצונים is a more emphatic expression for heretical books—they are books outside the pale, not of the canon, but of Judaism.

As types of these books, the reading of which shuts a Jew out of his birthright in the world to come, Jer. Sanhedrin 10ⁱ § names ספרי בן לענה וספרי המרים. || On these enigmatical names there is a literature more voluminous than illuminating. Limits of space precludes a discussion of the many fanciful identifications that have been put forward. It must suffice here to pursue our investigation of the sources.

For ספרי המרים the Aruch cites, besides Mishna Jadaim 4^a and Jer. Sanhedrin 10ⁱ, Hullin 60^b, which is quoted as follows: “Rabbi Simeon ben Lakish said, There are many verses in the Pentateuch which seem fit to be burned *like the books of* ספרי בן לענה.”

* The reading ירון החיצון, attested in the Aruch, is also found in a manuscript of the Talmud.

† See Sanhedrin 88^b, where the principle that the regulations of the scribes have stronger sanctions than the words of the written law is exemplified by the case of the phylacteries.

‡ So Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishna; Rashi on Megilla 24^b.

§ As emended above, p. 117; cf. p. 121.

|| The best attested spelling is המרים; there are many variations in manuscripts, editions, commentators, and lexicographers, chiefly affecting the vowels. Hai Gaon (on M. Jadaim 4^a) reads המרים, and takes this for *Homeros*; his explanation is cited, with others, by Nathan ben Jehiel in the Aruch, and was adopted by Mussafia in his supplements to the Aruch. It has been repeated by many since. The reading מרים is found also in Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 1^a (see below); but the forms ending in ס apparently have no support in known manuscripts or in editions of the Talmud.

¶ So Kohut, on manuscript authority; the first printed edition has מרים. Other manuscripts have המרים, etc.

and yet they are essential parts of the law.* The italicised words are lacking in the current editions of the Talmud, doubtless because the censors smelt a reference to Christianity. The first edition, however (Venice, 1520), and the Munich codex have ספרי הסינים, and the unmistakable allusion to deliverances about burning the books of heretics such as are reported in Sabbath 116* makes it certain that this is the original reading, for which, at a comparatively late time, מירון or something of the kind was substituted.

In Mishna Jadaim 4^o the Sadducees are represented as deriding certain Pharisaic decrees: We object to you Pharisees because you say, 'The holy scriptures make the hands unclean; the books of המירם do not make the hands unclean.' Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai replied, Is this the only thing we have against the Pharisees? They also say that the bones of an ass are clean, but the bones of Johanan the high priest are unclean.† The Sadducees answered, Their uncleanness is in proportion to the affection in which they are held. . . . He replied, Just so with the holy scriptures, their uncleanness is in proportion to the affection in which they are held.‡ The ספרי המירם, for which we have no love, do not make the hands unclean.§

The general rule which the Sadducees quote, 'Holy scriptures make the hands unclean,' is stated in Mishna Jadaim 3^o (cf. Mishna Kelim 15^o), and is assumed throughout in Tosephta Jadaim 2¹⁰ §, cf. 2¹⁰; to show the absurdity of the rule they adduce a Pharisaic decision which corresponds word for word to Tosephta Jadaim 2¹⁰, || ספרי המינים אינן מטמאין את הידים, 'the books of the heretics do not make the hands unclean,' except that for הסינים the Mishna has המירם. The commentators on the Mishna Jadaim 4^o interpret ספרי המירם as writings of Jewish heretics; those who attempt an explanation of the word regard it as a disparaging term, which they etymologize as if it were coined *ad hoc*.¶ However unconvincing we may

* See above, pp. 101 ff.

† Cf. Nidda 55a.

‡ Cf. Tos. Jadaim 2¹⁰. For כתבי הקודש the Vienna manuscript of the Tosephta has ספרי המירם! (Zuckerman, in loc.)

§ Johanan's answer is an argumentum ad hominem. || Above, p. 101.

¶ R. Simson of Sens (12th century) says: "These are the books of the Sadducees [substitution of מזיקים for מינים, as often], of which it is said in Sabbath 116 that they ought to be burned." Maimonides: "Books which con-

find these etymologies, we must give its due to the exegetical insight which recognized that the context in the Mishna demands "the heretics," the *minim*; and since, in the deliverance which the Sadducees quote, the Tosephta actually has הַמִּינִים, the inference can hardly be avoided that הַמִּירָם in the Mishna is either a corruption or, more probably, a sophistication of הַמִּינִים,* as it demonstrably is in Hullin 60^b.

There remains Jer. Sanhedrin 10ⁱ, where "the books of Ben Laana and the books of הַמִּירָם" are cited as examples of the writings which are the object of Akiba's commination.—We have seen that Akiba's contemporaries manifest a peculiarly violent animosity toward "the gospels and the books of the heretics," and there is a strong presumption that the ultra-heretical writings against which Akiba fulminates are the same that aroused the ire of his colleagues. This presumption is strengthened by a confrontation of Jer. Sanhedrin 10ⁱ with Tosephta Jadaim 2ⁱⁱ: in the former, "The books of Ben Laana and the books of הַמִּירָם . . . Sirach and all the books that have been written since," etc.; in the latter, "The gospels and the books of the heretics . . . Sirach and all the books that have been written since," etc. The correspondence of the formulation suggests that the same books are meant in both cases.†

In the other places where הַמִּירָם occurs it has been shown that הַמִּינִים is demanded either by manuscript evidence or by the context and parallels, and the same is true here. "The books of Ben Laana" we shall then take to be, not obscure apocrypha of which nothing is elsewhere heard, but the gospels.

Ben Laana (Son of Wormwood ‡) has not the look of a real

travene our law and set forth dissident views about it. They are called סְטֵרִים, as if to say, May God thrust them away and banish them from existence! meaning, destroy them, as the house in which they assemble for such purposes is called Beth Abidan, meaning a house which may God cut off."—Bertinoro's comment is: "The books of the heretics (סְטֵרִים הַמִּינִים); they are called סְטֵרִים הַמִּירָם because they have exchanged (הַמִּירָם) the true law for falsehoods."

* Compare *gilion*, 'awen *gilion*, 'awon *gilion* for εὐαγγέλιον, above, p. 105.

† It is the correspondence of the formulation that is significant; that in the Tosephta Sirach is put with the gospels in the category of uninspired scriptures, while in Jer. Sanhedrin, Sirach as a secular book is contrasted with the heretical books is here irrelevant.

‡ Heb. לַעֲנָה is a bitter and poisonous herb; the conventional rendering 'wormwood' is not meant to imply identification with *Artemisia absinthium*, L. The same reservation must be made about the translation 'hemlock' below.

name or a parody on a name, but rather of an opprobrious nickname, conveying an allusion to something in the character or history of the person decorated with it. The point of the allusion lies, if I mistake not, in the association of לענה in the Old Testament with apostasy and the fate of apostates. In Deut. 29¹⁷, for example, the Israelite who turns away from the Lord to follow the gods of the idolatrous peoples becomes "a root bearing hemlock and wormwood" (ראש ולענה); * Jer. 9¹²⁻¹⁴ "Because they have forsaken my law. . . . I will make this people eat wormwood and drink hemlock." Most pertinent of all these passages is Jer. 23¹⁸: † "Therefore thus saith the Lord of Hosts concerning the prophets; I will make them eat wormwood and drink hemlock, for from the prophets of Jerusalem defection (חנופה, religious defection) is gone abroad into all the land." The application of such utterances to Christianity and its founder lay near at hand. Rabbi Jonathan teaches that wherever the Bible speaks of defection (חנופה), often with the connotation of hypocrisy) it means heresy (מינות). Jesus was in the eyes of the orthodox a seducer of the people, ‡ a false prophet; he appears in the Talmud as Balaam, the type of the false prophets.§ From this point of view Ben Laana, "Wormwood Man," is a cognomen as apt as it is pointed.|| The "books of Ben Laana" would then be the gospels; compare Mark 1¹, The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.¶

The text of the much vexed passage, Jer. Sanhedrin 10¹, is accordingly to be restored as follows:

הקורא בספרים החיצונים. כגון ספרי בן לענה וספרי המינים
אבל ספרי בן סירא וכל ספרים שנכתבו מיכן והילך הקורא בהן
בקורא באגרת:

* Note the use of this verse in Heb. 12¹⁵; cf. Acts 8².

† See the whole of this drastic oracle against the false prophets, Jer. 23⁹⁻⁴⁰.

‡ Sanhedrin 43^a, 107^b; cf. Deut. 13.

§ E. g. Sanhedrin 106^b.

|| If Ben Laana is meant for Jesus, the probability is strong that Ben Tigla in Kobleth Rabba is another nickname.

¶ Another possible association of the name may perhaps be suggested. The story of Imma Shalom gives evidence that the Jews were acquainted with a Hebrew gospel related in some degree to our Matthew. In the account of the crucifixion in Matt. 27³⁴ we read that they offered Jesus *οἶνον μετὰ χολῆς, μεμυγμένον*. By *χολή* some bitter drug is doubtless intended. In the Greek Bible *χολή* sometimes translates לענה (Prov. 5¹, Lam. 3¹⁵; it more frequently

“‘He who reads in the arch-heretical books.’—Such as the books of Ben Laana [Gospels] and the books of the heretics [Christians]. But as for the books of Ben Sira and all books that have been written since his time, he who reads in them is as one who reads in a letter.”

It is evident from the texts that have been discussed that there was a time when Christianity had for many Jews a dangerous attraction, and when the circulation among Jews of the gospels and other Christian books gave the teachers of the synagogue serious apprehension. The earliest mention of the ordinance against “the books of the heretics” is in Mishna Jadaim 4⁶, in a tilt between the Sadducees and Johanan ben Zakkai, which may have occurred before the war of 66–70, and cannot be more than a decade or two later. Johanan’s successor at the head of the college and council at Jamnia, Rabban Gamaliel II, caused the petition for the downfall of the heretics to be inserted in the prescribed form of prayer; he and his sister Imma Shalom, the wife of Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, figure in the story of the Christian judge who quotes the gospel; in the same time falls the intercourse of Eliezer ben Hyrcanus with Jacob of Kefar Sekania, “a disciple of Jesus the Nazarene.” In the second and third decades of the second century the situation becomes more strained; all the great leaders of Judaism—Ishmael,* Akiba, Tarphon, Jose the Galilean— inveigh against the heretics and their scriptures with a violence which shows how serious the evil was.† Tarphon would flee to a heathen temple sooner than to a meeting house of those worse-than-heathen whose denial of God is without the excuse of ignorance; the usually mild-mannered Ishmael finds pious utterance for his antipathy, like many another godly man, in an imprecatory Psalm: “Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? . . . I hate them with perfect hatred.” Akiba, who was never a man of measured words, stands for שׂוֹנֵא). It is conceivable, therefore, that in the passage corresponding to Matt. 27³⁴ the Hebrew gospel read: יֵין מֵחַם בִּלְעֵנָה. If so, the Jewish reader might well be pardoned for seeing in the narrative a signal fulfilment of prophecy. No such fulfilment would be necessary, however, to bring to mind the words of Jeremiah.

* See also Ishmael’s interpretation of the dreams of a heretic, Berakoth 56^b.

† Just as in the Church Fathers, the increasing vehemence of their objections of heresy corresponds to the alarming progress gnosticism was making.

consigns to eternal perdition the Jew who reads their books. The rigorous interdict on all association with the Christians* breathes the same truculent spirit; it bears every mark of having been framed in the same age and by the same hands, as does also the anathema which condemns the heretics, before all the rest, to eternal torment in hell.†

In the second half of the century the polemic against Christianity abruptly ceases. From Akiba's most distinguished pupil and spiritual heir, Rabbi Meir, nothing more serious is reported than his witticism on the name of the gospel — *εὐαγγέλιον* 'awon gilion; from Nehemiah, only that among the signs of the coming of the Messiah he included the conversion of the whole empire to Christianity.‡ Of the other great teachers of the generation no antichristian utterances are preserved. What is much more significant, at the close of the century the Mishna of the Patriarch Judah embodies none of the defensive ordinances against heresy which we find in the Tosephta and the Talmudic Baraitas.§ The decision that the Gospels and the books of the heretics are not holy scripture is not repeated in the Mishna; it deals only with the Jewish antilegomena, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs, the long-standing differences about which were passed on by a council about the beginning of the second century—a decision which did not, however, prevent the differences from lasting through the century.|| The only mention of heretical writings is preserved as a mere matter of history in the account of the Johanan ben Zakkai's defense of the Pharisaic ordinances against the criticisms of the Sadducees.

We shall hardly err if we see in all this an indication that the danger had passed which in the early decades of the century was so acute. The expansion of Christianity had not been checked, nor was the attitude of the Jewish authorities to it more favorable than before; but with the definitive separation of the Jewish Christians from the synagogue they ceased to be a spreading leaven of heresy in the midst of the orthodox community, and

* Tos. Hullin 2²⁰ a.; above, pp. 110 f.

† Above, p. 111.

‡ Sanhedrin 97^a, and parallels.

§ If M. Hullin 2² be regarded as an exception, it is an exception that proves the rule; cf. Tosephta Hullin 2¹⁹⁻²⁰.

|| M. Jadaim 3^b.

became a distinct religious sect outside the pale of Judaism. The complete and final separation was brought about by the rebellion of the Jews in the reign of Hadrian. This rebellion was not merely a national uprising, but a messianic movement. Its leader was hailed as the "star out of Jacob" predicted by Balaam (Num. 24¹⁷),* and Bar Coziba became Bar Cocheba. In such a movement the Christians could not join without denying their own Messiah, Jesus, the signs of whose imminent return they doubtless discerned in the commotions of the time. They stood aloof from the life-and-death struggle of their people, and incurred the double resentment of their countrymen as not only heretics but traitors.† Before this storm they retreated to regions beyond the Jordan, where their neighborhood was heathen. In the eyes of the government, however, they were Jews; and the edicts excluding all Jews from residence in the new city, Aelia Capitolina, ended the succession of Jewish bishops of Jerusalem; henceforth the church was a church of gentile Christians, with Greek bishops. From that time Jewish Christianity, deprived of the prestige which the see of the mother church gave it, left behind with its primitive ideas by the development of Catholic doctrine—trying to be both Jew and Christian, and succeeding in being neither, as Jerome puts it—stigmatized as heresy by both camps, languished and dwindled in the corners in which it had taken refuge.

The Catholic Christianity which succeeded it in the centres of Palestine was essentially a foreign religion, and had little attraction for Jews. By its side Judaism could live, as it did by the side of a dozen other foreign religions, not without controversy,‡ but without fear that it would spread like a pestilence in the orthodox community. The Patriarch had no need, therefore, to repeat in his Mishna the deliverances against heresy which had been so necessary seventy-five or a hundred years earlier. But the memory of the crisis and the stringent measures it demanded were perpetuated in codifications of the oral law

* This application of the prophecy is attributed to Akiba.

† There is no reason whatever to question the assertion of Justin Martyr, a contemporary, that efforts were made to force them into line.

‡ On the controversies of the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century, see above, pp. 107 f.

and traditions less exclusively dominated than his by a practical end.*

Not the least interesting result of an examination of these sources is the fact that the attempt authoritatively to define the Jewish canon of the Hagiographa begins with the exclusion by name of Christian scriptures.

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* It is perhaps not without a bearing on this point, that a prominent part in the redaction of the Tosephta is attributed to Hoshaia, who, at Caesarea, was in close contact with a vigorous and aggressive Christianity.

XI

THE GREEK AND THE HITTITE GODS

BY WILLIAM HAYES WARD

EVEN to the present day the sway of Phenicia on the mind of the scholars of early history is not wholly broken. It has been believed as if it were a fact unquestionable that the Phenicians, with their wide commerce and colonies, were the intermediaries of culture and art between Egypt and the Greek world. Slowly, quite too slowly, we are correcting that error. We have learned that a high culture could grow up, and did grow up, locally, very little or not at all affected by Egypt, and long before the Phenicians became a maritime and colonizing power. Phenicia as a state did not exist before about 1000 or 1100 B. C. To be sure, the Phenician coast was there, and the local cities of Tyre and Sidon and others mentioned in the Tel el-Amarna tablets existed, just as dozens of other towns were scattered along the coast, and inland on the rivers, but they were not predominant. We are misled if when scholars like W. Max Müller, in discussing the Egyptian raids of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth dynasties, speak proleptically of Phenicia, we imagine that they mean to use the term in anything other than a geographical sense. Long before the rise of Phenicia as a state, not only Babylonia, but the Cretan cities had achieved their own indigenous culture; while yet another culture and civilization was predominant throughout the entire region of Asia Minor and Syria ruled or influenced by the Hittite Empire.

Scholars now have begun to discredit the preëminent influence of the Phenicians on Greek art and religion. They have learned that the Phenicians came too late, long after the flowering of Ægean civilization as seen in Crete, Mycenæ, Tiryns and Hissarlik. The materials for this primitive Greek civilization are vastly more abundant than those from Phenicia. Equally

we have now a much richer mine of materials to illustrate Hittite art than that of Phenicia. In the study of Greek religion we no longer have to go to Phenicia for important Oriental influence, for much more likely sources are at hand. Accordingly Eduard Meyer, in the article, "Phœnicia," in the "Encyclopedia Biblica," recognizes the late emergence of the Phenicians, although he inconsistently gives them their usually accepted influence in the field of art and religion. Even this is too much to allow. He says there was no distinctive Phenician style; for "a decorative Western Asiatic style was developed, which began to exert an influence on Greek art from the ninth century upwards." This is true, yet he says, "The Egyptian emblem of the moon became a half-moon with the sun or a star around it." But this was not Phenician, nor related to Egypt, but was common in Asia Minor much earlier, taken from Babylonia. S. Reinach in his "*Le Mirage Orientale*," has, as remarked by Ridgeway in his "*Early Age of Greece*" (i, p. 473), shattered the pretensions of the Phenicians to have exercised any special influence on Mycenæan art. "Indeed," he says, "Mycenæ rather influenced Phenicia."

The Mycenæan art, if it has borrowed nothing from the Phenicians, appears equally to have borrowed very little from Egypt, and not very much from the Hittite civilization of Asia Minor. What we call Greek art, however, borrowed much after the Mycenæan period. The people of the Mycenæan or Cretan period were Pelasgians; and the Homeric Achæans came later, and the Dorian rule later still, and they borrowed much from the Ionian coasts, and little from Phenicia; and the Ionian coasts were saturated with Hittite culture, a culture itself complex, representing its own indigenous elements, mixed with Babylonian, and even Egyptian; for the Hittites came in contact with Babylonian culture say nearly as early as 2000 B. C., and with Egyptian culture about the same time in the Hauran region of Southern Palestine, as proved by Hittite seals discovered there.

Students of classical mythology often admit an Oriental influence in the cases of a few Greek deities and heroes, such as Aphrodite and Herakles, but they usually suppose that influence to be unimportant. The most distinguished of the living Grecians, Dr. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, declares it baseless

("bodenlos") to seek the Greek Herakles in the Babylonian story. Herakles, he says, is originally Dorian, an ideal Dorian man. Even if there was an original Dorian Herakles, there was time enough for the Dorians to have adopted Gilgamesh during the centuries that they were in Thrace, just across the Hellespont from Phrygia and Troas. We must remember that nowadays we are putting back a somewhat advanced civilization in all Asia Minor by many centuries. The classicists therefore are in error when they seem to imagine that such names as Kadmos and Melikertes (Melkarth) prove that the Greeks got their Oriental touch from Semitic Phenicia. They learned it nearer at home and earlier, from Asia Minor, from a time before the Phenicians began to rule the seas, from the Ionian coasts which were not Semitic, but largely under Aryan rule, while under Semitic influence from Assyria and the Aramæan states, but hardly from Babylonia in any direct manner.

Herakles is one of those demigods which we can trace back to the very earliest Babylonian art, a demigod, whether Herakles in Greece, or Gilgamesh in Babylonia. The two had the same character, performed the same exploits. Did Herakles slay the Nemean lion? So Gilgamesh fought lions. Did Herakles conquer the Kretan bull? Gilgamesh did as much. Did Herakles capture the hind with the golden horns? Gilgamesh is holding horned stags. Did Herakles kill the Lernæan hydra? Gilgamesh or his double, Bel, with the dragon, is figured with the same exploit. Did Herakles fight the monsters, Cheiron the centaur, Geryon and Cacus? So Gilgamesh appears in art, fighting monsters whether Eabani, Humbaba, or the divine bull.

One of the most interesting of the Greek myths of Herakles is that which relates the last of his twelve labors. He was to bring back to Eurystheus a golden apple from the tree in the garden of the Hesperides, guarded by a serpent. But the Hesperides gave it to him, gift of immortality. What is this but the fruit of the tree of life, which was always guarded by genii of some sort, winged figures, or fantastic animals, or even serpents? (Ward, "Seal Cylinders of Western Asia," fig. 710.) It was a design familiar from Assyria and all over Asia minor, and the fruit of the tree was plucked off (ib. p. 230) as the gift of life for the worshiper. It corresponds to the Gokart tree of the Persian Bunda-

hesh, protected by ten kar-fish. It was the fruit of this tree of life that Herakles was bidden to take by force from its protector, which the Bundahesh represents as a great lizard. Among other parallels observe his fight with the Stymphalian birds. Gilgamesh and Marduk are constantly confused in Assyrian art, and it is the composite god we see engaged in such a labor in this scene (ib. figs. 595-598). Other parallels, quite as remarkable, do not supply easy illustration, but the Gilgamesh epic supplies them and they have attracted scholars. Such is the leprosy which attacked Gilgamesh, to be compared with the poisoned shirt of Herakles. Both made a wonderful journey to the regions of the dead in search of immortality, in the course of which Helios gives Herakles his boat that he may go to the Garden of the Hesperides, while Gilgamesh is given the boat by the Babylonian Noah. The parallels are too close to allow any other conclusion than that Herakles is but the Babylonian, or rather the Asianic Gilgamesh, made Dorian and Greek.

Like Herakles, Adonis was an Eastern immigrant, confessed Syrian, with a Semitic name, and identified with Tammuz, lover of Aphrodite as Tammuz was of Ishtar. His

"annual wound in Lebanon allured
The Syrian damsels to lament his fate
In amorous ditties all a summer's day,
While smooth Adonis, from his native rock
Ran purple to the sea."

But he was a late entrant into Greek mythology, recognized as Oriental, and to be mentioned here only as illustrating earlier and nearly forgotten adoptions of Asianic deities.

It is a fact familiar to mythologists that Aphrodite is a composite goddess having both Oriental and Greek elements. And it is frequently affirmed that she is related to the Babylonian Ishtar, through the intermediary Astarte, or Ashtoreth, of the Phenicians, or some Syrian Ashera, or Atergatis. It is natural that these mythologists should go no farther than to the Phenicians, for the Phenicians are quite familiar to our Greek scholars, but they know little of the Asiatic empires back of Phenicia and the nearer Syria. It will be well to study a little the data open to us. There is no similarity, as they are represented in art, between the

Greek Aphrodite and the Babylonian Ishtar. The former is a naked, or nearly naked, goddess of beauty and love, unarmed and unused to war. But the Babylonian Ishtar is most decently clothed (ib. p. 155 ff.) and has a distinctly military character, being represented in the earlier period with alternate clubs and the serpent scimitar rising from each shoulder, and in the middle period with a quiver and sheafs of arrows from either shoulder. To be sure she is in literature a goddess of love also, but not in art. When she descends into the under-world sexual love ceases on the earth. It is also to be remembered that both Aphrodite and Ishtar are connected with the planet Venus. The classical dictionaries seem to think it necessary to make Aphrodite a moon goddess also, because they connect her so closely with Astarte who may have been a lunar goddess, although the moon is masculine in Semitic languages. If the Syrian Astarte really represents the moon, and not the planet Venus, it may be because she was, as I think probable, to the Syrians and Phœnicians an adventive deity, brought over from the conquering Hittites, in whose language, as in other Aryan tongues, the moon would be feminine. We seem to have Astarte occasionally with the crescent in her head, and it is supposed that the crescent represents the horned moon, and that it connects itself with the crescent of a cow's horns. It is interesting to know that the Hittite Ishtar, if we may call her so, stands on a cow, or bull.

Now I wish to describe this Hittite goddess more definitely, with a view to showing it not improbable that she was the origin of the Greek Aphrodite, at least in some of the manifestations of Aphrodite.

I have elsewhere (*American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. III, No. 1) called attention to the fact that there were three principal Hittite deities; one a dignified superior god, very likely Tarkhu, who is fully clothed to below the knees, and who usually carried no weapon, or only a spear on which he rests, or a short rod, or scepter, though rarely in a militant attitude; next a goddess, who was probably his wife, usually nude, sometimes clad, and who often stands on a cow or bull, and third, a militant god, clad in a very short garment, who wears a spiked helmet, stands on the mountains, leads a bull by a thong, both of whose hands are filled with weapons, and who is probably the son, cor-

responding to the later Attis, of the superior god and goddess. These three were probably the origin of the Egyptian Osiris, Isis and Horus, who were a late trinity.

This goddess doubtless had many names, as she was worshiped by various peoples. She seems to be called Ishkara, and in Hittite Hepi. While sometimes decently clothed, as in the Boghaz-Keui relief, which may represent the marriage of the chief god and goddess, or the conquest of the capital by a superior tribe, and the submission of the goddess and her citadel to the conquering deity, or some other important ceremonial event, she is usually nude, and takes pains to display her nudity by drawing aside her garment (Ward, l. c., p. 296 ff.). She is the goddess of beauty and love, and in the better art is made as attractive as possible. First we see her with her garment wholly withdrawn on each side, then on one side, and sometimes winged. Her characteristic bird is the dove, as it is of Aphrodite, and this is a conclusive proof, as it appears again and again, of the connection between the two.

The resemblance to Greek representations of Aphrodite is notable. The Ionian colonists were familiar with her in Asianic art. If they had a native Aphrodite of their own they could not have helped identifying the two, and giving to their own the attributes of the Asianic goddess. Aphrodite was not only the goddess of love, but was related to moisture, rain and the fruits, and here she has her parallel, and probably her origin in the Asianic Ishkara, or Hepi, who is often represented in her modified forms with streams of water about her, much as the Cyprian Aphrodite is said to have arisen out of the foam of the sea.

The question naturally arises what is the relation between the Hittite naked goddess and the naked goddess of Babylonian worship, Zirbanit, wife of Marduk. This latter is a very widely extended type, common at a late period from Babylonia through Syria to Cyprus and Egypt. But this is to be noticed, that she does not appear in the archaic art of Babylonia, not even in the less ancient period of the elder Sargon. She is introduced into the Babylonian pantheon not much before the time of Hammurabi, with her consort, Marduk and Ramman-Adad, and was then introduced from the West, that is, from the Syro-Hittite region where she was worshiped. In Babylonia she is entirely

nude and lifts both hands under her breasts. In Egypt she is also a late importation, and there her hands generally hang down by her side. These forms are both later than the true Hittite form of the goddess with the single garment withdrawn, and I believe they spread from Babylonia, which had adopted the goddess from the West at the time of the great western invasion which culminated in putting Hammurabi on the throne. This invasion was Hittite, and the Hittites were not Semites, but probably Aryans, and it must be remembered that they were an intrusive powerful fighting people who commanded an hegemony over a wide extent of Semitic or Turanian races.

Let it be understood that the Greek Aphrodite has no clear relation to the true Babylonian Ishtar, with lions and quivers full of arrows from her shoulders, or, at an earlier period, with clubs and scimitars; but to the naked Hittite goddess who appears with garment wholly or partly withdrawn and with her dove. Nor is Aphrodite particularly related to the Assyrian Ishtar (ib. p. 248 ff.) who is of a separate type, characterized by a circle, or halo, of stars, about her body, or weapons radiating from her, tipped with stars. This is a comparatively late representation, somewhat less than 1000 B. C., an Ishtar, perhaps, of Arbela, differing from the northern, or western Hittite goddess, attended by the dove. She appears to have originated at a period much later than the older dominant Hittite form, possibly from it, after the goddess had been partially supplied with clothes, or even with wings. The goddess of love was not received by the Greeks by way of Phenicia, as so often assumed; for the Phenician goddess Astarte followed the middle Babylonian type of Zirbanit, with hands on her breasts. Astarte's name, to be sure, is from Ishtar, and not from Zirbanit, but the two goddesses were confounded, through their common function of love, the military function of Ishtar being lost, and Astarte became the composite of the two.

If it be true, as I have attempted to show, that the Greek Aphrodite was closely related to the Syro-Hittite nude goddess who has been called Ishkara or Hepi, and thus was in part derived from the Asianic civilization of Asia Minor, rather than from the Phenician civilization, as usually supposed, we are then led to ask whether any of the Greek male deities were derived in

whole or in part from the two Syro-Hittite gods whom we may designate, the one as Tarkhu-Marduk, and the other as Teshub-Adad. We will first consider the latter god (ib. p. 288 ff.).

A most extraordinary figure of Teshub (SBA, vol. XXXII, p. 25) which Professor Sayce, following Miss Dodd, takes to be an Amazon, has lately been discovered at Boghaz-keui, perfectly preserved, and giving details of his embroidered garments. He corresponds very closely in form and function with the Greek Ares, the Roman Mars. Like Aphrodite, Ares was so far recognized as an Asianic god that he fought on the side of the Trojans at the siege of Ilium. According to Hesiod and Æschylus he was the father of the race of Kadmos, for his daughter Hermione was the wife of Kadmos, and the warriors of Kadmos came from the teeth of the dragon of Ares, which Kadmos sowed. Thebes was thus particularly sacred to him, and Thebes was a city of the Pelasgians. He corresponds very exactly to Teshub-Adad. Teshub is figured definitely as the god of war, is helmeted like Ares, and the only helmeted god in the Hittite or Assyrian pantheon, as Ares was the only helmeted among the Greek gods. Both gods are heavily armed. The Hittite Teshub if found depicted on a Greek vase would instantly be recognized as Ares. I think it certain that the Greek Ares was not borrowed from the Babylonian Nergal, god of war, nor from the later Babylonian Adad, but directly from the corresponding Asianic god of war, or at least drew from him his form and attributes. The Hittite Teshub was introduced into Babylonia as Adad (ib. p. 131 ff.) and there took the purely Babylonian weapon, the thunderbolt, which the Hittites themselves later adopted and gave to Teshub.

While Teshub-Adad is probably to be identified with Ares, the Hittite god in any region where he was worshiped as chief deity would be later identified by Greeks and Romans with their chief deity Zeus or Jupiter. Thus we have Jupiter Dolichenos worshiped in Kommagene, in just the region that belonged to Teshub. He is another form of Teshub, with axe and the later thunderbolt, with the short garment about his loins, and standing on a bull. But he lacks the helmet. Teshub's relation to Poseidon will be considered later.

The third, or rather the first, of the Syro-Hittite triad (ib. p. 284 ff.) is the god of dignified presence, well clad, not usually

carrying any weapon, or sometimes resting on a spear, or even carrying the Hittite axe, whom we call, provisionally, Tarkhu, the Kassite Turgu, and the biblical Terah, father of Abraham, "Thy father was a Hittite" says the prophet and Terah was a Hittite god. He passed into middle Babylonian worship, with a western immigration, somewhat before the time of Hammurabi, and in two forms, and so, probably by different routes. From him is derived the chief god Marduk (ib. p. 163 ff.) of the Hammurabi dynasty, and also the Martu (ib. p. 176 ff.) god of the West, who appears to be one of the two variant forms under which Adad, or Ramman, was worshiped. As Marduk he carries the old Babylonian scimitar, or serpent-weapon, at rest by his side, and as Martu he simply holds a short scepter to his breast.

For the earliest reported emergence of Marduk we are indebted to the Chronicle concerning Sargon and Naram-Sin published in King's "Chronicles Concerning Early Babylonian Kings," ii. pp. 8, 9. We are there told, as translated by King, of Sargon:

"The soil from the trenches of Babylon he removed
And the boundaries of Agade he made like those of Babylon.
But because of the evil which he had committed the great lord
Marduk was angry,
And he destroyed his people by famine.
From the rising of the sun unto the setting of the Sun
They opposed him and gave him no rest."

As I understand this, the account, as written by a Babylonian scribe, shows that Sargon was punished for his attack on Babylon. He filled up the trenches, or canals, with the earth on their banks, and extended his borders of Agade (modern Anbar) southward to Babylon. His later misfortunes the Babylonian scribe refers to this insult to Marduk (ib. p. 11); Dungi was later punished for similar impiety:

"Dungi, the son of Ur-Engur, cared greatly for the city of Eridu, which
was on the shore of the sea
But he sought after evil, and the treasure of Esagila and of Babylon,
He brought out as spoil. And Bel was . . . , and body and . . .
he made an end of him."

We gather from this again, that this later Babylonian scribe refers the misfortunes of Dungi to the anger of Bel, by whom he doubtless meant Marduk. That Marduk's name appeared in the original text from which he drew these records we may doubt.

Neither as Marduk nor as Martu does the Babylonian god seem to have definitely influenced the Greek religion, for the original Hittite Tarkhu was too near at hand in Asia Minor and Syria. Yet Tarkhu was usually so little specialized by an attribute, being simply a standing clad deity, that he might be related to any Syrian Baal, or to almost any Greek god, Zeus, or Apollo, or Dionysos. But this may be mentioned, that to Marduk belongs the planet Jupiter, and the same planet belongs to the Greek Zeus; and it is not unlikely that it belonged to Teshub. It is a fact of moment that of the five planets four were male in both Babylonian and Greek mythologies, and one, and the same one, female; and this implies some early genetic relation between the two; and under that category, the fact that Marduk and Zeus were both Jupiter seems to require us to presume that the intermediary Hittite god may have been also Jupiter. Still either of them, like almost any other god, may also, in certain aspects, have been related to the sun.

The weapons carried by the Babylonian and Hittite gods, as also by the Greek, require some consideration. In the earliest Babylonian art we have the usual weapons of war and the chase, the short sword, the bow, the club, also, perhaps, later, the long spear. Besides these are two divine weapons carried only by gods. One of these is the triple thunderbolt, which appears at an extremely early period; the other is the sickle-like serpent scimitar. The thunderbolt appears in the hand of a goddess, in archaic art; while the serpent scimitar makes its appearance also very early, in the armory of Ishtar, and in the hand of a god, at the time of the dynasties of Ur. It is a weapon with a rather long handle, and the end curved like a sickle. It is never used in war, but only carried by a deity of high rank, and particularly by Marduk, altho it is earlier than his emergence. This weapon was originally a serpent, like Moses' rod; and in the earlier period the curved portion is clearly the thickened neck of a serpent like the asp, and the head with open mouth.

But it was a true divine weapon. At an early period it was doubled, to form the Babylonian caduceus; but this was conceived of not so much as a weapon, but rather as a honorific attribute of the god, or more often of Ishtar. The scimitar, as I have said, is the special attribute of Marduk, carried by him not in a militant attitude, but held downward by his side, as comported with his quiet dignity. The Hittite Tarkhu, from whom he was derived, sometimes held an axe or a peaceful spear or a crook in the same way; and when the Babylonians adopted the god, they gave him their own peculiar divine serpent scimitar, just as they gave their thunderbolt to Adad, who had, in his original Hittite worship, only the usual military weapons, such as the axe and club. In the later Assyrian art, when Marduk was represented fighting the dragon he made use of this same scimitar or of a trident thunderbolt; but in Babylonian art he was almost always represented as standing in a quiet attitude, holding his scimitar downward by his side.

Now this sickle-like scimitar we find in Greek art, and always belonging to a god only, never as an implement of war. It was given by Hermes to Perseus, under the name of the *ἄρπη*, when he went to behead the Gorgon Medusa. The Greek word *ἄρπη* is applied properly to this divine weapon, while the usual word for the sickle is *δρέπανον*. But the representation of Perseus slaying the sea-monster is precisely parallel to the conflict of Marduk with the dragon.

The Greek thunderbolt and trident were also both probably derived from the Babylonian thunderbolt. I have said that originally the thunder-god Teshub-Adad, as worshiped by the Hittites, was armed solely with the usual weapons of war, while the triple thunderbolt was an invention of the early Babylonians. But the thunderbolt became familiar all over the Asianic region, hardly before 1000 B. C., and is the special weapon of Zeus, in all probability taken from Asia Minor, and usually in the form in which we see it in the earliest Babylonian and the later Assyrian art, grasped in the middle with the trident prongs each side. It is thus used by Marduk against Tiamat. But the thunderbolt as wielded by the Babylonian Adad was a single trident, and such it became finally as carried by the Hittite Teshub, replacing the earlier ordinary weapons of war. It is the trident that

is wielded by Poseidon, god of the sea and ruler of the storms. After him the storm-month, December-January, was Poseidon. It is not strange that the thunderbolt, passed over from the inland Babylonians and Hittites, and taken by the sea-faring Greeks of the islands and coasts, should have been assigned to a sea-god, who was, like Adad, also god of storms; and so it is that Poseidon carries the trident of Adad. I am aware that the classical authorities generally suppose that the trident is nothing more than a fish-spear, and as such it is even figured in late art; but Poseidon was no fisherman. He had a far higher rôle. His trident smote the land as well as the sea. The thunderbolt much more befits him than the economic fish-spear. Like Adad, his animal was the bull. A number of scholars, like Curtius, have concluded that Poseidon was not an original Greek deity, but was first worshiped by the Ionian colonists and was a god of the Carians and Leleges. The Carians had a native god corresponding to Poseidon, whom the Greeks knew as Osogoa, or Zeus Labrandenos, Zeus with the axe, who, under either form, carried the thunderbolt and the axe in a warlike attitude, both weapons those that were assumed by the Hittite Teshub-Adad. Zeus-Dolichenus is the same god, all forms of the original Hittite god. It is probable, then, that the Greek Poseidon with his trident, who fought in the Trojan War on the side of Asiatics against the Greeks, was originally the Hittite Teshub-Adad, and reached the Greeks by way of the Ionian settlers of the Ionian coasts of Asia Minor, where the native sea-faring men worshiped him as master of the sea and its storms, and gave him the axe and thunderbolt, the latter retained as the trident of Poseidon,

I have said that as carried by the Hittite Teshub the thunderbolt is later than the usual weapons of war, the sword, axe and spear. It may be worth while to observe that the Hebrews did not know the thunderbolt, but imagined Yahve with arrows and spear, as the god of lightning and storm. As Teshub strided over the mountains, brandished his sword and axe and spear to represent the glittering lightning and led a bull to typify the bellowing thunder, so Yahve marched over the mountains in anger, with the light of his arrows he went, and he was represented at Sinai, Bethel and Dan under the form of a bull.

I have tried to show more at length elsewhere (*American Journal of Semitic Languages*, xxv, 3) that the Hebrew Yahve was related originally to the Syro-Hittite Adad. Professor Haupt, not long ago, surprised scholars by an argument to show that Jesus was of Aryan and not Semitic lineage. But an argument may be presented for a more surprising conclusion, namely, that Yahve was an Aryan god. We are definitely told that Yahve was originally worshiped as Shaddai, which is not unlikely to be a dialectic form of Adad, or Hadad-Adad. But Adad was derived from Teshub, and Teshub was Hittite, and the Hittites were Aryan, and knew Indra and Varuna and Mitra. So we are at liberty to believe that Yahve was Aryan and not originally Semitic. Stranger things have turned out true.

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XII

BABYLONIAN ESCHATOLOGY

BY STEPHEN LANGDON

THE Babylonian conception of life after death and the relation of the dead to the living shews, as far as our archæological and literary sources permit us to infer, little change of ideas during the three milleniums (*circa* 3500–300 B. C.) represented in our sources. In essaying the task of outlining the Babylonian ideas of the other world and the final fate of man, their burial customs must necessarily form the first subject for investigation. It is precisely here that we find reflected the deeper spiritual conceptions of eschatology, for ritual is the surest and most fruitful source in studying the deeper problems of religions.*

When the civilization and political power of Babylonia and Assyria perished at the hands of the Persians, Greeks and Parthians, the ancient cities became mounds used largely as Parthian and Sassanian burial grounds. In fact all the more important sites—Babylon, Nippur, Ur, Erech, Sippar, Nineveh, etc., have been sites of Parthian, Christian and Arabian cemeteries to this day. Abundant material, therefore, exists for studying the late period which in a certain measure continued the beliefs and practices of the classical peoples. The entire absence of burial remains of the Assyrian period in the

* Babylonian burial customs have been described by Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies, Der Alte Orient*, I, 3, 1903, now antiquated by the recent excavations at Nippur (Haynes and Hilprecht), Fara, Abu-Hatab and Assur (German Oriental Society, chiefly conducted by Andræ and Koldewey) and by the fact that the so-called "Hades Reliefs" used both by him and by Meissner, *Wiener Zeitschrift für Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xii, 59–66, are not scenes of hell but represent the ritual of healing the sick. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 595–611, gives a *resumé* of what was known at that time [1898]; see also Perrot et Chipiez, *Histoire de l'Art*, ii, 369–378, based principally upon the reports of Taylor's excavations at Ur and Eridu; see also *ibid.*, pp. 353–6 [upon the whole antiquated].

ruins of Nineveh and the neighboring mounds led to the inference of early excavators that the Assyrians either threw their dead into the rivers or transported them to the sacred soil of Sumer where vast necropolises were found dating from the earliest period.* But the recent German excavations at Aššur have given us decisive information concerning Assyrian burial customs, although an exact date cannot always be assigned to the different tombs, coffins and urns found beneath the Parthian remains. Nevertheless the suggestion of Loftus, one of the early excavators who directed his attention principally to this question, cannot be disregarded, namely, that the vast majority of Assyrians preferred to bury their dead in the sacred soil of Sumer. The total absence of inscriptions on or within the tombs and coffins makes a decision on this point difficult.†

The evidence concerning burial, so far as the inscriptions are concerned, contains no reference to cremation. The dead were ordinarily committed to the earth,‡ in which case every vestige has long since disappeared, or in the case of more careful burials brick vaults were used.§ The more ordinary custom, however, consisted in placing the body upon a slightly raised platform of bricks provided with a reed-mat (*burū*), over which was fitted a large cover made either of one piece of baked clay, or by fitting together several pieces.|| A more simple method of in-

* On the mooted question of the date of these necropolises, whose great antiquity is denied by Jastrow, see Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, 288. The two necropolises Fara (Sukkurru-Suruppak) and Abu-Hatab (Kisurra), excavated by the Germans, are certainly very ancient.

† See Perrot et Chipiez, 352.

‡ As on the *Stèle of the Vultures* (circa 3200 B. C.) where a number of soldiers, naked, are being covered with earth by attendants who first placed the bodies in a heap, each lying horizontally, one above the other, with the head of one above the feet of the one beneath; beside the funeral pile is an ox tethered for sacrifice. The most recent and accurate reproduction of this, the earliest known funeral scene, is Heuzey and Thureau-Dangin's recent edition of the *Stèle des Vautours*.

§ The greatest possible confusion still exists concerning the periods to which we must assign the different forms of burial. The earliest vaults discovered by Taylor at Ur, are illustrated and described in *Perrot et Chipiez*, I. c.

|| The covers seem to have been usually oblong and spacious enough to admit the body together with the numerous water jars and other accoutrements necessary to the welfare of the soul. Occasionally the platform is round with a correspondingly shaped cover. For drawings after Taylor see Perrot, I. c., and Hilprecht, I. c., 176.

terment consisted of a baked clay coffin in capsule form made by fitting together two deep bowls, or the coffin might consist of a huge vase simply.* This description applies to the Sumerian period, as well as the later Semitic period. The best examples of vaults have been found recently at Aššur, the ancient capital of Assyria. In Babylonia the commodious brick vaults seemed to have been walled up after the last interment, but in Assyria an opening at the west end, as well as a covered and walled staircase leading down to it, has been found in all cases. Family vaults of this kind have been found in great numbers at Aššur,† containing skeletons, sometimes in considerable numbers.

In one of the vaults at Aššur were found funeral urns, cone-shaped, made of baked clay and containing the remains of cremation.‡ Funeral urns of this kind had been found everywhere in the upper strata of the mounds of Babylonia, but direct evidence of cremation for the classical period had been lacking. Remains of cremation were found in Nippur in the lowest Sumerian strata in the court of the stage-tower beside the remains of vaults;§ according to Professor Hilprecht a large crematorium stood near the corner of the stage-tower. Several years ago a German expedition exploited the remains of two vast necropolises a few miles south of Lagash, modern Telloh, now famous through the excavations of De Sarzec.|| Both were found to be *fire* necropolises, in which the ashes of millions of ancient Sumerians must have found a last resting-place. Here the bodies were placed in narrow brick casings, wrapped with inflammable material and covered with soft clay. Cremation was produced

* In which case the body was mutilated. Another much-used form of coffin is the bath-tub shape, often very deep, in which the body was placed in a sitting posture. Another curious pattern is a huge flask-shaped coffin, bulging towards the oval base, in which the body lay on the back with raised knees, *Mittheilungen der Deutschen Orientalischen Gesellschaft*, 36 p. 13. For recent finds of variously shaped coffins see MDOG 17, 4 ff.; 20, 24; 22, 22 and especially 27, 20 ff. Scheil's *résumé* of this matter as far as concerns Sippar is of great importance, *Une Saison de Feuilles à Sippar*, pp. 55 ff.

† Descriptions and drawings in MDOG 21, 36; 25, 48; 25, 55; 27, 29; 31, 18; 36, 23.

‡ *Ibid.*, 31, 10 f.

§ Hilprecht, l. c., 456 ff.

|| These two fire necropolises, whose ruins now bear the names of *Surghul* and *El-Hibba*, are fully described by Koldewey in the *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, ii, 403-30.

by burning a huge pile of wood above this clay covering. In case this process reduced the body to ashes the remains were placed in an urn and buried in the family plot. If the process did not reduce the body to ashes, the casing remained the tomb.* Brick vaults† were often constructed to contain the funeral urns and last remains; the excavators found large rectangular structures containing large numbers of these rooms, whose pavements were drained by sewers, descending to the water level.‡

Undoubtedly the peoples of ancient times buried their dead in their temple courts, a practice fully established by the remains of the lowest strata of Nippur. Andraë found a vault at the very foot of the stage-tower at Aššur.§ The desire to have a last resting-place in such consecrated soil is one universal in the human race and is abandoned only for practical reasons. At Ur certain parts of the city seem to have been reserved for cemeteries. In other parts of Babylonia, whole districts, including large cities, buried in one vast city of the dead, the local necropolis.

Although the ancient Sumerians, whose beliefs were transmitted to the Semites, conceived of an immediate separation of body and soul at mortal dissolution, the latter passing at once to *Arallū*, the land of the dead, yet the soul or *edimmu* maintained a lively interest in the body which it had left behind.|| In fact

* Jastrow refused to accept an early date for the ruins of these two sites, and speaks of Koldewey's explanation as unacceptable, but the trend of recent archaeology is in favour of cremation at an early date, which custom seems to have existed in all periods.

† Called by Koldewey "*Totenhäuser*."

‡ The two necropolises, *Fara* and *Abu-Hatab*, located between Nippur and Lagash, and hence in the centre of a most densely populated district, contained no traces of cremation whatsoever. We must therefore infer that customs differed in the various communities. For traces of cremation at Babylon, see MDOG 36, 12; 38, 13, at a depth of twenty feet.

§ *Ibid.*, 25, 55. Hommel and Hilprecht infer that the stage-towers are really *tombs* of gods of vegetation, more particularly of Šamaš, the sun-god, who is supposed to dwell in the nether world each year; see Hilprecht l. c., 459 ff. This explanation, however, rests upon an improper interpretation of the word *gigunā*, which when applied to temples denotes a room in the temple made in imitation of the land of the dead and is not a part of the stage-tower.

|| One might suppose that cremation would lead to a more spiritual conception and detach the body forever from the soul, but the post-burial rites and ceremonies seem to have been the same whether the body was buried or

the future happiness of the soul depended largely upon the proper care being given to its abandoned body. In every vault water jars and bowls of food were placed beside the body, also in coffins of every description. The same necessary supplies for the soul accompany the funeral urns and remains of cremation. A properly buried person must take with him to the grave his jewels, his own seal, his sword and whatsoever implements characterized his profession in the land of the living. In the graves of women the excavators often find palettes, paint-boxes and remains of paint-brushes for coloring the eye-brows and eye-lashes.* The soul, therefore, continues its earthly existence in the lower world, eats and drinks, and preserves its identity. Here one finds kings, priests, magicians, and legendary heroes.† The soul whose body does not receive provisions, or lies unburied on the earth, is condemned to misery until its remains receive proper burial.

I come now to the principal matter which I wish to discuss, namely the evidence from the inscriptions themselves. The earliest important reference to burial is found in an inscription of Urukagina; ‡ “When a dead man was placed in his coffin his drink§ three jars, his breads eighty, one bed, one kid-sag,|| as funeral offering (?) he received.” Then follows the interesting and hitherto unexplained passage;—“30 *ka* of barley the wailer ¶ received. If a [dead]** man were placed in the dark [chamber] of Ea†† his drink 4 jars, his breads 240, 60 *ka* of barley, as (his) offering (?) he received. 30 *ka* of barley the wailer re-

cremated. No difference in beliefs concerning the fate of the soul can be inferred from the different burial customs. Dr. Farnell has called my attention to his own views on this point in the *Hibbert Journal*, 1909, 422.

* MDOG 17, 4 ff.; for the same relics in Egyptian graves see *ibid.*, 30, 9.

† Jensen, *Mythen und Epen*, 188.

‡ Circa 2900 B. C.; a baked clay cone with duplicate, both in the Louvre, published in *Decouvertes, partie épigraphique*, LI, f.; translated by Thureau-Dangin, *Sumerische und Akkadische Keilinschriften*, 46-54; the passage under discussion is col. ix, 26-34 on cone A, = B, viii, 32-38.

§ The word employed, *kas*, means a kind of beer.

|| A special kind of kid, cf. BM 14335 obv. 5; RA iii, 122, l., 14.

¶ *Galu dim-ma-ge*, “man of wailing.”

** Text of B is illegible here, A has not the infix for *dead*, but the infix is probably to be inserted.

†† *gi-^d. en-ki-ka-ka*, for *gi-^d. en-ki-ka-ka*, evidently a poetical phrase for *gi-^d. en-ki-ka-ka*, “great house of darkness,” the ordinary word for *vault*.

ceived." We have here a clear distinction between an ordinary burial in a sarcophagus* and the more stately interment in a vault with corresponding difference in the amount of the offering placed at the disposal of the soul for his last voyage.† A monument of the same period contains the following passage;—"In the city no coffin was interred, no dead were buried; the psalmist raised his dirge, wailing arose not, the woman wailer uttered not wailing (sic!)."‡

The passages cited prove that the drink-offering placed beside the dead in the ancient period was not water but a kind of beer.§ As a matter of fact water did not form the element of the offerings in the tomb, nor is water mentioned among the offerings regularly made by the living at the tombs of their ancestors. Only in a later period arose the idea that water was necessary to the existence of the soul. The original word for offerings made for the souls of the dead is *anag* or more fully *kianag*. It has been commonly supposed that *anag*, which was borrowed by the Semites as *anakku*, means "to pour out water," but there is absolutely no evidence to support this interpretation.|| *Anag* means, in practice, any offering made for the repose of the dead. The living not only buried their dead according to the customs dictated by their eschatological ideas, but they continued to make regular offerings at their tombs or graves. The relation between a man and his ancestors was not severed at the grave. A decent burial constituted only the necessary beginning of a happy existence in *Arallū*; the soul's happy existence could not continue unless its kinsmen performed for it the necessary rites. Inasmuch as those souls whose bodies failed to receive proper burial or the proper continuance of attention by their kinsmen, rose from hell to torment mankind and especially their own negligent descendants, the offerings for the repose of the souls

* *kimaḥḥū*.

† The passage continues with a list of allowances for other persons, viz., the priestess, the *galu siga*, the psalmist, and a large allowance for a *meal*. If this part of the passage belongs to the description of the burial, then we have here the long desired evidence of a funeral meal, the *parentalia*. I am doubtful about this matter and hesitate to make far reaching conclusions on the basis of this passage.

‡ Gudea, *Statue B*, v, 1-4.

§ *kas* = *ḥikaru*.

|| The root *nag* means "to drink," and *anag*, a drink offering. The prefix *a* is the simple vowel augment and has no reference to water.

formed an important part of Sumerian and Babylonian religious practice. We shall see from the numerous ancient sources now at our disposal that a general offering was provided for, in the official religion, to appease the souls of the dead. We have here truly the primitive conception of a feast of all souls. I translate first the sources for private ancestral commemoration and secondly those which concern a general offering for the repose of all souls.*

OBV.

Col. i.—One she kid—unweaned,
4 male kids†—weaned,
20 male kids
set aside for the mortuary
sacrifices

Col. ii.—of Enlitarzi
and of Dudu
the priest,
at the festival of Bau.
Eniggal

REV.

Col. i.—the prefect
has assigned
to the shepherd
Lugalšagga.
[Property of] Baranamtara

Col. ii.—wife of Lugalanda,
priest king of
Lagash.
3d year.‡

Lugalanda son of Enlitarzi and his successor to the throne of Lagash, here through his wife provides for the offerings to be made at the tombs of his father and of a former high-priest. A small tablet of the same period has the notice;—"One male sheep has been slain for the mortuary sacrifice of Enlitarzi. The sheep consumed was of his own estate."§ A list of offerings for each of the eight days of the feast of the goddess Nina

* I have avoided the use of the term "cult of the dead," since a cult implies the deification of the being worshipped. The Sumerians did deify their rulers, built temples to them and even identified them with planets, but the deification of rulers has little relation to the problems under discussion. We have in Babylonia only a *tendency* to an ancestral cult system, but the Sumerian religion in the earliest period had already become too lofty in its conceptions of divinity to descend to the level of ancestry worship.

† *maš* should always be translated "male kid," Semitic *lalu* and *šabitu*, although the latter form is feminine. The ordinary translation "gazelle" for *šabitu* should be reserved for *uniku*.

‡ Nikolaki, *Documents of the Most Ancient Epoch*, Collection Likhatcheff, No. 195.

§ Literally, "of his own name." Allotte de la Fuyë, *Documents Présumés* no. 56.

at Lagash contains the following entry among others for the second day:

"120 *ka** of meal, 60 *ka* of servant's beer, 60 *ka* of black beer, 60 (?) *ka* of oil, one *ka* of dates, one *ka* of wine . . ., one basket (?) of fish, one male kid, have been offered as the mortuary sacrifice of the king of Lagash." †

The tablet from which I have taken this extract is dated in the 3d year of Lugalanda, in whose time the rulers of Lagash had long ceased to use the title of "king." The natural inference would be that regular offerings were maintained for the souls of the rulers who founded the dynasty and who called themselves kings.

Tablets containing lists of regular offerings for the souls of ordinary men and women are not wanting. In this regard the most interesting document is a large tablet in the British Museum, containing a list of temple (?) receipts and expenditures, among which occur the following notices;—"270 *ka* (of barley) the regular religious tax‡ for the mortuary sacrifice§ of the mother of the priestess, barley from the field of the goddess Ningul";|| "300 female slaves for one day, the overseer being Ur-⁴ Lama son of Uda, 108 female slaves for one day [the overseer being] Ikkuš son of Lala, paid from the regular religious tax for the mortuary sacrifice of Gin-⁴ Bau the priestess and of the father of the priestess."¶ Here the state provides for the cults of the father and mother of a priestess, as well as for that of the priestess** herself. I use the term "cult" for the subject matter of this inscription, for we have here a real legal institution. Evidently the state provided a regular income for the vault of

* The *ka* was a small vessel containing a little less than half a litre.

† *Ibid.*, no. 53 obv. ii, 5-11.

‡ *satukku*.

§ Here I translate *ki-a-nag* by "mortuary sacrifice."

|| BM 14308 obv. ii, 12-14.

¶ *Ibid.*; rev. iii, 1-12.

** *nin-dingir-ra*, cf. *Urukagina*, Cone A col. x, 12, and Jensen, op. cit. 439. Offerings for the *ki-a-nag* of the father of the priestess also in a fragmentary tablet of the same size, Reisner, *Temple-Urkunden*, no. 128, obv. iii.; monthly offerings for the soul of the mother of the priestess are registered on a fragment, *ibid.*, no. 112; obv. col. i has part of the offering for the 2nd. month, col. ii mentions allowances of beer for the *ki-a-nag* of the *šabru* (a religious office) and of the mother of the priestess [4th month], col. iii has the end of an entry for the *ki-a-nag* of the 5th month, followed by similar allowances for the 6th month.

a family whose services in the official religion had been great. We find, therefore, considerable property actually accruing to the credit of this fund, which the authorities drew upon to pay the ordinary expenses of the temple.*

Another tablet furnishes even more interesting evidence concerning the part which respect for the souls of the great played in the official religion:†

Obv: "60 servants of the prefect Enušimma, 60 servants of the prefect Galu-^dNingirsu, (both are elders); ‡ 23 servants of the house of the messengers (whose overseer is Galu-^dBau), of the prefect Uršagga: 143 servants. Of these, 15 for the *zi-gur* § of the temple *Uz-ga*, one for the mortuary sacrifices of Ma-^dEngur,|| one for the mortuary sacrifices of the deified Dungi, 6 for the slaughter-house—*Sagdana*, 2 for the slaughter-house of Nippur."¶ The tablet continues with a long list of groups of servants who served in various capacities.

The sources do not always make clear whether the offerings were burnt, or whether they were consumed as a family meal in memory of the dead. The jars and bowls placed with the body provided for the needs of the soul for the time being. Inasmuch as the vaults were found securely bricked up, we infer that they were never entered again. The offerings in question can, there-

* Other instances, in which the *ki-a-nag* is represented as possessing property, occur: Nikolaki no. 236, in a list of skins of goats belonging to different persons, the last entry is six skins of little kids, property of the *ki-a-nag*.

† BM 17775 published in Cuneiform Texts of the British Museum, vol. vii, pl. 47. Cf. RTC no. 46, obv. II.

‡ *ab-āš-āš-me*: the ordinary meaning of *ab* is *šbu* "old man, councillor, judge;" cf. *amelu ab-irrišu* K. 50, I 24. With this passage cf. 14595, "2 royal *gur* of barley Ur-Bau has received from Ur-^dEnlil, as provision for the servants of the two elders (*sag-gal erin āš-āš-me*). In Thureau-Dangin, *Recueil de Tablettes Chaldéennes*, 112, a man has the title *ab* of the king. Although the *ab* appears to have been a councillor concerned with secular matters, yet he belonged to the temple staff; BM 12232 obv. iii, 18, Lukani is the *ab* of the goddess Ninmarki; the *ab* of Tammuz, of Nini, etc., also occurs; also the *abba* of god, simply, in Nikolaki 19, obv. iii, 7. For the *ab-ba* in later times see Zeitlin, *Style Administratif*, p. 42.

§ The word is written ZI-IL; *zi-gur* may be Semitic for *zigurat*, stage-tower. Cf. Reisner TU no. 173, obv. 6.

|| *I. e.*, one servant employed to do menial service in connection with rites for the soul of Ma-^dEngur.

¶ Sic! The tablet comes from Lagash. The two buildings (*é-gud-gaz*) mentioned were used for slaughtering victims for the temples. A house of the same kind was built outside the north wall of Babylon.

fore, have no reference to the food placed in the grave. Fortunately at least one text is more definite on this point, proving that we are actually dealing with a ceremony of eating a meal in memory of the dead.

"One sheep for the priest-king, one kid for the priest of the goddess Ninā, one lamb and one kid for the priest of the goddess Ninmarki, have been eaten in the assembly (?)*. One sheep for the priest-king, one sheep for the chief scribe, in the month *giš-dim-ka-na*† at the celebration of the mortuary sacrifice have been eaten."‡

Thus we see that the soul was nourished in Aralū by the memorial meals consumed in his memory by his kinsmen on earth or in case of rulers, priests and important persons the memorial meal formed part of the official religion. Such memorial meals would naturally take on a more sacramental character when the ruler was deified. Not only was he then raised to the rank of a god, and worshipped and sacrificed to, as a god, but the ordinary mortuary sacrifice in which his human nature persisted was maintained.§ We have already found one instance of the mortuary rites of the deified Dungi in the last inscription. A similar reference to the same deified ruler occurs on a tablet in Berlin.|| A large fragment of the same collection has the following entry; "One male kid, 5 *ka* of servant's meal,¶ 5 shekel-weight of butter, 2 large wicker jars [of oil of dates?]** for the mortuary sacrifice to Gudea the king."†† Here Gudea has not yet been deified.

The evidence for a more general application of the memorial feast in memory of all the souls who had passed to Aralū can-

* *gūn-a ba-kur*. Some doubt exists about the word for assembly (*puhru*), but the word used for "eat" is certain.

† Otherwise unknown as the name of a month.

‡ Allotte de la Fuyé, op. cit. no. 80. Naturally the participants burnt a portion as a sacrifice to the dead.

§ See Scheil's article on the *Culte de Gudea* in Maspero's *Recueil de Travaux*, vol. xviii.

|| Reisner, TU., no. 173, obv. 7, "a servant for the *ki-a-nag* of the divine Dungi."

¶ *zid-kal*, an inferior quality of meal.

** *id sū-lum*, cf. same column six lines below, and BM 17775, obv., 17.

†† Reisner, TU., no. 128, col. ix. Cf. the offerings to the *ki-a-nag* of the kings, RTC 316, rev., 1.

not be so abundantly documented but is none the less certain. A large record of offerings for the six days of the festival of the goddess Ninā provides meal, beer, oil, dates, wine and fish for the mortuary sacrifice of Lagash, that is, for the feast of "all souls" for that city. This took place on the first day of the festival. Another entry for the third day enumerates similar offerings for the mortuary sacrifice of *Ninā-ki*, a section of the same city.* Another tablet, according to which the same festival lasted only four days, fixes the feasts of all souls for both *Sirpurla* (Lagash) and *Ninā* for the first day.†

It need not be surprising, therefore, to find in an account of the monthly tax paid by the wealthy consort of one of the priest-kings of Lagash, an entry for the *ki-a-nag*,‡ or in a list of monthly allowances for different temple expenses and offerings, a large quantity of wheat given for the *ki-a-nag* of a certain Ningirsu-urmu,§ in the 9th year of Lugaland, and another monthly account in the 4th year of the same ruler provides a smaller quantity of wheat for the same purpose.||

When Gudea, the well-known priest-king of Lagash, placed his own statue in the temple of Ningirsu before that god, among the prayers which he inscribed upon it is the following: "May it receive mortuary sacrifice."¶ The same inscription begins with an account of the regular (monthly)** offerings to be offered to his statue during his lifetime. The two rites must, however, not be confused. The worship offered to the statue of a living monarch proves that the Sumerians deified their rulers even in their own lifetime.†† It would seem, therefore, that the memorial monthly meal was eaten in the presence of the statue of the de-

* See Nikolaki, no. 23 obv., cols. i and ix. A feast of all souls at the festival of Bau, RTC no. 60.

† H. de Genouillac, *Tablettes Sumeriennes Archaïques*, no. 1, obv., vii.

‡ Th.-Dangin, RTC 51 obv., v, end. The text is broken away so that either the name of the city or the name of a person may have followed. See also no. 47, obv., ii, 7.

§ *Ibid.*, no. 55.

|| *Ibid.*, no. 66, obv., ii.

¶ *ki-a-nag-e ga-ba-tum*, Statue B. 7, 55.

** *satukku* which seems to have been monthly and in case of Gudea (at least) offered to him after his death on the 15th or day after the full moon, see Scheil l. c.

†† A practice known from many other sources. See Hilprecht, *Earliest Version of the Flood Story*, 24-29. Dungi bears the title of "god" Dungi in his own reign, CT ix, 44 col., ii, 18.

parted, if the person in question was important enough to be honoured with a statue.* This prayer of Gudea inscribed in classic Sumerian upon his statue appears to have been worked into a hymn to Ningirsu, of which we have a late fragmentary copy supplied with a Semitic translation. "As for the king whose being† has been created‡ unto a life of far-away days, whose statue if one fashion unto eternal days and [bring] it into Eninnū, the temple of gladness, the mortuary sacrifice § . . . as is fitting may he receive."|| Another passage of great importance in this connection, in which the primitive force of the word *ki-a-nag* seems evident, is the following: "The *ki-a-nag* of the gods where the mortuary sacrifice is made,¶ in the temple Ninnū, the *tarkullu*, he fixed." This is not the only passage in which the souls of the dead are called "gods"; the demons, good and bad, were originally souls which arose out of hell at the instance of the wizard, or sent by the powers of darkness. This weird conception which peopled Aralū with spirits who were capable of interfering with the affairs of men and upon whose good will the happiness of the living largely depended is illustrated by a passage from a late incantation, "The bound gods arise from hell, the evil ghouls arise from hell, for the breaking of bread and the pouring out of water."** In another passage Gudea refers to fallen heroes in affectionate terms:

* Offerings to statues occur in RTC no. 247, obv., i, 12, and TSA, no. 35, obv., v.

† *mu* = *šumu*, literally "name."

‡ *išakkanu*, for *iššakkanu*.

§ *ki-a-nag* is translated by *ašar* . . . , the decisive word being unfortunately broken away. Assyriologists have inferred from this passage that *ki-a-nag* refers to a *place*, i. e., an altar or a chapel of some sort where water was poured out to the shades of the dead. This practice, however, [*nāḫ mē*] belongs to the late period only. The Sumerian *ki* of course means place [*ašru*] and *a-nag* should mean "to give to drink water." But the late term *kisig* which replaced the earlier *ki-a-nag* means *kašāpu ša kiepi*, "breaking of bread for the dead," and in no way is it used of a *place*. Both forms, however, evidently mean the place where the parentalia was performed, but in actual usage only the *ritual itself* is intended. If *a-nag* actually means to pour out water to the dead, it is nowhere so explained, for *nāḫ mē* of the later parentalia is translated into Sumerian by *a-nisag*, CT, xvii, 37, 9. See below, note on *a-nag*. || IV R 13a, 22-29.

¶ *ki-a-nag dingir-ri-ka a im-nag-nag-a*; here *a-nag* is a compound in which *a* does not have the meaning "water," but is a vowel augment as in *a-ru*, *a-kid*, *a-sil*, *a-kešda*, see *Babyloniaca*, ii, 96.

** CT xvii, 37, 1-10.

"The dead heroes . . . to them I administered at the place of mortuary sacrifice."*

The material utilized in the foregoing discussion is entirely from ancient Sumerian sources and must form the basis for our study of the earliest ideas concerning eschatology. Our inferences may not be altogether certain, yet we may perhaps assume that the parentalia or solemn meal in memory of the dead formed the essential act necessary for the repose of the soul. The general parentalia or meal for all souls took place in most cases on the first, second or third days of the great feasts of Ninā and Bau, *i. e.*, at the beginning of the fifth and seventh months. No importance should be attached to this fact, for the parentalia seems to have recurred every month and it is only because we have so much documentary evidence for the two festivals mentioned that the parentalia for these months is so often found.

When we reach the Semitic period of the first dynasty we find a new expression which seems to have entirely replaced the ancient term *ki-a-nag* "mortuary sacrifice" or more strictly, "place for mortuary sacrifice,"† namely *ki-sig* which the Semitic scribes interpreted by "breaking of bread." The earliest passage is a pure Sumerian text;‡ "food of the parentalia § in its place I eat"; the goddess Ininni, Semitic Itšar-Ašoreth, uses this phrase

* Gudea, Cyl. A, 26, 15 f., *ur-sag dig-ga-ni-me . . . KA-bi ki-a-nag-si mu-gar*. *KA-gar* ordinarily means, "conduct a suit," in a hostile sense, hence, "complaint"; but cf. *KA-gar sag-ga-a* "good intention," Cyl. A, 20, 3. Our passage means literally, "their affair I plead," and may include wailing.

† The notion of *mortuary* or *memorial for the dead* is not inherent in the etymology of either of these words but they are, in fact, used only in this sense. The Sumerian *ki-sig* is translated by *kispa kasāpu*. The fundamental notion is "to break bread together," exactly equivalent to the N.T. Greek *το ἄρτον κλάειν*. In actual usage only the form *kusapa kasāpu* occurs for eating in common, whereas the form *kispa kasāpu* is reserved for the parentalia. For the primitive idea, cf. *la kusapi lākal*, "thou eatest not broken bread," Harper, *Letters*, 341, 9. The phrase occurs in the Gilgamesh Epic xi, 300, *ana esā simāni iksupu kusapa*, "every twenty double hours' march they broke bread," followed by, "every thirty double hours' march they made a night's lodging." [The passage has been universally misunderstood]; see also v. col. iii, 44. *kusapu la ekuluni*, "they ate broken bread," Harper, *Letters*, no. 78, 11.

‡ CT xv, 7, 23, see my *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, p. 10. The new term *kisig* may be due nevertheless to Semitic conceptions.

§ So I translate *ki-sig* everywhere, to distinguish it from *ki-a-nag*, "mortuary sacrifice." Both translations are only a *vade mecum*.

in a lamentation over her city; she assists at the public feast of the breaking of bread for the souls who perished in the destruction of her city. The lamentation continues: "Of the stalls their cattle I sacrifice."* The rite now consists in the breaking of bread together at a common meal, as well as the offering of a sacrifice. The ancient ceremony seems to have been a sacrifice which the family of the deceased partook of, but part of which was burned for the soul in Aralū, the so-called Hebrew "peace-offering," שלם. Alongside of this grew up a more spiritual ritual, the breaking of bread. In the evolution of the rite, the two practices merged into one, and the ancient term disappeared. We now find the term *kisig*, *kispa kasāpu*, "breaking of bread," used for the entire ceremony, in which it is difficult to separate the ideas.† The word *kispu* soon acquired the meaning sacrifice for the dead and in the Cassite period several temple records shew that the official religion provided for the public parentalia.‡

In an inscription recently discovered at Eski-Harran, a priest of the famous temple of the moon god in Harran affectionately refers to the friends whom he had lost in the course of a long lifetime, and for whom he had performed the monthly ceremony for the repose of the dead.§ The description to be disengaged

* *tūr amar-bi a-nag-an me-en*; the passage was not understood by me in SBP, p. 11. Notice that we have here the verb *anag*.

† The Babylonians built special temples for the parentalia, probably only for the general sacrifices to the dead which if carried out regularly would absolve the individual families from these burdens. Reference to the *bīt kisikki* at Keš occurs, SBP 24, 74; at Adab 26, 6: cf. also, 214, 24. Especially interesting is a letter of the Babylonian king Ammiditana (2021-1985 B. C.) in Th.-Dangin's *Lettres et Contrats* no. 7. "To Šumma-ilu. son of Idin-Marduk say:—thus saith Ammiditana: Milk and butter for the *kisig* of the month Ab are lacking (*iḫḫaššem*). When thou readest this letter may thy overseer take 30 cows and 60 *ka* of butter and come to Babylon. Until the *kisig* is finished let him supply milk. He shall not delay but come at once."

‡ Clay, *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, xiv, pl. 60, 43, fourteen animals set aside for the *kispu*; xv, 200, i, 6, in a list of grain offerings to the gods, 20 *ka* for the *kispu u rimku*, "sacrifice to the dead and libation." Cf. also xv, 185, i, 5; here the sacrifice took place in the *bīt ilāni*, "temple of the gods."

§ Henri Pognon, *Inscriptions sémitiques de la Syrie*, Boulder of Eski-Harran iii, 16, "lambs, wine, etc. . . . I offered unto them as a sacrifice to the dead," [*kispi*] *akassap šunuti*. The word for "monthly" is partly broken away.

from the fragmentary inscription clearly applies to a sacrifice of which the priests probably partook. The monthly celebration of this rite is made certain not only by the abundant evidence from the period but by an entry in a late calendar in which the *ud kisigga* appears as one of the regular monthly feasts.*

The Babylonians attributed many of their woes to the spirits of the dead, who, not receiving their due respect at the hands of the living, rose out of hell to torment humanity. Under such circumstances they usually appealed to the gods Ea, Šamaš and Marduk. One interesting ritual directs the afflicted to erect seven altars (?), with a censer for each and to sacrifice seven lambs. Then he must offer the parentalia† to seven statues. According to Babylonian theology the devils were seven in number, whom they conceived of as wicked souls. They are here represented by their seven statues at the meal which mortals provide to appease them. Another ritual directs the persecuted man to place a seat for the souls of his ancestors at the ritualistic scene and to offer them the parentalia.‡

Only in the late Semitic period do we come upon the practice of pouring out water for the soul of the dead in connection with the memorial meal, the so-called *nāk mē*.§ Ashurbanipal speaks of this institution in the following line: "The regulations|| for the parentalia and the pouring of water for the souls of the kings who preceded me, which had fallen into disuse, I organised."¶ The libation of water for the dead appears first in the Cassite

* K 6012, l. 21, in PSBA 1904, after page 56.

† *kispi takasip-šunuti*. See Zimmern, *Ritualtafel*n, no. 49.

‡ Zimmern, *ibid.*, no. 52. The ordinary word for "soul" is *edimmu*, less often *utukku*, and both are Sumerian loan-words. The seven devils usually bear the names, *ašakku*, *namtaru*, *utukkū*, *alu*, *edimmu*, *gallū*, *ilu limnu*. They are called "the offspring of hell," *binūt Arallē*, IV R. 1, a 12.

§ *naḫū* has the root meaning "pour" but soon took on the general meaning "to offer as a sacrifice," and might be applied to libations, animals or any kind of sacrifice. In the strict sense of "pour," the Sumerian equivalent was *bal*, but in the wider sense of offering any kind of sacrifice the scribes translated by the word *nisag*, correctly written DĒ (Brünnow, No. 6714), but often confused with MURU (No. 6701). When either sign is used for *naḫū*, or the noun *niḫū* the phonetic value is *nisag*. *nāk* in the phrase *nāk mē* is the infinitive, and we should translate, "giver of libation of water," unless the notion of a person is indicated by *amēlu*, or is otherwise evident.

|| *adi*.

¶ Lehmann, *Šamaš-šam-uktn L² rev.*, 1.

period, in the terrible curse, "May god deprive him of an heir and a giver of libation of water;"* "May god cause him to have neither heir nor giver of libation of water;"† "May god take away heir and giver of libation of water."‡

The land of the dead, which the Babylonians imagined to be a vast chamber beneath the surface of the earth, was ruled by the goddess Ereškigal§ whose name means "mistress of the vast place." An interesting myth explains how this goddess, sister of the great gods, obtained her consort Nergal. She, in her capacity of queen of the dead, could not leave Aralū to attend a feast of the gods, but sent her messenger *Namtaru*. When the messenger arrived in the assembly of the gods all but Nergal arose to salute him. Whereupon by the consent of the gods Ereškigal summoned Nergal to hell for punishment. Nergal arrived at the gates|| of hell and was announced by the watchman. Admitted into the presence of the queen he violently threw her from her throne and spared her life at her plea that she be made his consort. Nergal thus became lord of *Aralū*. As a matter of fact Ereškigal seems to have been the original ruler of the land of the dead. Nergal, originally the winter sun, was supposed to dwell in Aralū half of the year whence his character as lord of Aralū and the pest god *par excellence*.¶ In religious literature and in the syllabars Nergal appears without a consort.** His principal titles are, god of the grave, of perception †† of judgement,‡‡ of wrath, of gladness, of plague, of the street.§§

* Inscribed Memorial Deed of Melišupak, col. vii, 9-11.

† KB iv, 86, 19.

‡ *Ibid.*, 72, iv, 20. See Hinke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar* i, p. 291. The same curse is frequently used and the references often referred to in popular works; see Delitzsch, *Handwörterbuch*, under *nakā*.

§ In ii, 59, 33 the name is interpreted by *iltu Allatu*, which scholars have usually regarded as the Semitic equivalent.

|| Here fourteen gates are mentioned.

¶ For this legend see Jensen, *op. cit.*, 74-79.

** See Böllenrücher, *Hymnen und Gebete an Nergal*; also Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, nos. vii, viii, xxvii. †† *ilu ša ha-ja-ti*.

‡‡ *šipti*. See also Langdon, *ibid.*, 84, 4, and iv, R, 24, no. 1, 27-8. This title of Nergal is the only real evidence we have for supposing that souls were examined concerning their good and bad deeds while on earth.

§§ CT. xxiv, 41, 64-74. Another list on the same tablet, ll. 89-95, where he follows the grain goddess Nisaba, has the titles, god of lightning, god of purification, god of Sutu, god of the mountain, and god of dwellings.

The Babylonians had several picturesque names for the land of the dead, which was often described as the *iršit la tārī*, "land of no return."* The ordinary word is *arallū* or *aralū*, a Sumerian word which means "place of desolation."† The scribes explained the word with other fanciful phrases—"mountain house of the dead," "the vast city";‡ *irkallu* "prison house,"§ of which the soul of Eabani says to his comrade Gilgamesh, "Descend unto me, unto the house of darkness, abode of the god of *irkalla*." Another term, *bit ilu Tammuz*, "house of Tammuz,"|| arose from the ancient myth concerning this god who abode in hell each year during the autumn and winter season.

The descent of Istar into inferno to search for the departed Tammuz has been described in a poem of remarkable beauty and it is from this poem, which has been exploited, that most of the popular ideas concerning the Babylonian Hades have been taken.¶ According to this poem *Aralū* is a land without light, where dust is the only food and solitude reigns supreme. Seven gates guard the descent into *Aralū*, at each of which a warder challenges the visitor. In the interior *Ereškigal* holds her court, which consists of her messenger *Namtaru*, chief of demons, and the *Anunnaki*, servants of the under world.** An ancient Sumerian text mentions several demons who conduct the sister *Tammuz* into the lower world in quest of her brother. The scene is described as follows:

"The watchman, the *gallu*-†† demon, opponent terrible,
To the compassionate *Bêlît-seri* spoke,
'Why to thy brother, the lamented, wilt thou enter?
Why to Tammuz, the bewailed, wilt thou enter?'
With the *gallu* she pursued her way unto him.

* For this rendering of *kùr-nu-gi*, see Jensen, *op. cit.*, 80, n. 2.

† Cf. *dra-li-a = karmu*, "ruin," [Ethiopic *kamr*] ii, 35a, 44.

‡ ii, R, 30d, 3-5.

§ Sumerian *kešda*, v, R, 16, 80, with which compare the "mountain house of the dead," the *kešda azag*, CT, xvi, 3, 95; *irkallu* also in Rm. 343, obv. 15, between the words *iršitum* and *naḫbu*.

|| BM 93063 in CT xii, 23, where a list of words for "under world" may be found, among them *karmu*, "ruin," and *ḫabru*, "grave."

¶ iv R, 31.

** One text mentions 600 *Anunnaki*, SBH, 87, 35.

†† One of the seven devils.

The slayer upon the route advanced* with her.
 The *šudū* journeyed with her unto him.
 The *alu* † journeyed with her unto him.
 Together they hastened, together they pressed forward."‡

We possess but one passage in which a soul rises from hell to describe the existence of the dead. Nergal opens the earth and allows the ghost of Eabani to ascend and reveal the horrors of death to his comrade Gilgamesh:

"Speak, O my comrade, speak, O my comrade,
 The law of hell which thou hast seen, speak."
 "If I tell thee the law of hell § which I have seen,
 In . . . thou shalt sit, weep.
 Truly in . . . I sat, truly I wept." ¶

So runs the fragmentary text concerning the only message which man has brought back from the "land of no return."

The entrance into Aralū was located in the far west ¶ at the place where the inhabitants of Babylonia saw the sun descend into the nether sea, as they supposed. I translate here an incantation against restless souls who have wandered from hell;

* Read *dīb*, not *ba*.

† One of the seven devils.

‡ Langdon, *op. cit.*, 312, 22 ff.

§ *irsitu*, hell, here and often.

¶ Jensen, *op. cit.*, 263.

¶ Cf. the title of Nergal "*mar-urū = ilu ša sutū*. CT xxiv, 42, 91 f. *MAR-TU*, the ordinary Sumerian word for *abubu*, "storm," "deluge," is to be read *mar-urū* when it has this sense. [Not to be confused with the word *mā-gūr*, "ship," ZA, xx, 451.] Although *mar-uru* is the form used in classical texts for *abubu* yet the form *a-mā-urū* > *a-ma-ru* [K 3372 + 5241 obv., 12 = CT xvii, 37] may be original. Since the ancient word for "quiver," *išpatu* was *é mar-urū*, "dwelling of the storm" and the primitive notion of *abubu* is "flood of light," "quiver" meant really "abode of the shafts of light," *mar-urū*, *a-ma-urū*, *a-ma-ru* [dialectic *mā-urū* is frequent] "storm," and "quiver" [*é mar-urū* later became *mar-urū = išpatu*] is evidently a pure Sumerian word. Now *MAR-TU* is the ordinary writing for *Amurrū*, west-land, the land of the Amorites. If we are to read *mar-urū* then the inference must be made that *Amurrū*, Amorite, is pure Sumerian meaning, "land of storm," hence west-land. We have direct evidence for reading *MAR-TU* as *mar-urū*, when it means West, Amorite, since in CT xxiv, 40, 48, Adad, god of the west-land, usually written "*MAR-TU*," is explained by *abubu*. The reading *mar-tu* for West is, therefore, definitely excluded. *Sutu*, already known to be a Syrian province (iv R, 38, 22 f., *su-ri-ki* and *su-ti-um-ki*) is here written with the Sumerian word for West, more especially Amorite. Nergal, therefore, is god of the west-land, i.e., Sutiūm.

it not only contains evidence for placing the entrance to hell in the west but is one of the most useful sources for studying Babylonian conceptions of the spiritual world.

"Mighty sage of the universe, Marduk, raging one, [who makest glad] * Egurra

O Ea, Shamash and Marduk come to my aid.

By your grace may I conduct my life rightly.

O Shamash the terrifying ghost, which since many days,

Behind me clings and cannot be loosed,

Which every day oppresses me, every night terrifies me,

Which persecutes ever (?)†, causes the hair upon me to stand on end,‡

Which makes my bosom gasp for breath (?)§ which hunts my eyes.||

Which brings woe to my back (?) poisoning my flesh, ¶

Which brings woe to my whole body,

Be it a ghost of my family by male or female lineage,**

Be it a ghost who was murdered.

Be it a wandering †† ghost—this one or that one,

O Shamash before thee I seek him.

* Read *šal-[ba-bu mu-rēš]*, cf. BA V, 347, no. xiii, 3.

† *riḏḏu izzī-zu* or *uḏzi-zu*; literally, "who stands in pursuit." *riḏḏu* < *riḏḏu*; for *riḏḏu* "succession," "following after," cf. Jensen on the root *riḏ*, "follow after," in *Mythen und Epen*, 317.

‡ See Meissner, *Supplement*, under *ḥḥ*.

§ *pūti-ia iḥṣū*. The information on the root *ḥiṣ* in the lexicons is false. At least one root *ḥiṣ*, "to take refuge," "to conceal," seems to be certain. Heb. *ḥḥ*. Another root, "remove from the way," in Tiglathpileser I, col. iv, 67, in I² form "take for oneself," Delitzsch, AL⁴, 167, and cf. Behrens, *Briefe*, p. 2, also Meissner, *Supplement* 39. I have ventured to connect the root in this passage with Arabic *ḥaṣiya*.

|| II² of *šādu*, *uṣṣanadu*.

¶ *šamāmu*, "to poison (?)," so Meissner: cf. *šammu*, "drug," Küchler, *Medicine*, 66, *šerā-šu iṣammamušu*, CT, xxiii, 46, 26; *ḫata-šu šepa-šu ušammamu-šu*, *ibid.*, l. 27.

** *eimmu kintī-ia u salati-ia*: the full phrase is *kintu nisutu u salatu*. This passage proves that blood relation is meant, hence the interpretation, "household," including slaves and servants does not come into the discussion. Feiser first gave the interpretation accepted here, *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek* iv, 305, followed by Daiches, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunde*, 40.

†† *murtappidu*; cf. Meissner, *Seltene Assyrische Ideogramme*, no. 2313, where the Sumerian *sag-dū-dū* is explained by *šabbitu* and *murtappidu*. For *šapādu* < *rapādu*, cf. *Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler* i, 70, col. v, 12; *liṣtappud*, "may he wander about." *šabbitu*, therefore, for *šappidu*, "wanderer."

Garments for his wear, shoes for his feet,
 A girdle for his loins, a leather bottle of water for his drink,
 Meal of *puklu*-grain I grind (?) for him *, food for his journey I give him †.
 To the sunset may he go.
 Unto the god *Ne-duh*, great watchmen of hell ‡, I entrust him.
 May Neduh, great watchman of hell, keep strong guard over him.
 May he lay hold of the bar of their gate fastenings."§

The fundamental concept of Babylonian eschatology is the inseparableness of the living and the dead. The welfare of the living depended largely upon the care which they bestowed upon their departed kinsmen. Although these disappeared from the sight of men, yet their souls communed with them at the solemn parentalia in the temples, or at their graves. Some change of ritual may have taken place, but they found no higher revelation of the whither of the soul than this. No trace of a resurrection, no promise of change in the monotonous and silent existence in hell. The emphasis upon the intimate interdependence of the living and the dead tended to mystery in religion, to social and family solidarity in politics. Dread of offending the dead, whose wrath brought upon mankind most terrible affliction, compelled respect for justice and aided powerfully in maintaining the best institutions of the race.

PHILOLOGICAL NOTE ON "BREAKING OF BREAD"

I have translated the root *kašpu* by "break," and when used with *kusapu*, or *kašapū*, by "break bread." The passages cited make clear that we have here an expression for eating at a common meal. The verb is, however, not used in any connection except with *kispu* in the arbitrary sense of breaking bread for the parentalia, and with *kusapu*, or *kašapū* of an ordinary meal. The evidence for this root meaning rests principally upon a syllabar published by Hilprecht, in BE xx, pl. 14, where we find:

* Read *kém pukli e-šah-šu*. Cf. Meissner, SA I, 689, and Hrozný in *Wiener Zeitschrift*, xx, 102.

† The last four lines are translated by Frank, *Babylonische Beschwörungsrelief*, 89, n. 6.

‡ *iršitu*.

§ King, *Magic and Sorcery*, no. 53.

[*ku*]*ku** = *ku-ru-ma-tum*, "ground food"
 (*pa-ad*) = *ka-sa-pu-u*
 [*ditto*] = *pussusu*
 [*ku*]-*jur* = *ṣaltu*, hostility.

The fact to be disengaged from this text is that *pussusu* and *kasapū* are synonyms. The root *paḏsu* means "to break," and *pussusu* probably means "crumb," or "biscuit broken from a large layer of biscuits baked together." *kasapū* has, therefore, a similar meaning.

The Greek phrase ἡ κλάσις τοῦ ἄρτου, το ἄρτον κλᾶν, in whatever form it may occur must be the translation of some Semitic phrase like *kusapa iksupu*. The Hebrew phrase back of the Greek is קָרַם לֶחֶם; cf. Je. 16', "Not shall they break bread in sorrow to comfort him because of the dead"; the Heb. קָרַם לֶחֶם (rd. קָרַם for קָרַם) is translated by κλασθῆναι ἄρτον. Here we have an exact parallel to the Babylonian parentalia and the passage must be so understood. In Is. 58', "Is it not to break thy bread unto the hungry?" we have a reference to an ordinary meal, the Babylonian *kusapa iksupu*. The Greek has here διαδοῦναι τὸν ἄρτον. La. 4', "Children ask for bread but there is none to break (it) unto them," קָרַם יֵצֵא לָהֶם; Greek ὁ διακλᾶν. The Syriac version uses the verb *kṣā* in each case, the ordinary word for breaking bread in the Eucharist. The Targum retains the verb קָרַם for Je. and Is., but paraphrases by מוֹשִׁיעַ, "one who reaches bread to," for La. 4'. The Talmud has a cognate construction קָרַם פֶּרוֹסָה exactly parallel to Bab. *kusapa iksupu*: *Rosh ha Shanah* 29b, לֹא יִפְרוֹס אִם פֶּרוֹסָה לְאֻרְחָיו, "Not does a man break bread to guests" (unless he eats with them). Cf. also פֶּרוֹסָה, "a piece of bread," identical in meaning with Bab. *kusapu*, and *pussusu*. The ordinary Aramaic word is כִּנֵּץ, cf. *Berakhoth*, 46a.

כִּנֵּץ הַבַּיִת כִּנֵּץ וְאָרַח מְבָרַךְ, "The master of the house breaks (bread) and the guest blesses it."

We have here a widespread Semitic idiom for sharing a meal with relatives and friends. The Babylonian and Hebrew phrases apply to the parentalia as well as to an ordinary meal. A mysterious spiritual communion already existed in this ceremony from an early period which hastened the early Christian conception of a sacrament in connection with the Agape. [For the Aramaic references on the phrase "breaking of bread" I have had the assistance of Professor G. A. Cooke, whose abundant knowledge supplied a serious defect in tracing the history of the institution.]

Oxford, May 10, 1910.

* See Brünnow, *Classified Lists*, No. 9922 ff.

XIII

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMON ARABIC SPEECH OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE

BY FREDERICK JONES BLISS

THIS brief paper does not, of course, attempt to compete with the technical studies of Count Landberg, Dr. Spoer and others in the same fields. It is literally a word "about" the subject, seeking not so much to strike its centre as to touch on certain matters that belong to its penumbra. The term "speech" occurs in the title advisedly, for pronunciation, phrases, and even gestures, or wordless speech will be touched upon. First of all, however, we must contrast the spoken with the written language. Such a contrast is common to all tongues, but in the Arabic presents some unusual features. The difference between the speech of the New York tenements and the language of the editorial columns of the "Sun" may be conceded for the sake of argument to be as great as that between the written and the spoken Arabic dialects, but the editor of the "Sun" may reasonably be supposed to talk at home in the same general style in which he writes, whereas the most flowery Arabic rhetorician whose paragraphs would bewilder the Fellah, uses in his family and with his friends the language of the Fellah, or, at least, the common dialect of the street. Exceptions, of course, may be found, for there are pedants everywhere. Especially the initiated among the Druses are apt to affect a literary style in their ordinary talk, but, in general, given a certain district, the spoken language of the educated and of the uneducated is one. What would be incorrect if written is quite correct when spoken. Your grammarian frankly abandons grammar when he speaks, except in making a public discourse. The spoken language is called "da'rij"

or current, the literary language "na'hawy" or grammatical. Practically, however, there is a tacitly-acknowledged grammar governing the speech of any district. The educated Syrian, justly proud of his noble inheritance of the classical tongue, often shows a sensitive reluctance to divulge to a stranger the vernacular forms. When asked for a verbal translation of an ordinary foreign phrase he is apt to give the literary equivalent, With the uneducated, on the other hand, a contrary tendency leads them to attempt a horrible imitation of the speech of foreigners, with the mistakes distorted and exaggerated, which they firmly believe will be more comprehensible to their visitors than the real thing. I have talked myself hoarse in my very best vernacular vainly attempting to alter this presupposition. An attempt of that brilliant Arabic scholar, Dr. Post, was more effective. When a patient persisted in the use of the "Frangy" Arabic, he gravely asked him: "Is your Excellency then the son of a Turk? You do not appear to be able to speak Arabic correctly!" A certain analogy is found in the celebrated Italian manner of Mrs. Plornish in "Little Dorrit" who proudly felt that she was almost addressing the unfortunate Italian in his own tongue when she said to him, for example: "Me ope you leg well soon . . . Peaka Padrona!" *

While the main difference between the spoken and the written languages is shown in the deterioration and mutilation of grammatical forms, there are also interesting differences in the vocabulary. In English, such words of the common speech, as are not ordinarily written, usually fall under the category of slang, such as "skedaddle." Now the common Arabic has its slang, often local, such as the word "ha'lamy" used in Jerusalem to signify "humbug," though not generally understood in any other part of Syria where I have quoted it; but the common language is also characterized by some perfectly normal roots, universally used to describe simple and ordinary actions, that do not appear,

* (1) Dickens furnishes another curious analogy with the Arabic vernacular. Mrs. MacStinger denounces with bitter emphasis Captain Cuttle's "guzzlings and muzzlings." The irate landlady has not in mind the verb "to muzzle": she simply follows with the Syrians—and, I understand, with the Turks as well—a tendency to emphasize a word by repeating it in altered form, substituting the letter M for the initial letter: "semen wa memen," "khubr, mubr," etc., etc.

as far as I am aware, in the literary language. Such roots, for example, form the basis of the conjugations of the verbs "to see" and "to go." Thus "he went" is spoken "rāḥ," it is written "dha'hab"; "he saw" is spoken "shāf": it is written "na'dhar."* Some words, however, especially particles, which appear superficially to have no connection with grammatical forms, are found when analyzed to be corruptions or combinations of these. One interesting question regarding the relations of the two dialects is as to how far the uneducated people understand the classical language, which is wonderfully rich in synonyms. The old-fashioned rhetorician, priding himself on his knowledge of obscure words, might produce a speech that would entirely puzzle the unlearned. But on the other hand it is quite possible to write perfectly classical Arabic which the peasant may clearly comprehend although he cannot use it. Thus the noble Arabic translation of the Scriptures made by Doctors Eli Smith and Cornelius Van Dyck, with the literary assistance of one of the finest native Arabic scholars of his day, is a model of classical purity, while at the same time it is easily understood by the people. The same may be said of the Ritual of the Greek Church, as well as of such parts of the Maronite Ritual as are translated into Arabic. Summing up, it may be stated that whereas the great majority of roots employed in the vulgar speech are also common to the classical, the latter, being far richer, contains many that never appear in ordinary use.

The differences between the Syrian and the Egyptian dialects are largely superficial, but like all things on the surface they are at once apparent, especially as they characterize the forms of speech in most constant use. Coming to Egypt from Syria for the first time, the first day I understood little and was understood less; the second day many of the puzzles of the first were explained, and within a few days I found no difficulty in expressing myself and in understanding. When the Syrian finds that he must say "Ai di?" instead of "Shu ha'dha?" in asking

* In reproducing forms that the Arabs themselves never write it would be pedantic to use Arabic type. When the late Dr. H. H. Jessup brought out an edition in Vulgar Arabic of the English Nursery Rhymes, the bewilderment of the type-setters was equalled only by their amusement. Accordingly in this paper the forms will all be transliterated. The accent is indicated by an acute: "ac'cent."

"What is this?"; when he learns to drop the use of "bed'di" (my wish), "bed'dak" (thy wish) to express not only desire but present action; when he begins to accent the second syllable of many words instead of the first—then he is on the road to talking like an Egyptian. It is amusing how this lesson, once learned, sticks to the learner, who after his first brief holiday in Cairo may return to Syria with a fine Egyptian veneer over all his speech.

I know of no language that has so highly organized a system of wordless speech, to emphasize articulation as well as to substitute for it, as the Arabic. I refer of course to the gestures which are commonly used in Syria and Palestine, even by the most voluble in vocal utterance. One of the most expressive signifies, in its elementary meaning, the idea of waiting. You may be, for example, talking with some one; a servant looms on the horizon, wanting to speak to you; instead of interrupting the conversation to tell him to wait, you draw together your fingers so that they meet the thumb, hold out your hand, fingers pointing upward, and shake it up and down. I have seen a school-boy make the same gesture, with an accompanying scowl of menace, to his seat-mate, who had prodded him in the leg, or had offered some similar indignity under the temporary immunity of school-time: what *he* meant was "Just wait till I catch you outside!" "It's none of my business" is perfectly expressed by shaking the lapel of your coat. You may signify the idea of "nothing at all" by slipping your thumb-nail under your tooth, and then rapidly jerking your hand forward. When you want to know "What's up?" you give your wrist a rapid turn with the hand half open.

Syria, including Palestine, is but the narrow strip of land at the East End of the Mediterranean, about 400 miles long and—exclusive of the Desert—ranging from 70 to 100 miles in breadth, yet every variety of pronunciation may be found within its limits from the broad vowels of the Maronite dwellers in the high Lebanon, relic perhaps of their Aramaic origin, to the painfully flat vocalization of the Druses. Apart from actual pronunciation, the inhabitant of any given district, sometimes of a given village, may be bewrayed by his very tones. One learns to contrast the gentle, insinuating cadences of Damascus, and especially

of Hama, with the coarse robustness of the Beyrout Moslem; the mincing tones of the Druse peasant with the abrupt ejaculations of the dwellers under the shadows of the Cedar Mountain, in the Beshierreh district. You may pick out natives of Deir-al-Qamr and of 'Abeih by their pronunciation of the word "ana" (the first personal pronoun, I), which they turn into something that sounds like "eh'na." Such great variations of speech over so small an area are to be expected from an ancient civilization whose law has been inter-marriage within narrowly circumscribed districts. As a rule, again, a Moslem may be distinguished from a Christian by his pronunciation, at least in the cities. In the dropping of the letter Qâf, initial or otherwise, in ordinary speech, the country is almost universally Cockney. When dropped from the middle or end of a word its place is taken by a Hamza, or emphatic interruption of sound. The Druses, however, even the Uninitiated, usually retain it in full force. But as the London Cockney is apt to most betray himself when he tries to be especially correct in the matter of the letter H, so the uneducated Syrian falls into absurd blunders when he attempts to show off a supposed knowledge of the classical. Once when we had a rabbit hanging in the Kitchen Tent, a pompous but ignorant Sheikh who was calling on us asked, with an affectation of High Arabic, whether we ate Qar'nab, thus adding a perfectly superfluous Qâf to the word "Ar'nab." The Syrians tell a story of a village school-teacher, who desiring to inculcate the pronunciation of the Qâf, which he had never been able to master himself, said to his pupils: "You must always pronounce the letter 'Âf—but not like me!"

All languages, I presume, have certain forms of Baby-Talk but I know of none like the Arabic Vernacular, which possesses a list of words, short, indeed, but covering amply the simple needs of infancy, being genuine duo-literal roots, and not abbreviations or corruptions of adult speech. I must content myself here with giving the list of words (monosyllabic but sometimes repeated), leaving an etymological study of them for other times or persons. Almost all these words I learned as a child in Beyrout and the Lebanon, but recently I have submitted the list to natives of Mesopotamia and of Egypt, who recognized part but not all. A few of the words might be characterized

as onomatopoeic. A child first becomes articulate on the subjects of food and drink, and then rapidly learns to express the elemental ideas of pain, pleasure, exercise, sleep, etc. His parents soon feel the necessity of making him understand words for prohibition and punishment. A vocabulary covering such experiences is quite adequate. Here, then, is the list, as far as I know it:

NAN (Egyptian MAM) food	KAKH, dirty, ugly;
BUFF, hot food;	WĀ'WA, pain;
EMBŪ', water, drink;	BAH! gone, out of sight;
O'OH', sleep;	DID'DY (Egyptian A'AH')
DA'DA, walk;	slap, punish;
TISH, go to walk;	DŪ! you mustn't!
NU'NU, little;	TISS, money;
DAH! pretty, nice;	DEH, horse.

A Syrian parent or grandparent has a curious habit of attributing his own personality to the child: thus a father will call his son "My father," a mother will call him "My mother," a grandmother will say "My grandmother." Sometimes, to express greater love, a mother will address her daughter as a boy, with all the masculine verbal and adjective forms.

The Syrian vernacular is rich in stereotyped polite phrases which apply to all the ordinary emergencies of life. They form a common inheritance, coming as readily to the lips of the peasant or the beggar as to the lips of the courtier. They constitute the "blarney" of the land. Much of this appears to be unfamiliar to the dwellers of Egypt, and I gather that it is more widely diffused in Syria than in Palestine. Such a blarney is known in Italy, but for every conventional polite expression used in English, the Syrian dialect can show a score. The salutations follow a sort of antiphonal liturgy, often remarkable for its indirection. A common sequence in the Lebanon is as follows: "Inhā'rak or nahā'rak sa'id": May thy morn be happy; "Inhā'rak imbā'rak or mubā'rak": May thy morn be blessed; "Kaif hā'lak?" How is thy condition? "Al'lah sel'mak": God give thee peace; "Inshul'lah mabsût": God grant thou art well; "Taht nu-zurak": Under thy protection. This counter-stroke must at once be parried by the exclamation: "Nu'zur Al'lah!": Under the

protection of God, before the dialogue can proceed: "Kaif hāl al maḥrustn'?" How are the preserved, *i. e.*, the children? "Bibū'su f'dak": They kiss thy hands. And so on ad infinitum. It is no wonder that when our Lord sent his disciples upon their mission he warned them to salute no man by the way!

Among the phrases in general use the following are common:* "Na'ai'man": Grace be upon thee (used when one has been to the bath or the barber); "Imbā'arak": Blessings on thee (used when a friend has new clothes); "Hen'yan": Congratulations! (when one has drunk water or sherbet); "Ah'lan wa sah'lan (said in welcome and meaning: You are of our folk, it is easy to entertain you); "Dai'man": Forever! (said when a guest has drunk the coffee); "Sah'tain": Two healths! (said when a guest appears to enjoy the food), to which the answer is—for each phrase has its set answer—"Ala qal'bak": Upon thy heart be it. At the end of a visit there is this final exchange of polite salutes: "Bil izn": By permission; "Izn'kum ma'kum; shurruf-tū'na": Your permission is with you; you have honored us; "Tshurruf'na; bikhatār'kum": We have been honored; by your favor. The host then has the last word: "Ma' sala'my": Go in peace! On admiring a piece of handiwork or in acknowledging some manual favor, you say: "Sel'im dayya'tak": Peace to thy hands. On receiving a compliment you are supposed to protest: "Min lut'fak": This is of thy politeness. It is expected that you should murmur unobtrusively: "Istagh'far Al'lah": God forbid! when an equal or a superior refers to himself as your servant.

On the etiquette of addresses much could be written, but this hardly falls under our present subject. Here is a specimen: "Ila Had'rat al Ba'ria', al Fā'dhil, al Ka'rtm, al Muhadh'dhab Mū'sa 'Abdul'lah, al Muhta'ram, dam baqā'hu": To the Presence of the Distinguished, the Magnanimous, the Generous, the Cultured Musa Abdullah the Honorable, May he live forever! More germane to the present paper are the common endearments, such as: "Ya rū'hi": My spirit; "Ya ai'ni": My eye; "Ya tuqbur'ni": My gravedigger (literally, O thou who shalt bury me; as who should say, My survivor). I may add that the polite native is by no means confined to the use of stereotyped

* In some cases we translate in paraphrase.

phrases, but, however humble his condition, may be capable of improvisation along the same lines. On my first visit to a certain Lebanon village, some three thousand feet above the sea-level, one of the inhabitants asked me how it happened that I had never been there before. When I pleaded the steep ascent as an excuse, he said at once: "Had we known of the possibility of your Excellency's honoring us, we would have made the way a plain!"

We are bound to state that an equal fecundity is shown in the phrases of objurcation. Dr. Spoer gives a list of curses at the end of his book. A very angry man may be spurred into improvisation with results as shocking as they are amusing. It may happen that a man will curse the religion of his own donkey's master! It is interesting to note an analogy with the affectionate use in English of "Confound you!" and of the words "rascal," "scamp," "sinner," etc., addressed to children. The Syrians often say: "Yukh'rab bei'tak!": May thy house be ruined! to express amused admiration.

Twenty years since in an article on the Aramaic dialect of Ma'lûla, one of a group of three small villages to the north-east of Damascus, where the ancient Aramaic has come down in a very corrupt form, I called attention to the use of common Arabic roots, which were subjected to the Aramaic laws of inflection, conjugation, etc.* A similar tendency is going on today in the United States where tens of thousands of Syrians are congregated in different centres. Into the ordinary vernacular have become incorporated many English roots, which follow the grammatical changes of the language upon which they have been grafted. Thus the Syrians have appropriated the word *Hotel*, but instead of saying *Hotels*, they make a plural by internal change, according to a common Arabic formation, and say "Howattl'." Taking an English root "to change," they make an intensive or Piel verbal form; thus for "Change cars" they say "Chen'nij"; "Chennej'elna" means "Give us change." Here not only the middle radical is doubled, but we also find the proper pronominal suffix. The vocalization of these hybrids is as fluid as it is in real Arabic. Thus "They made me a present

* Published in the April number of the *Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund* for 1890.

of it" becomes, "Barzanû'ni ff'ha." Here we also note that B substitutes for P, which is non-existent in Arabic. A more complicated expression of the same idea is found in the phrase of a woman who, when asked where she got an expensive article, said (referring to a rich lady friend): "Farnatit'ni ff'ha as-Sitt." What she meant was: "The lady gave it to me for nothing," or better, "She for-nothinged me with it!" Such borrowings are made from other languages also. From the Italian comes the use of Fantasf'yeh, the reflexive form being "Itfan'taz" meaning "to have a good time."

Here are some of the forms from the conjugation of the verb "to telephone," with the pronominal suffixes:

Telphentil'hu: I telephoned him;
 Telphentil'lak: I telephoned thee;
 Telphenit'li: she telephoned me;
 Telphennêl'hum: we telephoned them;
 Telphennûl'na: they telephoned us;
 Telphen'ni! : telephone me!

A supposed correspondence is traced by the emigrant Syrians between many Arabic and English proper names. The ignorant seem to regard them as real equivalents. At any rate, each name may be said to have its recognized working equivalent, based on a superficial likeness not often extending to all the radicals. Thus Khalil' becomes Charlie; Nejt'b', Jim; Selîm', Sam; Fuad', Fred; Aff'fy, Eva; Shaff'qa, Sophie; Nej'la, Nellie; Maht'ba, Mabel, etc., etc. The attempts to pronounce foreign names are amusing, though following recognized phonetic laws of change, and reminding one of the Arabicizing of ancient place-names in Palestine, where you find Fendequmf'yeh representing Pentekomias, and Qasr Berdawil' standing for Baldwin's Castle. Once when a returned emigrant gave me the name of the place in South America where he had done business, I had to think a minute before I could recognize in the Semitic-sounding term "Bint-al-Beda'wi" the Latin capital Monte Video.

CLIFTON SPRINGS, N. Y.,
July 19, 1910.

XIV

THE PERSON OF JESUS IN THE DOUBLE TRADITION OF MATTHEW AND LUKE

BY GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

THIS paper assumes, as well established, certain results of synoptic criticism, *viz.*, (a) that our Gospels of Matthew and Luke originated in substantial independence the one of the other, (b) that these Gospels in the sections which they have in common and which have no parallels in Mark rest upon a common written document (or, perhaps, documents), and (c) that this document consisted mainly, if not wholly, of words of Jesus brought together without clear indications of the occasions on which they were spoken.

Further, this paper also naturally assumes that the written document which underlies the parallel sections of our Matthew and Luke—those sections, that is, which have no parallels in Mark—reflects the Christian tradition of a time anterior to the composition of these Gospels, perhaps in large measure the tradition of the first Christian generation, and that it is for this reason of very great value. It must have been highly esteemed and widely circulated in the early Church to account for its large use in two Gospels so unlike as Matthew and Luke, one of which appears to have been written by a Jew, while the other was written by a Gentile for Gentile readers.

It is the aim of this paper to ascertain as far as possible what the ancient document in question had to teach in regard to the person of Jesus.

Of the extent of this lost source we have no certain knowledge. The material that Matthew and Luke extracted from it amounts to about five chapters of average length (ca. 182 verses in Mt. and 177 in Lu.), and since this material covers the entire public

ministry of Jesus up to the eve of his crucifixion it may be conjectured that our evangelists made use of practically the entire document. This conclusion is somewhat confirmed by the consideration that if this ancient document had not been absorbed pretty completely in Matthew and Luke, it would naturally have continued in circulation, for the Church would not consciously have allowed any sayings of Jesus to be forgotten.

Of the general character of this source, in addition to the statement already made, that it consisted mainly, if not wholly, of words of Jesus, it may now be added that these words of Jesus were short striking sayings, such as might easily have been kept in memory and widely circulated long before they were committed to writing. It seems to have contained but one parable, that of the Leaven. For though the parables of the Wedding Feast (Mt.) and the Great Supper (Lu.), may be modifications of one original story, and though in like manner the parable of the Talents (Mt.) and that of the Pounds (Lu.) may have sprung from one utterance of the Master, it is not probable that the wide variations between these parables are to be set down to the conscious activity of the evangelists. The differentiation is more likely to have been prior to the written sources whence Matthew and Luke drew.*

Another general remark in regard to the sayings of the document with which we are concerned is that the greater part of them are purely ethical, such as the injunction to agree with one's adversary (Mt. 5²⁵⁻²⁶, Lu. 12⁵⁸⁻⁵⁹), not to resist one who does evil (Mt. 5³⁹, Lu. 6²⁹), to love one's enemies (Mt. 5⁴⁴, Lu. 6²⁷⁻²⁸), and the teaching that it is impossible to serve both God and Mammon (Mt. 6²⁴, Lu. 16¹³). This large group of utterances puts Jesus in the class of great spiritual teachers. They make no radical line of demarcation between him and an Isaiah or Jeremiah. He appears in the prophetic succession, where some of his contemporaries distinctly acknowledged that he stood (Mt. 8²⁸), and where Jesus himself was also conscious of standing (Lu. 13³³). On these passages, therefore, we shall not dwell,

* Professor Burton supposes that Matthew drew here from the Logia and Luke from a Perea document, which he designates "P." For the text of these documents according to Burton, see Sharman's *The Teaching of Jesus about the Future* (1909).

but pass on at once to those data which seem at least to set Jesus apart from the prophets, and in some sense above them.

Part of these data are in such a state of preservation in the two Gospels that we cannot certainly regard them as belonging to the more ancient common source. These we must first consider:

1. In Mt. 5⁴ (Lu. 6²⁷⁻²⁸) Jesus is represented as setting himself directly against the traditional law: "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, love your enemies," etc. This strong assertion of superiority to all former authorities in Israel which is prominent in Matthew's version of the Sermon on the Mount (see 5²⁸, 32, 34, 39, 41) is not supported by Luke. For though he introduces the injunction to love one's enemies with the words "But I say unto you," * the antithesis is with the verse immediately preceding, and that does not refer to the Law. There is also an intrinsic improbability in supposing that Jesus, who, in Mt. 5¹⁸, had declared that while heaven and earth remain one jot of the Law should not pass, would have voluntarily antagonized the scribes by setting his word above the sacred Law. As he most carefully sought to avoid a popular misunderstanding of his attitude toward Messiahship, even so, we may naturally think, he would not have provoked a conflict with the rulers in regard to that Law which was certainly of as great importance in their sight as was the Messianic hope. It seems probable, therefore, that the introduction to the injunction in Mt. 5⁴, as also in the other parallel cases to which references have been given, belongs to the editorial activity of the evangelist.

2. It is doubtful whether Matthew and Luke go back to the common written source of their double tradition in the word of Mt. 7²¹ and Lu. 6⁴⁶. This reads according to Mt.: "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my father who is in heaven." But Luke has in the same setting these words: "Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say." This saying in Luke is a protest against present insincerity; that of Matthew refers, according to the context, to the time of the future judg-

* Luke has a stronger adversative than Matthew (ἀλλὰ in place of δέ), but does not have the personal contrast furnished by Matthew's ἐγώ.

ment. Moreover, the words in Matthew presuppose a conception of Jesus which cannot be carried back to so early a time as that of the Sermon on the Mount. People who could possibly imagine that a reverent attitude toward Jesus would be a sufficient passport in the time of judgment must be supposed to have clearly recognized him as the Messiah; but such recognition seems not to have taken place before the great day at Cæsarea Philippi. While therefore the sayings of Matthew and Luke may go back to the same utterance of Jesus, it is not certain what that original saying was.

3. Another passage in the Double Tradition of Matthew and Luke whose origin can hardly be placed in the common written source which we are considering is that which asserts a judicial function of the twelve apostles. According to Mt. 19²⁸ this reads: "And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel"; and according to Luke 22²⁸⁻³⁰: "But ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me; that ye may eat and drink at my table, in my kingdom; and ye shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." It is noticeable, in the first place, that the settings of the sayings in Matthew and Luke are unusually divergent. In Matthew it is spoken in response to a question of Peter, in Luke it is a spontaneous utterance of Jesus. Peter seems to be actuated, in Matthew, by much the same motive that led James and John to seek the first places in the coming kingdom, but in Luke Jesus of his own accord promises kingly rule to the Twelve in view of their faithfulness. Still more significant are the phraseology and ideas. Thus the word *παλιγγενεσία* occurs nowhere else in the Gospels, nor indeed in the entire New Testament in the sense it has here, for in Tit. 3⁵ it is individual and ethical, not cosmical.* Further, there is nothing in the teaching of Jesus that throws light on the term, no idea that is parallel to the meaning which it seems to have. It appears in the text as a foreign element. Again, the thought

* It is of interest to note here that, according to Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, p. 145, this word cannot be literally translated either into Hebrew or Aramaic.

that Jesus is to sit upon a throne is purely Matthæan, and the other passage in which it is found (25³¹⁻⁴⁶) bears marks of a late origin. Then the promise that the twelve should be enthroned as judges of the twelve tribes of Israel seems to depart in two fundamental points from the thought of Jesus. Thus he told James and John that it was not in his power to assign places of honor in the kingdom of the future (Mt. 20²³), and he made it clear on more than one occasion that the way of true honor was open to *all* disciples without distinction (Mt. 20²⁶, 23¹¹); but both these positions, according to the present passage, he surrenders. It may also properly be added that the strictly *national* outlook of this verse does not accord with the thought of Jesus. Nothing in his teaching is more certain than that he regarded his revelation of God as fitted and destined to bring blessing to all mankind. Even in the source now under consideration, on occasion of the faith of a Gentile, Jesus declared that many should come from the east and the west and sit down in the kingdom of heaven (Mt. 8¹¹⁻¹², Lu. 13²⁸⁻²⁹), a statement which is assuredly not to be limited to the Jews of the Diaspora. It is a vision of Gentile conversion, called out by Gentile faith.

There are still expressions in Luke's version of this saying of Jesus which deserve notice besides those that are common to him with Matthew. Thus it is without parallel in the Gospels that Jesus speaks of his "temptations" (*πειρασμοῖς*), temptations which his disciples have in some sense shared with him. Again, in the words "I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me," we have an unparalleled use of *βασίλεια*. For though in Lu. 19¹² it is used in the sense of authority, it is nowhere so employed with reference to authority in the kingdom of God. Finally, it is only here in the Gospels that participation in the authority and honor of Jesus is set forth in the figure of eating and drinking at his table. In view therefore of these peculiarities in the double text of this passage we cannot regard it as a part of the common source from which Matthew and Luke drew their parallel material.

We pass now to a consideration of the texts clearly belonging to the common source which seem to put Jesus in a class by himself, separate from the prophets; and we shall take these up in the order in which they occur in Luke.

1. The first of the data in this group concerns the attitude of men toward Jesus. It is the great utterance closing the Sermon on the Mount, and its positive content is that one who hears and does the words of Jesus is like a man who builds on a rock-foundation (Lu. 6⁴⁷⁻⁴⁹, Mt. 7²⁴⁻²⁷). The floods cannot shake his structure. It has the firmness of Jesus himself, for it is built on the words of Jesus. Other sayings in our source that bear on this same point may conveniently be brought together here. It would appear from the narrative of the centurion in Capernaum of whom, after his message to Jesus, the latter said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel" (Lu. 7²⁻¹⁰, Mt. 8¹⁰), that Jesus had been looking for faith on the part of those who had heard his word and seen his works. To judge from this narrative the faith which Jesus welcomed was trust in him as one able and willing to help. It is not more nearly defined in this source. Another significant saying in regard to the attitude of men toward Jesus is that of Lu. 12⁸⁻⁹, Mt. 10³²⁻³³: "Every one who shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess before the angels of God: but he that denieth me in the presence of men shall be denied in the presence of the angels of God." The term "confess," though not found elsewhere in the synoptists, is in both Matthew and Luke, and seems to have stood in the source. Its general sense is determined by the antithetic word "deny," and by the antithesis of the two scenes of mutual confession or denial, one in the presence of men, the other before the angels of God, that is, in the judgment. The saying clearly assumes that a man's attitude toward Jesus is of fundamental importance.*

2. The message of Jesus to John the Baptist indicates his thought of himself from another point of view. It defines by contrasting him with the former revelation of God. John had sent to Jesus, saying, "Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?" (Lu. 7¹⁸⁻²³, Mt. 11¹⁻⁶). The answer of Jesus contains two important points, or rather two mutually supplementary aspects of one relationship. In the first place, the messengers

* The word of Matthew, "He who loves father or mother more than me," hardly belongs with the preceding passages. It might have been spoken by a prophet. Any one conscious of having a message from God knows that his relation to men, for this very reason, is of more worth than human friendship.

were to tell John what they had heard and seen, and it appears that these facts were thought to be suggestive for John because of their correspondence to such prophetic forecasts as those of Is. 35⁵ and 60¹; and second, they were to bear back this weighty personal word: "Blessed is he whosoever shall find none occasion of stumbling in me." It is here plainly admitted to be possible that, in spite of the fact that the activity of Jesus answers in a remarkable manner to prophetic pictures of the coming age, one may find in him occasion of stumbling. It appears from this that, in the thought of Jesus, he did not *altogether* correspond to the prophetic forecasts of the deliverer who should one day arise for Israel. He fulfilled, and again he did not fulfill. His appearance answered to Is. 60¹, but not to Is. 9⁶⁻⁷. One *might* stand on Old Testament ground and yet not recognize Jesus as "him that should come."

Such was the message to John. But the message *about* John also helps us to discover the thought of Jesus regarding his relation to former revelations made to his people. No prophet had arisen, he said, who was greater than John, and yet John was less than the little ones in the kingdom of God (Mt. 11⁷⁻¹¹, Lu. 7²⁴⁻²⁸). Since, therefore, he had *established* that kingdom (Lu. 6⁴⁷), one must infer that he regarded his office as essentially higher than that of John and the old prophets.

Two other notable sayings in the common tradition of Matthew and Luke give expression to the same consciousness. On that occasion when scribes and Pharisees sought a sign from Jesus (Mt. 12³⁸⁻⁴², Lu. 11²⁹⁻³²), he first put his appearance to that generation in line with Jonah's appearance to Nineveh, and then went on to declare that the men of Nineveh would condemn the present generation because they had repented at Jonah's preaching, and something greater than Jonah was now among them. In like manner the Queen of the South would condemn the present generation for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and something greater than Solomon was now among them. This "something" that is greater (*πλεῖον*) than prophets and wise men of old is not here defined, but obviously the connection leads us to see it in the message of Jesus. The other saying that belongs here is that of Mt. 13¹⁶⁻¹⁷, Lu. 10²³⁻²⁴: "Blessed are the eyes which

see the things that ye see: for I say unto you that many prophets and kings desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not." This word like the preceding sets Jesus apart from the prophets, at least in the *completeness* of his message.*

3. The next datum in the Lucan order is the title "the Son of Man" (Mt. 8¹⁹⁻²⁰, Lu. 9⁵⁷⁻⁵⁸). This occurs elsewhere in the double tradition of Matthew and Luke four times, *viz.*, Mt. 16¹⁶⁻¹⁹, 24^{27, 37}, and in the Lucan parallels 16²⁴, 17^{24, 26} and 12⁴⁰. It is impossible to determine from these passages what content the title had for Jesus. One of them mentions his poverty, another that he, in contrast to John the Baptist, ate and drank as any ordinary man, and was contemptuously styled the friend of publicans and sinners. But these throw no light on the meaning of the term. There is no suggestion that Jesus took the name because of his poverty or because he ate and drank in a normal way instead of appearing as a prophet of repentance, fasting and clad in sackcloth; nor is there any implied contrast between the title and the circumstances predicated of the Son of Man. The other passages are all eschatological in character, but do not appear to throw any specific light on the title. They do however intimate, though somewhat vaguely, that he who bore the title believed that his function from God extended beyond the present life. They do not, indeed, directly represent him as the judge of men, but since "the day" or "the days" in which one is to be "taken" (*παραλαμβάνεσθαι*) and another "left" are called "days of the Son of Man," it seems to be implied that he is in some manner associated with judgment.† More than this the source before us does not warrant us in saying.

4. The last passage in our common source, according to the order of Luke, concerns the relation of Jesus to God (Mt. 11²⁵⁻²⁷, Lu. 10²¹⁻²²). Unfortunately the text of this passage is not altogether certain, and its original setting is unknown. Matthew lets it follow the woes on the Galilean cities, a connection that

* The passage concerning the guilty Galilean cities (Mt. 11²⁰⁻²⁴, Lu. 10¹³⁻¹⁵) implies much the same thought as the last text.

† Though Luke wavers between "day" and "days," his language is to be preferred to the term *ἡμέρα* which Matthew has in 24^{27, 37}. This is found nowhere else in the Gospels except in Matthew. The "day of the Son of man" may have been formed in analogy with the Old Testament "day of Jehovah."

offers no explanation whatever of the *ταῦτα* which the Father had revealed to "babes"; and Luke's setting is not better, for in his narrative it follows the report of the Seventy on their wonderful *works*. But what Jesus gave thanks for was a certain *knowledge* which God had imparted to his disciples, not for the power to cast out demons. Whatever the specific occasion of the thanksgiving may have been, this at least is clear, that it marked a decided advance in the knowledge of God on the part of Jesus' disciples. It was this progress that led Jesus to give thanks to the Father, from whom, he confesses, the revelation had ultimately proceeded.

Again, as to the text of Mt. 11²⁷, Lu. 10²², it is difficult to decide what stood in the source. Harnack* has pointed out that the clause *καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ* does not suit the context. The *πάντα* which had been delivered to Jesus was the full knowledge of the Father. It was their participation in this revelation by the disciples which occasioned the preceding words of thanksgiving. It is this complete knowledge of the Father that Jesus claims in the third clause of the verse and of which the last clause treats. Knowledge of the *Son* is not the theme, but knowledge of the Father.

Furthermore, the aim of these words seems to be theological rather than practical. They affirm that no one but the Father knows the Son, and there is no hint that the Father shares this knowledge in any way with man. The assertion appears to have no other aim than to claim that Jesus can be known by the Father only, in other words, to claim that he is of the same nature with the Father, as is done by the author of Mt. 28¹⁹. Thus these words contrast in the most striking manner with the next clause, that only the Son knows the Father. This statement is wholly practical, for the Son has this knowledge *to impart to others*. The utterance is born of a consciousness which is the joy of Jesus' life. He knows the Father, and he can impart this knowledge to his disciples. His knowledge then is clearly not omniscience, but such knowledge as a man may have. Jesus does not hint that he has for himself a knowledge of God which cannot be imparted. He can share what he has and *all* that he has with those who are receptive. Thus the knowledge

* *The Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 293-294.

of the *Father* of which the verse speaks has man as its destination, while the knowledge of the Son in the clause *καὶ . . . ὁ πατήρ* belongs only to the Father. Hence the clause appears to have no other purpose than to suggest a certain conception of the nature of Jesus, and thus it has a character which does not belong to any unquestioned utterance of the Master. We conclude then that this clause did not belong to the ancient source of the double tradition of Matthew and Luke, but was a later development.

There remains in Mt. 11²⁷, Lu. 10²², the great threefold* claim that Jesus has a complete knowledge of the Father, that he *alone* has this knowledge, and that he can impart it to such as are receptive.

We have now considered those passages in the ancient source of the common tradition of Matthew and Luke that bear on the person of Jesus, especially those that claim a super-prophetic function, and now in conclusion will sum up their content. This is virtually done for us in the last passage that was studied. For the claim that Jesus and Jesus alone has reached a complete knowledge of the Father and that he can impart this knowledge to other receptive souls involves the thought of all the great texts which have been passed in review. One conscious of possessing this knowledge could say that the man who heard and did his words was like one who builds on the rock; he could reasonably look for faith in his word and rejoice when he found it; he could say that confession or denial of him was of transcendent importance; he not only could but must say, when standing over against the Old Testament, that he fulfilled it and also that he did *not* fulfil it, for if he was the first to have complete knowledge of the Father, then that of former prophets must of necessity have been incomplete; he could say also that the members of his kingdom were greater than John though John was equal to any of the former prophets; that something greater than Jonah and greater than Solomon had been manifested in his appearance and work, and therefore could pronounce his disciples blessed as compared with kings and proph-

* It seems doubtful whether the word "my" should be regarded as belonging to the source, since, with the exception of Luke 22²⁸, whose text is uncertain as we have seen, it is confined wholly to Matthew.

ets of old. Yea, more, one conscious of possessing this knowledge of the Father and of an appointment to transmit it to others might naturally believe that the ancient "day of Jehovah" would at last appear as the day of the Son of Man.

The reader will observe that the source which we have been considering lacked certain terms and ideas which, elsewhere and chiefly at a later day, were regarded as furnishing important material for the construction of the doctrine of the person of Jesus. Thus it did not have the title "Son of God," it made no allusion to the pre-existence of Jesus, nor did it deal with his death and resurrection. His conception of his person as compared, for example, with that of the author or final editor of the first Gospel, is characterized by unity and great simplicity.

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XV

THE INTEGRITY OF SECOND CORINTHIANS

BY MARVIN R. VINCENT

THE question of the integrity of this epistle has been long under discussion. The material for the discussion is distributed over more than a century, from Semler's *Periphrasis* in 1776. It has been treated by numerous critics since that date, including Hausrath, Heinrici, Pfeiderer, Clemen, Klöpper, Krenkel, Drescher, Schmiedel, Van Manen, Lisco, Jülicher, Weizsäcker, Zahn, and by Rev. J. H. Kennedy in *The Expositor*, October and November, 1898.

The point in which perhaps, more than any other, the discussion has originated, and on which all critics are agreed, is the sharp contrast between the contents of Chaps. 1-9 and 10-13. This, with other considerations, has suggested the conclusion that our canonical epistle consists of two letters, written at different times, and placed in our Testament in inverse order.

Three points may be said to be fairly established: 1. That before the composition of the First Corinthian letter, Paul wrote a letter to the church at Corinth, which is alluded to in I Cor. 5⁹, but which has been lost. 2. That Paul made a second visit to Corinth which is not recorded in Acts. This appears from II Cor. 2¹; 12¹⁴; 13¹³. He declares his intention to make a second visit, in I Cor. 4¹⁹⁻²¹; 11²⁴; 16⁵. This second visit is conclusively demonstrated by Weizsäcker. Both he and Schmiedel effectively dispose of the attempt to identify the "sorrow" of II Cor. 2¹ with the "weakness, fear, and trembling" of I Cor. 1³. The depression and self-distrust described by Paul in the latter passage differ radically from the indignant grief resulting from defection and insult on the part of the Corinthian church. 3. The contrast already alluded to between Chaps. 1-9 and 10-13 is very

sharp. The tone in the two sections is not only different, but opposite. In the former, Paul appears as reconciled to the church: his language is gentle, commendatory, forgiving, and his spirit joyful. In the latter, he is involved in irritating complications. He is afraid that the Corinthians will repudiate him and go over to his enemies. He is at swords' points with the church. He is defending his apostolic prerogative and his personal honor. Comp. 10²⁻¹¹; 11^{2, 20}; 12^{11, 12, 20, 21}, with 7⁹; 8⁷.

Assuming these three points, it appears that Paul's first letter failed of its desired effect. In that letter he announced his intention of soon visiting the church again. This second visit he made, but not according to the plan indicated in I Cor. 16⁵⁻⁹. According to that plan he had not intended to visit Corinth until he should have finished his work at Ephesus: but he broke off that work, and went at once to Corinth, and then returned to Ephesus.

During this visit he was subjected to a painful experience, for which indeed he seems to have been partly prepared (I Cor. 4¹⁷⁻²¹). The precise nature of this experience he does not state. He assumes that it is known to the church. It was, apparently, a personal insult from an individual (II Cor. 2⁵; 12²¹; comp. 7⁷⁻¹⁵). Those who have attempted to find in the first canonical letter the facts presupposed in the second, have identified this person with the incestuous offender of I Cor. 5; but it is quite enough to say that the language of II Cor. 2⁵⁻¹¹ can be applied to that case only by forcing. It is indeed urged that II Cor. 10-13 contains no demand for the punishment of the offender of the second visit. Such a demand might be implied in 10⁶, but it is highly improbable that this would be the only form in which Paul would have alluded to that matter, if he alluded to it at all; but, granting the omission, it is not conclusive against 10-13 as a part of the intermediate letter, so long as other proofs are not set aside. Moreover, it is not claimed that the intermediate letter is entire. If an entire epistle like the one alluded to in I Cor. 5⁹ could be lost, why not parts of one? Jülicher thinks that 10⁹ leaves no doubt as to the nature of the wrong inflicted on Paul; but it is not Paul's way either to feel or to manifest such violent emotion at a mere personal slur. Weizsäcker (Apost.

Zeitalt.) effectively disposes of the identification, and a full discussion to the same effect appears in Schmiedel's excursus on II Cor. 2⁸⁻¹¹, in the *Handcommentar*.

From II Cor. 7⁸⁻¹², it would appear that, immediately after this second brief visit, Paul addressed to the Corinthian church a severe letter so painful to the church that the apostle was disposed, later, to regret his severity (II Cor. 2^{1 ff.}).

What of this letter? Is it lost, or does it appear elsewhere? Hausrath, Pfeleiderer, Clemen, Schmiedel, Kennedy and McGiffert, hold that we have this letter or a part of it in 10-13; and that these chapters consequently antedate 1-9.

Certainly it cannot be maintained that the first canonical epistle answers to the description of the intermediate letter in II Cor. 2¹. The words "out of much affliction and anguish of heart with many tears," cannot be said to characterize the first epistle. Neither does II Cor. 7^{8, 9}. The visit which Paul was contemplating according to II Cor. 1²³, and 2¹, was one from which he shrank; while the visit proposed in I Cor. 16 is apparently looked forward to with pleasure. On the other hand, all the passages just cited exactly fit II Cor. 10-13.

Dr. Kennedy has made a strong case with his three pairs of passages in his first article. In each pair he shows that the section in Chaps. 10-13 is written about the present, describing the apostle's present attitude, while the section in Chaps. 1-9 refers to past events and feelings. If there is a real parallelism between the members of each pair, which I see no sufficient reason for doubting, it follows that 10-13 antedates 1-9.

Assuming then the existence of the intermediate letter, and the second visit, the evidence points to the place of the second visit between the first and second canonical epistles, and consequently to the composition of the intermediate epistle between the second visit and the second canonical epistle. Even Heinrich, who denies the partition of the second epistle, admits that the assumption of a second visit bears on the second epistle only in case it took place between two canonical letters. II Cor. 1¹⁸ must have been written before the second and after the first epistle. The plan referred to in that passage could have been communicated only after the second visit; and that this was actually the case may be inferred from II Cor. 1¹² and 2³. Fur-

ther, II Cor. 13² seems to contain a definite statement that the second visit had preceded the second canonical letter.

The sharp change of tone after the close of Chap. 9 cannot be explained by a change of disposition, or by distractions (11²⁸), or by new and unfavorable tidings (see Jülicher). None of these would justify a letter so contradictory; and besides, as Dr. Kennedy observes, if we are to take II Cor. 10-13 as indicating the gravity of the situation which arose in consequence of this new development, then these later tidings must have caused the complete destruction of all the hopes which had been excited by the result of Titus's mission, and have showed the state of things at Corinth to be worse than ever. It is very strange that Paul should never have mentioned or alluded to such momentous news. Strange that he should have sent to the rebellious church the commendation of 1-9, and then have immediately appended the censure without explanation, annexing it to a heartfelt thanksgiving to God simply by a connecting δέ, "and, strangest of all, should have fallen back on a declaration which he had made before the mission of Titus, as if nothing had happened in the meantime" (13²). The introduction of such an entirely contradictory line of thought merely by the particle δέ is strange, on the assumption that the entire letter is continuous. No antithesis appears to αὐτοῖς δέ ἐγὼ Παῦλος. Δέ expresses connective opposition. It does not surrender the sense of connection even when it introduces something opposite. Oftener in the New Testament than in classical Greek, it is a mere mark of transition at the beginning of a sentence.

Nor is the sharp change explained by the change from addressing a repentant and submissive church to addressing a rebellious minority. The ὑμεῖς indicates the same class of persons as those to whom he had been all along speaking. This is well brought out by Schmiedel, *Handcomm.* A minority calling for the words of 10-13 is surely not indicated by the strong and universal feeling on the reception of Paul's letter displayed in 1-9. (See πάντων, 7^{12. 13}).

A review of the evidence appears to me to justify Holtzmann's words: "The second Corinthian letter will no longer hold together." I believe that Chaps. 1-9 and 10-13 represent two different letters; that 10-13 is the earlier of the two, and that in it

we have a part at least of the letter written shortly after Paul's second visit to Corinth, and before the second canonical epistle. This conclusion does not affect the question of Pauline authorship. It merely asserts a displacement or rearrangement, which may have been the result either of accident or of design subsequently to the apostolic age. "Nothing," as Professor McGiffert remarks, "would be easier than for two comparatively brief epistles to be joined together and counted as one, over against the larger epistle which we know as First Corinthians; and this would be particularly easy if one of the epistles lacked the formal introduction which most of Paul's epistles bore."

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XVI

Οἱ Ἀτακτοὶ

(1 Thess. 5¹⁴)

BY JAMES EVERETT FRAME

THE Christian community of the seaport town of Thessalonica was made up chiefly if not wholly of Gentiles and that too workingmen (I 4¹¹ α., II 3⁶ α.). It was small and poor. To be sure, we hear (Acts 17⁴) of *μυναικῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐκ ὀλῶσαι*, but not of patronesses like Prisca (1 Cor. 16¹⁹, Rom. 16⁵) and Nympha (Col. 4¹⁵ B). It is true that in the earlier days Jason (Acts 17⁵ α.) had opened his house to Paul, but, as II 3⁷ seems to indicate, had received therefor some remuneration. And while later on the names of Aristarchus (Acts 20⁴, 27², Col. 4¹⁰, Phm. 24) and Secundus (Acts 20⁴) appear,* we learn of no such patrons in Thessalonica as Gaius of Corinth (Rom. 16²³), Philemon of Colossæ (Phm. 2), and the husband of Prisca.† In fact, Paul found it necessary to support himself by manual labor while he preached in Thessalonica in order not to put a financial burden on his converts individually or collectively (I 2⁹, II 3⁷ α.), and this in spite of the fact that he received at the time aid from Philippi. ‡

But although the community was small and poor, made up, as were most of the early Christian assemblies, of the humbler classes (cf. I Cor. 1²⁶ α.), yet it was rich in the possession of the

* It is not certain that Gaius (Acts 19²⁹) and Demas (Phm. 24) were Thessalonians. The Jason of Rom. 16²¹ may be the one of Acts 17⁵.

† Compare the names in Rom. 16; (to Ephesus?)

‡ The Philippians were in the habit of aiding Paul as Ph. 4¹⁶ shows: You sent to help me both (while I was) in Thessalonica and repeatedly (*ἀπαξ καὶ δις* as 1 Thess. 2¹⁶) (while I was elsewhere).

Spirit.* The praise which Paul lavishes on the Thessalonians as a whole (e. g. I 1⁸ ff., 3⁶, II 1⁸ ff.) becomes even more remarkable when we remember the social status of the community, its poverty, and the persecutions it was compelled continuously to undergo, and above all the concern the believers felt at Paul's failure to return. It would appear that the unbelieving Jews of Thessalonica—the original instigators of trouble but not the official persecutors—had, after the enforced departure of Paul, been scattering broadcast the insinuation that the Apostle was but another example of the common itinerant preacher or priest, deluded, immoral, and deceiving, who engaged in cajoling speech to win his hearers, who used the Gospel as a foil to cover selfish gain, and demanded suitable honors to be paid him. Doubtless also they interpreted his failure to return as evidence of the truth of their assertions. The converts must have been disturbed by these rumors and anxious. Paul likewise, when he learns the situation from Timothy, was greatly concerned, as is seen from the fact that he devotes the first three chapters of the First Epistle to a defense of his visit (especially 2¹⁻¹²), and to his failure to return (2^{17-3¹⁰}), praying finally (3¹¹⁻¹²) that the Lord would direct his way to them. But notwithstanding the poverty of the community, the persecutions, and the temptation to suspect the motives of Paul, the Thessalonians as a whole stood fast in the Lord, as the distinctly favorable report of Timothy (I 3⁶) and the indications of the First Epistle in general make clear.

There were indeed some lacks in their faith (I 3^{8, 10}), important, but, if we may judge from the tactful way in which the exhortations are qualified (I 4¹⁻². 9, 10, 5¹¹), not crucial. To the perfecting of these lacks, the last two chapters of I are directed. Three points are conspicuous. With some of the converts, the temptation to sexual aberration (I 4²⁻⁵) seems to have been keen, due no doubt either to the allurements of a port or to the influence of pagan cults.† Still it is not improbable that the

* It was owing to a direct request from Corinth that we are in possession of the discussion of spiritual gifts in 1 Cor. 12-14. In Thessalonica, it is competent to assume a similar enthusiasm, even though it be referred to only in I 5¹⁹⁻²².

† Note the cult of the *κδβαιοι* or *κδβαιοι*; and see Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, 257 ff., and Bloch in Roscher, 1897, article *Megalot Theoi*, col. 2522-2541. Indeed the charge of *ακαθαρτα* made against Paul (I 2³) may have been

exhortation to a consecration not simply religious but moral (I 4³⁻⁵) may have been in part at least prophylactic.* The other two main difficulties presupposed by the First Epistle centre about the belief in the nearness of the Parousia. In I 4¹³⁻¹⁸ an entirely new matter is discussed. (There is no *οἶδαι* here as in 5²). In the interval between the departure of Paul and the writing of I, some person or persons had died, and the question emerged as to the advantage of the survivors over the dead at the Parousia. Paul replies tactfully that both classes stand on the same level of advantage (cf. *ἀμα σύν*, *simul cum* 4¹⁷, 5¹⁰). Then too the ancient query as to times and seasons reappeared. Into this, however, Paul refuses to enter, urging that the believers were already accurately informed, and turning the edge of their curiosity by reminding them that the Parousia was for judgment upon the wicked (I 5¹⁻¹¹).† For a few, however, and this for our purpose is important, the belief in the immediate coming of Christ had stirred up serious complications. Even when Paul was with them, he had been obliged to command the brethren *ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐρμάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν* (I 4¹¹) or more specifically *εἰ τις οὐ θέλει ἐρμάζεσθαι μὴδὲ ἐσθιέτω* (II 3¹⁰). These commands indicate that the views of some of the brethren touching the Parousia had unsettled their minds and had led them to become meddlesome and idle. The situation grew worse after Paul's departure as the exhortations of I 4¹¹ ff. and 5¹⁴ intimate,‡ and became acute in the interval between the writing of I and II, as is seen by the fact that II is concerned solely with two problems, the Parousia (1³-2¹⁷) and the Idlers (3¹⁻¹⁶). While it is quite true that Paul does not state in so many words that the idleness in the community was either simple inertia due to no specific cause or that it was directly the result of the excitement induced by the belief that the Lord was coming soon, still the latter hypothesis is distinctly suggested to the subtle Jews by the 'foul orgies' (Lft.) of some such cult as the Cabiri.

* Theodore Mops. (*apud* Swete II, 37) with plausibility suggests a connection between I 4³⁻⁵ and *οἱ ἀσθeneῖς* (I 5¹⁴): *de illis qui fornicatione deturbantur*.

† *οἱ ἀλογόφυχοι* (I 5¹⁴) naturally refers to those who were impatient of the Parousia.

‡ As we shall endeavor to prove, *οἱ ἀτακτοὶ* (I 5¹⁴) refers specifically to the *μὴ ἐργαζόμενοι* (I 4¹¹).

convincing in the light of I 4¹¹ ^α. and especially of II where, as already noted, the two points considered are Parousia and Idleness. Lightfoot (ad I 4¹²) is thus certainly correct when he remarks: "the supposition is so natural as to commend itself, and we are not without instances of the disturbing effects of such an unchastened anticipation in later ages of the Church." "Immer ist es," says E. von Dobschütz (*Die Urchristlichen Gemeinden*, 1902, 72) "wie im Thessalonich die Flucht vor der Arbeit die als entscheidendes Moment uns entgegentritt."

The purpose of this note is to prove, if possible, that οἱ ἄτακτοι in I 5¹⁴ is to be translated straightway "the loafers." It might seem necessary first of all to consider the possible meanings of the group of words which in the New Testament occur only in I and II, namely ἀτακτεῖν (II 3⁷), ἀτάκτως (II 3⁶. ¹¹) and ἄτακτος (I 5¹⁴). From Suidas (on ἀτάκτημα, ἀταξία) and from the passages gathered by Wetstein (1752 II 306) and Kypke (1755 I 345), we could learn (cf. also Liddell and Scott) that ἀτακτεῖν and its cognates are originally military words, as Chrysostom had already noted. The τάξις is that of troops in battle array or of soldiers at their post of duty. By a natural extension of usage, these words come to describe irregularities of various sorts such as "intermittent" fevers, "disorderly" crowds, "unrestrained" pleasures and the like; and by a still further extension of meaning, these words designate a disorderly life in general. But since Milligan's convincing note (*Comm. on Thess.*, 1908, Note G, 152-154), in which not only the classical but the later Greek usage including that of the Greek Bible* and papyri are examined, it is unnecessary to do more than call attention again to some papyri. Dr. Milligan notes first of all P. Oxy. 275 (dated in the 13th year of Nero, i. e., 66 A. D.) where Trypho apprentices his son to the weaver Ptolemaus. Among other stipulations of the contract, it is said: οὐκ ἐξόντος τῷ

* In the LXX, we have ἄτακτος δρόμος 3 Macc. 1¹⁰; Symmachus has ἄτακτος in De. 32¹⁰, Ezek. 12²⁰, and ἀτάκτως 4 Reg. 9²⁰ (of Jehu's driving). We may add Test. XII, Naph. 2⁹: οὕτως οὐκ ἔστωσαν τέκνα μου πάντα τὰ ἔργα ὑμῶν ἐν τάξει εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἐν φόβῳ, καὶ μηδὲν ἄτακτον ποιήσῃτε ἐν καταφρονήσει, μηδὲ ἐξω καιροῦ αὐτοῦ; also the only cases in the Apostolic Fathers (cf. Goodspeed's *Index Patristicus*), 1 Clem. 40⁸, οὐκ εἰκὴ ἡ ἀτάκτως ἀλλ' ὠρισμένοις καιροῖς καὶ ὥραις, and Diog. 9¹ ἀτάκτους φουραῖς "unrestrained impulses" (cf. Plutarch *de lib. educ.* 7 p. 5 A, noted by Wetstein, ἄτακτοι ἡδοναί).

Τρύφωνι ἀποσπᾶν τὸν παῖδα ἀπὸ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου μέχρι τοῦ τὸν χρόνον πληρωθῆναι (i. e., the contracted period of apprenticeship), ὅσας δὲ ἐὰν ἐν τούτῳ (the period stipulated) ἀτακτῇσῃ (the boy) ἡμέρας, ἐπὶ τὰς ἴσας αὐτὸν παρέξεται (i. e., Trypho) μετὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἀποτεισάτω ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἀργυρίου δραχμὴν μίαν κτλ.* Grenfell and Hunt (*Oxy. Papyri* II 262 ff.) translate ἀτακτῇσῃ "fails to attend"; Milligan, "plays the truant"; the present writer (*Amer. Journ. Theol.*, VIII, 1904, 614 ff.), in referring to this papyrus, suggested: "is idle."

Dr. Milligan next alludes to P. Oxy. 725 (A. D. 183), where, (l. 35 ff.) speaking again of a weaver's apprentice, it reads: ἀργήσῃ δὲ ὁ παῖς εἰς λόγον ἑορτῶν κατ' ἔτος ἡμέρας εἴκοσι, οὐδενὸς ἐκκρουνομένου τῶν μισθῶν τούτων ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἐὰν χορηγηθῇ μισθός, ἐὰν δὲ πλείονας τούτων ἀργήσῃ [ἢ ἀσ]θενήσῃ ἢ ἀτακτῇσῃ ἢ δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἡμέρας ἐπὶ τὰς ἴσας ἐπάναγκες παρέξει αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰσχυρίων τῷ διδασκάλῳ ἡμέρας. "The boy may be idle 20 days yearly on account of the festivals, nothing being knocked off from those wages from the time when payment of wages is granted; but if he is idle more days than these, [or is sick, or loafs, or for any other reason, Ischyriion shall be obliged to produce him for the teacher for an equal number of days." Grenfell and Hunt translate ἀτακτῇσῃ apparently "is disobedient." Milligan (l. c. 154) does not happen to give a translation of this word. The analogy of P. Oxy. 275 quoted above, and the similarity but not identity of ἀργεῖν and ἀτακτεῖν, the latter implying neglect, suggest the translation "loaf."

In this connection, attention should be called to P. Oxy. 724 (A. D. 155) which treats of apprenticeship to a short-hand writer (σημειογραφός), where (l. 12 ff.) it reads: οὐκ ἐξόντος μοι ἐντὸς τοῦ χρόνου τὸν παῖδα ἀποσπᾶν, παραμένει δὲ σοὶ μετὰ τὸν χρόνον ὅσας ἐὰν ἀργήσῃ ἡμέρας ἢ μῆνας. ἀργεῖν and ἀτακτεῖν are in contracts practically synonymous (cf. P. Oxy. 731, l. 12, where ἀργεῖν is used).

Finally, in a note to the present writer dated Feb. 12, 1910, Dr. Milligan draws attention "to a still more striking instance of ἀτακτέω = 'to be idle' than the Oxyrhyncus passages. In

* This contract of apprenticeship has been recently edited again with a new translation and notes by Milligan in his admirable handbook: *Greek Papyri*, 1910, 54 ff.

BGU 1125⁸ (13 B. C.)—a contract—the words occur *ὡς δὲ ἐὰν ἀρτακῆσῃ ἢ ἀρρωστήσῃ*. Evidently *ἀτακῆσῃ* is to be read, with a confusion in the writer's mind with *ἀργήσῃ* (so Schubart)."

From this conspectus of usage, it is manifest that we are justified in translating *ἀτακτεῖν* either generally "to be disorderly" or specifically, as in the papyri quoted, "to be idle" or better, to distinguish from *ἀργεῖν*, "to loaf." With this result, let us turn to I 5¹⁴ where, as the definite articles indicate, three well-known classes are mentioned, *οἱ ἄτακτοι*, *οἱ ὀλιγόψυχοι* and *οἱ ἀσθενεῖς*. These we have already identified in passing (*v. supra* Notes p. 193) with respectively the *μὴ ἐργαζόμενοι* of I 4¹¹, the impatient of the Parousia (suggested by I 4^{13-5¹¹}) and those tempted to immorality (I 4³⁻⁸). At first sight however it is not clear what the *τάξις* is which *ἄτακτοι* implies; hence various interpretations are adduced. (1) Chrysostom takes *οἱ ἄτακτοι* generally as *οἱ παρὰ τὸ τῷ θεῷ δοκοῦν πράττοντες, πάντες οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες*, the reveler, the drunkard, the covetous. He observes, as we have said, that *ἄτακτος* is a military term: "For the order of the church is more harmonious than the military order. . . . They walk not orderly in their ranks, but out of line." (2) Others, seeing a reference to *οἱ ἄτακτοι* in I 4¹¹ and especially in II 3^{6 ff.} assume that the *τάξις* is the general norm of Christian conduct. Bornemann for example (ad 5¹⁴) remarks "Die Unordentlichen, diejenigen die ein ungeordnetes unregelmäßiges Leben führen, sei es in Müßiggang, sei es in Zerrissenheit, oder die sich in die allgemeinen Ordnungen und Regeln christlich-sittlichen Lebens in Haus und Gemeinde nicht schickten." More concisely E. von Dobschütz (ad 5¹⁴): "Hier ist Müßiggang, Dreinreden in fremde Angelegenheiten, exaltiertes Wesen gemeint." (3) Theodoret, however, had already observed: *τοὺς ἀτάκτους τοὺς ἀργίᾳ συζῶντας οὕτως ἐκάλεσεν*; and Ephraem Syrus (Armenian commentary on Paul translated into Latin by the Mechitarist Fathers, Venice, 1893): *corripite aut inquietos qui otiosi ambulant et nihil faciunt nisi inania*. Ellicott similarly restricts the reference when he notes (ad 5¹⁴): "Here the precise reference is probably to the neglect of duties and callings into which the Thessalonians had lapsed owing to their mistaken views of the Lord's coming." So also Milligan: "In the present passage (5¹⁴), the special refer-

ence would seem to be to the idleness and neglect of duty which characterized certain members of the Thessalonian Church in view of the shortly-expected Parousia."

One or other of these three views is held by the commentators and the translation of ἀτάκτους is as a rule literal; e. g., *inordinatos* (also *delinquentes*, *incompositos*, *indisciplinatos* (see Poole, *Syn. Crit. ad loc.*) *inquietos* as Vulgate and Old Latin, *offendentes*, as Syriac); or, in the English version, "the disorderly" as AV¹⁶. RV. (also "unquyete men" Wick., "the unquiet" Rhem., "them that are unruly," AV and six remaining versions according to Ellicott, *Thess.* 156).*

It is evident that the real question at issue is, granting a relation between οἱ ἀτακτοὶ (I 5¹⁴) and the exhortation (I 4¹¹⁻¹²), whether οἱ ἀτακτοὶ refers generally to the μὴ ἡσυχάζοντες, the πράσσοντες τὰ ἐτέρων, and the μὴ ἐργαζόμενοι—in which case οἱ ἀτακτοὶ should be translated "the disorderly"; or whether οἱ ἀτακτοὶ refers specifically to the μὴ ἐργαζόμενοι—in which case it should be translated "the loafers." A brief examination of I 4⁹ π., 5¹² π., 5¹⁹ π., 5²⁷ may help us to a decision.

In I 4⁹ π. Paul states that it is unnecessary to write about love to the Christians, for the readers are already exercising this virtue. Then in v. 10^π, with δὲ introducing a new point, he proceeds not, as we should expect, with παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, φιλοτιμεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., but with παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, περισσεύειν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτ. κ.τ.λ. The point is that just as in v. 1, where he interrupts the run of his exhortation by a tactful statement that the addressed are already doing what he is about to ask and exhort them to do and suddenly changes to ἵνα περισσεύητε μᾶλλον, so here, after observing that they are loving the brethren at home and throughout all Macedonia, he bids them to abound the more. Clearly, as most interpreters opine, this περισσεύειν is a περισσεύειν ἐν τῇ ἀγαπᾷ ἀλλήλους. Moreover, the καὶ after μᾶλλον, which grammatically co-ordinates περισσεύειν with the three main infinitives

* The rendering 'the disorderly' is favored by Ellicott, John Lillie (whose exceptionally excellent work, *The Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians*, New York, American Bible Union, 1856, has been too frequently neglected), *Twentieth Century New Testament*, etc. Weizsäcker has 'die Unordentlichen.' Dr. Vincent, *Word Studies*, IV, 1900 *ad loc.* prefers "them that are unruly," as "more vigorous and less stilted than 'the disorderly.'"

ἡσυχάζειν, πράσσειν, and ἐργάζεσθαι (for it is probable that φιλοτιμείσθαι is to be taken solely with ἡσυχάζειν), really introduces the specific points at which φιλαδελφία needs perfecting. The statement indicates not that Paul is setting one part of the community over against the other, for the community as a whole is addressed, but only that he recognizes tactfully the incompleteness at certain points of love to the brethren. That is to say—and the point is important—the exhortation in v. 10^{b-12} like that in v. 9-10^a has to do with φιλαδελφία. Furthermore, while the three main infinitives are themselves in simple co-ordination (καὶ...καὶ), the logical relation appears to be that the first ἡσυχάζειν expresses itself in the second and third, πράσσειν τὰ ἰδᾶ and ἐργάζεσθαι. But the meaning of ἡσυχάζειν is problematic. (a) Some commentators, not uninfluenced by such passages as that of Plato, *Rep.* 496 D, where the philosopher retires from public affairs and pursues philosophy ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων (cf. also Dio Cass. 60²⁷ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγων καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων), find in ἡσυχάζειν a political reference. They conjecture that some of the laborers (who were not of course philosophers) having dropped their work were proclaiming in the market places and elsewhere their notions about the Parousia and were meddling in public affairs, with the result of bringing the Christian body as a whole into disfavor with the Gentiles.* Paul's exhortation is that they retire from public affairs and so mind their own business and attend to their own work. The reference in v. 12 to τοὺς ἔξω and μηδενός, if masculine, might seem to countenance this opinion. (b) Other expositors, with greater probability in view of the eschatological interest of I (not to speak of II), discover in ἡσυχάζειν a specific religious connotation.† They assume that the tranquillity of spirit enjoined presupposes a state of feverish excitement due to the expectancy of the immediate coming of Christ. As a result of this excitement, these brethren, unlike the ὀλιγόψυχοι (I 5¹⁴) whose impatience of the Parousia did not bring them into trouble, began to be meddlesome and idle. Of none of them could it be said with La. 3²⁸ ὑπομενεῖ καὶ ἡσυχάζει

* So in general Zwingli, Schott, Koppe, Findlay apparently, and von Dobschütz clearly.

† So Lünemann, Ellicott and others.

εἰς τὸ σωτήριον κυρίου. * This meddlesomeness had to do not with public affairs, with the Gentiles, but with church affairs, with the Christians,† as the context (vv. ^{10b-12} and vv. ^{9-10a}), which touches the imperfections of the brotherhood, indicates. Furthermore, this meddlesomeness is not so much the cause as the result of μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι as the ἵνα clause (v. ¹²) seems to intimate. This clause states the purpose‡ of παρακαλοῦμεν (v. ^{10b}), namely (1) that the Thessalonians might conduct themselves in a becoming fashion§ (not "in the eyes of," *coram*, but) with an eye to the judgment of the Gentiles (πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω as Col. 4⁵), thus preventing the Gentile employers of labor from judging the Christians as a whole by the neglectful idleness of a few; and (2) that they might have need of nothing (or no one),|| the point being that the brethren ought to support themselves by labor and not be financially dependent on the group.¶ In other words, the lack of tranquillity of mind led to idleness, idleness to poverty, poverty to demand for support from the brethren, and demand for support to meddling in the affairs of the organization.

How far this idleness with its resulting meddlesomeness went while Paul was in Thessalonica cannot be determined. That it was present is evident from the command which Paul then gave (cf. v. ¹¹ καθὼς ὑμῖν παρηγγείλαμεν and II 3¹⁰), namely ἡσυχάζειν . . . ἐργάζεσθαι. That it increased after his departure is likewise evident both from the fact that he repeats the command in the form of an exhortation, adding the purpose clause (vv. ^{10b-12}) and from the indications of I 5¹²⁻²⁷. Assuming still a con-

* For the majority of the brethren, the Parousia was a sanction for ὑπομονή (I 1³).

† So Flatt, 1829, "wohl"; cf. Estius (*apud* Poole) ut quisque de suo habeat unde vivat, nec otio suo fratribus oneri sit et infidelibus scandalo.

‡ In taking ἵνα as the object of παρηγγείλαμεν, von Dobschütz breaks away needlessly from exegetical tradition.

§ Grotius notes I Cor. 14⁴⁰ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν.

|| Perinde est sive μηδενὸς in neut. gen. sive in masc. accipias. (Vorstius *apud* Poole). Nor does it matter logically, for in either case the allusion is to begging from the Church as in general Theodoret, Estius, Lightfoot and others have surmised. Vulgate gives *nullius aliquid*. Even those who find in ἡσυχάζειν κ.τ.λ. a reference to public affairs, and who incline, in view of τοὺς ἔξω, to take μηδενὸς masc., do not always restrict μηδενὸς to Gentiles (cf. von Dobschütz).

¶ That the ἵνα clause has in mind chiefly if not solely ἐργάζεσθαι is suggested not only by the contents of the clause but also by II 3¹⁰.

nection between οἱ ἄτακτοι (5¹⁴) and the brethren intended in 4¹¹, we must admit that the exhortation (5¹²⁻¹³) to recognize the worth of (εἰδέναι as in 4⁴) τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῖν (an especially apt designation under the circumstances *) and to regard them highly in love διὰ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν, that is, because they are laborers in the Lord, and the command εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς (not μετ' αὐτῶν); and the juxtaposition of 5¹²⁻¹³ and 5¹⁴ (which begins νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους) become extremely significant. Clearly the peace of the church is disturbed and the blame is not confined to one side (εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς). Some of the brethren had not shown that respect to the "workers" which was their due, and the "workers" had not been quite tactful. Precisely what the situation is we do not know, but it may not be too rash to conjecture that the idlers had asked the "workers" for funds and had been refused, with an admonition, on the ground that the claimants were unwilling to work, thus violating Paul's oral command (i. e. in 4¹¹ καθὼς ὑμῖν παρηγγείλαμεν). May we go further and surmise that the demand of the idlers had been made ἐν πνεύματι? † Such a request is not without analogy, for in Did. 11¹² we read: ὅς δ' ἂν εἴπῃ ἐν πνεύματι· Δός μοι ἀργύρια ἢ ἕτερά τινα οὐκ ἀκούσεσθε αὐτοῦ. And did this unethical interpretation of the utterances of the Spirit so affect the "workers" that they became inclined to distrust somewhat the validity in general of the χαρίσματα? Some countenance is given to this guess by 5¹²⁻²² where Paul exhorts the brethren on the one hand not to quench the gifts of the Spirit and not to despise the χάρισμα of προφητεία, and on the other hand to test the utterances of the Spirit. This exhortation may well be *ad hoc*, for (as Grotius remarks on 4¹¹) *mos est Paulo peculiariter ea vitia tangere quæ quoque in loco vigeabant maxime*.

* The designation "those who labor among you" is quite untechnical; the labor is further defined also untechnically by προῖσταμένους and νουθετοῦντας, namely by looking after the needs of the group and giving brotherly admonition. κοπιᾶω is a favorite word of Paul used figuratively of himself and others (e. g., Gal. 4¹¹, I Cor. 5¹⁰, Rom. 16¹², Ph. 2¹⁶, Col. 1²⁹) and also in connection with ἐργάζεσθαι (I Cor. 4¹², Eph. 4²⁸). As Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, 1909², 227 f., observes, the word discloses Paul's acquaintance with the laboring classes.

† In this connection it is worthy of note that some of the brethren, innocently or not, had interpreted the Spirit as saying: The Day of the Lord is present (II. 2⁹ διὰ πνεύματος). Were these brethren also idlers?

Clearly again in 5²³ it is appropriate to invoke in prayer the God of peace. But why in 5²⁷ is it necessary to adjure solemnly that this letter, our First Epistle, be read to *all* the brethren? Had the idlers endeavored to take the management of the funds into their own hands and refused to listen to any epistolary injunctions from Paul? * However we may account in detail for the indications of I 5¹²⁻²⁷, it is evident from this as well as from 4¹¹⁻¹² that the original difficulty with the meddlesome idlers had increased since the departure of Paul, although affairs had not reached the crucial stage presupposed by the Second Epistle.

If this brief examination of I 4⁹⁻¹² 5¹²⁻²⁷ has been successful, it has made probable that οἱ ἄτακτοι is to be rendered not "the disorderly," indicating the brethren of 4¹¹ as both unquiet and meddlesome and idle, but "the loafers," singling out as important the result of unquietness of spirit due to the belief in the nearness of the Parousia, and the cause of the meddling, namely idleness, an idleness which is not simply a being without work (ἀργεῖν) but an idleness which neglects the divine τάξις of labor (ἀτακτεῖν). In this case, 5¹⁴ with its definite articles † refers to the three classes chiefly in mind in the last two chapters of I, οἱ ἄτακτοι ‡ who as the most troublesome are warned; οἱ δολιγόψυχοι who, impatient of the Parousia but not mischievous, are encouraged; § and οἱ ἀσθενεῖς who being tempted sorely to impurity are to be clung to and tenderly but firmly supported.

While the indications of the First Epistle make probable the rendering "the loafers" for οἱ ἄτακτοι, the full persuasion thereof is from the Second Epistle, especially 3⁶⁻¹¹. This Epistle, as already noted, is devoted to two points only, the Parousia

* If the meddlesomeness reached thus far, then Wetstein's comment on φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡγουμένους is, with modifications, apt: *eleganter dictum: ambit et expetite non honores et magistratus, quod plerique solent, sed vitam privatam et quietam.*

† μακροθυμεῖτε (v. 14) is to be taken with ὁρᾶτε and διώκετε (v. 15).

‡ The unique phrase ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀγάπης (I 1³), probably minted by Paul, thus gains in meaning. This phrase like ἡ ὑπομονὴ τῆς ἐλπίδος and τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως (cf. II 1¹¹) is not found elsewhere in the Greek Bible nor in the Apostolic Fathers.

§ In the light of 5¹⁴, 2¹¹ παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς παραμυθούμενοι καὶ μαρτυρούμενοι εἰς τὸ κτλ becomes definite, "urging you both by encouragement and by solemn appeal to walk," etc. παραμυθεῖσθαι only here and 5¹⁴ in Paul; the δολιγόψυχοι are in mind. The stronger μαρτυρούμενοι would refer to οἱ ἄτακτοι.

(1³-2¹⁷) and the Idlers (3¹⁻¹⁶). Our present concern is with the latter point. Paul had been hearing * of some † who had been and still were περιπατούντας‡ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀτάκτως, that is, as the explanatory clause without καὶ intimates, "not working but busy-bodding" (v. ¹¹). Precisely in what this περιεργάζεσθαι consisted does not appear. Inasmuch, however, as there is no mention of the Gentiles in the context, it is legitimate to infer that the interference is not with public affairs, but with the affairs of the church. This inference is supported also by vv. ¹²⁻¹⁶, where, after urging the brethren not to falter in well doing, Paul goes on to say: "If however any one (τις, cf. τινος v. ¹¹) does not obey (ὑπακούειν as Ph. 2¹²) our word (that is, the gospel utterance on ἐργάζεσθαι v. ¹²) expressed in this Epistle (our II), mark him (whether by putting up his name on a board or by publicly naming him at a meeting is uncertain); do not associate with him" (μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι; cf. στέλλεσθαι v. ⁶). This rather severe § command is modified by the statement of its purpose, that the brother "may be ashamed of himself" and presumably go back to work; and by the method of its execution: "do not regard him as if he were an enemy but admonish him (νουθετεῖτε as I 5¹⁴) as if he were a brother." The meddling then is with the affairs of the organization, and the consequence was, as the prayer to Christ the Lord of Peace (v. ¹⁶; cf. I 5²³) suggests, a disturbance within the brotherhood. The origin of the trouble seems to have been an unquietness of mind (v. ¹² μετὰ ἡσυχίας) due to the belief in the nearness of the Parousia. From this unquietness flowed idleness (ἐργάζεσθαι v. ¹²), a blameworthy idleness, for it was a direct violation of the gospel command (v. ¹⁰). And this idleness in its turn brought on poverty, and poverty the demand for support with its begging (v. ¹² τὸν ἐαυτῶν ἄρτον) and meddling.||

* ἀκοῦμεν as I Cor. 11¹⁸, not ἠκοῦσαμεν as Eph. 1¹⁸, Col. 1⁴. We need not, however, press the present to mean "we keep hearing."

† Though he does not say τινος ὑμῶν, they too are brothers (vv. ⁶, ¹²).

‡ The participle, not the infinitive (I Cor. 11¹⁸).

§ Absolute excommunication is hardly intended, for the persons are not enemies but brothers (v. ¹⁶) and no μὴ συνεισελθῆναι (I Cor. 5¹¹) is expressed.

|| The command of I 4¹¹ ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν is not repeated. By joining ἐργάζεσθαι first with περιεργάζεσθαι (v. ¹¹) and then with μετὰ ἡσυχίας and τὸν ἐαυτῶν ἄρτον (v. ¹²) Paul makes

The indications of vv. ¹⁰⁻¹⁶ reveal a situation similar to that in I but somewhat more acute. We do not know, of course, the exact run of events at Thessalonica in the interval between the writing of I and II, but we may surmise that the "workers" (I 5¹²) had heeded Paul's advice about peace (I 5¹³) and about spiritual gifts (I 5¹⁹⁻²²) and had, as *νοουθετοῦντες* (I 5¹²) admonished, the *ἀτάκτους* (I 5¹⁴) to desist from their demands for support and to return to work, as Paul had commanded both orally and by letter. The idlers, however, refusing to acquiesce asserted again (v. ¹⁴; cf. *πᾶσιν* I 5²⁷) that they would pay no attention to Paul's commands by letter. The result was naturally that the "workers" grew tired of doing the right thing for the idlers and the peace of the church continued to be troubled.

To meet this acuter state of affairs, Paul devotes the last chapter of the letter. The approach (vv. ¹⁻⁵) to the theme is tactful. Speaking first of himself and the needs of his work, he urges the brethren to pray for him that his gospel may run its race successfully and be crowned with glory (cf. Rom. 15³⁰), and that he may be rescued from those unrighteous and wicked opponents, meaning doubtless the Jews who are still causing trouble in Corinth.* Having thus asked for sympathy, he turns sympathetically to his brethren in Thessalonica (v. ⁸), who also are facing obstacles, and assures them that the Lord (Christ not God as I 5²⁴), the faithful, will establish them and guard them from the Evil One, the opponent of the kingdom as in the Lord's Prayer. Then (v. ⁴) somewhat abruptly he expresses his confidence based upon the indwelling Christ that the Thessalonians are doing and will do what he commands. Why this just now? Without forcing *παραγγέλλομεν* to mean "we are on the point of commanding," we cannot escape the impression that a serious command is at hand. But why does he say not *πεπολθαμεν ἐφ' ὑμῶς ἐν κυρίῳ* "we have confidence in you who are in the Lord" (as Gal. 5¹⁰), but *πεπολθαμεν ἐν κυρίῳ ἐφ' ὑμῶς* "we who are in the Lord have confidence in you"? In the

clear what we assumed in I 4¹¹⁻¹² that *μὴ ἡσυχάζειν* led to *μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι*, and this to poverty, begging, and meddling, and that *μηδεὸς χρεῖαν ἔχητε* (I 4¹²) refers to begging.

* The added *οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἡ πίστις* indicates a mood similar to that in I 2¹⁴⁻¹⁶; a similar situation prompts the similar mood.

light of the tactful *καθὼς καὶ ὑμᾶς* (v. ¹), it is clear that the majority of the brethren by reason of their confidence in the Lord would do what Paul commands; but apparently he feels that some have not that confidence in the Lord. Hence (v. ⁵) with the minority in mind he prays that Christ would direct their purposes to the end of possessing divine love without which "the labor of love" involving hard work would be impossible, and of possessing the endurance of which the Messiah is an example * without which example steadfastness would be impossible.

With this tactful approach, the Apostle takes up in v. ⁶ the specific command already in mind in v. ⁴. Invoking the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, he commands the brethren in a body to stand aloof from every brother *ἀτάκτως περιπαδύντος*, that is, who is violating the *παράδοσις* (singular not as 2¹⁵ plural) already received by his converts. What this *παράδοσις* is, this *μὴ ἀτάκτως περιπατεῖν* is made clear by vv. ⁷⁻⁹ and v. ¹⁰ each introduced by *γὰρ*. In v. ⁷ the *γὰρ* explains not directly what the *παράδοσις* is, but indirectly how it was exemplified in the conduct of Paul: *οὐκ ἠτακτήσαμεν ἐν ὑμῖν* nor did we get support *gratis* from any one of you. That the *παράδοσις* includes only the *οὐκ ἀτακτεῖν* is evident from v. ⁶ where it defines *ἀτάκτως περιπατεῖν*; and also from v. ⁸ where attention is called to the fact that he worked (*ἐργαζόμενοι*) incessantly, purposing not to put a burden upon any one of the brethren, that is, in the light of v. ⁷, to relieve the converts of the duty of supporting him while he preached.† That the *παράδοσις* is *ἐργάζεσθαι* is even clearer in v. ¹⁰ where the *γὰρ* (parallel to *γὰρ* in v. ⁷) explains directly the *παράδοσις* thus: *εἴ τις οὐ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι μηδὲ ἐσθιέτω*. The *ἀτάκτως περιπατεῖν* which is contrary to the *παράδοσις* (v. ⁶) is *μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι*. This interpretation is strengthened by vv. ¹¹⁻¹² where *γὰρ* (v. ¹¹) introduces the reason for repeating the original command (v. ¹⁰ = ἡ *παράδοσις* v. ⁶), namely that

* Cf. II Cor. 1³, Col. 1²⁴. The phrase *ἡ ὑπομονὴ τοῦ χριστοῦ* is apparently coined by Paul; cf. Ignatius Rom. 10².

† Note the characteristically Pauline *οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν*. The same claim to apostolic authority and the same waiving of it in love are to be found in a different connection in I 2⁴⁻⁷ "although we were ever able to be in a place of importance as Christ's apostles" we waived this right in love, choosing to appear among you not as apostles but as babes.

Paul has been hearing and still hears of some who are *πειρατούντες ἐν ὑμῖν ἀτάκτως*, that is, *μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους* but, using a common pun, *περιεργαζομένους*. Again *περιπατεῖν ἀτάκτως* like *ἀτακτεῖν* (v. ⁸) is *μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι*. Clearly then in vv. ⁸⁻¹¹, the specific *τάξις* in mind, the oral *παράδοσις* exemplified in the conduct of Paul is labor. Having thus assured the brethren as a whole (vv. ⁸⁻¹¹) that there is nothing new in the command to work, he turns to the *μηδὲν ἐργαζόμενοι* and commands such as these and exhorts them as well that with tranquillity of mind they work and earn their own living, suggesting that it is only by working with a mind undisturbed by thoughts about the nearness of the Parousia that they can support themselves as Paul did. Then in vv. ¹²⁻¹⁶, he turns to the brethren as a whole with the exhortation not to weary in their doing what is right to the troublers and with directions how to treat the recalcitrants, ending with a prayer for peace.

If then the *τάξις* in vv. ⁸⁻¹² is work, it is natural to translate *ἀτακτεῖν* "to be idle" and *περιπατεῖν ἀτάκτως* "to walk idly" and consequently *οἱ ἄτακτοι* in I 5¹⁴ "the idlers," as indeed I had already done in 1904 on the basis of these verses and P. Oxy. 275.* It is to be observed however that the idleness here is specifically a refusal to work (v. ¹⁰ *οὐ θέλει*; Bengel aptly: *nolle vitium est*), a direct violation of the *παράδοσις* (v. ⁹) and of Paul's own example (v. ⁷⁻⁸), and of the gospel utterance (v. ¹⁴ *τῷ λόγῳ ἡμῶν*). To express this notion of neglect, Paul chooses not *σχολάζειν* (cf. Exod. 5⁸ *σχολάζετε, σχολασταί ἐστε*), a word he prefers to use in the sense "to have leisure for" (I Cor. 7⁵; cf. Ps. 45¹¹); not *ἀργεῖν* (cf. Sir. 30²⁶ *ἔμβαλε αὐτὸν εἰς ἐργασίαν ἵνα μὴ ἀργῇ*; also *ἀργός*, Sir. 37¹¹, Mt. 12²⁶, 20⁸⁻⁹, I Tim. 5¹², Tit. 1¹²), a word Paul does not use but which, as we saw, is in some papyri equivalent to *ἀτακτεῖν* though the latter has the nuance of neglect; but *ἀτακτεῖν* and *ἀτάκτως* and *ἄτακτος*, words distinctly implying an infringement of the divine order of labor. In English, however, this notion of neglect is suggested best not by "to be idle," etc., but by "to loaf," etc. It was thus of interest to me to discover that W. G. Rutherford, in his admirable translation entitled *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians and to the Corinthians* (posthumously

* See *Amer. Journ. Theol.* VIII, 1904, 614 ff.

published in 1908), translates in two of the four cases in which the words occur: "not to be intimate with any of your number who is a loafer" (II 3⁶); "we were no loafers when we lived among you" (II 3⁷). Supported by the internal evidence of the two epistles, and by the use of ἀτακτεῖν in papyri, and by Rutherford's translation in two of the four cases, I venture to propose "the loafers" as the rendering of τοὺς ἀτάκτους in I 5¹⁴.*

In conclusion it may be added that it is not accidental that letters betraying the existence of feverish excitement about the coming of the Lord should also contain the warning against loafing; not accidental that the two main points of II are the Parousia and the loafers; for, as we have seen, such expectancy is frequently coupled with indifference to the ordinary duties of life. (Cf. in certain respects even I Cor. 7²⁵ ff.) It is however worthy of note that it is in letters to workingmen that words are used in a sense as yet found only in the papyri reflecting the life of the common people. And it is further significant that from a situation created by the belief in the immediate coming of the Lord, Paul stamps once for all as Christian the necessity and dignity of labor. For it is to be remembered that the divine tradition is not a mere Jewish or Greek proverb to the effect that if a man does not work he does not get anything to eat, but is a lofty ethical imperative: If a man *will* not work, he shall not eat.†

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* Sir. Wm. Ramsay, in an appreciative review of Milligan's *Thessalonians* (*Expos.* VII, 1909), remarks (pp. 2-4) that the context in II 3⁷ places beyond doubt that idleness is involved in ἀτακτεῖν and concludes correctly: "If that be so, there can be no justification for clinging to the harsher meaning" (that is, apparently "the disorderly") "in I 5¹⁴." See also the citation from Dr. Milligan, quoted above (p. 195), ἀτακτεῖν = "to be idle."

† It were indeed a pity if we had to assume that it was not Paul but a *falsarius* who invented this "golden rule of labor" (von Dobschütz) with its fine ethical emphasis. But the assumption is unnecessary. As a matter of fact the argument of H. Holtzmann, ZNTW, 1901, 97-108 (cf. Hollmann, *ibid.* 1904, 28-38, and especially the brilliant essay of Wrede, *Die Echtheit des zweiten Thess.* 1903) that a *falsarius* had enlarged I 4¹¹⁻¹² into II 3⁶⁻¹² tends to neglect the exegetical fact that were it not for II 3⁶⁻¹² we should be unable to be sure of the meaning of I 4¹¹⁻¹² or of the translation of αἱ ἀτακτοὶ in I 5¹⁴.

XVII

CALVIN'S THEORY OF THE CHURCH

BY ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT

ACCORDING to Catholic theory the Church of Christ is the visible and organized institution founded by the apostles and ruled by their successors the bishops. This institution is the alone ark of salvation and the supreme authority upon earth. According to Luther, the Church of Christ is the community of all Christian believers, whether organized or unorganized, and its vocation is to proclaim the gospel of God's forgiving love in Christ, and to bind men together in mutual love and service and in common labor for the good of others. Apart from it salvation is impossible as truly as on the Catholic theory, not however because it is the sole depositary and dispenser of saving grace committed to its bishops by the apostles, but because through it alone the gospel of God's forgiving love in Christ is made known.

In order to understand Calvin's theory of the church and to appreciate its relation to the Catholic theory on the one side and Luther's on the other it is necessary to remind ourselves of his fundamental conception of Christianity and the Christian life. All controlling in his religious thinking was the doctrine of the absolute and unconditioned will of God. For the manifestation of his character as just and merciful God decreed human sin, the punishment of some sinners, and the pardon and sanctification of others. The means by which he accomplishes his purpose concerning the latter are of his own appointment and might have been quite other than they are. That men can be saved only by the free grace of God through faith in Christ, who has made atonement and paid the penalty of human sin, is due not to the inherent necessities of the case but to the sovereign

will of God. Under these circumstances the test of every system, institution, doctrine and so-called means of grace, is not its fitness for the work in hand but its conformity to the will of God. What he has appointed or commanded is to be recognized as necessary and of absolute obligation. Our duty is undeviating conformity and unquestioning obedience. "Pure and genuine religion," Calvin says almost at the beginning of his *Institutes*, "consists in faith united with a serious fear of God, a fear which comprehends willing reverence and leads to such legitimate worship as is prescribed by the law" (book I, chap. 2); and in the fourth book, "Everything pertaining to the perfect rule of right living the Lord has comprehended in his law in such a way that there remains nothing for men to add to that summary. And he has done this first, that since all rectitude of life consists in the conformity of all our actions to his will as their standard, we might consider him as the sole master and director of life; and secondly to show that he requires of us nothing more than obedience." (Chap. x, § 7.)

God's will which is the rule of life is unknown except he reveal it, and this he does in the Bible, the authoritative code of faith and conduct. The Christian life consists not in the free and spontaneous expression of the character of a child of God, but in faithful obedience to the divine commands as laid down in the Scriptures.

Calvin claimed to believe in Christian liberty and devoted a brief chapter to the subject in the third book of his *Institutes*, but though in form his doctrine was identical with Luther's at least in part—the Christian by his faith being set free from dependence upon works for justification—in reality liberty had very little place in his interpretation of the Christian life. He was chiefly interested not to promote liberty, except from subjection to ecclesiastical rites and ceremonies, but to guard against the misuse of it by unworthy and slothful Christians, and Luther's glowing tract on the Freedom of the Christian Man it would have been quite impossible for him to write. He did not trust the saved man as the great German reformer did. The Christian, he felt, needs, as well as others, the pressure of an external law, and it must be obeyed by him as by them, not because it is good or expresses his character as a child of God but because it is

God's law. Calvin separated from the Roman Catholic Church and opposed it with all his might, but he was a thorough-going believer in authority in the religious sphere as everywhere else, and his Christianity was in this respect as catholic as any Romanist's.

Moreover, in still another fundamental matter he was a genuine Catholic. He believed in the corruption of human nature and the need of its transformation by divine power if it were to escape eternal destruction. Regeneration was therefore necessary, and although God might have used other means to effect it, he actually chose to bring it about ordinarily through baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, and to nourish the regenerated nature by the Eucharist, the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. Calvin, to be sure, rejected transubstantiation, and also the realistic doctrine of Luther, and talked about a spiritual instead of material presence of Christ in the Lord's supper, but he was a sacramentalist nevertheless, much more of a one than Luther, for he always thought of baptism and the Lord's supper not merely as signs of the forgiving love of God in Christ, the word made visible, but as having to do primarily with the birth and sustenance of a new nature—an essentially Catholic conception. Indeed, the whole notion of regeneration is Catholic, involving a change of nature not merely of disposition and will. At this point Luther, too, often felt the influence of Catholic tradition, but what with him was exceptional only with Calvin was constant and controlling.

In the light of what has been said of Calvin's general position let us consider his theory of the church. In the fourth book of the last edition of his *Institutes* he sets forth his doctrine of the church at great length. It is the fullest and final statement of the matter from his pen. In the *Genevan Catechism* he had defined the church as "The body and society of believers whom God hath predestined to eternal life." By the church thus defined he meant, not the visible church, but "the assemblage of those whom God has adopted by his secret election, which is neither at all times visible to the eye nor discernible by signs." Also in the first edition of his *Institutes*, with the same spiritual body in mind he said, "We believe in the Holy Catholic Church, that is the universal number of the elect

whether angels or men, whether dead or living, and however widely dispersed among the nations. We believe that there is one church and society and people of God whose leader and prince is Christ our Lord, the head of the one body. In him, by the divine goodness, they are elect before the foundation of the world that they may all be gathered in the kingdom of God. This society moreover is Catholic, that is universal, because there cannot be two or three of them; but the elect of God are all so united and bound together that as they depend on one head in the same way they coalesce in one body, adhering to one another as members of the same body do. They are truly one, being called in one faith, hope and love by the same Spirit of God while they live, and being made heirs of the same inheritance of eternal life. The church is also holy, because as many as are chosen by the eternal providence of God, that they may be received as members of the church, are all sanctified by the Lord. . . . Since, moreover, the church is the people of God's elect, it is not possible that those who are its true members should ever perish. . . . This is the Catholic Church, the mystical body of Christ" (chap. 2).

Here the visible church, made up of good and bad, saved and unsaved, is not dwelt upon, but in the last two editions of the *Institutes* it is made the principal subject of discussion, a clear indication of Calvin's increased ecclesiastical interest. To be sure, the same theory of the invisible church still appears. Almost at the beginning of the fourth book of the edition of 1559 it is said, "When in the creed we profess to believe in the church reference is made not only to the visible church of which we are now speaking, but also to all the elect of God, including in the number even those who have departed this life. . . . But because a small and despised number is concealed among an immense crowd and a few grains of wheat are buried in a heap of chaff to God alone must be left the knowledge of his church of which his secret election forms the foundation" (chap. 1, § 2). He was thus both earlier and later in agreement with Wyclif and Huss in his interpretation of the invisible church as the totality of the elect. Indeed, in view of the controlling place which the doctrine of predestination had in his system it would have been strange had he not agreed with them at this point. But

he departed from them, particularly in later years, and followed Luther in his recognition of a true visible church. Only such recognition on his part, as on Luther's, made the establishment of a new church possible, for with the theory of Wyclif and Huss no church in a real sense as a community and association of men here on earth could have any existence.

It is common to speak of the reformation distinction between the visible and invisible church, but the distinction was not Luther's. To him, at any rate after the first few years, there was only one true church, the assembly of all Christian believers on earth. It is at once visible, because it manifests itself in word and sacrament, and invisible because nobody but God knows just who and how many are its members. There are therefore not two entities, the invisible company of the elect and the visible ecclesiastical organization, there is but one, the company of true Christian believers. Calvin on the other hand preserved the theory of an invisible church, composed of the elect both angels and men, in heaven and on earth, which Luther had accepted for a time but early abandoned, and set beside it the notion of a visible church, or external ecclesiastical institution, not identical with it but equally a true church. "From what has been said I conceive it must now be evident what judgment we ought to form respecting the visible church which falls under our observation. For we have remarked that the Scriptures speak of the church in a twofold sense. Sometimes in mentioning the church they mean that which is really such in the sight of God, into which none are received but those who by the gift of adoption are sons of God, and by sanctification of the Spirit true members of Christ. In this sense it comprehends not only the saints on earth but all the elect who have lived since the beginning of the world. But often the word church designates the whole multitude of men scattered throughout the world, who profess to worship one God and Christ, are initiated by baptism into faith in him, testify to their unity by partaking of the Lord's supper, agree together in the word of the Lord, and preserve the ministry which Christ has instituted to preach it. In this church there are many hypocrites who have nothing of Christ but the name and appearance; many ambitious, avaricious, envious, evil-speaking men, and some of impurer lives, who are tolerated

for a time either because they cannot be easily convicted or because due strictness of discipline is not always maintained. Hence as it is necessary for us to believe the invisible church which is manifest to the eyes of God alone, that which is called church in the eyes of men we are commanded to honor and to maintain communion with it" (book 4, chap. 1, § 7).

Two diverse interests, that of the theologian and that of the practical ecclesiastic, were here operative, and the result was a confusion of thought, which was perpetuated in reformed Protestantism, and has worked no little mischief.

In the later editions of the Institutes it was to the visible church, as already said, that Calvin devoted his attention, and in the standard edition of 1559 the discussion fills more than half the fourth book. The visible church he defines as follows: "The universal church is a multitude collected from all nations, who though dispersed in countries widely distant from each other, nevertheless consent to the same truth of divine doctrine and are united by the bond of the same religion. In it particular churches, distributed according to human necessity in various towns and villages, are so comprehended that to each belongs of right the name and authority of a church" (book 4, chap. 1, § 9.)

The marks of the visible church are the word and the sacraments. "Wherever we find the word of God sincerely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ, there it is not to be doubted is a church of God" (*ibid.*). "We see how great caution should be observed on both sides. For to prevent imposture from deceiving us under the name of the church every congregation receiving this name should be brought to that proof as to a touchstone. If it have in word and sacraments the order prescribed by the Lord it will not deceive us; we may securely render it the honor due to all churches. On the contrary if it exhibit itself without word and sacraments we must be no less careful to avoid the imposture than we were in the other case to shun pride and presumption" (*ibid.* § 11).

Only within this true visible church which possesses the word and the sacraments can salvation be had. At the opening of his discussion Calvin says, "I will begin with the church into whose bosom it is God's will that his children should be col-

lected, that by her aid and ministry they may be nourished so long as they are babes and children, and may also be guided by her maternal care until they grow up to manhood and finally attain to the perfection of faith. What God has joined together it is not lawful to put asunder, that to whom he is a father the church may also be a mother" (*ibid.* § 1.) "But as our present design," he says a little later, "is to treat of the visible church, we may learn even from the title of mother how useful and even necessary it is for us to know her; since there is no other way of entrance into life unless we are conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breasts, and continually preserved under her care and government, until we are divested of this mortal flesh and become like the angels. For our infirmity will not admit of our dismissal from her school until we have been her disciples all our life. It is also to be remarked that out of her bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins and no salvation" (§ 4). This explicit assertion of the impossibility of salvation outside the visible church is frequently repeated by Calvin. Indeed one of the interests chiefly controlling him throughout the entire discussion was to oppose those who decried the visible church and separated from it, claiming that they could be saved without its pale. To withdraw from the church, he says, is to renounce God and Christ. "So highly does God esteem the communion of the church that he considers every one a traitor and an apostate from religion who contumaciously withdraws from any Christian society which preserves the true ministry of the word and the sacraments. . . . Hence it follows that to depart from the church is to deny God and Christ, and such a criminal dissension is so much the more to be avoided, because while we endeavor so far as we can to destroy the truth of God we deserve to be consumed by the power of his wrath" (§ 10). A church may be at fault in many respects but if it have the word and the sacraments it is a true church and is not to be forsaken under any circumstances. Nothing could be more emphatic than Calvin's insistence upon this point.

How then did he justify his own and his fellow-Protestants' withdrawal from the Church of Rome? The answer reveals an important difference between his and Luther's ideas of the word of God. To him, as to Luther, the word was a necessary sign

of the true church, but while to the older reformer it meant the gospel of the forgiving love of God in Christ, to Calvin, as to Melancthon, it meant the Bible as a whole, or rather the Bible properly interpreted, in other words, sound doctrine. Where the sound doctrine of religion, which is set forth in the Bible, is faithfully taught, there is the true church; where the teaching of error takes its place, there the true church cannot be. Error in minor matters may prevail even in the true church, but error touching the fundamental doctrines of religion destroys it. "The errors," he says, "which may thus be forgiven are those by which the fundamental doctrine of religion is not injured, and by which those articles of religion wherein all believers ought to agree are not suppressed" (chap. 2, § 1).

That in this sound doctrine of religion he included much more than the mere gospel of God's forgiving love in Christ is abundantly clear from such a statement as the following:—"Some of the articles of true doctrine are so necessary to be known that they ought to be received by all as fixed and indubitable, as the peculiar maxims of religion; such as that there is one God, that Christ is God and the son of God, that our salvation consists in the mercy of God and the like" (chap. 1, § 12). It is clear also from the entire structure of his Institutes and from the attitude he always took toward those who differed with him at all widely in theological matters.

It was on the basis of this interpretation of the word as sound doctrine that Calvin justified secession from the Roman communion. "As soon as falsehood has made a breach in the citadel of religion, as soon as the sum of necessary doctrine is subverted, and the use of the sacraments fails, annihilation surely ensues, as a man's life comes to an end when his throat is cut or his heart mortally wounded. And this is clearly evident from the words of Paul when he teaches that the church is founded upon the doctrine of the apostles and prophets, Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. If the foundation of the church be the doctrine of the prophets and apostles which enjoins believers to place their salvation in Christ alone, how can the edifice stand any longer when that doctrine is taken away? The church, therefore, must of necessity fall where that system of religion is destroyed which alone is able to sustain it" (chap. 2, § 1).

Corruption and immorality in a church, whether in its members or its officers, is no excuse for separating from it. So long as it has the word and the sacraments it remains a true church however full of wickedness, and to withdraw from it is to forfeit the possibility of salvation. "Let these two points then remain fixed; first that he who voluntarily deserts the external communion of the church, where the word of God is preached and the sacraments are administered, is without excuse; secondly that the faults either of two persons or of many form no obstacle to a due profession of our faith in the ceremonies instituted by God; for the pious conscience is not wounded by the unworthiness of any other individual whether he be a pastor or a private person, nor are the mysteries less pure and salutary to a holy and upright man because they are received at the same time by the impure" (chap. 1, § 19). "We have already stated the importance which we ought to attach to the ministry of the word and sacraments, and the extent to which our reverence for it should be carried, that it may be accounted a perpetual mark of the church. That is to say that wherever it exists entire and uncorrupted no vices and faults of conduct form a sufficient reason for refusing the name of a church" (chap. 2, § 1).

The church is not made by persons, either lay or clerical, and its reality is not affected by their character, but solely by the word and sacraments. Even love itself is worthless without sound doctrine (chap. 2, §§ 3, 5).

It is often said that the Protestant reformation was due to the low moral state of the Catholic Church and represented primarily an effort to improve the moral condition of Christendom. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as appears clearly enough from many facts, among them this position of Calvin's touching withdrawal from the Roman Church. He was ethically the most rigorous of all the Reformers and spent much of his time and strength in laboring for the moral purification of Geneva and of the western Protestant world, but he declared emphatically and repeatedly that no one had the right to withdraw from an existing church on moral grounds. Only because the Roman Church by its corruption of the word and the sacraments had ceased to be a true church was the Protestant secession justified. Its real basis was religious not ethical.

The combination of his idea of the necessity of belonging to the visible church with his disparate notion of the church as the totality of the elect Calvin made, in the only way indeed in which it could be made, by asserting that it was God's will that the elect shall be in the church and find salvation only there. "God might," as he says, "have made his people perfect in a moment, but it was not his will that they should grow to mature age except under the education of the church" (chap. 1, § 5). And a little later, "Though the power of God is not confined to external means yet he has confined us to the ordinary manner of teaching." Of exceptions to this rule in the case of infants, idiots and the mentally incompetent it is not necessary to speak here. Calvin was no more liberal at this point than the Romanists.

Thus the visible church as he conceived it rests upon the will of God and is to be recognized as a part of his ordinance. Its constitutive element is God's decree as truly as that of the invisible church, and we are saved only within it simply because God has willed that we shall be so saved. The vital connection between the gospel of the forgiving love of God and the salvation of the sinner, which made the visible church essential to Luther, was largely lost sight of by Calvin, and thus though he emphasized the visible church as strongly as Luther his interest in it was very different. In accordance with this difference of interest it was conceived by him in a much more external and formal way than by Luther. By the latter it was never sharply defined and its boundaries clearly drawn. Wherever the word and the sacraments might be there was the church. Calvin, too, made the word and the sacraments marks of the church, as has been seen, but he went beyond Luther in thinking of the church as an organized institution with definite laws and a fixed order of government. The ministry also he made much more of. Whereas, according to Luther, any Christian had the right to declare a repentant and believing brother's sins forgiven, and to comfort him with the assurance of the divine pardon, Calvin, with his greater zeal for order and his greater respect for authority, confined this office to the clergy. "In the communion of saints, therefore, sins are continually remitted to us by the ministry of the church, when the presbyters or bishops,

to whom this office is committed, confirm pious consciences by the promises of the gospel in the hope of pardon and remission. . . . Here are three things, therefore, worthy of our observation. First, that whatever holiness may distinguish the children of God, yet such is their condition as long as they inhabit a mortal body that they cannot stand before God without remission of sins. Secondly, that this benefit belongs to the church, so that we cannot enjoy it unless we continue in its communion. Thirdly, that it is dispensed to us through the ministers and pastors of the church, either by the preaching of the gospel or by the administration of the sacraments, and that this is the principal exercise of the power of the keys which the Lord has conferred on the society of believers. Let every one of us therefore consider it his duty not to seek remission of sins anywhere but where the Lord has placed it" (chap. 1, § 22).

It was not because of any necessity in the case that ministers were made the sole agents of forgiveness and hence of salvation, but only because of the will of God who had seen fit so to order the matter as a "yoke of modesty" to believers. Thus though not controlled by the sacerdotal interest, as the Catholics were, Calvin lodged in the ministry an authority scarcely less than that possessed by the clergy under the old system. Moreover he put the ordination of ministers into the hands of those already ordained and gave the latter the deciding voice in their appointment to office.

To the authority and functions of the ministry he gave a great deal of attention, discussing the matter at length in the third and following chapters of the fourth book of his *Institutes*. Thus, for instance, after quoting Ephesians 4, he says—"In these words Paul shows that the ministry of men which God employs in governing the church is the principal bond holding believers in one body. He also indicates that the church cannot be preserved unimpaired unless it be supported by those means which the Lord has been pleased to appoint for its preservation. . . . By means of his ministers, to whom he has committed this office and on whom he has bestowed grace to discharge it, he distributes and dispenses his gifts to the church. . . . For neither the light and heat of the sun nor meat and drink are so necessary to the nourishment and sustenance of the present life as the apostolic

and pastoral office to the preservation of the church in the world" (chap. 3, § 2).

It was no accident that Calvin laid so much greater emphasis than Luther upon ecclesiastical polity, and did so much more for the external framework of the church. His notion of the church as an institution whose significance lay ultimately only in the ordaining will of God made it necessary to bring it in all respects completely into accord with the indications of the word. There was no underlying principle, such as Luther recognized, in the nature and purpose of the church itself, which could be trusted to work out its own proper forms in accordance with the varying circumstances of time and place. Luther was willing to let the forms take care of themselves, but as Calvin thought of the Christian life simply as obedience to the divine will, it was essential that that will should be known and followed in all respects. The Scriptures therefore must be carefully studied and all the activities of the church as well as all the conduct of Christians must be modelled thereon. It is true that Calvin did not go as far as many of his followers. He left a considerable margin of liberty for individual and church in matters not pertaining to salvation (cf. chap. 10, § 30). But in spite of his insistence upon liberty in what he called non-essentials, his underlying principle was genuinely legal, and the rigidity of the puritanism of a later day was only the logical outcome of it. The life and polity and worship of the Calvinistic churches, whether they were more or less extreme in their application of the principle, always bore a very different character from those of the Lutheran churches. Of the freedom of the spirit there was little; the control of the letter was minute and far reaching.

Another point of difference between Luther and Calvin was in their respective ideas of the purpose of the church. According to the former its primary purpose is to proclaim the gospel of God's forgiving love in Christ; according to the latter to train the elect in holiness. The church has not yet reached the mark of holiness but it is daily improving and advancing toward perfection as God is continually sanctifying his elect who are within its fold (chap. 1, § 17). The idea that there rests upon the church a responsibility for the improvement of the world, or the betterment of society, or the promotion of the

kingdom of God in the earth, was altogether foreign to Calvin's thought. The end of the church, as he viewed it, was the advantage of its own members. They alone, or rather only the elect among them, enjoyed its benefits, and for their good alone it was established. Forgiveness of sins was to be had within the church and only there, and the same was true of regeneration and the spiritual nourishment of the new nature provided in the eucharist. The church therefore, according to Calvin, was a means of grace, not merely a communion of saints, but a means of grace solely to those within its pale and not to all of them, for the elect alone were truly blessed by its ministrations (chap. 1, § 5 seq.).

The church was a body set apart from the world, "the peculiar possession and portion of God" (chap. 1, § 3), and it was better to hold aloof and keep itself pure than to endanger its character by throwing itself into the world's work. The supreme duty of Christians was not to serve their fellows and establish the reign of the spirit of love in all the institutions and relationships of this earth, as Luther believed, but to walk humbly with God, to obey him in all things, and to keep themselves unspotted from the world.

Calvin did not advocate as extreme an asceticism as the Catholics believed in, but he stood for an otherworldliness in principle the same in spite of all differences in detail. "It should be the aim of believers," as he says, "in judging of this mortal life to understand it to be of itself nothing but misery, that more easily and freely they may wholly apply themselves to meditation on the future and eternal life" (book 3, chap. 9, § 4).

The attitude of Calvin in this respect became characteristic of the Calvinistic churches in general. The notion of the church as a community of holy people, pure both in doctrine and in conduct, because governed wholly by the will of God, increasingly overshadowed the idea of it as an agency for the proclamation of the gospel of God's forgiving love, and thus Luther's controlling idea was more and more lost sight of.

It was in accordance with Calvin's interest at this point that he laid much greater stress than Luther upon ecclesiastical discipline. The older Reformer realized perfectly that Christians were not all they should be, but his confidence in the power

of the gospel and in the transforming influence of faith was so great, and his devotion to the principle of Christian liberty so controlling, that the development of a system of ecclesiastical discipline was far from his thought. To Calvin on the other hand, with his notion of the Christian life as obedience to the law of God, with his deep-seated distrust of man, and with his theory of the church as a body set apart from the world and composed of those predestined to holiness, it is not surprising that ecclesiastical discipline was a matter of the greatest concern, all the more so because, belonging as he did to the second generation of Reformers, he saw clearly enough that the Reformation had not borne fruit in the holy communities which he thought true churches of Christ should be. He therefore instituted in Geneva a very rigorous system of moral discipline, and in his discussion of the church in the fourth book of his *Institutes* he devoted a couple of long chapters to the subject, maintaining that the exercise of strict discipline is one of the necessary marks of the true church. "As the saving doctrine of Christ is the soul of the church so discipline forms the ligaments which connect the members of the body together and keep each in its proper place" (chap. 12, § 1). In the exercise of its authority the church must admonish or visit with its censures all sorts of offenders, and must altogether exclude from its communion those guilty of flagrant sins, as well as the contumacious and rebellious. It is true that he recommends that severity be tempered with mercy and denounces the discipline of the Anabaptists as altogether too severe. "The same conduct [that is, the conduct of the Donatists] is pursued at the present day by the Anabaptists who, acknowledging no congregation to belong to Christ unless it be in all its parts conspicuous for angelic perfection, under the pretext of zeal destroy all edification" (chap. 12, § 12). The visible church in fact must contain both good and bad. Its character is not destroyed, nor is its sanctity annulled, by the presence of the latter, and so to leave it as the Anabaptists left it because of the presence of unworthy members was quite unjustifiable (chap. 1, § 19).

At the same time although Calvin, practical ecclesiastical statesman rather than visionary enthusiast as he was, recognized that the visible church is not and cannot be made a body

of perfect purity he still insisted on the exercise of very strict discipline, particularly in connection with the eucharist, and on the constant watchfulness of the authorities of the church over the lives of its members.

"There are three ends proposed by the church in these corrections, and in excommunication. The first is that those who lead scandalous and wicked lives may not, to the dishonor of God, be numbered among Christians, as if his holy church were a conspiracy of vicious and abandoned men. For as the church is the body of Christ it cannot be contaminated with such foul and putrid members without some ignominy being reflected upon the head. That nothing may exist in the church, therefore, from which disgrace may be thrown upon his venerable name, it is necessary to expel from his family those through whose turpitude infamy would redound to the Christian name" (chap. 12, § 5).

The exercise of discipline Calvin entrusted to the officers of the church. Here is revealed what appears in many other connections, his radical aversion to democracy. He did not trust the ordinary man even though a Christian. He was instinctively an aristocrat in religion as in civil affairs, and he felt that the church could be properly governed and its character preserved only as large authority was lodged in the hands of its ministers. Their disciplinary authority did not rest upon the fact that they were successors of the apostles and had received from them a deposit of saving grace which they might dispense or withhold—in other words it was not sacerdotal—but upon the fact that they were ministers of the word. Because called and commissioned by God to preach the word they were also charged with the responsibility of administering discipline in accordance therewith, but this change of principle in no way reduced clerical dignity and power. "Although the Lord alone ought to rule and reign in his church, and to have pre-eminence in it, and this government ought to be exercised and administered solely by his word, yet as he dwells not among us in visible presence, he uses the ministry of men that he may make his will clearly known to us" (chap. 3, § 1). "This command respecting the remission and retention of sins, and the promise made to Peter in regard to binding and loosing, ought to be wholly referred to

the ministry of the word, which our Lord committed to the apostles, at the same time investing them with this power of loosing and binding. . . . We hold that the power of the keys in these passages is simply the preaching of the gospel, and considered with regard to men is not so much power as ministry, for strictly speaking Christ gave it not to men but to his word of which he appointed them ministers" (chap. 11, § 1).

Calvin's influence in promoting liberty and democracy is often spoken of and counted to his credit. As a matter of fact, it was only a limited liberty that he was interested in, and to democracy he was unalterably opposed. He did much to break the authority of the pope in western Europe and so to prepare the way for the growth of a larger freedom in later days, but he was at best only indirectly responsible for a development which he would have been entirely out of sympathy with had he lived to witness it.

In his idea of the relation of church and state he also agreed with Luther in part but only in part. He recognized, as the older Reformer did, the separate functions of church and state and the sharp distinction between their spheres. "Whoever knows how to distinguish," he says, "between the body and the soul, between this present transitory life and the future eternal one, will find no difficulty in understanding that the spiritual kingdom of Christ and civil government are things very remote from each other" (chap. 20, § 1). Civil magistrates are vicegerents of God in their sphere as truly as ministers of the church are in theirs, but the spheres are entirely different. It may be remarked in passing that Calvin emphasized in the strongest possible fashion the divine right of civil government and of duly constituted governors and princes.

Though he drew a sharp distinction between church and state he followed Luther in laying upon the civil government the responsibility "to cherish and support the external worship of God, to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to defend the constitution of the church" and to suppress "idolatry, sacrilege, blasphemy and other offenses against religion" (chap. 20, § 2 seq.). In all this Luther and Calvin were at one, but there was nevertheless a radical difference between them, for while the former gave civil rulers the power of determining what true religion is,

according to the word of God, and laid upon them the responsibility of supporting the true and prohibiting the false thus determined, the latter, in agreement with the mediæval Catholic theory, made the state only the servant of the church in carrying out its behests. It lies with the church and particularly with the clergy as ministers of the word to discover what is God's will and truth, and the civil government is charged with the duty of acting accordingly. The power of the sword is not lodged in the church but only in the state, but it is to be exercised by the state for the support of true religion and for the overthrow of its enemies who are the enemies of God.

In Geneva Calvin's theocratic principles were put into striking practice, and the influence of his work there, Catholic as was the underlying theory upon which it was based, constituted western Europe's greatest bulwark against the encroachments of a re-awakened papacy and a regenerated Catholicism. He fought fire with fire, and if Puritanism and the puritan states that were the fruit of his teaching and example were not in essence Protestant they were at any rate Rome's most vigorous and successful foes, and western Europe and America owe to the great genius from whom they drew their inspiration an inestimable debt of gratitude.

Calvin's general theory of the church appears in greater or less detail in most of the important confessions of the early Reformed churches framed after his influence began to be felt. A few may be referred to merely by way of illustration. In the French confession of 1559, which deals with the church in articles 25 to 32, special emphasis is put upon the ministry and upon the importance of having the church governed according to the order established by Jesus Christ. In article 28 it is said: "We declare that properly speaking there can be no church where the word of God [that is, the Bible] is not received, where profession is not made of subjection to it and where the sacraments are not employed." Here the marks of the church are three, subjection to the Bible, that is, obedience to its precepts in doctrine, in conduct and in ecclesiastical polity, being added to the two generally recognized marks, the word and the sacraments.

In the first Scotch confession of 1560, which was framed by

John Knox, there is an article on the church in which the doctrine of the invisible church is clearly stated (article 16) and another (article 18) on the notes of the church which runs in part as follows—"Because that Satan from the beginning has labored to deck his pestilent synagogue with the title of the kirk of God and has inflamed the hearts of cruel murderers to persecute, trouble and molest the true kirk and members thereof . . . it is one thing most requisite that the true kirk be discerned from the filthy synagogue by clear and perfect notes, lest we, being deceived, receive and embrace to our own condemnation the one for the other." The notes are then given as "the true preaching of the word of God," "the right administration of the sacraments," and "ecclesiastical discipline uprightly ministered as God's word prescribes, whereby vice is repressed and virtue nourished." The third note is not identical with the one given in the French confession but both are alike true to the spirit and interest of Calvin.

In the Belgic confession of 1561 it is said, in article 39, "We believe that we ought diligently and circumspectly to discern from the word of God which is the true church, since all sects in the world assume to themselves the name of church. . . . The marks by which the true church is known are these: If there is the pure preaching of the gospel; if there is the pure administration of the sacraments as ordained by Christ; if church discipline is exercised for the correction of vice; in short, if all things are managed according to the pure word of God, all things contrary thereto rejected, and Jesus Christ recognized as the only head."

Here the three marks are the same as those given in the Scotch confession and the principle stated in the French confession of submission to the Bible in all things is added, showing clearly enough the identity of interest in all three confessions, and their complete oneness with Calvin from whom they all learned their doctrine of the church.

That doctrine, it may be said in conclusion, was not primitive, nor Catholic, nor Lutheran, but it contained features of all the older doctrines in a combination largely original with Calvin and after him characteristic of Reformed Protestantism for many generations. From the primitive period came the notion of

the church as a community of saints which must hold itself aloof from the world and be kept pure by the exercise of strict discipline, though here his ecclesiastical statesmanship and practical sense kept him from carrying his principles as far as many others did and so reducing the church to a mere puritanic conventicle. From Catholicism came sacramentalism and clericalism, held in check, however, on the one hand by his conception of Christian liberty, emasculated though it was, and on the other by the recognition of the supreme authority of the Bible, applied in this case with uncommon seriousness. From Luther came the notion of word and sacraments as marks of the true church, though Calvin's interpretation of both, and particularly of the former, was such as to displace Luther's gospel of freedom with a legalism as oppressive as that of the Catholics. Finally, with it all, there came from Augustine through Wyclif and Huss, the doctrine of the invisible church as the totality of the elect, a doctrine which Calvin succeeded in combining with his theory of the visible church better than had ever been done before, but which tended to make the church end instead of means, and to substitute the complacent enjoyment of one's own blessings for the sense of duty to one's fellows. Calvin's doctrine of the church was a composite of many diverse and inconsistent elements, and, because of this, confusion concerning the meaning, place and purpose of the church has since his day reigned almost everywhere in the reformed wing of Protestantism.

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XVIII

THE REPRESSION OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH

BY JOHN WINTHROP PLATNER

WHAT was the difference between pagan and Christian thought upon nature and the world-problem in antiquity? It was not that the one was wholly enlightened and the other wholly naïve, nor was it that the one indulged itself in scientific speculation while the other abstained from it. Naïve world-views were shared by pagan and Christian alike, and cosmological theorizing was never developed to ampler proportions than among certain Christians of the second century. What Greek philosophers, from Thales and Anaximander to the Stoics, had wrought out in world-theory was known to Christian scholars, some of whom, themselves trained in philosophy, had contributions of their own to make to the advancement of speculative thought on these subjects. Nor was it true that Christian differed from pagan by thinking teleologically. There was in ancient times little of the objectivity of view in which modern science glories, but rather constant effort to reach some principle of interpretation, which modern science profoundly distrusts. Socrates defined natural science (*περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*) as "the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed." * This definition indicates with perfect clearness the view of the matter in classic antiquity, a view which Christianity inherited and heartily shared.

The fundamental difference between pagan and Christian was this, that while Greek philosophic speculation and discovery

* Plato's *Phædo*, 96, ed. Burnet, I, Oxford, 1900. Jowett's translation, I, 445, Oxford, 1871.

were free, Christian thinking along similar lines was from comparatively early times increasingly bound. Limits were established beyond which it might not pass. Catholicism,—that potent, excluding, conserving, and unifying force, which for at least twelve centuries controlled the church,—created these limits, and by the exercise of ecclesiastical authority compelled Christian thought to move safely within them. The same influence which operated to unify organization, worship, and creed, operated also to suppress divergence of opinion concerning matters not properly connected with religion at all, or even,—as we have at last come to see,—with theology either.

At the outset one is struck with the general freedom of opinion on scientific subjects among Christians before and during the third century, as compared with its increasing rarity after that time. When the church emerged from its position of obscurity and oppression into the light of public favor and the pride of power, then cosmological speculation and all efforts after scientific truth became merely so many more or less ingenious attempts to set forth what the church held to be the teaching of Scripture on the subject. For among the standards of ancient Catholicism, it was especially the Scriptures which furnished a convenient and sufficient source from which orthodox knowledge respecting nature and the world might be drawn. It is unimportant to inquire whether the literal or the allegorical method of interpretation was the more to blame for the production of crude and erroneous scientific notions. The simple fact is that neither method as such, but rather the Catholic conception of scriptural authority, is chargeable with responsibility for the whole policy of censorship and repression of opinion. Every novel and over-bold inquiry was answered by an official disquisition upon what the book of Genesis, or Job, or Psalms, taught regarding the matter in hand, and woe to the theory which could not be made to square with these! It was presently branded as heretical, or erroneous, and its obstinate supporters found themselves excluded from the church. *The truth* in all such cases was held to be deducible,—or at any rate it was deduced,—from Scripture, which, in the famous words of Augustine, “gives no false information.”* It can hardly be an

* *De civ. dei*, xvi, 9.

accident that this appeal to Scripture is heard most clearly and most confidently at the time when the limits of the sacred canon had just been fixed by the unanimous consent of Christendom.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out that the ancient church, along with much that was absurd and silly, possessed also a considerable amount of scientific information quite as respectable in quality as that of the non-Christian world, and also to indicate the process whereby the pursuit of scientific studies came to be officially discouraged within the church,—indeed for about a thousand years officially suppressed,—only to be revived as soon as the inherent, coercive power of truth should overcome the fear of ecclesiastical penalties.

I

We need not pause over such natural history as that reflected in the Epistle of Barnabas. According to the unknown author of that interesting document, babies are “first kept alive by honey and then by milk”; the hyena changes its sex in regular alternation year by year; and other curious things are alleged to occur in the world of organic life.* Nor need we consider the zoölogical monstrosities of the apocalyptic literature, largely borrowed from Judaism, for they do not belong to the realm of experience. When for example Hermas tells us that near Rome he met a huge sea-monster, one hundred feet long, raising a cloud of dust as it approached along the road,—“its head was as it were of pottery,” and “from its mouth issued fiery locusts,”—we know that the gentle Hermas had clothed his nightmare in the garments of the current apocalyptic.† None of this is observational science or even the first steps towards it.

There are crudities of another sort which, while far enough removed from fact, do nevertheless rest upon a correct method, namely that of observation. The only trouble is that the observations are mistaken. Here belong Lactantius’s interesting assertion that the “secretions of the brain” escape through the nose, and that the wind-pipe is made of “soft bones.”‡ Owing

* *Ep. Barn.* 6, 10.

† Hermas: *The Shepherd*, Vis. iv, 1.

‡ Lactantius: *de opificio dei*, 10 f.

to the fragmentary condition of the text it is not easy to decide how much sound knowledge may have lain concealed in that curious mixture of fact and fancy, the *κεστοί* of Julius Africanus.* Rural affairs, medicine, charms, geography, travels, and military tactics all come in for treatment, and many foolish, not to say immoral superstitions find a place. It is clear enough however that the author had collected facts, as well as curiosities, under his quaint title of "Embroidered Girdles."

Astrology proved to be a prolific source of pseudo-scientific theorizing, especially among Christians of heretical tendencies. Everyone is acquainted with the grotesque frontispiece, found in many modern advertising almanacs, which depicts the human body parceled out among the signs of the zodiac. This astrological superstition is as old at least as the fifth century, "that monstrous division of the whole human body among the twelve signs of the zodiac," being included by Leo I among the errors with which "the filthy puddle of the Priscillianists" was then reeking.†

II

More creditable to the Christians was the open-mindedness of many of them respecting the ultimate problems to which scientific inquiry leads back. Whence came the world? What is the origin of things? The early Christians were not nearly so dogmatic on the subject of creation as some of their later brethren. Tertullian, for example, who could be positive enough when he chose, would not commit himself as to whether "this entire world-mass was self-existent and uncreated, as Pythagoras maintains, or brought into being by a Creator's hands, as Plato holds."‡ Origen believed the world to have been created at a definite point of time, but he held that other worlds existed before it, and others still would exist hereafter, since it would be both impious and absurd to suppose that the creating Deity should ever be idle.§ Origen had already begun the process of

* See Harnack: *Gesch. der altchristl. Litt.* I, 508 ff. The tractate *de re militari*, the longest surviving fragment of the *κεστοί*, is printed in *Veterum Mathematicorum Opera*, pp. 275-316 (Paris, 1693), and also in *Ioannis Meursii Operum Vol. VII*, columns 899-980 (Florence, 1746).

† *Epistle* 15¹.

‡ *Apologeticus* 11.

§ *De princip.* iii, 5².

demonstrating theories from Holy Scripture, but his position is very far from the dogmatic exactness of later ages.*

It is not uncommon to meet with a devout reticence on scientific subjects among the early Christians, many of them evidently preferring not to venture too far into the unknown. Thus Irenæus hesitates to commit himself on such an apparently harmless topic as the periodic overflow of the river Nile, a phenomenon which had attracted attention and aroused perplexity throughout the ancient world. "We may say a great deal, plausible or otherwise, on the subject," writes the Bishop of Lyons, "but what is true, sure, and incontrovertible regarding it belongs only to God."† Hippolytus knew of Anaxagoras's theory, that the annual flood was caused by melting snow, but the only use he makes of his knowledge is to include it in a lengthy catalogue of pagan philosophical teachings from which he alleges the heretics have drawn their errors.‡ Therefore all such views are to be held in suspicion. But we can forgive Hippolytus his uncertainty when so well-informed a pagan writer as Ammianus Marcellinus, contemplating "that most useful of all rivers," finds himself equally at a loss to account for the Nile's overflow, and rests content with a recital of what others have believed to be its cause.§

Hippolytus has also heard of the rash conjecture of Anaxagoras that the sun surpasses the Peloponnesus in size,|| but apparently not of the still more venturesome hypothesis of certain mathematicians, reported by Cicero, who maintained that the sun is "more than eighteen times larger than the earth."¶ He does not however feel called upon to render a decision on the subject.

III

The Fathers exhibit most clearly both their limitations and their approaches to sound knowledge, when they undertake to treat of the world and man. Among works of this class three

* Precision was reached by Archbishop Usher whose *Annales veteris et novi Testamenti* (1650-54) placed the date of the creation at 4004 B.C. This was surpassed by his younger contemporary, Dr. John Lightfoot, who determined the very day, namely the autumnal equinox (*Works*, London, 1822 ff. iv, 112).

† Irenæus: *Adv. hæc.* ii, 28.

‡ *Refutatio*, i, 7.

§ *Res gest.* xxii, 15.

|| *Refut.* i, 7.

¶ Cicero: *Academica*, i, 82.

may be singled out for especial mention, Lactantius' *De opificio dei* (to which title Jerone appends the words, *vel formatione hominis**), Basil of Cæsarea's *Hexaëmeron*, and its supplement by Gregory of Nyssa, entitled *On the Making of Man* (*περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*).

Lactantius inveighs against "the folly of Epicurus" and "the ravings of Lucretius," but this is in the interest of his argument from design, which he develops in considerable detail. Following more congenial classical models, he philosophizes about the human body, pointing out the beauty and utility of its several parts and their admirable coördination in the whole, which in turn is under subjection to the ruling intelligence or mind.† Crudeness and error are common, but not constant, in Lactantius' treatise. Where he goes most into detail, there we see most clearly that he has been at pains either to make observations or to read the recorded observations of others. He not only knows that the tongue, rather than the palate, is the chief organ of taste, but he has discovered which parts of the tongue are especially sensitive.‡ He has found out that air passages extend from the mouth to the lungs, as well as from the nose.§ With regard to certain organs, such as the liver and spleen, he confesses ignorance; only the great Designer knows their purpose. But he seems to anticipate a time when more will be known about these things.||

Especially interesting are Lactantius' excursions into psychology. Where the mind is situated and what its nature is he does not know, although he views with favor the theory that its chief seat is the brain, but he does not wholly scout the notion that it may be diffused throughout the entire body as Xenocrates the Platonist believed. Is not the divine mind similarly diffused throughout the universe?¶ On the subject of sense perception he approximates to modern theories, as one may see from his discussion of vision. Through the eyes "the mind sees those things which are without," for "the office of seeing ought to be in that which sees, not in that which is seen." In the brain

* *De viris illustr.* 80.

† *De opif. dei.* 6 ff.

‡ "The parts which are more tender on either side [of the tongue], draw in the flavor with the most delicate perception." (*De opif. dei.* 10.)

§ *Ibid.*, 11.

|| *Ibid.*, 14.

¶ *Ibid.*, 16.

"is contained the system of the sensation."* "Man himself" (i. e., the *Ding an sich*) "can neither be touched, nor looked upon, nor grasped, because he lies hidden within this body, which is seen."† As to the "soul," or life-principle in man, philosophers are not agreed what it is, and perhaps they never will be. Lactantius however thinks it worth while to raise the question whether mind and soul are not the same thing. Finding arguments on both sides, he wisely leaves the question open.‡

Gregory of Nyssa in his work *On the Making of Man* likewise displays a considerable acquaintance with the structure of the human body. Here he sets forth the *raison d'être* of brain, heart, liver, lungs, etc., and also describes the organs themselves, indicating their position and their several functions. There are of course many erroneous statements in the book. But the noticeable fact is that Gregory is aware that progress has been made in anatomy and physiology, he is familiar with the lessons of the dissecting room and with the writings of competent investigators, and he by no means makes light of these things. On the contrary, he freely utilizes the best knowledge at his command,—presenting his results in the light of the church's teaching, and giving to everything a teleological interpretation. He is finally brought face to face with the ultimate problem of the nature of matter, but this, he says, may be "left without remark" since it has no immediate bearing upon his "consideration of the parts."§ One could wish that Gregory had not been so easily turned aside from this great problem.

Larger themes than the mere structure of the body challenge the attention of Basil in his *Hexaëmeron*, but here again one feels an occasional sense of disappointment, when some highly promising line of inquiry is broken off by the simple confession of ignorance. One was justified, one feels, in expecting something better. But this was a very common expedient among Christian writers in the transition period of the fourth century. Basil appears actually to have weighed in his mind the comparative merits of the geocentric and heliocentric theories of the universe,—without of course appreciating the problem in anything like its full significance. An earlier Christian writer, Methodius,

* *Ibid.*, 8 and 10.

† *Ibid.*, 19.

‡ *Ibid.*, 17 f.

§ Greg. Nyssæ: *περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*, 30.

had allowed one of the characters in his *Symposium* to ridicule the accepted Ptolemaic view,* but we must not therefore hastily conclude that he held the true theory. Even Cosmas combatted Ptolemy,—but he did it in the interest of his extraordinary cosmography, as we shall presently see. Basil must have regarded the heliocentric theory as at least possible, but instead of pursuing the inquiry to its utmost limit, he again contents himself with the remark, “If there is anything in this system which might appear probable to you, keep your admiration for the source of such perfect order, for the wisdom of God.”†

IV

We have already noticed the sympathetic acquaintance of many early Christian writers with the scientific hypotheses of the ancient world. To be sure the Christians are sometimes ironical, sometimes even scornful in referring to these views,—but not always. Tertullian, the Carthaginian lawyer, speaks flippantly of an age long past when the earth is said to have been covered with water: “To this day marine conches and tritons’ horns sojourn as foreigners on the mountains, eager to prove to Plato that the heights have undulated.”‡ It was rather early for appeal to be taken to geology in computing the age of our planet. He is less scornful in his reference to the fabled Atlantis, described by Plato§ and familiar to every lover of the classics. Lying westward from the pillars of Hercules, in size exceeding Asia Minor and Libya combined, inhabited by a powerful people, dread foes of the foremost nation of Europe, this island had been swallowed up by the all-devouring sea not less than nine thousand years before the Athenian lawgiver, Solon, that is, in the tenth millennium before the Christian era, or six thousand years before Archbishop Ussher permitted the world to be created. Tertullian found Plato’s fable useful in rebutting the popular charge that all great calamities were due to the presence of Christians in the world. There had been calamities before. Accordingly he does not attempt to discredit the story, although his satirical tone suggests that it scarcely meets his approval.||

* *Symposium*, viii, 14. † *Hexaëmeron*, i, 10. ‡ Tertullian: *De pallio*, 2.

§ *Timæus*, 24 f., ed. Burnet, vol. iv, Oxford, 1905.

|| *Ad nationes*, i, 9, *Apologeticus*, 40, *De pallio*, 2.

That there were worlds beyond the ocean, apart from fables, was a very ancient and wide-spread belief, resting upon what foundations, however, it is not easy to determine. It is at least as old as Aristotle.* Adventurous Carthaginian navigators, blown before a storm, claimed to have visited such a land,† and nobody seriously doubted their claim. Western Christians seem early to have accepted the traditional belief in transoceanic lands, although they held the intervening sea to be impassable,‡ and were apparently not interested in Seneca's striking prediction that a time would come when the ocean gateway would be unbarred.§ Before the end of the second century a more hesitant tone is heard among the Christian writers, and a disposition to be non-committal manifests itself. Things which transcend our knowledge should be left with God, writes Irenæus, and in this he includes, among other things, "what lies beyond the ocean."|| But Irenæus is acquainted with the opinion that there are such lands. A half-century or so later Origen cites the passage from Clement of Rome, finding in it a hint at a plurality of worlds,—an idea quite foreign to Clement, but which Origen could use to advantage in his speculative system.¶ Anything like an intelligent use of the old suggestion disappears in the haze of the Alexandrian's allegorical fancy.

V

The most interesting form of the classical belief in far-off lands was that relating to the antipodes, the existence of which had been asserted by Anaximander ** and other Greek philoso-

* *Meteorologicorum lib.* ii, 5.

† Diodorus: *Bibliotheca historica*, v, 19 f. (ed. Vogel, Leipzig, 1890). For the best sketch of ancient opinion on this subject, see Alex. von Humboldt: *Examen critique de l'histoire de géographie du nouveau continent*, p. 14 ff. (Paris, 1814-'34).

‡ Clement of Rome: *Ep.* 20.

§ *Venient annis sæcula seris*
Quibus oceanus vincula rerum
Laxet et ingens pateat tellus.

Medea, ii, 375 ff. Further information about a western land is found in Plutarch; see especially *Moralia*, recog. Bernardakis, v. 459 ff. (Leipzig, 1893). Goodwin's translation, v, 281 ff. (Boston, 1878).

|| *Adv. hæ.* ii, 28^a.

¶ *De princip.* ii, 3^a.

** According to Hippolytus: *Refut.* i, 5.

phers.* Seneca makes playful allusion to Vergil's lines which imply the acceptance of this view:

"And when to us the dayspring doth appear,
And blushing morn shows Phœbus' steeds are near,
To them the ruddy eve with weaker light
Kindles the lightsome tapers of the night." †

"Your friends," writes Cicero, "allege that directly opposite to us on the farther side of the earth are people who stand with feet over against our feet, and these you call *antipodes*." ‡ This theory is openly ridiculed by Christian writers from about 300 A. D. onward. Lactantius has a short and easy method with such "marvellous fancies," and he triumphantly flings down his challenge, "Is there anyone so senseless as to believe that there are men whose footsteps are higher than their heads? . . . that the crops and trees grow downwards? that the rains and snow and hail fall upwards to the earth?" § About twelve hundred years later another good churchman, a Spanish missionary in Peru, gently corrected his derisive predecessors, on the ground of personal knowledge of the antipodes. He had actually been there.||

Lactantius attributes the fictitious belief in antipodes to an-

* Lactantius: *Div. instit.* iii, 24.

† *Epist. moral.* xx, 5 (122), *init.* (ed. C. R. Fickert, Leips. 1842). The quotation is from Vergil's *Georg.* i, 250 f.

*Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens adflavit anhelis,
Illis sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.*

‡ *Vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terræ, qui aduersis uestigiis stent contra nostra uestigia, quos antipodas uocatis. Academicorum priorum*, ii, 123, ed. J. S. Reid (London, 1885). See his *Eng. transl.*, p. 80 f. (London, 1880), and cf. *Tusculan Disputations*, v, 24.

§ *Div. instit.* iii, 24.

|| "Lactantius Firmian and S. Augustine mocke at such as hold there be any Antipodes, which is as much to say, as men marching with their feete opposite to ours. . . . But whatsoever he [Lactantius] saith, wee that live now at Peru, and inhabite that part of the world which is opposite to Asia and their Antipodes (as the Cosmographers do teach us) finde not our selves to bee hanging in the aire, our heades downward, and our feete on high." José de Acosta: *Natural and Moral History of the Indies*, reprinted (for the Hakluyt Society) from the English translation of Edward Grimeston, 1604. I. *Natural History*, chap. 7 (London, 1880). Andrew D. White quotes part of this passage from Acosta in his *Warfare of Science with Theology*, i, 110, note.

other fiction, namely "that the world is round like a ball," * which likewise was an hypothesis widely current in antiquity.† Theophilus of Antioch, a contemporary of Irenæus, is acquainted with this view, although he does not accept it any more than he does the apparently equally reasonable hypothesis that the earth is cubical.‡ The idea of sphericity is opposed a little later by Eusebius of Cæsarea,§ and is passed over as useless by Basil the Great; since Moses is silent respecting the shape of the earth, shape must be unimportant; why then concern ourselves about it?||

Augustine applies the principle of ecclesiastical authority to the solution of the problem of the antipodes and all that goes with it. Their existence is not only incredible,—a fable produced by mere conjecture,—but it is also contradicted by plain inferences from Scripture, which tells us the truth and nothing but the truth.¶ Here we are brought face to face with a new situation within the church. Lactantius, be it observed, rejects the theories of the philosophers, when he does reject them, on

* *Loc. cit.*

† So Plato: "The earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens," (*Phædo*, 108). Similarly Aristotle: "The earth also has necessarily a spherical figure. . . . Hence too those who apprehend that the place about the Pillars of Hercules connects that which is about India, and thus that there is one sea, do not appear to think very absurdly." (*σχῆμα δ' ἔχειν σφαιροειδὲς ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν* . . . διὸ τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας συνάπτει τὸν περὶ τὰς Ἡρακλείους στήλας τόπον τῷ περὶ τὴν Ἰνδικήν, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἶναι τὴν θάλατταν μίαν, μὴ λίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀπίστα δοκεῖν). *De cælo*, ii, 14 (*Aristotelis opera omnia*, ii, Paris, 1850). Aristotle proceeds to say that the earth's circumference has been computed at only about 400,000 stadia, which makes it altogether likely that it is small in comparison with other stars. The geographer Strabo thus reports the views of Eratosthenes, which he in part accepts: "The temperate zone, which we have already designated as the longest zone, is that which the mathematicians denominate a continuous circle returning upon itself, (*κύκλον συμβάλλουσαν αὐτὴν ἐαυτῇ*). So that, if the extent of the Atlantic ocean were not an obstacle, we might easily pass by sea from Iberia to India, still keeping in the same parallel. . . ." (*Strabonis Geographica*, i, 4, ed. Meineke, Leipzig, 1866, i, 85.)

Cicero has a notable passage on the shape and the revolution of the earth in connection with what he writes of the antipodes: *Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, cælum solem lunam stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque præter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quæ cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quæ si stante terra cælum moveretur.*" (*Academica*, ii, 123.)

‡ *Ad Autolyc.* ii, 32.

|| Basil: *Hexæmeron*, ix, 1.

§ *Præp. evang.* xv, 56 ff.

¶ *De civ. dei*, xvi, 9.

the ground of their irrationality, not by appealing to an external ecclesiastical standard. But the dilemma, rational or irrational, no longer suffices for Augustine.* The century which had intervened was the precise period when Catholic authority was being worked out into a practical principle. And Augustine defines its scope more clearly than any of his predecessors or contemporaries, †—once even going so far as to affirm that he would not believe the Gospel itself, except for the authority of the church.‡

VI

The fully developed application of ecclesiastical authority to the domain of knowledge is found in a work of the sixth century, the *Christian Topography* of Cosmas, surnamed Indicopleustes. The author was a learned Egyptian merchant, traveller, and monk, who had seen much of the ancient world, and recorded his information (and misinformation) in this important treatise, with the special aim of combatting the theory that the earth is a sphere. The book is conclusive evidence that there were still not a few Christians who held that theory, notwithstanding the opposition which had been exerted by influential churchmen for more than two hundred years.§

According to Cosmas the "world," that is the universe, is an oblong structure, shaped like an old-fashioned Saratoga trunk with a rounded top, || or (to use his own metaphor), "a house, as one might call it, of enormous size, like an oblong vaulted vapor-bath." ¶ Our earth is a flat parallelogram, forming the

* So Acosta rightly understands him: "The reason which moved S. Augustine to deny the Antipodes was other than that formerly alleadged, being of a higher judgement. . . . Doubtlesse he drew the motive and cause from the bowels of divinitie, whereby the holie Writ doth teach us that all mankinde doth come from the first man Adam; and to say that men could passe to that new world, crossing the great Ocean, were uncredible, and a meere lye." (De Acosta: *Nat. Hist. of the Indies*, i, 8.)

† Except perhaps his younger contemporary, Vincent of Lerinum.

‡ *Ego vero evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas.* (*Contra ep. Manich.* 6.)

§ Κοσμά ἀγινκτου μοναχου χριστιανικη τοπογραφια. *The Christian Topography of Cosmas, an Egyptian Monk.* Translated from the Greek by J. W. McCrindle. (London, Hakluyt Society, 1897.)

|| See Plate I, fig. 7, at the back of McCrindle's translation.

¶ *Christian Topography*, ii, 129.

lower part of the "house." Its outer sides, beyond the surrounding ocean, are bounded by high walls, and overhead, separated from the earth by the "firmament," is the cylindrical vault of heaven, which thus forms an upper story of the "house." * In view of this theory it is of course impossible that the earth should be a sphere,—indeed it is "quite inconsistent with the nature of things." As for the antipodes, they are "old wives' fables," and the mere mention of them is prohibited by the plain teachings of Scripture.†

One notes an unconscious mingling of reason and authority in Cosmas' book. The earth, he tells us, belongs at the bottom of the whole structure because it is heavier than anything else and would naturally sink. ‡ Heaven, on the other hand, is a vaulted arch, in accordance with Old Testament prophecy.§ Yet it is certain that Cosmas meant to rely ultimately upon the authority of Scripture in establishing his views. "We have advanced the foregoing conclusions," he writes, "as expressive of the true Christian theory, having been moved to accept them by divine Scripture, for they are not inventions or conjectures of our own, but we have strictly followed what God has spoken to us through the prophets and the Apostles and his own Son."|| It is simple truth to say that Cosmas was honest in believing the whole of his absurd system to be in harmony with Scripture, and to be its sure exposition. If what the Bible was supposed to teach about the world was rational, well and good. If not, its authority was still paramount. What was man that he should presumptuously dispute the church? With William of Occam, Cosmas might have said that even if ecclesiastical doctrine were much more irrational than any of it is, it must still remain obligatory upon all Catholics, because it rests upon the indubitable authority of the church.¶ What the Indian navigator shows

* See the summary given in Book iv.

† *Op. cit.* i, 117, 121, ii, 157.

‡ *Op. cit.*, ii, 128. He also gives other reasons. Reason apparently led Acosta to a different conclusion, and it is difficult to doubt that he had Cosmas in mind when he wrote of the "gross error" of supposing that the universe is like a house, having the earth for its foundation and heaven for a covering. (*Natural History of the Indies*, i, 7.)

§ *Ibid.*, ii, 129, referring to Is. 40th (Sept.). || *Ibid.*, ii, 158 (end).

¶ Loofs: *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, p. 609. (4th ed. 1906.)

us is not so much the extent of his ignorance,—he is really a very learned man,—but rather the power over men's minds already exercised by mediæval Catholicism.

VII

The attitude of the church towards natural science from the sixth century onward was much simpler than before. There was no longer a wide margin of doubt as to what and how Christians should believe. Cosmography, like doctrinal theology proper, became fixed and stereotyped, and there was an orthodoxy of nature as truly as of God. The truth was settled for the people by the doctors, and the rank and file needed not to concern themselves with endeavoring to know what it was; the church knew, and that sufficed. The principle of "implicit faith" was capable of application to every department of inquiry, and momentous consequences followed Gregory the Great's famous interpretation of the oxen and the asses* in Job 1⁴. Under the skillful treatment of Hugo of St. Victor, Peter the Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas † this principle was so thoroughly established that it is hardly too much to say it directly discouraged the advancement of learning. What was true of sacred knowledge was still more true of what lay outside the theological domain. Ecclesiasticism had for the time being set its premium upon ignorance, and in two ways: first, by erecting as a standard of scientific truth a book, whose sole function should have been to teach religion; and, secondly, by the systematic discouragement of independent inquiry. There were survivals here and there of the older Christian freedom, as for instance in the writings of John Scotus Erigena and Roger Bacon, but these were suffered to pass unchallenged rather through over-

* *Quid aliud in figura per boves quam bene operantes? Quid aliud per asinas quam quosdam simpliciter viventes accipimus?* (cited by Hoffmann: *Lehre von der Fides Implicita*, p. 40 f. Leipz. 1903.)

† *Unde in Job: boves arabant et asinæ pascebant juxta eos. Isti erant asinæ pascentes juxta boves. Sicut hodie in ecclesia multi simplices, etsi ita distincte nesciant trinitatem assignare, credunt tamen, quia in fide et humilitate adherent illis, qui et hoc sciunt et credunt.* (Hugo of St. Victor, cited by Hoffmann, p. 50.) The principle is set forth with admirable lucidity by Thomas Aquinas, in his *Questiones disputatæ*, xiv, 11.

sight than through approval.* The policy of the church was fixed.

But while mediæval Catholicism must bear the responsibility for having inaugurated and long maintained an obscurantist policy with reference to scientific studies, there is something to be said on the other side. Those who are loudest in denunciation of her stupid bigotry in adhering to an impossible world-view and defending it by the illegitimate weapons of ecclesiastical authority and false exegesis,—who remember the condemnation of the heliocentric theory in astronomy and the trial of Galileo before the Inquisition,—often forget that the great astronomer, Copernicus, was a loyal son of the church, himself in holy orders, and that his epoch-making book, *De revolutionibus orbium cælestium*, was dedicated to Pope Paul III.† After all is said, one should remember that it was in this same intolerant church that the learning of antiquity as well as of the middle ages was preserved, and at her bosom were nourished children who should in time break down false barriers and once more make both religion and science free.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., July 30, 1910.

* Erigena's extraordinary treatise, *De divisione naturæ*, enjoyed a limited circulation for nearly four centuries before a pope discovered that it "teemed with the worms of heretical depravity." (Bull of Honorius III, *Inimicus homo*, Jan. 23, 1225.)

† For the condemnation of Copernicus' views see the decree of the Congregation of the Index, in 1616, in Mirbt's *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums*, p. 280. (2d ed. 1901.)

XIX

THE CHRISTIAN DEMAND FOR UNITY: ITS NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS

BY WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

ONE of the effects of the recent movement of thought known as Pragmatism has been to raise anew the question as to the nature and the extent of the religious interest in unity. Various motives have combined to render this question a vital one for religion. The curiosity of the mind as to the nature of ultimate reality is re-enforced in the case of religious men by their desire for the supremacy of the good, and the more intensely they realize the gap which separates the world of actual experience from the world of the divine ideal, the more acute must be their longing for some assurance that the gulf is not an impassable one, but that in some way and at some time God will make his control manifest and bring about the complete supremacy of the right. So it has come to pass that in every age, the Theodicy, or the question of God's relation to evil, has held a central place in Christian theology.

In the older theology, the affirmation of God's complete control was consistent with a clear recognition of the facts of experience which seem inconsistent with a monistic view of the universe. The fact of sin, with its tragic challenge and its appalling consequences, meets us on every page. Theologians of all schools, Roman and Protestant, Arminians as Calvinists, feel that in dealing with so far-reaching a phenomenon no half-way measures will do. Whatever unity religious faith may ultimately build up in a world which seems so hopelessly divided, it must take its departure from the actual dualism of experience. So Catholicism makes its great contrast between the Church and the world; Calvinism between the elect and the non-elect;

Arminianism between the right and the wrong choice. Each deals with an absolute antithesis—a contrast, the significance and reach of which it is impossible to exaggerate. For each the world of experience is divided into two rival realms; nature and the supernatural; the secular and the religious; the world of law and the world of grace; the dominion of sin and the sphere of salvation; the city of Satan and the city of God.

We are not concerned here with the various methods by which the older theology tried to overcome this antithesis. In the case of the official Roman theology this was done by a complex machinery through which the Church, the divinely appointed representative of God on earth, made its authority progressively effective in the territory of its rival, and subdued his subjects to its allegiance. In Arminianism it was secured through a self-limitation of God, manifested in the gift of freedom,—a self-limitation, such that the apparent failure which was its result was not to be regarded as a defeat of God, but only as the means which he had voluntarily chosen to secure a larger good, namely the union of free beings with himself by their own voluntary choice. In Calvinism, most daring but also most consistent of the older systems, the dualism was carried back into the nature of God himself, and the double outcome of the universe explained through a divine decree which required such a divided issue—the salvation of the elect for “the praise of his glorious grace” but no less the condemnation of the reprobate for “the praise of his glorious justice.” What interests us here is the fact that in each case the contrast which suggests the problem remains unmodified. The unity which is finally obtained is consistent with a full recognition—and what is more important—with an adequate emotional valuation, of the actual dualism of experience.

With the rise of modern science we find the introduction of a new factor. Here the intellectual motive, which underlies philosophy, and the practical motive, which inspires religion, are re-enforced by a third, which partakes of the nature of both. Science shares the theoretical interest of philosophy, in that it is in search of principles or rules of thought—laws, as we somewhat inaccurately call them—but it shares also the practical interest of religion, in that the problems which it seeks to solve are set for it by a definite set of human experiences, and their solution will

lead, if successful, to the possession of practical powers of great importance to human welfare and happiness. Philosophy had dreamed of unity; religion had prophesied it. Science has set itself the task of achieving it. This it does by taking the recalcitrant facts which elude generalization, and putting them in their places as parts of a consistent and orderly whole; and—what is even more important—by showing us how, when so related and ordered, they lend themselves to a practical use, or at least control, possible in no other way. An age of science, such as ours is, must, by the very nature of the case, be pre-eminently an age of unity.

The great idealistic systems of the nineteenth century are the emotional counterpart of the modern scientific movement. In part they anticipate its results, in part they accompany and interpret it. In the writings of Hegel and his successors, the unity of which science is in search is pictured as already attained, and the entire process of the universe is represented as the unfolding of the logic of the immanent idea. God, or the Absolute, is the one all-comprehending reality, and finite experience, in all its phases, is but the objectivication of his infinite thought. Apparent contradictions find their reconciliation in the higher synthesis of his all embracing intuition. What seems to us evil appears from the divine point of view but as good in the making. Death is the gateway to life, ignorance to knowledge, sin to salvation. Thus, by the magic of the formula, the wizard Thought unlocks mysteries hitherto deemed insoluble, and, for the first time, in the world of absolute idealism, presents us with a universe in which unity is not simply an ideal, but an attainment.

The effect of this transformation is nowhere more apparent than in the sphere of religion. Here the contradictions of life had been most acutely felt, and here, therefore, their resolution produced results most revolutionary. The absolute contrasts of the old religion are now reduced to relatives. Nature and the supernatural are not two kinds of reality, but two aspects of one and the same experience. Sin is not an appalling catastrophe; it is an element in every normal ethical experience. Atonement is not the great exception; it is the universal law. Christianity is not the only religion of salvation for a world otherwise hopelessly sunk in ignorance and corruption; it is the culmina-

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tion of a series of ascending steps through which, age by age, God has been progressively training mankind for himself. Incarnation is the necessary expression in fact of the logic of the immanent idea; and if we had no record of Jesus' life and teachings in the Gospel, we could still have predicted his appearance as infallibly as the astronomer can detect the presence of some unseen planet or anticipate the reappearance of a vanished comet.

The great theological systems of the latter half of the last century, were written by men who were under the spell of these daring generalizations. Dörner, Martensen, Biedermann, Pfleiderer and Frank, to mention only a few out of many, take up the task where Hegel had laid it down, and try, each in his own way and by his own methods, to make of Christian theology a speculative philosophy which shall fit all the facts of human experience into place as parts of a consistent and all-embracing world view. In England Greene and the Cairds have carried on the same philosophic tradition, and the liberal theology of the last generation has made its positions familiar to English and American students.

For some time past, however, the tide of absolute idealism has been ebbing. Its claim to give a satisfying world view has been rudely challenged, in Germany by Ritschl and his school, and more recently in this country by our own pragmatists. The unity of the Hegelian philosophy, they tell us, has no existence in reality. It is a figment of the mind, a pleasing picture painted by men of artistic temperament to blind their eyes to the ugliness of life and to protect their sensitive feelings from the shock of its discords. Life, as we know it, is not order, but, in part, at least, chaos; not harmony, but strife; not certainty, but chance; not unity, but multiplicity. For the all-embracing reality of the older idealism we are offered our choice between dualism and pluralism, with the odds in favor of the latter.

It must be admitted that the challenge has been a salutary one. It has been a good thing for theology to be recalled from its dreamland to the actual facts of life. It is well that we should be reminded that for our present experience, at least, unity is an ideal and not an attainment; that the world in which we live is full of tragic possibilities of failure and shipwreck; that evil is a real and present fact; that the possession of freedom involves the

power of wrong choice, and that the wages of sin is death. The practical test to which the pragmatists would subject all thought is one to be welcomed by the disciples of him who said: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." But where the ideal of unity itself is challenged, and we are bidden to face with an even mind the possibility of a universe permanently divided against itself, it is a question whether the reaction has not gone too far. Unity may be simply an ideal, and yet an ideal which is necessary for the highest practical efficiency. At all events, in view of the place which it has held in the past, this is a possibility not lightly to be dismissed.

The present paper is offered as a contribution to this discussion. I propose to consider the religious interest in unity, as it is illustrated by that one of the great religions with which we stand in closest relations—I mean the Christian. We shall inquire what are the motives which lead the Christian to desire a unified world view; and shall consider in some detail what this desire involves, how far it extends, and what is its relation to other motives which lead men to seek unity in other fields.

But here a preliminary definition is necessary. Christianity is a very comprehensive and indefinite term. It has been associated at different periods of history with widely different conceptions of religion, and almost every one of the possible philosophical positions has been defended by men who have called themselves Christian. If our discussion is to be fruitful, we must begin by explaining in what sense we ourselves use the word.

By Christianity, for the purpose of the present inquiry, we shall understand not merely the religion which Jesus founded, but that for which he is normative. Many forms of historic Christianity have departed so widely from the ideals of the Master that they can in no sense be regarded as the legitimate development of his teaching. With these we are not concerned here. The Christianity with which we have alone to do is the religion which makes Jesus central in fact as well as in name; or in other words, which is the expression of the principles and convictions by which he lived and for which he died.*

* This does not mean, of course, that Christianity must be simply the reproduction of the teachings of Jesus, but that it must be consistent with them. It must not contradict them.

Among these are the following:

(1) The conviction that God is our Father, and that we are his children and so brothers of one another.

(2) That Jesus has given us in his own person the supreme revelation, both of the character of God and of the ideal for man.

(3) That the Kingdom of God, or the society of men living in conscious sonship and brotherhood, is at once the final purpose of God and the supreme end for man, so that the individual fulfils his own true end only as he makes this wider social purpose his own.

(4) That salvation is not a matter of reward or of merit, but of one's attitude toward God and indirectly toward man, that it begins with trust, has its characteristic mark in freedom, and its fruit and test in brotherly love and service.

(5) That this state of trust, freedom and love, is possible here and now, and that it was Jesus' life purpose not only to show men its nature, but to make them sharers in its experience; yet that none the less the complete realization of the Christian ideal belongs to the future, since it involves a social transformation not yet completely attained.

(6) That the certainty of this ultimate realization is guaranteed by faith in the fatherly purpose of God, who is not only the saviour of individuals, but the ruler of the world, and hence able to bring his purpose to a successful issue in the world.

No doubt historic Christianity contains much more than this, and many Christians to-day would feel that such a statement omitted much that they regarded as important in their faith; but so much as this, at least, most men would admit, belongs to Christianity. To be a Christian means to believe in the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, the leadership of Jesus, the ethical and spiritual nature of salvation, and the Kingdom of God as the final goal and the certain outcome of history.

Taking this, then, as a working definition of Christianity, sufficiently accurate for our present purpose, we proceed to raise the question as to what follows for the Christian view of the world. What is the Christian attitude to this wide-spread human demand for unity? How far does Christianity make it its own? How far is it indifferent thereto? What special contribution has it to make to the problem of unity, and what is its relation to the

historic solutions which have been proposed by others? In other words, we have to do with the Christian demand for unity, its nature and its implications.

I say, its nature and its implications. The distinction is an important one. We may agree that the Christian interest demands unity, without accepting all the conclusions which have been drawn from this premise. Indeed, we shall find that a clear definition of the nature of the Christian demand is the first condition of a right determination of the extent and limits of the resulting conclusions.

I remark, then, in the first place, that the Christian demand for unity is a practical demand. By a practical demand, I mean a demand growing out of the active side of man's nature as distinct from that which is merely theoretical or speculative. The motive which leads the Christian to seek unity in the philosophic sense of the term is not the same which leads the philosopher or the scientific man to seek it, though we shall see later that there is a point at which the Christian interest touches the philosophic and the scientific interests, and can make them its own. It is a practical problem which leads the Christian to raise the ultimate theoretical questions, namely, the problem how to realize the ideal of Jesus in his own life, and to fulfil the purpose of Jesus in society at large. No sooner does he make the attempt to translate his faith into practice, than he is brought face to face with obstacles, which seem insuperable, and it is in the desire to overcome these obstacles that the specifically Christian demand for a consistent and harmonious *Weltanschauung* first makes itself felt.

The experience is so familiar a one that it needs no lengthy description. We live, every one of us, in a physical and a social environment, in which we touch and are touched by forces and influences which we must be able to control, if we are to realize our ideal, either for ourselves, or for others. These forces and influences are the same with which science and philosophy deal, and, whether we will or no, we are obliged to take account of them. Ritschl has well said that in religion we have to do not simply with God and the soul, but with God, the soul and the world. Even in those ascetic and other-worldly forms of religion, like Buddhism or thorough-going mysticism, which realize

their ideal through the negation of the world, it is still the world to be denied which determines the nature of the problem and the character of its solution. But, in Christianity, which is not primarily an other-worldly or a mystic, but a social and ethical religion, this contact is much more intimate. The Christian is conscious of being a fellow-laborer with Christ in his great work of establishing his Kingdom in the world, and, that he may be able to do this, he must be sure that the power upon which he relies for help in his own spiritual life is so far, at least, master of the world and of other men that no hindrance can come from them which will prevent the realization of his purpose. How much this involves in detail we shall consider presently. Here it is sufficient for us to note the fact of the demand and its nature.

I note, in the second place, that the Christian demand is an ethical demand; that is, one which is determined by the character of the divine purpose to establish the Kingdom. The unity which the Christian seeks in his world is such a unity as this involves. As such, the Christian view of the world is contrasted with all forms of monism which seek unity in the region of the abstract and the sub-ethical, or, in other words, with pantheistic monism, whether in its religious or in its philosophical form. It is Ritschl's great service that he has brought out this contrast so clearly. Indeed, so vehement have been his attacks upon philosophy, falsely so-called, that the speculative interest in his own theology has been unduly obscured. It is a great mistake to classify Ritschl, as is prevailingly the custom, with the philosophical dualists. Ritschl feels the impulse to unity as strongly as any monist, only it is in the specifically Christian way, a way which finds its gratification in an ethical rather than in a physical or a pantheistic monism. Ethical monism, by the very necessity of the case, makes place for a relative dualism or better pluralism, a pluralism in which many individuals, capable of divided interests and purposes, are bound together by their common relation to one controlling ethical personality and their common acceptance of his purposes. It is such a unity as this that Christianity demands.

And this leads me to remark, in the third place, that the Christian demand for unity is a religious demand, that is, it is a demand which springs out of the nature of the Christian conception of

God. The Father whom Jesus trusted was not simply a God of righteous and loving purpose, but one who was able to realize that purpose. The Christian God is not indeed a God of mere power, but none the less he is a God of power. If not necessarily strictly omnipotent, in the abstract sense of the word, he is yet strong enough to overcome all obstacles which may impede the accomplishment of his purpose. Certainly faith in such a God was an essential element in the religious consciousness of Jesus, and the motive which held him true when the supreme test of his life came. If, then, by essential Christianity be meant the principles and convictions which were controlling in Jesus' own life, we must admit, among such necessary principles, faith in a God of power adequate to complete ethical control.

If it be asked whether a man may not be a Christian who has lost this faith, one who believes in a good but limited, or even impotent, God, one who is content to follow the right even if it leads to ultimate defeat and destruction, not only for himself, but for society and the world at large, the answer is that certainly such a man is more Christian than one who believes in a God of power without right. He is one who is on the way to Christian faith, one with whom Christians can sympathize and work, but not a typical and normal Christian in the sense at present under discussion, a Christian, that is to say, who reproduces in his own experience those elements which were controlling in the religious experience of Jesus. Christianity, so defined, involves faith, not simply that God is Christlike, but that the Christlike God is supreme. Indeed, it may be said that the element of supremacy is always present in the idea of God, and it is a fair question how long religious faith could endure, if the believer's confidence in the power of his God to control were to be undermined.

So much for the nature of the Christian demand for unity. But the recognition of such a demand leaves the question of its extent and limits still undetermined. Here there is more room for difference of opinion, and to this second and more difficult phase of our question we now turn.

There are two spheres in which the Christian demand for unity needs to be tested, the realm of the sub-personal and non-moral, which we call the physical universe, or nature; and the sphere of

spiritual relationships where personality has its home. We shall consider each in turn.

With reference to the physical universe, it is sufficient to say that the Christian demand for unity extends so far, and so far only, as is necessary to secure the supremacy of the Christian principle in the second or spiritual sphere. The question under debate is as to how much this involves. Does it involve the recognition of a common principle in both realms? Must the Christian God be also the complete master of nature, either in the sense of having created and now preserving and ordering it, as in the older realistic philosophy, or as its immanent ground, as in modern monism? This is in part a speculative question, to be answered according to our general view of the relation of the two realms and the character and extent of their connection, as manifest in experience. We are here concerned with the general principles which determine the Christian attitude to all such questions.

In the first place, then, the control of God over nature is required by the Christian principle, so far as the functions of the human spirit may be shown to be dependent upon physical causes. If God is Lord of the spirit, and the Christian life is the life of free sons with their Father, then, so far as the spirit is influenced or affected by physical conditions, God as the supreme Spirit must be able to control these.

In the second place, the control of God over nature is required by the Christian principle, so far as the realization of the ideal human society may be shown to be dependent upon physical (e. g., sanitary, economic, etc.) conditions. So far as environment shall be found to influence and determine the nature of the Christian society, so far God must be shown to be master of the environment. This connection is actually made in the Christian estimate of pain. Pain is the form in which the effects of the physical environment upon the spirit of man make themselves felt most adversely. Christianity makes room for pain in its view of God's Providence. The Christian God may not, indeed, send trouble in the sense of arbitrary suffering for its own sake, but he is one who uses and controls trouble. Through suffering—physical and moral—he is continually teaching spiritual lessons of the highest importance, and so making it the

instrument of the advancement of his Kingdom. As to the exact way in which we are to think of God as exercising this control, there is room for difference of opinion. The older theologians conceived of God as exercising his sovereignty in a more or less external way, and relied for their proof of his presence in nature upon special acts of creation, or of providence, or of miracle. We to-day emphasize the orderliness and consistency of God's dealings, and interpret the laws which science formulates as the normal method of God's self-manifestation. The change is due partly to a better philosophy and partly to an enlarged experience. The result of both changes has been a new conception of the supernatural, or in other words, of the way we conceive spirit as manifesting itself through nature. Instead of identifying the supernatural with the exceptional, we interpret it as the worthful and meaningful, and gain our assurance of God's presence in nature from the purposes it serves, rather than from the power which it manifests. This change is of the highest importance philosophically, yet of itself it does not touch the essence of Christian faith. That which is essential for Christianity is that the Christ-like God shall control, and this is a conviction which men have held and do hold, whose views of the supernatural are very crude and imperfect. To us to-day, trained in modern science and philosophy, the conception of God's immanence is probably more natural and helpful than the older conception of his transcendence. But here again, that which is essential is that the Christian God shall control, not the way in which we conceive his control to be exercised. It is not even necessary from the Christian point of view to believe that God is the author of nature, provided we are sure that, now that nature is here, God is in complete control. It may indeed be difficult for most of us to see how it is possible to affirm complete control without at the same time believing in creation, but if any one finds this position philosophically satisfactory, he is at liberty to hold it, without sacrificing anything which is vital to Christian faith.

So far we have spoken of the indirect interest of the Christian in the assurance of God's control over nature. There is, however, one point at which the Christian demand for unity passes beyond this indirect interest and leads directly to the affirma-

tion of God's presence in nature. This is in connection with the phenomena which we call beautiful. In itself, of course, the discovery of beauty in nature is not a specifically Christian experience, but the interpretation of beauty, when discovered, as the handiwork of God, is the natural consequence of the Christian principle. It is a part, and a necessary part, of that process, by which all the phases of human experience are brought into harmony with the Christian principle and interpreted in the light of the divine purpose. Nothing that is good and true can be alien to the God whom Jesus reveals. But if this be true, beauty must have its place as a revelation of the divine nature. We have the highest authority for this attitude. Jesus himself sets us the example in those wonderful passages in the Sermon on the Mount, in which he carries back the painting of the lilies to his Father's love and care. In this religious interpretation of nature he shows his kinship with the poets and the artists of every age, who have made beauty their god. But he goes beyond them in emphasizing the moral significance of beauty as simply one aspect of that supreme harmony which dominates all life, and which is some day to find complete expression in the Kingdom of God.

But with this reference to the artists and the poets we have already passed from the first stage of our inquiry to the second, from the realm of nature to that of personality. What, we have still to ask, does the Christian demand for unity involve here? Here again our question divides itself. In considering the bearing of the Christian demand for unity upon the personal world, we have to distinguish its relation to those permanent types of spiritual experience which, while not specifically Christian, have appealed to a large multitude of men as inherently worthful, and secondly, to those phases of human experience which retard or oppose the realization of the Christian ideal.

And first of the bearing of the Christian demand for unity upon other worthful types of experience. Of these the most important are the artistic, the scientific and the ethical. With reference to all three, it is clear that the Christian principle requires an attitude not merely of tolerance, but of sympathetic appreciation and of appropriation of the good which they contain.

We have already spoken of the true attitude of the Christian to the beauty of nature. The same principle applies with even greater force in the case of art, which is man's attempt to beautify human life. There are two possible attitudes which the Christian may take toward art. He may be indifferent to it, as something which, while in itself legitimate and innocent, and useful for those who like it, is of no importance to the Christian as such; or he may value it as one of the forms in which the many-sided life of the Kingdom manifests itself. The latter is not only preferable on practical grounds; it is the only position theoretically compatible with the Christian principle itself. How can a Christian, who accepts Jesus' law of brotherhood, be indifferent to art? That law requires that so far as strength and time admit, the interests and concerns of each of the members of the Kingdom shall be the interest and the concern of all. It is the Christian's duty, as it is his highest privilege, to understand and sympathize with everything by which his brother's life is enlarged and enriched. How, then, can he be indifferent to the joy of the artist in creation or of the art lover in appreciation? But the Christian principle reaches farther still. We have something to give as well as to receive, something without which art cannot realize its highest mission, namely, the vision of that supreme harmony which unifies all life, and helps us to discover in regions of experience, which, seen without the illumination of the Christian principle, would seem partial, distorted, and therefore ugly, the beauty of holiness and the glory of sacrifice.

What is true of the artistic, is true also of the intellectual life. We have contrasted the scientific and the philosophical interest with the Christian, and such contrast is necessary. None the less it is true that the Christian attitude toward philosophy and science cannot be one of indifference. Here again the principle of sympathy applies, and here, too, the principle of ministry receives a new illustration. As Christians we are interested in philosophy and in science, because they are forms of the life of the Kingdom, and permanent interests of our brothers, in which we cannot but sympathize; but this is not all. We believe we have something to impart which philosophy and science need. We have something to give philosophy. The God in whom we believe is for us the ultimate reality;—if not the phil-

osophic Absolute in the technical sense, at least the Being through whom unity is attained in the sphere of practice. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of philosophy, to solve the problem of unity, which takes no account of the contribution of Christianity, must reach an inadequate result. We have something, too, for science. In the Christian experience we find the clearest illustration of spiritual laws of the highest practical importance. Until this experience is taken into account, the evidence as to man's nature is not all in, and we cannot therefore be indifferent to the question as to whether or not those who are studying the problems of the spirit make use of the clue which we believe we possess.

Even closer is the connection between Christianity and the ethical life. This connection has been so much emphasized in recent years by Ritschl and his school, that it is not necessary to linger over it here. That the Christian is vitally interested in the moral life wherever it is found; that he sees in it an evidence of the working of his Father's spirit, and a preparation for his kingdom; that every one who loves and serves his brother is following in the footsteps of Jesus, whether he is conscious of the fact or not; and conversely, that Christianity has a contribution to make to these unconscious followers, by providing them with a religious basis for their instinctive faith in the worth of the individual, with a comprehensive programme for social effort, and with a satisfying comradeship: all these are facts too patent to be denied. The danger is rather that in our emphasis on the ethical element in Christianity, we shall under-estimate the value of other types of human experience which are often contrasted with it.

Such an example of under-estimate may be found, I believe, in the attitude of some recent writers to the type of religion known as mysticism. The characteristic feature of the mystic experience is its immediacy. The soul feels itself lifted into the immediate presence of God, and in the emotional exaltation produced by this contact, all else is forgotten. The world of common experience, of daily duty, even of human love and sympathy, drops below the level of consciousness, and nothing remains but the glow of an indescribable joy. Now, it cannot be denied that mysticism has often assumed forms that are not merely unchristian but anti-christian. It has been individualistic, in-

trospective, unethical, selfish. Yet none the less is it true, if history and psychology are trustworthy guides, that in the mystic experience we have to do with a tendency in human nature too deep-seated to be dismissed with a simple denunciation. Mere negation does not meet the case. With the mystic, too, it is the Christian's duty to enter into sympathetic fellowship, partly that he may understand that which is precious and vital in his experience, and, so far as he can consistently do so, may make it his own; partly that he may correct its inadequacy and narrowness by supplying that which it lacks. What mysticism lacks is a clear vision of the kind of God with whom we should seek communion in religion. What mysticism has, and present-day Christianity often lacks, is the sense of joy in communion. We need to remember that the consciousness of God's presence in which the mystic finds his satisfaction is not to be found only, or even chiefly, in the self-centred, introspective life. It is through the service of man that we enter most directly into the presence of God and become most aware of his fellowship. Yet none the less that consciousness is something supremely to be desired for its own sake. There is a real danger that in our opposition to what seems an unethical individualism, we may lose that which has always been regarded as the supreme blessing of religion, namely, the sense of personal communion with the personal God. It is well to emphasize the purpose of God as the central fact of the Christian revelation; but God's purpose is not a substitute for his presence, but the means through which he manifests it to the intelligence and the will. Religion is more than ethics. Faith in God adds something to love for man, just as in the life of the home the consciousness of the father's love and care for each individual child gives added meaning to the homely acts of service through which alone the ideal of the home can be realized.

With reference to the other class of phenomena, those which oppose the realization of the Christian purpose, it is possible to be more brief. Not because the problem is unimportant or its solution easy, but because it is that phase of the question which has received most attention in the past, and in which the issues at stake are therefore most familiar. When we approach the facts of moral evil we face in its clearest form that relative dualism,

or pluralism, which is involved in all ethical life and which, considered in itself, is not the negation, but the condition of unity. The difficulty arises when the discord which sin at present causes is regarded as ultimate, and evil exalted to a power permanently independent of the divine control. This is a position which no Christian theologian has been willing to take, since it would involve the destruction of that practical supremacy, which is the fundamental postulate of Christian faith. Somehow or other we must believe that, while sin is sin and therefore hateful and harmful, it is here as part of God's plan and subject to his control.

The historical positions on the subject are familiar, and it is not necessary to linger over them here. Three possibilities seem open. We may explain sin with historic Calvinism as the necessary background for the display of the divine holiness. Or we may account for it, with Arminianism, as due a self-limitation of God, in the creation of free beings. Or finally, with Universalism, we may regard sin as a temporary incident in a process of divine training, whose end will be the salvation of all.

Of the three the first, at least in its older form, seems inconsistent with the Christian principle. According to this view God could have prevented the entrance of sin into the world, and, now that it is here, if he so decide, he can banish it completely through the conversion of all sinners, but he refrains from doing this because a double outcome of the moral life is necessary for the full display of his own perfections. Justice has its rights as well as mercy, and justice requires the final condemnation of some sinners, as mercy requires the salvation of some. This gives us a unity, indeed, but not the kind of unity which Christian faith demands. The God whom Jesus reveals desires the welfare of all his children, and it is impossible to believe that he would arbitrarily exclude any from participation in his salvation. Justice is not an independent principle in God, which requires vindication for its own sake, but rather the expression of that consistency of moral purpose which finds its highest satisfaction in the salvation of man.

As between the other alternatives, the issue is not so simple. Strong arguments may be cited on either side, and a full discussion of the subject would require a paper in itself and lead us into bypaths into which it is not possible to enter here. This only

need be said: that whatever self-limitation may be involved in the creation of freedom, it must not be such as to imperil the divine control. We dare not say with a recent theologian* that God has failed in his plan for men, and that the world which we now see is only his second choice, a world with which he puts up for want of a better. If all individuals are not ultimately saved, it will be because the salvation of individuals as such is not the primary object of God's plan—because, in other words, his plan is social and not individual, and the accomplishment of this social purpose involves a double issue, inexplicable, if not indefensible, from a purely individual point of view.

The difficulty with this solution lies in its application. Theoretically there is much to be said in its favor. It corresponds with what we know of God's method elsewhere. It seems most in accord with the facts of experience, which point to a double issue of the moral life, while at the same time it relieves us of the arbitrariness of the older theodicy, where the problem is conceived in terms of the individual alone. But when we attempt to apply it to the practical problems of every-day Christianity, it breaks down. It is hard to see how Jesus' estimate of the worth of each individual soul can be compatible with any such limitation of the range of God's purpose. The logic of Christian faith is as unwilling to set limits to the love of God as to his power.

We face here the old antinomy to which all consistent thinking is brought at last,—the question of the reconciliation of the claims of power and of love. What Christianity offers us here is not a new theoretical solution—the differences of opinion which have obtained among Christians in the past are the best proof of this—but such a reinforcement of faith in the love and power of God as to make it possible to hold fast to the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation in spite of theoretical difficulties. Whether, as individuals, we shall adopt one or the other of the forms of the historic theodicy will depend, as in the case of our interpretation of the relation of God to nature, on philosophic and scientific considerations which are in themselves apart from Christian faith.

* O. A. Curtis: *The Christian Faith, Personally Given in a System of Doctrine*, p. 465. "The final universe will be nothing but a second best, a drop down from the wish, an ideal mangled."

In the preceding discussion we have confined ourselves to the question of unity in the theoretical sense; but it is obvious that if the positions which have been taken are correct, they have an important bearing upon the practical questions before the Church. It follows from our faith in the supremacy of the Christ-like God that we must recognize his presence and activity in aspects of experience and among groups of persons, not at present included within organized Christianity. But it is equally clear that this separation between that which is Christian in name and in spirit is unfortunate, and that it ought to be our aim to bring to explicit consciousness and to effective expression the unity which we believe to exist in fact. This is the practical problem before the Church to-day. How it is to be solved in detail, it is not the purpose of this paper to inquire, but we may be permitted, in conclusion, to sum up in three simple principles the lines along which such a solution is to be sought.

(1) It is our duty, as Christians, to co-operate with any man, no matter what his intellectual views may be, who is willing to make Jesus' purpose his own and to labor for its accomplishment.

(2) It is our duty to enter sympathetically into the understanding of all those forms of human experience which differ from our own, that we may find the elements of truth or beauty which they contain, and may appropriate them.

(3) It is our duty so to organize the specific forms and practices through which the Christian principles find expression in the world, that all true and good men everywhere shall find in them something which answers to the needs of their own particular type of spiritual life. Only through some such comprehensive programme as this can we hope to secure that practical unity which will be the one conclusive proof of the theoretical unity, to the discussion of which this paper has been devoted.

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XX

A DEFINITION OF MYSTICISM

BY THOMAS C. HALL

1. It would be a gain in many ways if the word mysticism were used more exactly and more narrowly defined, particularly in works dealing with the development of religious thought. Schelling says: "Mysticism can only be called that spiritual state (*Geistesbeschaffenheit*) which turns with contempt (*verschmäh*t) from all scientific basis, or even discussion, and regards all truth as springing from a so-called inner and not at all universal, but rather individual light; from immediate revelation; from simple ecstatic intuition or simple feeling." That this describes elements in the great classic mystics cannot be denied. But practically the immediacy of nearly all religious and even æsthetic feeling defies in like manner scientific analysis, and the artist trusts to the immediate musical revelation, the poet to the rapture of poetic ecstasy, or the prophet to the profound sense of divine revelation for reaching his type of truth in thought or conduct. The impatience of romanticism with the formal shallow rationalism of the preceding age was justified by the facts of human life. But the message of romanticism was the place this immediacy had in human experience, and romanticism, even on its religious plane, was very far removed from classic mysticism. So that although immediacy is always an element in mysticism it can hardly be called its definite essence without introducing mysticism where it certainly does not belong.

2. Nor is mysticism simply sentimental piety. Its classic forms cannot be enclosed in a "phase of thought or perhaps feeling," as Andrew Seth in his most admirable summary of mysticism in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* seems to do. In these classic forms mysticism is both a goal, and a method for

reaching that goal; and where this goal is clearly apprehended then the various types of mysticism may most conveniently be classified in accordance with the ways they take to attain their end. The main element in a satisfactory definition of mysticism must therefore be found in its fundamental purpose. And once this purpose is firmly grasped it may be clearly seen how a narrow stream of classic mysticism flows steadily down the history of thought, now widening out and losing itself seemingly in a general religious demand for immediacy of vision, and personal experience, but whenever it comes to self-consciousness we find it stating again its essential purpose with insistent and decisive clearness. This purpose is *metaphysical union with the source of all Being*, the identification of the soul with the very substance of God.

3. The word metaphysical is here used to sharply divide classic mysticism from simple religious longing for union with God. This longing is a common element in all religious experience, and differs in its expression according to the worshipper's idea of God. The union with him may be as loyal subject to a chief or king, submission to him as Lawgiver and Creator, or loving obedience as to a Father, etc., etc. In such religious surrender there is no metaphysical background at all, and to make mysticism identical with this simple longing is to so widen the definition as to lose all that is really characteristic of the great classic mystics, and would result in making us all "mystics." The *unio mystica* is indeed often thought of as such simple submission to the divine will, and as such is an element in all religious experience worth the name; but classic mysticism has never been satisfied with any such simple definition of the religious longing. Indeed such a union is generally only the means mysticism would take for reaching its end. And from the Neoplatonists to Jacob Böhme that end is always the actual metaphysical swallowing up of the individual life, however defined, in the All. Wherever mysticism is true to itself and clearly conscious of its message it insists upon the disappearance of the phenomenal individual, and the absorption of individuality into the universal source of all Being. It may discuss the character of this phenomenal separation, and may call it evil or misfortune, or even as in some of its utterances (pseudo-Areopagite) seem to treat it as a neces-

sary step in the revelation of the consummate All, but in all that really deserves the name of mysticism there is the underlying conception of a separation between the phenomenal seen, and the true source of all things, and a sense that this separation must be overcome, and the goal is stated as a reunion with the unseen in a metaphysical sense.

4. Whether this separation is thought of as sin or misfortune or weakness or temporary but necessary imperfection, the effect of mysticism is always to reduce the bodily and phenomenal to *an evil* or limitation, and the religious life is flight from this phenomenal world to the unseen reality. Therefore what is characteristic of the religion of mysticism is hardly what Seth describes as "on the practical side. . . . The possibility of direct intercourse with the Being of Being." For this is a postulate of nearly all developed religious thought, but rather the possibility of direct union in a metaphysical sense with the eternal Being, and, for however short or long a period, a complete identification of the soul with God. For this reason, as Seth himself most justly remarks, "as this goal (interpenetration of the essence) is unattainable while reason and consciousness of self remain, the mystic begins to consider these as impediments to be cast aside." Hence underlying all real mysticism is a metaphysical pantheism as the ultimate reality, and a phenomenal dualism as a present evil to be overcome. This is variously expressed, and often shaded and even confused in the expression, but throughout the history of mysticism with greater or less clearness this underlying philosophy is a determining element. It would be well if in all histories and discussions of mysticism the various degrees of clearness with which this metaphysics is expounded were made more decisive in the inclusion or exclusion of religious writers within the ranks of mystics. Some ordinarily classed with the mystics, and using their language, are so evidently indifferent or hostile to this main interest that it would be well to exclude them from the ranks of the classic mystics altogether.

5. It is in this sense that mysticism must be regarded as a providential addition to, or an unfortunate intrusion upon, primitive Christianity, according to the attitude taken toward mysticism. It is certainly in this sense a foreign element in Judaism,

because Judaism has never been primarily metaphysical or cosmological in its interest. Even when taking over from another culture the cosmological stories (Genesis, etc.) it deals with them from an ethical and religious point of view and with obviously no metaphysical interest. And it is equally remarkable how distinctly the Hellenistic speculations taken over by Philo (omitting the *De Vita Contemplativa*) remain within the framework of an ethical and religious interest. Nor does this metaphysical speculation come directly from Greece. The Greek mind was not prone to mysticism, not for the reason, it seems to the writer, given so often, that the Greek was naturally hopeful and took a bright and natural interest in life. For the Greek mind, whether reflected in Homer or the classic drama, does not seem especially either joyous or hopeful. But in Greece speculation was early linked with empiric observation and physical experiment, and mysticism has almost nothing in common with empiricism. It is from the Orient, with its overweening faith that one may by pure intellectual analysis without empiric experiment reach the highest truth, that mysticism comes. And it comes weighted with the despondency bred of a political helplessness on the part of a highly gifted race. Hellenism had ceased in a large measure to be really empiric and had become oriental, and thus within Hellenism mysticism found a field, and all the more readily because the despondency of political helplessness had fallen upon the scattered Greek race. The power, moreover, of conceptual abstraction has been so all-important a factor in enabling the human mind to organize and master the manifold in its infinite variety, that philosophy has always been prone to separate the machinery from the data, and to regard the concept, or pure mental abstraction, as having a higher type of reality than that possessed by the phenomenal manifold which it seeks to organize. Plato and Descartes have modern followers in their superstitious worship of the conceptual machinery as a means for superseding the phenomenal experience of the manifold. But mysticism goes even farther, and is perhaps more logical when once the possibility of such transcendence is granted, for it would not only transcend the phenomenal manifold but even the conceptual machinery by which the manifold is organized as knowledge, and by pure abstraction gain its end apart from the phenomenal altogether.

6. This transcending of the phenomenal world must present itself primarily to the mystic as a psychological process; but it also carries with it a tendency to ascetic treatment of the body, as in itself an evil and a hindrance to the pure vision. Indeed the writer could wish again that the term asceticism were always carefully and narrowly confined to this method of thought and feeling. True asceticism is never content with a simple subjection of the body, but has as its logical culmination the ridding of the soul of its bodily limitation altogether. It is in both these forms that mysticism has found its way into historic Christianity, and we have speculative mysticism attempting by mental abstraction to transcend the mental process or by emotional ecstasy to transcend emotion, or by exercise of the will to gain an absolute passivity, and an ascetic mysticism seeking by pain and deprivation to render the soul independent of its phenomenal environment. The clearness with which the goal is comprehended varies very greatly. Much Roman Catholic piety is only mystical in its use of a language and ascetic discipline which it has rather unintelligently accepted on the basis of authority. The valuable book of Baron von Hugel on Catherine of Genoa is greatly marred by confusions along the line of definition of both mysticism and asceticism; and by the mingling of what may be called the externals of mysticism taken over mechanically on authority, with the conscious pursuit of the mystical goal. An extremely skeptical nature often takes refuge in an abject surrender to an external authority (Cardinal Newman), or it may sometimes fling itself upon a whole-hearted rejection not only of phenomenal process with its confessed empiricism and relativity, but of all phenomenal reality, and seek its type of reality in an abstraction from all bodily and mental process. The "world-weariness" of all true mysticism is due to this despair of the tentative, relative and hesitating approach to truth that is alone possible to the relative empiricist. Great outbursts of human energy and periods of supreme confidence and hope inspired by great but incomplete victory over the phenomenal environment are apt to be followed by periods of depression and despondency when refuge is sought either in surrender to authority of an external kind or in mysticism with its real rejection of all rationality.

7. If the goal of mysticism is once clearly apprehended then the various ways that are taken to reach the goal furnish us with a convenient index for the classification of the mystics properly so-called. This is not the place to more than indicate along what lines the present writer has sought to classify for his own use, he thinks with some success, the classic mystics of history. (a) There are those whose world-weariness has a profoundly intellectual caste. The overcoming of doubt and the realization of the Eternal is sought by these mystics by transcending the intellectual process in speculation. Thus Neoplatonism sought its goal, and the intellectual mysticism of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite is of the same type. The Gnostic systems by which so much of the apparatus and the phraseology of mysticism found its way into dogmatic Christianity was intellectual and speculative in its primary interest, and by fantastic cosmological constructions sought to transcend the analytical process and find metaphysical unity in and with the final and highest Being. (b) There is however no real separation possible save in thought, between emotional and intellectual processes. The difference is one rather of emphasis, hence all mysticism has sooner or later sought in ecstasy to transcend alike thought and feeling. Among the German mystics this emotional element has its roots in the spiritual awakening, whose origin it is still hard to trace, but whose fruits were the *cathari*, etc., and finally the reforming orders. The mystic elements may be a direct reimportation from the East. Such seems now the prevalent view, but although the mysticism of the movement is most certainly oriental, there is no need to suppose much new importation, for all that is found in German mysticism may be traced directly to older sources within historical Christianity, save only that the emphasis is now rather upon feeling than upon thought. Hence dogmatic speculation is an exceedingly secondary interest. (c) And lastly, there is a ritual mysticism in which the way to abstraction from the phenomenal is by means of rite, exercise, asceticism and submission. So by acts of will the will is transcended and passivity is attained. The individual is swallowed up in God, and the essence of individuality is found not so much in thought or emotion as in will. Here again it is by the emphasis we are enabled to classify various types. But Bonaventura and most

of the monastic mystics like the Victorians represent this type. Here also the emotional reappears in an æsthetic interest which is logically an intrusion, but which finds its way into ecclesiastical mysticism through the rite and ceremony of the church. Indeed the whole apparatus of sacramental magic so developed in Roman Catholicism became linked with this special school of mystical thinking, and obedience to outward authority, running counter to the general extreme individualism of mysticism, becomes a means for the suppression of the individual will. But as in all types of mysticism these things are but means to the end. Neither speculation nor ecstasy, nor yet obedience to authority, has *per se* any merit; all are but methods of attaining the supreme purpose, namely, absorption of the individual and finite into the infinite, and thus attainment of ultimate metaphysical union with God, which is for classic mysticism the final definition of salvation. Even the momentary vision, the temporary union with the Infinite in the rapture of ecstasy, the sense of loss for ever so short a time of the sense of individuality in emotional excitement, are but foretastes of the final and complete absorption of all phenomenal being in the Source of Being, the definite consummation which is the final aim of all really self-conscious mysticism.

This is not the place to enter upon any criticism or history of mysticism, nor even to indicate its relation to Christian thought and feeling. It is only necessary to sum up in a word the elements of what the writer deems an adequate definition of mysticism: mysticism as a system makes the religious goal the metaphysical union of the soul of the worshipper with God, and seeks this union by the way of speculation, ecstasy, rapture, emotional surrender, as means for the escaping from the limits of personality. It expects to overcome phenomenal dualism by a divine absorption into the All. It is therefore despondent as regards the phenomenal present, but is stayed up by the religious faith in the transcendent victory of the Eternal God.

GÖTTINGEN, June 15, 1910.

XXI

ONE LAW OF THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION

BY EDWARD C. MOORE

No question is more seriously before us at the present moment than the question—What is Christianity? This is the form which the question takes among us, because we dwell in a nominally Christian land. For us the alternative in the large is Christianity or irreligion. Judaism is the vital faith of some among us. But Jews too are asking—What is Judaism? And in that astonishing parity of movement, which now pervades all the world which thinks, Asiatics are raising the same question about their indigenous faiths. Sober spirits in Japan are asking—What shall take the place to us of that which Shintoism and Buddhism have been to our ancestors? Will these recover their prestige? Must we take the western man's religion, as we have already taken his civilization; or is there no longer any place for religion, any need of religion? Men are asking the same kind of question as to Confucianism in China. Can Confucianism possibly make this astonishing adjustment to new conditions which seems requisite? Can an ethical system, the very gist of which has been to look to the past, learn to look to the future? Can it be to the men of the new generation what it has been to their ancestors? If not, what can be put in its place? It will be just so in Turkey when the stupendous changes inaugurated in these last years have had time to do their work. Can Mohammedanism keep pace with the changes which are being made?

We say that this immense change in culture and civilization has come all suddenly to Japan, and still more recently to China. This is the reason why those nations feel the stress as they do. We must reflect concerning many of the major changes in the

view of the universe possible to an educated man, how recently these have come to us in Christendom. We must not imagine that a generation ago we gave to Japan sciences of nature, of man and of society, which were already current among us many generations ago. The view of nature and of man's relation to it, which now so generally prevails, was by no means axiomatic here in America when Pumpelly, Morse, Clark, and Lyman took it in 1872 to the University of Tokyo. It was a theory not long made, but then only in the making. The evolutionary view of society, of morals, and of religion for which Comte and Herbert Spencer stood was not then long-accepted among us. Those views were at that time, by Christian men at all events, almost universally dissented from. The view of sacred history and Scripture, which now so largely obtains among us, did not generally obtain until long after the time of which we speak. In certain portions of our country it does not yet prevail. It displaced a view of oracular revelation practically identical with the view which the Mohammedan holds of the Koran or the Chinese man of the Great Learning. Such a view of the divine revelation was for those who held it the foundation of a view of nature and of society which could not possibly maintain itself in the face of that which the sciences were declaring. Christianity itself has not perfectly made, and in some regions has scarcely begun, this great adjustment. These facts should be encouraging to us.

We said a moment ago that we had no occasion to feel ourselves alone, because all of our contemporaries, with their religions, are passing through this same experience. To them also has come, with its resistless force, this much altered and still-altering world view. We might add that we have no occasion to think ourselves particularly unfortunate. All of our ancestors have passed in their measure through a like experience, and all our progeny will have to do the same. The Renaissance virtually created a pagan Europe. The Reformation was in part made necessary by that paganism. But also the Reformation was made possible only by that Renaissance. Save for that, Christianity might have gone on for ages, as it had done for a millennium, unaltered in itself but steadily losing its power over the world.

This action and reaction, this interaction of the moral and spiritual power in men with the ever-advancing, ever-destroying, ever-rebuilding activity of the intellect and the shaping and re-shaping of the outward life of men which that imposes—this is the greatest drama of the human race. This is the movement to which if religions are not able to live up, they must perish. A whole class of them, the nature religions, are perishing under our very eyes. They can never live through the transformation involved in conformity to their environment in the view of the universe of the modern educated man. Whether a religion which turns its face away from this life and the world, as does Buddhism, can abide this transformation remains to be seen. On the other hand, the utmost magnificence of the development of the outward life of man in the world, all the marvellous achievements of the mind, are nothing save as these create in this new world only a new field for the moral powers and a new scope for the spiritual experiences of men. No inference could find less justification in the history of the human race than the inference that religion will not survive. But what form religion in the future will take is difficult to forecast.

If what we have said is true, then we are prepared to find that it is no easy matter to win a satisfactory answer to the question—What is Christianity? So many interpretations Christianity has had! Such manifold effects have been ascribed to it! So long is now the retrospect and so wide has been the area of its operation! The claims grow strident among us. Old meanings are discredited. The very newest ones divide attention. But among all these interpretations which are being set forth with emphasis, we may at least discern two groups. We may take as examples two larger types of apprehension, which are at the present moment, through agitation, criticism and propaganda, present to almost every mind.

There is on the one hand the whole group of movements which have for a decade or more claimed much attention, of which the common thesis is that Christianity is health. The health of the body is the immediately necessary thing which the religion of the soul is to subserve. Religion is healing. This healing is an individual end; that is, it is an end in the aspiration of the individual for himself. It is as truly an individual and not a social

end as was the old-fashioned soul-salvation. It inverts the relation of the physical and the spiritual, as these used to stand. For the moment at least, the great significance even of the soul's condition is in the service it may render to the body's state. An outward, present, temporal end is thus set in the forefront of religious discussion.

Over against this stands our second group and type. Christianity is social amelioration. It is this reform in civil or economic condition of the poor and distressed. It is that necessary and beneficent work. It is sympathy with the victims of the industrial order. It is the endeavor, by persuasion if feasible and by force if necessary, to bring about a new order. It is the beneficial alteration of the whole outward state of man. What we have here is not an individual end; at least, not dominantly such. It is the appeal to men to sacrifice themselves, if need be, for a common end. Devotion to this aim may have as its consequence the sacrifice of the individual, his wealth, his health, his life itself if need be, for the good of others. This is the point of contrast with that other type. It hardly admits of question that the contrast is immeasurably to the advantage of the type of which we just now speak.

Yet the coincidence also is striking. This social amelioration is, like that other end of health, a present, outward, an immediate aim. It is the condition, the environment, the circumstance of life, which is to be transformed. The belief is wide-spread even among the deeper spirits of this advocacy that the inward transformation of men's characters can take place only after an outward change in their lot in life has been achieved. Many others are of course entirely frank in saying that their minds are not much occupied with this matter of inward and spiritual change. They are not debating character. They want more comfort. Economic conditions, social welfare, are their only ends. If religion will help them to get these, they are for religion. If not, then they have no use for religion. And, to be just, no one can deny that the altruism and heroism shown in this crusade do fill the place which religion, as some of these men and women have been taught it, has left vacant in their souls.

Often enough has this quality of Christianity which is here revealed, this attitude of men toward Christianity which is here

illustrated, been commented upon. Almost as often has it been forgotten again. Being forgotten, men are bewildered by the divergent and often mutually-contradictory claims. The Gospel seems to each age, and almost you might say to every individual upon whom it has really laid hold, as if it had been written for the sake of the special problems which, to that age or for that man, appear the pressing problems. The real religion of any age, of any man, is not a sacred tradition brought along from the past, no matter how much men may think that this is so. The language of the professedly religious may become well-nigh unintelligible, the aims which they have associated with religion obsolete. The real religion of any man is in the things which seem to that man divine and worthy to have life staked on them. What we mean by God, as Goethe said, is always just the best we know. When this condition has been reached, men will divide according to their temperament. Some men will serve these ideals, and yet carry forward the tradition for a time, so to say, in a separate compartment of their souls. Others will serve these same new and majestic ideals without the slightest regard to the tradition, or in bitter condemnation of the same. Looking askance at the Gallican Church in its unholy alliance with the Bourbon state, Madame Roland said in the great days of '89: "The declaration of the rights of men is the new Gospel of God. Religion? The French Constitution is our religion, on behalf of which the French people are ready to die."

But the interesting thing is that, so likely as men are in such a crisis either sadly or else madly to break with institutional Christianity, they do not always seem to themselves to have broken with Christ. The old name exerts a spell. It has, in Schiller's phrase, been "hallowed by the might of years." The real religion of any age is in the masterful and actually mastering ideals of that age. But new religions are not now manufactured. Old ones must be stretched to do. Where, in a *naïver* time, a great new insight would have fathered a new faith, now men cry—"Not at all! This is no new faith; it is only the true interpretation of the faith which we have already had." A new purpose dawning upon a new generation in all the freshness of its majesty yet sets men only reaching backward through sixty generations. It causes men to say, often with sublime self-confidence, Christ

had this purpose too; in fact this was his main, his sole purpose. Is this feeling true, or false? Does it signify, as some would say, that Christianity is by this very fact proved to be of infinite significance? Is it thus clear that Christ's religion is of limitless freshness and originality, of unwasting power, holding in germ all things within itself, evolving gradually all things out of itself, even some things which previous generations of true Christians never would have dreamed? Upon other minds the same phenomenon produces just the opposite effect. They say—"On your own terms, Christianity is anything and everything. Any good which the old world by its tears and sweat and blood has won, the Christians claim. That is, they claim it after it is won. Ignored, fiercely resisted by the religion of its day, bloody and miry, the new era beats its way forward on its lonely, glorious road. It has always trodden the wine-press alone—this advance of humanity." Yet in the end you men of Jesus say—"It is true that our fathers did not clearly perceive all this. But you have said nothing which Jesus did not say, done nothing which Jesus did not plan."

The antagonism to religion and Christianity is only an apparent one. It results from the mistaken assumption that Christianity is something definable, and furthermore that it is something stationary. We must own that the guardians of the Christian tradition have themselves confidently asserted that Christianity is definable. They have described it as unchangeable. The alienation from an unalterable Christianity may be quite explicable. But if religion is the force of ever-expanding truth and ever-enlarging goodness, if it is coincident with truth ever freshly revealing itself, ever to be revealed—if it is itself identical with the advance of humanity to new goodnesses which make the old goodnesses to seem inadequate or even bad—surely that is a different matter. Only, to make good that contention, one has to realize how large a part of the religion of the world is of the unofficial, the unprofessed, and even of the unconscious sort. Not in the tenets, the practices, the concrete manifestations of the spirit of the confessedly religious, but in the moving of the ever-living and all-loving God upon and in and through the whole humanity—there lies religion. "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."

If this is true, then it appears to be quite obvious that no claim can be made for a complete and absolute revelation of religion. The revealer of religion, in proportion as his own soul is pure and his own ideal high, must have had his times of realizing that every word he said, every deed he did, was but a bare fragment. It drew from out the infinite. It had reach into the infinite. But in itself it was set round with sharp, prosaic limitations of the actual life. He must have had sorrowful, sure forecast how his zealous followers would seize upon some aspect of his teaching or example, and would fairly crush in their tenacious grasp the perishable flower which his pure spirit had put forth as time and circumstance had called for it. They would cry—"This was his religion!" He would answer—"No, that was only a passing expression of it."

It belongs apparently to the intensity of the revealing temper, it has been a general trait of the monitors for God to men, that they have lived within a certain stress. They saw their given truths in fiery isolation. They set them forth with a tremendous emphasis, as if there were no other truths besides. It was said concerning Luther that apparently even God could hardly make a man strong enough without making him too strong. Without diminishing our reverence for these revealers, Mohammed, Confucius, Buddha, Moses, one may say that their truth was not the whole truth. Nor, on the same principle, can Jesus' truth uttered in specific words or given in concrete example have been the whole truth. On the contrary, it is in Jesus' larger sense for the whole, his realization of the limitation of the parts, his refusal to say that in given tenets or certain practices lay the whole Gospel; it is in his serene view of every aspect of man's life, his infinite patience with things which he could not conquer, his brooding over the men and things he could not shape to his desire;—it is exactly in his sense of limitation, as truly as in his sense that he had hold on the unlimited, that we feel that Jesus is a greater revealer of the meaning of religion than the rest.

The tenor of Christ's life, the body of his teaching, gives us the right and lays upon us the injunction to say something to this effect: There is no human woe of whatsoever sort or source to which he was indifferent, or of which he would not censure us for being negligent. There is no improvement of the condi-

tions of man's life thinkable, no enlargement of liberty or privilege possible, no enhancement of man's power of attainment of the good things which appeal to him, no uplifting, widening and enriching of existence, which would not appeal to Jesus. Nothing could be easier than to prove from the face of the New Testament Jesus' compassion for the sufferings of men and women in the body, his gentle solicitude for those under aberration of the mind. He seems to have been unflinching in his eagerness to do what in him lay to mitigate and to forefend these woes. So true is this that we cannot sufficiently wonder that men in Christian ages have esteemed it the superior piety to neglect these things, and have so prevailingly lived in a fixed attention upon an alleged other world than this.

None the less, when one shuts the Book, and with quiet mind would conjure up the benign figure of the Christ; when one asks—Did he really see the problems of the outward and the present in the proportions and the isolation that we do?—surely there can be but one answer. It seems the very sacrilege of misunderstanding to link his name with a cult whose major emphasis is upon the care of the body and the escape from suffering. So many things palpably appear to his mind to have been of an importance infinitely greater than the body's life. So incredible does it appear from Christ's standpoint, when one sees him clearly and sees him whole, that a man should, because of distress, stand back from sacrifice, or for a pain evade a heroism, or lose faith in God if torture should befall, or imagine that in gaining health he gained anything which differentiates him from the beasts, unless indeed he uses health for a transcendent end.

And again, nothing could be easier than to prove from the very face of Scripture, Jesus' sweet compassion for the poor; his fierce wrath against those who in oppression made them poor; his contempt for and his menace toward the unjust, the ungenerous, the indifferent rich. That thing is so easy that verily it requires no extraordinary art to do it. Nothing could be easier than to show his interest in what we now call the social questions. The amazement is that with such an example of Jesus before our eyes, this whole range of his opinions and his sentiments should have left the Christian body so long measurably untouched; that the Church could have remained so long on good terms with a

social order, which you would think could not have escaped its condemnation the first moment that the Church seriously thought of Christ.

None the less, when we close the Book and think, we realize that what we have in Jesus is not a theorist upon society. He was no theorist upon government, or commerce, upon crafts, trade, capital and labor. He had not that kind of mind. He was not at the level of knowledge of those subjects, even as that knowledge existed in his day; much less had he the miraculous forecast which would have made him level with the achievements of the social sciences in our own day. All that seems the ecstasy of a partisan misunderstanding. What we have in Jesus is transcendent religious genius. What we have is the consequent appreciation of the principle of love. What we have is the proclaimer of brotherhood, the apostle of selflessness, one who made earnest with the precept as old as Confucius, though no doubt Jesus did not know that,—“Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.”

But over and above his solicitude for a man's outward state, his wrath at injustice, his demand of rights, his proclamation as to duties in this sphere, it seems as if one must be altogether carried away in his excitement if he does not hear an altogether different note. It is the note of one to whom, for himself, the outward life means not overmuch. It is the note of one who would teach others to care for that life not overmuch. It is the note of one whose heart would have been broken if in giving men mere things, which, to be sure, he might rejoice to give them, he yet fostered in them an insatiable lust for the mere things. It is the note of one who knows that for a man there will always be facts infinitely more significant than those which come to him, or which can be taken from him, in the chances of his outward lot. It is the note of one who profoundly distrusts wealth, comfort, leisure, power. He distrusts them because by wealth, ease, power—possessed or even only inordinately striven for—men's souls are prone to be made sordid and their characters made base. It seems an utter eclipse of insight into the meaning of religion, a well-nigh incredible vanishing from the consciousness of the age of the obvious meaning of Christ, to set him forth in this exclusive apprehension as the patron saint of schemes



whereby outward, present, earthly wishes only, no matter how legitimate, may be gratified.

Now all of this which we have been saying is only another illustration of the great law of religion to which we alluded above. It is only a reminder from the life of our generation how each succeeding age has read into Christ's teachings, or drawn out of Christ's teachings, that special meaning which that generation, or that race, that social level or that individual man needed to have drawn. Nothing could be more enlightening than is reflection upon the process of which we speak—this reading of the ever-changing ideals of man's life into Christianity, or of Christianity into the ever-advancing ideals of man's life. This chameleon-like quality of Christianity is the farthest possible remove from the changelessness which men have loved to attribute to their religion. It is the most wonderful quality which Christianity possesses. It is a quality which Christianity apparently possesses in a degree far greater than has any other religion which has ruled the hearts of men. It is upon this sensitive response to the law of change, this preservation of itself as spiritual impulse in and through all change;—upon that, and upon the hunger and thirst of men after that moral fortifying and that spiritual impulse in the midst of all the changes of their lives, that one may base his absolute confidence in the permanence of Christianity.

Shall we say that we can infer the ruling ideas of an age from the complexion which its religion takes? Or shall we declare that we can be sure of the complexion which the religion of an age, a race, a social level, or of an individual man will take, when once we know the aims which really dominate that age? This method of diagnosing the ever-varying states of our religion is in high degree suggestive. We have perhaps been used to thinking that religion makes the age. In larger measure possibly than we suspect, the age makes the religion; that is, it determines that aspect of religion which will be real to that age. It is the fact that our generation makes so much of getting well and keeping well which has transformed the confessional into a clinic, made the cure of souls the patching-up of bodies, replaced the preacher-pastor by the healer, or at least given some ministers the unquiet feeling that unless they set up a healing annex they



may be displaced. Ours is an age supremely sensitive to physical discomfort, preoccupied with provision for comfort, averse to pain, and glad to turn away from sorrow. It is an age firmly convinced that men and women have suffered many things in time past as irremediable, which, rather, it is our obvious duty to remedy. In such an age we find the parallel and subordinate phenomenon of an interpretation of religion, also, in which the point of central interest for many is the abolishing of pain, the turning away from sorrow, the achieving and maintaining at all costs of the blessing of good health and of an untroubled mind, not because, in the old worn path of conflict, it has triumphed over trouble, but because it has fled from it or even has denied that there is trouble.

Equally upon the other side, it is an age haunted by the sense of the terrific social and economic inequalities which prevail, which has set its heart upon the redress and elimination of those inequalities. It is an age whose disrespect for religion is due to the fact that religion has not done away with those inequalities; which is interested at once in an interpretation of religion which will make central the contention that, before all else, these particular inequalities are to be done away. These are the terms, so to say, upon which religion can have men's suffrages, but not on any other. They know what they want. If religion will help them to get what they want, then they want religion. If not, then they will make their religion out of the pursuit of these things for themselves and others. There never was an age of greater intensity of life. But that intensity sets tangible objects before itself. It seeks to compass definite ends. It is intolerant of waste of energy on other ends. If religion can be made a means of every man's getting his share of the good of this world,—well and good. If not, then there are many men to whom religion seems utterly meaningless.

We run some risk of seeing these facts in an inverted order. It is not Christianity as it has been generally taught in the past which has created this type of mind—unless, indeed, you will say that it may have aided to create this type on the principle of contrariety. Rather the reverse is true:—it is the type of mind which is just now so largely prevalent among us which has created the interpretation of religion of which we speak, which has

given its prominence in the present, and which sets it forth with confidence as the religion of the future.

Let us seek for a moment for some other illustrations. There is an old tale of a man in Constantinople to whom, when he asked for a bath, it was replied that "the Son was consubstantial with the Father." We find it hard to put ourselves in the position of men who had such a taste for metaphysics. But it is a relief to be convinced that it was not the Christian religion which created that taste. Rather, the Christian religion was accommodated to that taste, already existent and wide-spread. There are many of us who have stood before these great old creeds, the Nicene, the Athanasian, and the rest, and wondered how Christianity could ever have produced them. It is a comfort to argue that Christianity alone and unaided never did produce them. Christianity, entering upon the declining world of Hellenic intellectualism, became transformed in the hands of the men of that age into the sort of thing which they esteemed of transcendent significance.

The early Church taught submission to the powers that be. The later Church taught submission of the powers that be to the Church. You will say that the Christians submitted when they were forced so to do, and dominated when they could. That is, however, not quite the whole case. They clothed their submission in the old days of persecution and of martyrdom with a great ideal. They submitted to outward tyranny as men who, in submission, could maintain the freedom of the soul. They suffered reproach gladly, so only that in the eyes of God and of men of like mind with themselves they were above reproach. Kings in the spirit, what mattered the bondage and torment of the flesh! Furthermore, the better men among them meant to stand also for a great ideal when they came to rule. There swayed before the mind of many a pope and bishop the vision of an earth ruled as God would have it ruled. It is difficult to withhold this meed of praise from a man like Innocent III, or Alexander in his struggle with the Barbarossa, or Hildebrand in his conflict with Henry IV, or Becket in his strife with Henry II. But the vision was beyond the power of realization of men. Most of all, a quality which they had when they were weak—respect for the lowly, sense for the holy—largely forsook them

when they were strong. Their dominion became just like the other dominions, only the worse for its shams and its hypocrisies.

It is hard for us to make real to ourselves the attitude of mind of men who felt that they must leave the world to walk with God. The eremite, the celibate, the ascetic, we have so long judged without sympathy that we now judge them without even intelligence. The monastic life probably seems to many of us absolutely foolish and inane. There we are wrong. Too many wise and great and good have lived that life, that we should be quite so cavalier. One stands before the vast fabric created by an apprehension of Christ's religion essentially from the point of view of the total denial of the worth and significance of this present life and world; one reads the words of Benedict and Bernard, of Francis, of Xavier and Loyola, of Pascal and Molinos, and says—"How did Christ's Christianity ever come to that?" The answer is, as before,—Christ's religion alone and unaided never did come to that. It was Christianity working on an age in which those ideals were regnant, which made that the regnant Christianity and was itself transformed after those ideals.

We cry—No, the world, with its wonderful, rich, full life, is the place to walk with God! The world needs to have Christians walking in it, not withdrawing into holes and corners from it. The Christians need the world, that they, on their part, may not become mere shadows and parodies of men, but competent and practical, turning the wisdom of God's spirit to some good account. One wholly admits that. And one sees many men who are walking in the world, of some of whom one is not so sure that they are walking it with God. One sees many men who represent what they, with furtive glance at others, have called "a working gospel." But one is not sure that the Kingdom of God is nearer by their work. One thing we may know:—that if we keep on sufficiently long with this our boasted religion of the outward, of the practical, of the present, of the human, we shall have need of some man from the wilderness to come some day and tell us what religion is.

We boast ourselves of our Puritan forefathers. If we were quite honest we might say that they are good to be descended from—better than to live with. But frankly it is beyond our power to enter into their sense of the eternal, of the future, of

the transcendent worth of the spiritual; into their conviction of the worthlessness of life save as grandly controlled from within and animated from above. We do not instinctively understand their construction even of the liberty for which they strove,—not as freedom to do what a man himself may choose to do, but merely as a necessary condition of man's being able to do what God chooses to have him do. We read Jonathan Edwards' sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God." We perceive how real it was to him that man has no worth or hope until God shall supervene upon his damned state; how real it was to him that the new birth was a convulsion, a total separation of the man's new self from his old self. Religion meant always giving up. The world was created apparently on purpose to be given up. We know how near to insanity the question sometimes brought men as to whether or not they were the elect of God. If one looked out of eyes to which all that was real, how unreal all the life of men here upon earth, alike its happiness and its miseries, must have seemed. We stand before this truly Dantean fabric and ask—"How did Christianity ever come to that?" The reply is, as before, that Christ's Christianity alone and unaided never did come to that.

Yet it might be worth while to ask ourselves what Jonathan Edwards would think of our resolution of religion into a solicitude for the body's health and an exclusive enthusiasm for man's economic state. We think his religiousness unreal; but what would he think of our realities? Thomas Carlyle has told us, in no measured language, what he thinks of the kind of religion which most takes our fancy. This was not because Carlyle would have been in all respects at one with Jonathan Edwards. Carlyle is not prejudicedly orthodox; he was agnostic, pessimistic, he has several of the marks of the liberal; but he does know what religion is. We turn the pages of Tolstoi. If ever there was a country in which agitation might seem justifiable, that country might be Russia. But Tolstoi too has moments when the Christianity in him brings his socialism to a full pause. We read Ibsen. We are shaken by his terrible realism. He talks much of the Christian religion. Religion is too great a factor in life not to be drawn within the vortex of his realistic delineation. But we close the book often with the wonder whether Ibsen really did

know what religion was. We read Fogazzaro—*Il Santo*. Our idea of a saint would hardly be his. But he is not a Roman Catholic for nothing. He knows that the greatest saint is not the most assiduous shiner of brasses in this brazen and shiny world.

Religion has had these two seemingly-opposite effects upon the souls of men. It has tended to give men inward peace and power by revealing to them the beauty and the glory of the life which is by the things of the spirit, often in the face of the bitter oppositions and insuperable obstacles of the life in the flesh. It has made them lords of the world within, even if they were bound in affliction and iron in the world without. It has been the secret of the magnificent denial of any decisive significance of the world, with its strivings and its ills, so only that a man put it under his foot and set his heart upon holiness within and God above. Stoicism, which, besides being a philosophy, was also a religion, was a religion of this cast. The clear soul of Aurelius found here its refuge amid the incredible abominations and monstrous wickednesses of the decadent ancient world. By this he held himself to his duty as emperor when all else within him would have prompted him to flee from that duty.

Buddhism, with its outlook on the illimitable woe of man's existence, on the hopelessness of man's striving after worthy things and the worthlessness of most of the things for which men strive, was a religion dominantly of this cast. Whole ages and areas of Christianity, as well, have worn this cast. Jesus had this side. Here his serene, triumphant spirit rescued itself as over against a world of pagan rottenness and Jewish bigotry. This recourse religion was to him in proper part as he lived out his little span of life in a world which he could hardly, in smallest measure, yet begin to transform according to his holy will. Fortified in his unstained conscience and upheld in the faith of God, the more absolute is the catastrophe of his outward lot, the more is his soul sure of belonging to a realm in which such catastrophes never by any possibility occur. The world has not been wrong in supposing that exactly in this he was the great revealer of religion.

Paul, fighter that he was, well knew that there were more victories in the world than he would ever win. Slavery might be

the absolute contradiction of the principle of Christian brotherhood, yet even slavery might stand temporarily, so only that master and man knew each the other as a brother-soul. The persecuted might have to put up with persecution. Christianity does not mean every man's taking up cudgels with all the world at once. The distressed may still have to bear distresses, the poor their poverty, the sick and crippled their disease. The complete remedies of all these things might still be far off, and none the less a man might know himself to be God's child in all. "For this thing"—the Apostle himself says—"I besought the Lord thrice that it might depart from me; and he said unto me, 'My grace is sufficient for thee.'" Hear George Fox, the Quaker, in prison, sick, insulted: "Christ it was that opened to me when I was shut up, and had no hope or faith; Christ who enlightened me, gave me his light to believe in. He gave me hopes which he himself revealed in me; he gave me spirit and grace which I found sufficient in deeps and weaknesses."

Nor is this all the religion of times dead. The poor, the sick, the despondent, the defeated, the broken-hearted—these are with us still. Even the mightiest struggler for reform, so only that he do not blind his soul with clay, so only that his hope is still of such grandeur that all successes seem but failures when they are won,—these represent that old religion still. They wait not for the heaven of the fat and prosperous, but having done their part toward the great transformation, they make of troubled earth a heaven by the spirit which they show. Even Goethe said—"Who never ate his bread in tears, or weeping watched through anxious nights, he never knew the heavenly powers." It is sometimes said that this is the religion of the passive Orient. Even that is a mistake. The religion of the militant West is full of it. With all its agitating, fighting, reforming, it would be far less religious than it is did it not answer to this note. Not even from the soul of the same person do these two aspects of religion shut one another out.

But it must be owned that this one of which I have just spoken is not the phase of religion which our own age best understands and loves; rather it is the one which we, oftentimes with scorn, repudiate. A conquering age, a dominating race, personalities used to achievement in the outward, set their hearts on other

things. The scorn of content with the things with which we ought not to be contented possesses us. The very words which pious souls have framed seem blasphemous to us in our altered mood. The present violent denunciation of the Church voices itself in some such terms. The Church's condemnation of itself runs to the same effect. To have pointed men to heaven when it should have lent a hand to make the earth a little less like hell; to have harped upon the soul when what was needed was to feed and clothe the body; to have asked men to be patient when sick, instead of taking up into our holy place of religion the intent to make them well—these seem the last betrayals of religion by supposedly religious men. And so it has come to pass that there is not a problem which modern society presents which is not being set forth in the light of an object of religious purpose and religious apprehension. Admirable is the recognition that it is within the scope of our Christianity to take up every fight that needs to be fought, to bear every burden that is to be borne, to hold back nothing until the full idealization of man's life, as we believe that God designed it, shall have been secured.

But what we wish to bring out is that this view is no more adequate when it stands alone than is that other view when *it* stands alone. The excesses and extravagancies upon the one side are as disastrous as are the exaggerations on the other. A religion which is all of this world must in the end be but a parody of religion, so surely as must a religion which is all of the soul and of the other world. It is this which we feel when the smallness, the fragmentary nature, the outward and passing quality of that which thus for some takes up into itself the whole energy of religion, sometimes appals us.

For this would seem to be the true thing here to say: A single object of ethical, social, economic endeavor may be quite legitimate. It is the great sign of the times that we seek to spread thus the apprehension of the sacred and eternal over the things which have been left altogether on one side by the religious, or dismissed as secular. A single object of social, ethical, or economic endeavor may be upon occasion, above all others, the proper object for the Christian enthusiasm to set before itself. But so surely as that single object, or that single kind of object, is torn from its relation to the whole of life, is made the limit of

the horizon, the absolute content of life and goal of our endeavor, it loses all its light as a divine ideal, its glory as an object upon which true religion may expend itself. Religion cannot be thus circumscribed, shut in, cut off. The moment you limit it in this way, it ceases to be religion. It was at this point that the men of the elder view of religion, as belonging solely to the inner life and the other world, made their mistake. We are in danger of making precisely the same mistake, only the other way about. It may be true that I, as a Christian man, may be under obligation to pour out my life for the bettering of the economic condition of the poor. But if I am so carried away by my sympathy as to think, or to make those for whom I labor think, that that better economic condition of the poor is all, or even a large part, of what is meant by the Kingdom of God, then we are in danger of forgetting what religion is. Then the pursuit even of a great end becomes narrowing, hardening, lowering; the following of it does not lift us up in the old way, but drags us and all men down. The thing becomes a mere fad and fanaticism, and even the successful achievement of it would leave us only more sodden than we were before. A mind sobered by reflection upon the experience of humanity cannot but feel the infinite pathos of the assumption so widely current among us that where reforms—these or those, any or all—have been accomplished, all that we mean by the Kingdom of God will have come.

If ever an age should have been cured of the hallucination that wealth or the being absolved from toil brings blessedness, it should be this age of ours. Who is the man whom wealth blesses? Surely only the man who has something for which he cares more than he does for wealth; something which he would not have sacrificed to gain wealth; something for which he uses wealth now that it is gained. Caring most of all for that, he could be blessed even should he lose his wealth. Who is the man whom health blesses? Surely only that man who, having health, uses it as a priceless endowment of the power for work. On any other basis, the oxen beat us. But such a man as this of whom I speak would sacrifice health and even life itself tomorrow for a worthy end. Such a man, if he lost health, would then be exalted in character and hallowed and glorified through pain. Emerson said—"If a man will have too much, what goes

into his bag comes out of his soul." How much is too much? You can never answer that question in dollars. You have to know the man. A little is too much if one sets his soul upon it. In fact, even the dollars which a man never got have been too much for the man whose soul was shriveled through the passion for the getting them. At the bottom of our hearts we all admit that for anything concerning the constitution of the universe which we yet know, it will draw much nearer to being a God-forsaken world than it now is when all the courage, patience, tenderness, which are born of sorrow, and all the power and majesty of manhood which come by conflict and toil, are gone out of it and the sodden millennium of the flesh is come. Never fear! the millennium of the flesh thus isolated from the kingdom of the mind and spirit will never come. In every effort thus to bring it in, humanity has overreached itself. It will never come, the ideal condition of the outward lot and life, save by the same steps and in the same measure that the millennium of the mind and spirit come as well. When these come together, then the outward condition will be a benediction and not a curse.

For there is another thing which in this connection we must never forget. Into the things which we just now propose to storm by violence, or steal by sentimentality, the mental toil—most likely of whole generations—to discover principles and learn how to apply them must yet go. Nothing whatsoever can be counted gained here until it is intellectually valid. The mind of man, intent oftentimes upon the most painful problems, yet as problems of pure science and as if there were no pain, has worked out all the previous questions in the issue of which we, in modern civilization, stand in any way secure. One marvels, therefore, how in this day of universal praise of education, it is as if, midway of the process of discovery of the intellectual basis of the changes which our eager hearts forecast, the generation had suddenly lost patience. It is as if men could not wait for science, but must steal that good sign and set it up upon their own imaginings, must disregard the remonstrances of those who have made it their life business to try to find out what is the underlying truth in these relations. They must fall to abusing slow-footed, plodding intellect in the same breath with which they have decried the ancient faith. In the long period of difficult adjustment

which we have been passing through, the disagreement between the sciences and faith has sometimes been assumed to be a fundamental one. But to have the whole intellectual endeavor of a generation flouted because it also is not able to march fast enough, that is a picturesque experience. We advocates of religion, so long down-trodden, are touched in our sense of humor to find our old opponents, the scientific people, now somewhat in the same case. It looks as if we were going to be pungently reminded, from this side as well, of the wholeness of man's life, of the integrity of scientific processes, of the inviolable nature of evidence, of the impossibility of any real advance of man into a realm to which the sober, patient study of the facts and cautious induction from the facts, the brave and often costly experiment in the application of the facts, have not prepared the way.

Nothing that is not intellectually sound can possibly stand. Nothing which is not economically right, socially just and advantageous for all concerned, can in the long run by any possibility prevail. And concerning much that with passionate zeal and hot heart we do desire for others, or demand for ourselves, just that it is which has got to be worked out. The question is whether they are sound. You say that the Church must show sympathy. By all means! but sympathy is not the only quality requisite to leadership. Upon occasion it means more to leadership to be right than even to be sympathetic. We do not think so meanly of our fellows as to believe that any great majority of them want coddling. They do not know what is right. We do not any of us know altogether what is right. But the instant we go within ourselves we know that many things which are now being held out to people in the name of religion and to impress upon them the notion that we are sympathetic are not right and not wise. They are not intellectually sound, and they are not morally for the best. They refer too much, if not wholly, to rights, present advantages, outward gains, ease, and escape from toils and pains. They have not that note which every man knows to be true, that note which, believe me, this age and land of ours is waiting to hear, and knows that it ought to hear of all places on earth in the church of Christ; and which, when it hears, it obeys.

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XXII

THE THEORY OF PLEASURE

HARRY NORMAN GARDINER

THE word "pleasure" is ambiguous. We call a man's "pleasures" the things he takes pleasure in, usually his amusements. Again, "pleasure" is used to denote the whole of a concrete pleasurable experience. In psychology the term has a more restricted meaning. A distinction is drawn between the other factors of the experience and the feeling of its pleasantness. "Pleasure" then denotes this feeling, an aspect, moment or element of the pleasant experience. The distinction is in certain respects important. It is a question, for example, in the discussion of hedonistic theories of ethics, whether pleasures differ in quality, and so afford a ground of preference, or only in degree. Clearly if the question relates to concrete pleasures, the answer is plain: the pleasures differ in quality so far as there is any qualitative difference in their constituents, and this difference may be a valid ground of preference. But if the question relates to the mere pleasantness felt in the different experiences, abstraction being made of the other elements of the content, the answer is not so easy, for mere pleasantness is unanalysable and different instances of it are difficult to compare; hence the conflict of opinion on the subject among trained observers. Presumably a decision can be reached, if at all, only from considerations that are indirect. Again, it is sometimes asserted that pleasure is always the object of desire. But this, if mere pleasantness is meant, is evidently false, for it is only in the rarest cases that that is thought of as an object at all. On the other hand, if concrete pleasurable experience is meant, the assertion becomes almost a truism, for we certainly desire an experience fulfilling the desire and so far pleasant, though not necessarily so in other respects.

Psychology, then, understands by "pleasure" the feeling of pleasantness, of being pleased. This feeling cannot be defined, it can only be felt. But its psychological relations, the conditions of its genesis, its function in the mental and bodily economy can be studied and speculated about, and it is these which constitute what we call its "nature," and which form the subject-matter of the psychological theory.

The interest of such a theory is obvious from the place occupied by pleasure and its antithesis, displeasure, in human life. It is doubtful if there is a single moment of our waking consciousness in which one or the other of these feelings is altogether absent. It may indeed be that a given object appears to us as relatively, or altogether, indifferent; it is certainly true that we are not all the time rejoicing or grieving, nor much of the time reflectively thinking of how pleased, or how displeased, we feel; we may hardly be aware that we are feeling at all. But it is extremely doubtful whether, if we take pains to examine the matter, we shall not find either in the whole or in some aspect of our experience at a given time a degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, of being well or ill at ease, of liking or disliking, in a word, of feeling pleased or displeased. There can at any rate be no doubt concerning the universality of the experiences to which these feelings attach themselves. There is no kind of experience which may not excite them; sensations and ideas, emotions and actions, states and functions, things present, past and to come—everything that can in any way enter into consciousness at all is capable of affecting it in one or the other of these modes. These feelings have also a remarkable range of intensity, now pervasive and overwhelming, now restricted and more subconscious than noticed. The close connection of the two has often been commented on; the keenest pleasure seems often akin to, or to be mixed with, pain, and there is frequently a very rapid transition from the one state to the other. The influence of these feelings, moreover, on the course of mental life can hardly be exaggerated. They affect our sentiments, beliefs, judgments and conduct. The principal reason for this influence appears to be that they register for us, not indeed the reflective, but the immediate values of our experiences as agreeable or not agreeable. We naturally like what is pleasant and dislike what is unpleasant.

What pleases us is in so far good and accepted, what displeases us is in so far evil and avoided. True, there is such a thing as pleasure in pain. This phenomenon may be pathological, but it may also be an incident in the highest form of spiritual life. Christians have obeyed the injunction to "rejoice in tribulation" in both ways. In either way the phenomenon is due to special conditions and proves, not that pain or unpleasant experience is in itself pleasant and an object of liking, but only that, under certain circumstances, it may excite pleasure. On the other hand Antisthenes the Cynic expressed his abhorrence of "pleasure" by saying that he would rather be mad than pleased. But this was a judgment of moral reflection and implies what we are asserting, namely, the natural tendency to regard pleasure as a good, a tendency which Antisthenes found it important to resist, especially when "pleasure" was identified with the gratification of the sensuous appetites. The Cynic doubtless took pleasure in his Cynicism. The natural identification of pleasure and good has been the absorbing theme of ethics. Religion deals with the same subject in connection with ideas of sin and grace, of rewards and punishments, and of the future life. And both religion and ethics, while often condemning pleasure as a snare and the love of it as a sin, nevertheless recognise its claims. The rigoristic Kant admits it into the ultimate ethical ideal, the Puritan preacher extols it as it exists forevermore at the right hand of God.

It is not strange that a feeling so universal and significant should early have become an object of scientific reflection. Discussion took its rise prominently in the ethical schools of Greece in connection with the assertion and denial of the doctrine of hedonism.* Aristippus, identifying pleasure, good and utility, made definite what Socrates had left vague in his conception of happiness. The Cyrenaics joined to this evaluation of pleasure as the good or end of life a physiological doctrine of its nature: pleasure, they said, is a smooth or gentle "motion," in con-

* There were earlier speculations. Heraclitus, *e. g.*, connected pleasure with the soul's humidity; Diogenes of Apollonia, with aeration of the blood. The general tendency was to regard pleasure as related to suitable organic conditions, pain to their disturbance. But these early speculations were sporadic and led to nothing.

trast to pain, which is hard or rough, and in distinction from the intermediate state, which is either one of rest or a motion too slight to be perceived. As motion it is something positive, as gentle agreeable to nature, but it allows of no differences except of degree. Antisthenes and the Cynics, in repudiating hedonism, conceived of pleasure as something merely negative, the cessation of pain; some even declared that there was no such thing as pleasure, but only its illusory appearance.*

The questions thus raised needed profounder investigation, and this they received first from Plato and afterwards from Aristotle. In his estimate of pleasure as related to the end of life Plato varies. In the early *Protagoras* Socrates is represented as arguing on the basis of the assumption "that the pleasant is the good and the painful evil."† Knowledge has then the function of weighing and balancing pleasures and pains to the end that the conduct of life may lead to the greatest sum of pleasure. But in the *Gorgias* the pleasant and the good are sharply contrasted, and the advocate of pleasure being forced to admit the distinction between good pleasures and bad, is brought to the conclusion that pleasure is to be sought for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of pleasure. Neither view expresses the full Platonic doctrine. The first indeed is merely a stage in the defense of the Socratic thesis of the unification of the virtues by knowledge as against the sophistic assertion of their multifariousness, and may possibly be regarded as an assumption common to the disputants and sufficiently near the doctrine of the historical Socrates to be plausible. But the opposition of pleasure and good in the *Gorgias* was also not final. In the *Republic*, and more definitely in the *Philebus*, the relations of the two are more carefully considered, the conclusion being reached that pleasure, qualified as to its kind, is an essential ingredient of the highest form of life, the finally good life being one in which wisdom, pleasure and truth are symmetrically combined.‡

The considerations which lead to this result are partly logical and metaphysical, partly psychological, the different points of view never being sharply distinguished and the ethical interest

* Plato, *Phileb.*, 44 B, 51 A. Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* II, 1st, p. 308, n. 1.

† *Prot.*, 358.

‡ *Phileb.*, 64 f.

predominating throughout. An important section of the *Philebus* (12-16) treats dialectically of the relations of the one to the many in the realm of ideas, the object being to indicate the possibility and necessity of a division of the one thing called "pleasure" into its kinds. Pleasure in general is defined as a restoration of the natural organic harmony, the dissolution or destruction of which is pain.* This definition, like that of the Cyrenaics, conceives of pleasure as a positive organic process, though, of course, for Plato the feeling of the process is in the soul,† but a process of repair, of replenishment, conditioned, therefore, on an antecedent disturbance, the feeling of which is painful. The normal condition would be one of calm, neither pleasant nor unpleasant, a state ascribed to the gods. Plato is ever aware of the close connection of pleasure and pain, two bodies, as he says, with a single head.‡ The conditions of pleasure and pain are more precisely defined in the *Timæus*.§ There we learn that it is not any and every disturbance of harmony which is painful and its restitution pleasant, but that the respective movements must have a certain degree of intensity and suddenness. These qualifications enable Plato to bring under the terms of his theory dissolutions which are painless because no resistance is offered by the particles, and restorations which are without pleasure because the process is too gradual, and—most important for the classification and appreciation of pleasures—pleasures like sweet smells which have no antecedent pain, the explanation being that the "withdrawings and emptyings" are too gradual to be noticed, while the corresponding replenishments are great and sudden. A little later in the dialogue he accounts for the euphoria which, as he alleges, attends death from old age, contrasting with the painfulness of death from accident or disease, on the general principle that what is according to nature is pleasant, what is contrary, painful, without showing, what might perhaps have been for him not easy, that that, too, was a case of organic replenishment.

The above definition of pleasure, though stated in the *Philebus* in general terms, applies directly, it would seem, only to

* *Phileb.*, 31 E ff.; cf. 25 E f., *Cratyl.*, 419 C.

† *Tim.*, 64 B, *Laws*, 673 A, *Phileb.*, 33 D, *Rep.*, 462 C, 584 C.

‡ *Phædo*, 60 B.

§ *Tim.*, 64 f.

bodily pleasures, and Plato held that some pleasures were only of the soul. But he uses the general conception, either directly or analogically, in establishing the distinctions required by his theory of the sort of pleasure worthy of admission into the ideally good life. These are the distinctions of "pure" and "mixed" and of "true" and "false" pleasures. By a "pure" pleasure Plato means one free from pain, either as an antecedent condition or as a necessary concomitant; if it is conditioned on or combined with pain, it is "mixed." He finds, accordingly, that most sense-pleasures are "mixed," though some few are "pure" in the manner already explained in the case of sweet odors. Many mental pleasures are also "mixed," for they may be combined with bodily disturbance or depend on the fulfilling of a desire, which implies the unpleasantness of want. But characteristically and for the most part "pure" pleasures are of the mind. Now Plato is probably right in recognising mixed states of feeling, that is, states in which there is a feeling at once of pleasantness and unpleasantness. "Our sincerest laughter with some pain is fraught." But he unites this psychological doctrine with the questionable assumption that pleasure which is won at the cost of pain is itself contaminated by the pain and therefore of an inferior order. This assumption is developed in considering the partly coincident distinction of "true" and "false" pleasures. Pleasures are "false," he explains, when they import a wrong judgment regarding their objects, their quality or amount, or their intrinsic constitution. Here again Plato is on good psychological ground so far as he calls attention to the illusions to which we are all subject regarding the sources and attributes of our affective states.* But he regards the illusion as affecting not a mere attribute, but the very essence of the feeling; we suppose ourselves to be enjoying pure pleasure, when in reality we are experiencing a mixed state of feeling, pleasure infected with pain. And this, he holds, is more especially the case where the pleasure, as in sensual delight, is intense. Such pleasure he therefore disparages, not only as morally dangerous, but as pleasure. He maintains that "a small pleasure, or a small amount of pleas-

* *Phileb.*, 36 C ff. Cf. for a recent treatment of this theme Ribot, *Problèmes de psychologie affective* (1910), pp. 147-170 ("Sur une forme d'illusion affective").

ure, if pure and unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter (as well as truer and fairer) than a great pleasure, or a great amount of pleasure, of another kind." * As only "pure" pleasure is "true," or strictly, pleasure, it alone is admitted as a constituent of the good, which thus includes for Plato some simple sense-pleasures and some of an analogous sort, but pre-eminently the pleasures of knowledge. In the *Republic* the conception of the greater reality and truth of mental and moral pleasures is supported by the metaphysical argument that what is filled by the more real being is more really filled than what is filled by the less.† We have seen Plato explaining, in accordance with the terms of his theory, the painless pleasures of sense by the unsupported hypothesis of a gradual emptying and a great and rapid replenishment. Here the theory appears in a form which transcends all psychological boundaries under the analogy of a "filling" of the soul with reality. It needs scarcely to be remarked that the conclusion as to the superior "truth" and "reality" of certain pleasures is also extra-psychological. The intrinsic quality of pleasure, whether as such or in any respect good or bad, can only be precisely as it is felt. Under what conditions it is experienced with, or without, pain is a psychological question to be settled by induction; but whether it is always better and to be preferred when unconditioned by or unmixed with pain is not strictly a psychological question at all, but a matter of appreciation to be determined by other considerations than that of mere "purity."

Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure takes a broader and more objective survey of the facts. At the outset he frees himself from the ambiguities attaching to the conception of pleasure as "motion" and places himself squarely on psychological ground by declaring it to be, like the act of vision or a mathematical point, whole and indivisible and all at once. In particular he rejects the Platonic notion that it is a process of replenishment, regarding that notion as suggested by the pains and pleasures of nutrition, but as inapplicable to many other pleasures which are not preceded by a sense of want.‡ Positively, his own view is that

* *Phileb.*, 51 ff.

† *Rep.*, IX, 583 ff.

‡ *Eth. Nic.*, X, cc. 3 and 4. In *Rhet.* I, 11, 1369, b 33 we find pleasure defined in terms strongly reminiscent of Plato as "a certain movement of

pleasure is a concomitant of the normal exercise of the faculties. The free and unimpeded exercise, or functional realisation, of any natural capacity and of the vital energies in their totality is pleasant; experienced restriction, unpleasant. The greatest pleasure relatively to a given function is obtained when the faculty is at its best and the fullest scope is afforded by the stimulus to its exercise. This is one ground for the superiority of the pleasures of the intellect as compared with those of sense. In the latter the ratio of stimulus to capacity is limited: transcend the limit and the exercise is impaired; but in thought, although owing to natural conditions its exercise cannot be continued indefinitely, activity increases and the faculty is more fully realised with every advance in the intellectual character of its objects. Hence so far is Aristotle from agreeing with Plato in thinking it unworthy of the gods to ascribe to them pleasure, that he conceives of the Deity as experiencing in the uninterrupted exercise of perfectly fulfilled intellection highest and completest joy.*

Now this doctrine which connects pleasure with the normal exercise of faculty undoubtedly accords with a far larger number of facts than that which makes it consist in a process of restoration of a disturbed organic harmony. But does it fit in with all the facts? There are pleasures of activity, certainly, many of them; but there are also pleasures of recreation and repose. And there are "pathological" pleasures which appear to contradict the assumption that pleasure is always a symptom of "normal" activity and, therefore, an index of welfare. How does Aristotle deal with such cases? Well, he notices them and suggests explanations. He tells us, for instance, that "all conditions of ease, comfort or inattention, amusements, recreations and sleep" are pleasures, the reason being that they fulfil and express either natural or acquired tendencies and conform to the general

the soul and a sudden and sensible settling into the normal state." But, however this is to be interpreted, it cannot be set against the express rejection in the Ethics of the idea that pleasure is a *κίνησις*. The definition, which is introduced by *προκείμεθα ἡμῖν*, may be taken as an assumption sufficiently accurate for the purpose in hand. In the sequel the emphasis is on the normal and natural conditions of the affection. See Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1867), App. D to Bk. I.

* *E. N.*, X, 7; *Met.* 12 (Δ), 7, 1072 b 14 f.

conditions of life.* This is clearly a modification of the original doctrine in that it includes, along with the actual realisation of faculty, the realisation of tendencies incidental thereto. But abnormal tendencies may be acquired and their fulfilment, on the theory, must also yield pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, will not be in all cases an index of the normal fulfilment of vital energies. But it may still be "natural" in one sense of the term, for habit is second nature. The difficulty is to define the "normal." Aristotle does not attempt to formally define it, but assumes an *ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ* as the standard and declares that base pleasures, like perverted tastes in disease, are not pleasures "except to corrupt men."† This is his version of Plato's "false" pleasures.

Aristotle holds that pleasures differ in kind according to the differences in the faculties whose exercises they complete, and this view he supports by observing the facilitating effect of the pleasure attending any kind of activity on that kind and its inhibitory effect on rival activities.‡ They thus differ in purity, for sight is "purer" than touch, hearing than smell and intellection than any sense. Independently of this distinction, which refers not to freedom from pain, but from "matter,"§ Aristotle also recognises, with Plato, "mixed" states of feeling, the most conspicuous illustrations of which are found in the emotions. He further notes the differences of pleasure relative to the total life-functions of one species of animal as compared with another and the individual differences among members of the same species, using these facts as a background for the conception of a normal life-function for man.

Besides its relation to the cognitive powers, pleasure has important relations to conation and conduct, the outstanding features of which Aristotle has drawn with a firm and sure touch. It is unnecessary to go into details. The point of ethical interest is that while pleasure consolidates or suppresses tendencies, it is not itself a criterion of the tendencies desirable to cultivate, nor does it show how the different tendencies of our nature are

* *Rhet.* I, 11; cf. *Probl.*, 878 b 11: "the way to what is natural is sweet, if only it be perceived."

† *E. N.*, X, 5, 10 f.

‡ *Ib.*, 5, 1-5.

§ See Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, II, p. 435.

to be organised into a perfect life. Life consists essentially for Aristotle in the continued renewal and fulfilment of functions. Pleasure and life seem constantly conjoined, as the theory, partly supported by this observation, requires;* pain marks a disturbance, an interruption. But pleasure is not the realisation of any vital function. It is not *ἐνέργεια*, but *ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ*. There is no faculty of pleasure in the exercise of which life finds even a partial, much less its complete fulfilment. Pleasure is an added perfection, a supervenient grace, "like the bloom of youth."† If, therefore, the end of life is the fulfilment of life, pleasure will be a concomitant of it, but not the end itself. And if the end of human life is the realisation of man's specifically human functions, we must seek it in the fullest expression throughout its whole extent of man's rational nature. This is "good life," a state of *εὐδαιμονία*, pleasant, but not *ἡδονή*. This is Aristotle's reply to hedonism.

Little of importance was added by antiquity to the psychology of pleasure except perhaps the teaching of Epicurus, which Cicero and others found an object of ridicule, that the calm, but fixed and stable (*καταστηματική*) pleasure of the memory of days spent in the study of philosophy was capable of overcoming the acutest bodily suffering. This, however, was not a theory of its ultimate nature. The Stoics made *ἡδονή* one of the four principal "passions," which they defined, now as excessive impulses, now as false judgments or perversions of reason. This uncertainty of classification prevailed, pleasure and pain being reckoned now with the "active" and now with the "cognitive" powers, till Sulzer, Tetens and Kant set up the present traditional tripartite division of the mental faculties and assigned pleasantness and unpleasantness to the distinct division of "feeling." The wholesale condemnation of *ἡδονή* did not prevent the Stoics from admitting pleasurable states among the approved dispositions, *e. g.*, *τέρψις*, wholesome pleasure in the use of the higher senses, and *εὐφροσύνη*, *bonhomie*, or delight in social intercourse.

* *E. N.*, X, 4, 7.

† *Ib.*, 4, 8. It apparently conflicts with this that pleasure is described in *E. N.*, VII, 12, as an unimpeded *ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξω*. It is sufficient to remark that Bk. VII (with V and VI) is in all probability derived from the Ethics of Eudemus. See Stewart, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 218 ff.

But they had no theory of pleasantness as such. Thus the theories of Plato and Aristotle stand out as typical and representative. And they have remained so not only for antiquity, but to a large extent for the history of opinion on the subject down to the present time. Hamilton is not altogether wide of the mark when he classifies all conceptions of pleasure as either Platonic or Aristotelian, as repeating with various modifications the idea that it is either connected with the restoration of equilibrium or a concomitant and sign of unimpeded activity.*

It is no part of our present purpose to trace the history of the modern doctrine. We turn rather at once to the more recent phases of the discussion and, confronting that with the ancient, enquire in what respects our knowledge has been advanced and our insight developed. Now there are at least three things characterising the present state of the psychology of the affections which offer a favorable comparison. First, its strictly empirical attitude: it seeks to study the facts, to discover their causes and effects and to build up a theory of their conditions, relations and general significance in life as far as possible without *parti pris*. It is, therefore, no longer controlled by ethical, metaphysical or other practical or theoretical interests. It is not free from presuppositions, nor even altogether from hindering prejudices, but it has become extremely critical of possible sources of error and extremely suspicious of the invasion into its territory of ideas not derived from the accredited results or working hypotheses of recognised science.† Secondly, its interpretations are aided by the total outcome of its own discipline, so that, for example, it is no longer concerned with the relation of an affection to our "faculties," but only to the movement and organisation of our functioning, empirically conditioned, life, as well as by the positive knowledge and guiding ideas furnished by the modern advances of the biological sciences. It is characterised, in the third place, by a rich development of methods of investigation, largely experimental. In a recent article Külpe

* Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, II, p. 444 ff.

† As an illustration of the strictly empirical, critical spirit of modern enquiry we may refer to Ribot's demand that in studying pleasure we free ourselves from the confusing prejudice that pleasure is the "contrary" of pain; *op. cit.*, p. 127 ("Sur la nature du plaisir").

distinguishes six *classes* of methods, enumerating under each a variety of elementary methods, in one case, that of registering the reactions, as many as fourteen.*

The meagreness of positive results obtained from all this experimental research is, however, it must be sadly confessed, exceedingly disappointing. We have learned a little about the relation of intensity of stimulus to intensity of feeling, and know, for example, that increasing the stimulus adds to the displeasure of an unpleasant impression, but does not necessarily increase the pleasure of a pleasant one; and similar relations hold with repetition and continuance of the impression. But all this we know, if not precisely, from every-day experience. We have also discovered that pleasure, when obtained under the simplest experimental conditions, characteristically "expresses" itself in movements of the vital organs: the pulse, for example, is strengthened and retarded. But it is not easy to interpret the phenomena and many of the results of this sort obtained by different investigators are conflicting and the suspicion which attaches to certain instruments of measurement, *e. g.*, the ergograph and dynamometer, which were at one time supposed to show that pleasure increased, while pain decreased, the vital energy, at least temporarily, is extended by many to the whole method of expression, at least when employed apart from the introspection required by the method of impression. Meanwhile many problems, capable of experimental study, press for solution. What, for instance, is the exact relation of pleasure and displeasure to facility and arrest? Does pleasure always attend unimpeded activity? How about the "*res severa verum gaudium*" and the joy of struggle? What is its relation to attention and interest? Scores of such questions rise up to remind the psychologist how much this department of his science lags behind every other in definite achievement.

Contrasting with this meagreness in positive results we have a luxuriant variety of conflicting hypotheses. Opinions differ even as to the kind of mental fact we are here dealing with, for while all call it a "feeling" or "affection" and most assert a generic difference between that and other aspects of the mental

* O. Külpe, *Pour la psychologie des sentiments*. J. de psych. norm. et path., VII, pp. 1-13. 1910.

life, some hold it to be a general "attribute" of consciousness (*e. g.*, Marshall), some a unique "element" (Külpe, Titchener), while others, finding no clear criteria by which to mark off feeling from sensation, declare it to be a kind of sensation, either organic, as *e. g.* a sort of diffused tickling (Bourdon), or central, a form of cerebral coenæsthesia (Stumpf). This last view claims support from the analogy with bodily pain, for which special nerves have been discovered, and also from a certain localisation in sexual pleasure. But its opponents point in refutation to the absence of any evidence for special organs of pleasure and explain so-called bodily pleasures and pains as sensations markedly affective in quality or effect. A broader theory (Baldwin's) holds that pleasure and pain (displeasure) are probably both sensations and *qualia* of consciousness according to the genetically determined conditions of their appearance. They have also been described from the point of view of the "action" theory of consciousness as impulses in the service of perception (Münsterberg).*

As to kinds of pleasure, the distinction being drawn between the concrete mental state and the feeling of pleasantness, it is still possible to distinguish it according to its sources as sensuous and ideal and according to its character as exciting and calm, general and particular (attached to individual objects), and the like; but whether it embraces a plurality of qualitative differences, as Wundt thinks, or is always intrinsically the same, as Külpe holds, is a question not yet settled. Probably the majority of contemporary psychologists favor the latter opinion.

As to the immediate conditions of its genesis in the individual, the theories may be broadly divided into psychological and physiological. Psychological theories tend to be either intellectualistic or, in the widest sense of the term, voluntaristic. The former, assuming the priority in mental life of the presentational content, make "feeling" in general a function of the content and pleasure in particular a product of its freely developing ac-

* It is perhaps worth noting that Aristotle commonly assigns them to *αἰσθησις* and occasionally to the *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* (*Top.*, IV, 5, 126 a g). But these ascriptions, from which the scholastic reference to the affections to the "sense-appetite" is derived, have nothing in common with the "action" theory and are far from identical with the "sensation" theory. Aristotle's *αἰσθησις* is our "feeling" in the broad sense.

tivity, or of the favorable relations of its elements. This was the view of Herbart. The latter, assuming activity or functional process as fundamental, make pleasure and displeasure functions in the process of apperception or assimilation of content or in some form of psychic activity agreeing or disagreeing with the tendencies uppermost at the moment, whatever their character in other respects, whether profound or superficial. This is the view, with varying shades of difference, of Ward, Stout, Lipps and Wundt. Physiological theories, divided over the question of a central organ of affection—for which there is little evidence—tend to agree in connecting pleasantness and unpleasantness with conditions suitable or unsuitable for efficient organic activity and ultimately with contrasting processes in the trophism of the higher centres. There are numerous forms of the theory, some highly speculative and hardly to be followed in details. One of the best known, and on the whole most plausible, is that of Dr. Marshall. Marshall conceives of pleasure and pain as determined by the relation of the energy stored up by nutrition of the blood in the neural elements or systems corresponding to noetic consciousness and the demand made by the stimulus. If the neural elements or systems are so well nourished as to react forcibly to the stimulus, we have pleasure, if they are so ill-nourished as to act but feebly to the same stimulus, we have pain.* Many facts of experience favor this hypothesis, notably those in which a change from a moderate to a great stimulus brings about a transition from pleasure to pain; but it does not well fit them all. Even with the gratuitous assumption of Dr. Marshall that every sensation is, or would be, pleasant, with a stimulus moderate enough, it is hard to believe, for example, that the neural elements corresponding to the smell of rotting fish are so ill-nourished as compared with those excited by the scent of honeysuckle that the demand made on the former by even a slight stimulus is excessive, while the response of the latter, under normal conditions, is invariably efficient.

The idea, common to nearly all modern and ancient doctrine, that pleasure is a concomitant and sign of ease, efficiency, success in the ongoing mental and bodily processes, is expressed in a

* H. R. Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics*, pp. 15 ff. (1894.) *Consciousness*, pp. 250 ff. (1909.)

special and significant form in the modern biological theory, associated particularly with the names of Bain and Spencer, that pleasure is the product, symptom and cause of organic welfare, the contrary being true of pain. "Pains," says Spencer, "are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare." And again, "Every pleasure increases vitality; every pain decreases vitality. Every pleasure raises the tide of life; every pain lowers the tide of life."* Stated thus, the theory is more a deduction from the assured principles of evolution than an inductive generalisation from observed facts. Recent criticism has brought to light such a mass of adverse evidence—harmful pleasures (alcohol, morphine), beneficial pains (surgical operations), grave organic troubles without pain (arterio-sclerosis, phthisis, tuberculosis), pleasure which the bodily condition fails to justify (euphoria of the dying and insane), displeasure having little or no connection with bodily health (intellectual, æsthetic, moral displeasure), sensations having a degree of unpleasantness out of all proportion to the organic injury involved (*e. g.*, from a cinder in the eye), useful actions the pleasure in which bears little relation to the degree of their utility (breathing air, eating bread):—the classes might be variously extended and the illustrations indefinitely multiplied—that it is impossible to maintain with any strictness the existence of a connection between pleasure and organic welfare, pain and organic injury. We may then either acknowledge the connection in general while denying it in detail, or we may acknowledge it in the details of the organic process while denying it for the organic process as a whole. The first is the course adopted by Mr, Spencer himself when he admits, indeed insists, that the pleasures acquired by past accommodations are no criteria of what is useful for an organism required to accommodate itself to ever new conditions, especially those arising, as in the case of man, from an artificial civilisation; but this fails to explain the many persistent anomalies in purely organic pains and pleasures. The latter is the explanation of Lotze, Lehmann and others, who hold, for example, that a pleasant poison is good for the tongue, though bad for the blood and the organism generally; but this isolates the interrelated parts of

* Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, § 124; *Data of Ethics*, § 36.

an organic process and leaves little remaining of the theory that pleasure is an index of organic welfare.*

There are two truths, however, underlying the theory which it is important not to lose sight of. One is that the conditions and meaning of pleasurable experience have to be sought in part at least in the evolutionary history of the race. This is an essentially modern way of looking at the matter which, when the hypothetical construction goes hand in hand with observation of facts now open to our inspection, promises a genuine development of our insight. And it seems altogether probable, in view of what we now see of the effect of pleasure on action and of the connection of pleasure with healthful activities, that the habitual reactions to the conditions favorable to life—reactions to light, air, warmth, food, etc.—when sufficiently intense to rise to consciousness and not too intense for easy accommodation, were originally connected with pleasant feeling and constitute its primordial and fundamental source. It cannot be denied that pleasure, as such, always feels good and that pain feels bad. But the conditions of organic evolution are so extraordinarily complex, the lines of hereditary transmission so tangled, and the aims and interests of a human being so far in excess of those concerned with the maintenance and propagation of the life of the organism, that any advances in the interpretation of the principle as applied to our affections seem bound to be slow and likely to remain always more or less tentative. A theory which connects them all with organic welfare and injury is too simple. The second element of truth in the biological theory is that pleasure seems always to be connected with enhancement of function. The mistake lies in identifying that with organic welfare. It is not of the furtherance of energies conducive to organic or mental well-being that pleasure is the sign, but of the emergence into consciousness of inherited or acquired organic or mental dispositions with which the self of the moment, and not necessarily the larger self of reflective consciousness, feels itself identified. Pleasure is an index of value, but what it indicates is not, as such, the real and

* For criticisms of the theory, see Wundt, *Phys. Psych.* ⁵, II, p. 354 f.; Ribot, *Psych. d. sentiments*, pp. 87-91; Külpe, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 268-270; especially C. Nádejde, *Die biologische Theorie der Lust und Unlust*, Heft I. Leipzig, 1908.

permanent values of existence, but the subordinate, though in many respects still highly important, value of the free and lively play of function agreeable to the latent and more or less profoundly organised tendencies of the psychic individual. What pleases is an object, state or activity by or in which a function is consciously exercised conforming to the demands of the tendency. Pleasure, as expressing and furthering this function, is indeed a sign of enhanced vitality, not, however, of the organism, but of the tendency and of the function sustaining it.

This view of pleasure is substantially the view of Aristotle, substituting "function" for "faculty." If we may assume in the free and unimpeded exercise of a function above the level of mere mechanical adjustment or a subconscious stirring too slight to be noticed a vital process disturbing to the bare equilibrium of latent energies, but tending to settle and consolidate them as functional tendencies, we may even include in it a characteristic moment of the conception of Plato. But modern psychology, speaking broadly, lends no countenance to the notion that every pleasure is preceded by conscious pain. Nor does it support the contentions of either pessimism or hedonism. It agrees with the ancient doctrine that pleasure is a "good," for which even Plato may be cited, and which cannot be successfully denied. The theologians and moralists who have decried pleasures as evil have not really meant to include all pleasure in their condemnation. The distinction of pleasure from its conditions enables us to go farther and say that it is always a good. But it is a good strictly limited. It is not a measure of all the values of life, but only of the unobstructed flow of the energies temporarily expressing present tendencies. The origin of these tendencies must be sought in the complicated phylogeny and ontogeny of the individual. Their ultimate evaluation belongs partly to biology, partly to the normative sciences of the mind, and in practical reference in large part to ethics and religion.

SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

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XXIII

NATURAL TELEOLOGY

BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE

THE operations of nature do not appear to be aimless changes. They issue in specific products the history of which can be traced and construed as the adaptation of means to ends. It is, doubtless, this aspect of nature as the producer of definite and particular results which, more than any other, profoundly stirs the imagination and provokes scientific curiosity. From of old the coming into being of things in an ordered world and their passing away has been the theme of both poet and scholar. Reflection, after it has endured disappointment and sophistication, may come to view nature with eyes less fascinated by her productivity, seeing in her nothing but an aimless and ceaseless rearrangement of elements to which chance or a human prejudice in favor of final causes imparts the illusory appearance of direction; but such is not the spontaneous vision of things. There they are, constituting the great whole we call nature, each of them with its individual history culminating through many helps and hindrances in the present product. Illustrations are so abundant that choice is baffled in selecting the most appropriate. For while living things may at first appear to be more evidently the products of directive and selective forces, inanimate nature itself—the plain with mountains about it, the river with its course motivated by the character of the land through which it flows—exhibits likewise the adaptation of means to ends. And the adaptations are admirable, well-calculated, the more they are analyzed, to produce the specific results which eventuate. Thus we come to think that we have explained the origin of anything when we are able to view it as the kind of result we should expect from the

operation of the factors which have produced it. But this means, of course, that these factors serve. They aid and abet the outcome in definite ways and will produce it if no obstacles of sufficient contrary influence thwart their natural productivity. Thus individual existence appears to be the outcome of the success of processes which help toward the realization of some specific end over those that hinder this realization. Nature is a domain, not of chaotic changes, but of definite, teleological changes pointing to particular results. In other words, in view of nature's productivity, there are helps and hindrances; things and the elements of things have specific uses.

Philosophy has not always been content to take this fact of specific usefulness as metaphysical, something to be set down as of the nature of things. Explanation has been sought of it and the question asked, Why do things have their uses, and, indeed, their specific uses? In asking this question philosophy has been stimulated by an analogy which has often proved of striking value, the analogy between nature and art. For art, like nature, produces. Its procedure is an adaptation of means to ends. Now art is controllable and its manner of operating is measurably obvious, while nature is stubborn and obscure. The building of a house is a comparatively simple process for analysis, but the factors which combine to produce a star require long searching for their discovery. To pass from art to nature thus affords knowledge the desired opportunity of passing from the better to the less known. Science has ever availed itself of this opportunity and by so doing has often attained its most signal achievements. The analogy between nature and art captivates the imagination also and has been no mean instrument in the poet's hands. And it has an obvious bearing on the problem of use. Its record in this respect has, however, been unsatisfactory. Instead of leading to accepted and intelligible opinion, it has led to bitter controversy. Instead of clarifying use, it has, more often, obscured and mystified use. Its procedure is reviewed here, not for the idle purpose of fighting old battles over again, but in the hope of securing fresh emphasis upon the obvious, but often neglected, fact that teleology is natural; that use is something on which to build, not something requiring explanation; that it is a datum in metaphysics.

I

Art, when consciously productive, evidently intends its products to be useful. A house is made for shelter, clothing for protection or adornment, pictures to delight the sense. The skill of the artist is measured by the success with which he makes his materials serve his chosen end. The finality of art appears, thus, to be an imparted and intended finality. So we find a ready explanation of the usefulness of the things man makes in the intention or design with which he makes them. Asking why the loom so successfully weaves the colored fabric, we get the answer, it was made in order that it might do precisely the thing which we admire. Furthermore our admiration of the product passes over into even greater admiration of the skill which could contrive a machine so useful. Thus in the products of art we seem to have instances where the explanation of use is obvious. The ease of the explanation readily begets a habit of thinking about use generally, leading us to regard all uses as designed for the ends they serve. Since the hand is so useful for grasping it may be thought of as made in order to grasp. Since the adaptations of nature grow more wonderful the more they are perceived, nature may be thought of as directed by a skill commensurate with such wonder. The analogy between nature and art thus easily constituted is reinforced by human necessities. For man needs the useful in order that he may live long and well. His life is a struggle for help. Nature, too, appears to struggle and its products, like man himself, fail if help is not attained. Indeed, so profoundly may this analogy between nature and art affect the mind, that it becomes incredible that the uses of nature have any other explanation than in a power great enough and intelligent enough to contrive their manifold adaptations. Thus philosophy is led to explain natural use by design and to see in the varied adaptations of means to ends in nature proof of intelligent direction. Nature becomes thus a work of art.

If this explanation of the uses of things, this thinking of nature as somehow a work of art with its adaptations admirably contrived, does not settle down into an unquestioned faith, it suffers in its satisfactoriness from further reflection. For no work of man's art is so perverse as nature. The spider and the fly

have afforded a favorite illustration of this. How admirably adapted is the spider's web for catching flies! But shall we also say, How admirably are flies adapted to be caught! Such a summer's day illustration may provoke a smile at the ease with which philosophy may embrace a hasty conclusion. The tragedies of life, however, the tragedies which arise out of these same adaptations which we have been asked to admire, provoke amazement and leave the mind bewildered. Expected harvests blighted in a night, lives of promise lost through no discoverable fault, even the kindnesses of men turned to cruelty when blame can be lodged at no one's door—these and a multitude of similar instances make nature as a work of art irrational and perverse. Indeed, if philosophy has found it easy to accept the adaptations of nature as evidence of intelligent contrivance, it has also found it easy to tear that evidence to shreds. Count only the gains, the seed breaking upward towards the life-engendering sun, and the inference to design looks easy; but count the losses also, the frost that kills before the blossom, and the inference is hard. If, when all is considered, belief in design still lingers, it is belief in a design the purposes of which are past finding out, and clearness of philosophical vision gives place to profound bewilderment. Nature, as a work of art, becomes, thus, an inscrutable mystery.

There are other considerations besides nature's perversity which disturb the opinion that use may be explained by intelligent design. The analogy between nature and art may be preserved while the inference to intelligent direction is abandoned. For the products of art often turn out to have uses which the artist neither intended nor suspected. In breaking stones, man discovered fire. In trying to make gold, he found what gold could never buy. But there is no need of striking illustrations, for accidental advantage is one of the commonest attendants of directed activity. Now this fact may be generalized as well as that of intelligent direction, and use be, consequently, explained as an accident, as something which attaches to things not by design or for any ascertainable reason, but, as we are wont to say, by chance. Incredible as such an explanation often appears when first proposed, it grows in credibility as it is steadily contemplated. For, contradictory as it may seem, the appeal to

chance tends to become, when attention is focused on the thing that happens, an appeal to necessity. Long ago Democritus noted that the orderly arrangement of the sand, the pebbles, and the stones upon a beach was not due to any designed selection, but was the necessary result of the coincidence of these things and the action of the waves. So, too, while the arrangement of plants in a garden may show the gardener's taste and skill, the distribution of vegetation about the shores of a lake, although no less remarkable in its arrangement, needs no gardener for its explanation; for, again, the fact that water and soil have happened to meet there under certain natural conditions excludes any other explanation of the resulting order. And it has not been difficult to extend a similar explanation to the marvellous structures and functions of animals. Its apparent incredibility when so extended steadily diminishes with greater familiarity with the facts and with increased experimentation, until it becomes no longer easy—it may, indeed, become impossible—to think of nature as a work of art. Its uses and adaptations appear rather to be accidental, because they simply befall under the conditions which happen to exist in any given case. They appear also to be necessary, because, given these conditions, no other results than the actual appear to have been possible.

The explanation of use by design founded upon the analogy between nature and art finds thus a rival explanation in the contention that use is the outcome of chance and necessity, a rival founded upon the same analogy. The first is a generalization from intended use and the second is a generalization from unintended use. Yet the second has a certain superiority over the first. The perversity of nature, as we have seen, reduces the generalization of design to a mystery, making the purposes of nature inscrutable. But it is just this perversity which the contrasted generalization appears competent to explain. For, if there is no design in nature, but advantage and disadvantage fall out as the conditions happening at the time determine, perversity in nature is something to be expected. Life will be quickened under the sun's grateful warmth, but be destroyed by the sudden frost. As nature works for no hoped for or expected results, its results are simply those that happen. Thus within the limits of their definitions, within the limits, that is,

set by the facts from which they are generalizations, the inference to design is inferior to the inference to chance and necessity. Yet the conviction that things must be as they are is a potent means of obscuring what they are, and the appeal to chance is often only a device to end our curiosity. To conclude, therefore, that the teleology of nature has been explained, may not, after all, be an exhibition of wisdom.

There lurks in the argument which, in contrast to the argument from design, may be called the argument from chance and necessity, an obscurity regarding what it has really achieved which is seldom sufficiently emphasized. The argument is essentially negative. It insists that there is no valid reason for appealing to design in explaining the adaptations of nature; it points out that these adaptations, when clearly seen, appear to be the natural outcome of the conditions under which they arise; when applied to specific cases, it often succeeds in tracing admirably the history of the adaptations involved. These are admitted services. But it may not claim that use has been explained, that a world of useless things could by chance or by necessity become a world of useful things. Its most ardent supporters would hardly venture to make such a claim. Yet the suggestion of it serves to show the limits within which the argument moves. Chance, that is, can operate to produce adaptation only under conditions where that adaptation is already possible. A variation can turn out to be useful only in an environment where it has a possible use. It would be quite profitless, for example, for an organism to develop eyes in a world where there was nothing to see. Thus chance and necessity can operate to secure adaptation only in a world where things have their specific uses, only in a world already essentially teleological. The uses and adaptations of nature remain, having lost nothing of their teleological character from our efforts to explain them or to explain them away. Nature may not be a work of art. It may not be a work of chance. It is a domain of uses where chance and design may operate, but it is a domain of uses first.

Still the analogy between nature and art may be preserved, but it should now be less ambitiously construed. Art and nature both produce and their products are both useful and instances of the adaptation of means to ends. But in neither case is use

itself something produced. Not to be sufficiently conscious of this fact is to run the risk of confusing the analogy and indulging in unwarranted speculations. Art makes useful things and may make them with or without intention, but it never makes things useful. That fact alone renders the argument from design or from chance logically illegitimate. Since the sun's warmth is grateful, it may be thought of as graciously bestowed. Life would indeed be poor if such a sentiment were forbidden; but sentiment is not reason. It is one thing to call the sun gracious because its effects are grateful, but it is quite a different thing to regard these effects as evidence that the sun acts with a motive. Poetry and science are separated by that difference. It is imperative in science that evidence should be evidence, that the facts cited should be unequivocal in their import. But in the illustration it is clear that the sun's warmth would be grateful even if it were bestowed with malice or with no motive at all. To be sure a generous gift implies a generous giver, but the thing given is not a gift because it has the quality of being generous. It is a gift for other reasons, and no connection is discoverable between these reasons and that quality which warrants an inference from the one to the other. So too with respect to use; if a thing is useful, it is useful irrespective of the causes which produced it, and no connection is discoverable between its use and its causes which warrants an inference from the one to the other. It is not because it is a work of art that a watch is useful; and it is not because the adaptations in nature may be the work of chance that they are useful. The use of anything is, thus, no evidence whatever of the character of its origin. A thing may originate by art or it may originate by chance, but whether it is useful or not is not thereby determined. Since, therefore, there is no ascertained connection between use as use, on the one hand, and chance or design, on the other, the arguments which have been considered lack the kind of evidence required by science. Use is, accordingly, to be set down, not as a product of nature or of art, but as a factor in their productivity. Art and nature are, therefore, alike in this, that in their productions use is discovered and applied.

II

The argument thus far pursued points to the conclusion that use, when it exists, is not produced, but discovered, that, in the last analysis, it is an original property of whatever possesses it. Teleology is natural, something to build upon, not something to be explained. There is, as Aristotle insisted long ago, a final factor in every instance of production, and thus a final factor among the factors of evolution. But it may be urged that thus to regard use as natural is not to provide knowledge with a valuable category. It is the business of knowledge, one may claim, to study how things do and may go together. It is causes and not uses which constitute the object of scientific research. To look for them with an eye on use is to rob science of its disinterestedness. For use is detected only as means and ends are distinguished, while causes operate independent of such distinction. If, therefore, it is affirmed that use is a factor in nature's processes, must it not also be affirmed that nature distinguishes between means and ends? And does not this latter affirmation imply that nature, after all, operates intelligently, and so open the door again to visionary speculation?

But there is no peculiar sanctity attaching to the category of causation, just as there is no peculiar sanctity attaching to any category of thought. Consequently, when it is asserted that nature must operate intelligently if means and ends are to be naturally distinguished, there is a ready retort in the assertion that nature must also operate intelligently if causes and effects are to be naturally distinguished. Yet it is not good philosophy to dismiss an objection simply by pointing out that it shares the difficulty which it raises. For simply to put one's argument and objections to it in the same boat is not to be well-assured of a prosperous voyage. Reason may be better served by a consideration of her chart, for her voyage is not arbitrary, nor her port self-chosen. To drop the figure, the mind cannot create the distinctions which it discovers. Were there no causes and effects discoverable in nature, nature would never be construed by the mind in those terms. And the same is true of means and ends. That ends are reached in nature through the utilization of serviceable means is as simple and unsullied a fact of observation

as any other. It is not read into the order of things; and surely disinterested inquiry should not read it out for the irrelevant reason that intelligence is necessary in order to observe it. The sole question to be raised about any category of thought is the extent of its applicability. Now to claim that the distinction between means and ends is known only when intelligence operates is not the same as to claim that the distinction exists only when intelligence operates. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, there is no discoverable connection between intelligence and use which warrants an inference from the one to the other. The category of use is not, therefore, necessarily limited in its application to the field where intelligence operates. Philosophy is amply justified in supposing that a world of useful things could exist, characterized by the adaptation of means to ends and yet unilluminated throughout its whole extent by the presence of thought. Only, let it be added, such a world would not be our world.

Our world is illumined by thought. By such illumination the distinction between means and ends, together with all other discoverable distinctions, gains in significance. The gain, however, is still natural. It is another instance of natural teleology. For nature produces thinking beings as well as whirling stars. It is, consequently, no more astonishing that men should philosophize than that bodies should fall; that nature, through its products, should operate intelligently, than that it should operate unintelligently. There are, doubtless, difficulties in tracing the natural genesis of intelligent beings, but these difficulties are not reasons for concluding that their genesis is not natural. Men are not dropped into the world from without. Nature may, therefore, be said to be intelligent, but the statement should not be rendered absurd by a misuse of the concept of totality. One may speak of nature as a whole if one's intention is to be as inclusive as possible in one's utterances. For nature as a whole is simply nothing left out, but nothing more. As a whole, nature allows no other descriptive predicates. It is simply the domain where predicates are specific in their application. To affirm, therefore, that nature is intelligent, is to affirm that among the total of its specific operations intelligence is to be included. Since nature appears to be intelligent in this sense, since our

world is illumined by thought, the distinction between art and nature turns out to be a distinction within nature itself, a distinction between nature as intelligent and nature as unintelligent. It points to a specific instance of the adaptation of means to ends. It is a special case of use. Thus, far from creating the distinction between means and ends, intelligence is one of its most significant illustrations.

In metaphysics, moreover, the category of use would appear to be indispensable. Here, at least, where the aim is to define the factors which enter into existence generally, our view of things is warped by a too exclusive emphasis upon causation. Metaphysics may be limited in the appeal it makes, and our chief business in life may remain the discovery of the quantitative value of the factors which combine to effect any change; but only a mind long habituated to the disregard of all but the quantitative can be content to construe the world generally only in quantitative terms. The quantitative is only so much, and always so much of the concrete and the qualitative, of sugar and salt, of gold and silver, of space and time, of motion and electricity. Furthermore, all our skill is unable to discover any connection between the quantitative value of a cause and the peculiar character of its efficiency. The quantity of food required to sustain life does not resemble the quality of the life sustained. And while we may consider such a generalization as the conservation of energy to be among the triumphs of scientific induction, its value consists, not in rendering the characteristic efficiency of any cause intelligible, but rather in showing that all causes appear to be connected and subject to control. Consequently philosophy can never be satisfied with the attempt to regard the qualitative features of the world as negligible in any effort to construe existence generally. For this purpose the category of causation is inadequate, because it is colorless. Moreover, it is useful only because, in its application, it presupposes the characteristic and qualitative efficiency of the factors with which it deals. To define a world, therefore, solely in terms of the dimensions of energy, is to define another world than ours. The vision of things is only distorted when their qualitative features, their esthetic character even, are regarded merely as the incidental byplay of factors which have no other law than the equation.

III

The justification of the category of use has, thus far, been mainly negative. The attempt has been made to show, first, that there is no relevant connection between the fact of teleology and the operations of chance or design; and, secondly, that intelligence may not be regarded as the source of the distinction between means and ends, because it cannot be credited with creating the distinctions it discovers, and because it is itself an instance of teleology. These considerations do not, however, amount to a positive definition. They produce at best a negative conviction and so serve to warn us that teleology is to be reckoned with. But if teleology is natural, how is it to be naturally construed and worked out? This study would be incomplete if no attempt were made to answer the question. For the baffling thing about the distinction between means and ends is that it is a distinction which points towards the future; and to regard an end not yet attained as an efficient factor in producing present changes has never been productive of generally convincing reasoning. Historically the progress of knowledge has often been arrested by some fresh and fascinating appeal to final causes, but knowledge has usually proceeded again unmodified by the appeal except in so far as it has directed attention to new methods of obviating the difficulties it raises. The science of biology is a pertinent illustration of this. Its history is marked by repeated appearances of vitalism in some form, but its great gains have not been made by the use of that hypothesis. There is, thus, in the fact noted, cause for inquiry and caution. The appeal to final causes always commands interest, but it is always regarded with suspicion. The interest appears to be due to the fact that the appeal forcibly calls attention to the habitual presupposition of finality in tracing the course of any natural process. The suspicion appears to be due to the fact that the appeal insists that what the presupposition involves should be regarded as an efficient factor during the process. The issue thus raised is more of a logical tangle than a question of fact. Its analysis may serve to indicate that a definition of natural teleology must recognize an ultimate diversity in the character of the factors with which we have to deal. Use is always specific use.

The bare statement that the attempt to trace the life history of a given organism is the attempt to follow the movement from its germ to its matured form, is sufficient to indicate that the finality of the movement is presupposed. For the germ is not the germ of an organism in general, but the germ of a particular organism. A kernel of corn is not a grain of wheat. And, to transfer the illustration to the inorganic world, carbon is not oxygen. Consequently, whether we are dealing with elements or with complexes, with dead things or with living things, these factors, if they are to enter into the production of any future result, are never conceived irrespective of the particular part they are to play in that production. Their finality, their serviceableness in the production of definite ends is presupposed. Without the presupposition inquiry could not go forward, but, when once made, the presupposition may be disregarded without any damage resulting to the explanation. To conclude, however, that teleology does not exist or that it has been explained is unwarranted. It both exists and is unexplained. An appeal to final causes directs attention to this fact. But it goes further. It insists that an additional cause should be incorporated among the already ascertained factors in any process. It invokes some "end," "form," "idea," "entelechy," "psychoid," "soul," to account for the fact that specific ends are reached. The situation thus produced is ambiguous and confusing. If one asks what is the specific function of the final cause, the answer is, obviously, to give the product its specific character. Since, however, the product must first exist before its specific character is realized, and since this character has already been presupposed, the answer appears to mean nothing at all or an absurdity. An acorn is not an oak, but to put an oak into the acorn in order to explain why acorns grow into oaks instead of into fishes, is like putting an explosion into gunpowder in order to explain why it explodes when ignited. In other words to put the end of a process into the beginning of it in order to explain why that end is reached, is either meaningless or absurd. For, assuredly, if the end existed at the beginning we should need more than all our wit to distinguish the one from the other. A world so constituted would be a world where nothing could happen, a perfectly static world. If it is urged that this is only a caricature of the doctrine of final causes, the reply may wisely

be made that that doctrine is only a caricature of the facts. For little more is gained besides a kind of mystification of the mind by expressing the doctrine in terms less gross than those here employed.

Yet something is, perhaps, gained, although a more refined expression is not necessary to secure it, and although the gain is not a gain for the doctrine itself. The appeal to final causes calls, as we have seen, attention to the fact that teleology exists, but is unexplained. Its own explanation is devoid of force because it turns the necessary presupposition of teleology in any movement toward a result into a cause why the particular result is reached. That is why it fails to be logically convincing. But its failure does not constitute a reason for rejecting teleology. It points rather to the fact that what is needed is not explanation, but definition. It does more. It points also to the fact that any definition of teleology must recognize an essential diversity of character in the processes involved in any change. Things and the elements of things are specifically different in their character and their operations. In terms of use, uses are always specific and in specific directions.

When we indulge in speculations about the origin of things in general we are forced to conceive that origin as capable of yielding the kind of world we discover ours to be. Such speculations may at first impose themselves upon the mind as explanations of why things are as they are, but candid scrutiny can find in them only more or less successful generalizations of the obvious. Thus our attempts to explain why the processes of the world move on in specific and distinguished directions with specific and distinguished results, amounts, in the last analysis, to a generalization of the fact of specific difference in a dynamic world. In biology, for instance, the problem of the origin of species is always the problem of the origin of particular species, and its solution is not an explanation of the existence of species generally. The solution is rather the fact of specific differences generalized and refined in view of the conditions under which they exist. By this is not meant, of course, that biological species must always have existed, but that ultimately specific differences in the factors dealt with must exist if specific differences in the results of their operation are to be made clear. Express-

ing the matter once more in general terms, recognition is here asked of the fact that uses are specific and operate in specific directions. In other words, to claim that things are generally useful is not to exhibit the fact of teleology in the processes of nature. The particular—and, indeed, many—ways in which they are useful must first be discriminated if there is to be any pertinent consideration of the adaptation of means to ends. The teleology of nature is not, therefore, a general drift toward some general result, it is always in individualized directions. It is a teleology of special cases. Our world is thus a collection of concretes, so that we are always inquiring about some definite thing, a star, an atom, an element, an organism, or some specific relation of these things to one another. There is no other kind of profitable inquiry, because there is no other kind of subject-matter for investigation. Ultimately concrete and specific differences in the character and operations of whatever factors go to make up the world, appear, thus, to be the first element in a definition of natural teleology. Given such differences, any change, no matter how it originated, would be subject to them, and the resulting movement be consequently a controlled movement.

Natural teleology involves more than controlled movement. We get but an inadequate picture of things if we view them only as the arrangement of given factors under fixed conditions. For the movements of nature are marked by unmistakable gains and losses; they are helped and hindered. In view of these helps and hindrances, it is possible for us to select any one of the concrete things of the world and regard it as a center, while the others form its varying attendants or environment. The world's processes may thus be regarded as the interaction between a thing and its surroundings. Since the selection of any center is at our pleasure, this procedure has a certain universality about it, so that the complete natural history of anything would be a history of nature itself. Yet many such histories would have to be written, for the world as a whole has no possible single history, because it has no possible environment with which to be related. But one may say that it has many histories, because, as a whole, it is but the sum of all possible distinctions between a thing and its environment. Thus we come once more upon the fact of

ultimately specific differences, but we come upon it under new aspects. For to construe the world as the environment of any chosen thing as its center, reveals the world as contributing, not only in different ways, but with unequal success to the processes of that thing. The elements in the environment are not all useful, and those that are useful are not all equally so. Any thing's existence presents itself thus as a kind of survival, as a center where the useful in a given direction has been in excess. While attempts to explain survival are not usually successful because they have a fatal tendency to reduce themselves to the simple statement that things do survive, it is evident that only in a teleological world is the concept of survival appropriate. Indeed, when the concept is critically examined, it appears to mean primarily that all things are not equally useful in supporting individual existence. Natural teleology involves, therefore, the recognition that use is comparative. Things and the elements of things differ in their teleological importance. Deductively expressed, one might say: Given a world made up of specifically different elements in dynamic relations and of different values with respect to any processes which might occur, these processes would result in specific products the existence of which could be construed as survivals, as the adaptations of means to ends, as the success of processes which help more over those that help less. The deductive expression ought not, however, to blind our eyes to the fact that it is not an hypothesis invented to explain the world. It is only a generalization of familiar facts.

The third element in a definition of natural teleology is a corollary of the preceding. Uses are not only specifically different and of comparative value, they also persist and accumulate. The eye, when it appeared, afforded, not a temporary glimpse of the world, but a continuing vision of it. This persistence and accumulation, however, should be construed under the general limitations already set for the definition. That is, we do not appear warranted in speaking of progress in general; we may speak only of specific and individualized progress. Consequently, when we affirm that natural teleology is progressive, we affirm that factors of greater teleological importance have continued to operate. The fact of such continuance is the fact of

progress. It is possible, therefore, to imagine that a given thing, if it met with no hindrance in the progressive appropriation of the useful, would present an instance of the steady approach towards complete adaptation to its environment and towards a conquest of the uses of the world. The Malthusian rabbit might thus become sovereign of the universe. It is, therefore, not unnatural to believe that, if there is any dominating direction in the appropriation of the useful, that direction must be due to the operation of some individual being. But sober thinking is reminded that the directions in which use is appropriated are many and diverse, and that hindrances consequently oppose complete adaptation. There is war in the world and sovereignty there is hazardous. The most dominating of beings may succumb to the most insignificant, as man may be destroyed by the animalcule. Yet sober thinking must also recognize that the symbol of war is appropriate, and that uncertainty in the tenure of supremacy does not obscure the fact that there are genuine victories.

The definition of natural teleology involves, therefore, besides the recognition that uses are specific, in specific and controlled directions, and of comparative value in view of these directions, the further recognition that uses are progressive. Let it be insisted once more, however, that the definition is not proposed as an explanation of teleology in the world's processes, but as a generalization from facts which we can, in wisdom, neither overlook nor explain away. While no attempt has been made to question the right of any science to employ the categories it finds best adapted to its specific aims, the attempt has been made to justify metaphysics in the employment of the category of use.

IV

There are, doubtless, various applications of the general definition of natural teleology which has been here proposed. These lie outside the scope of this discussion. There is, however, a special instance of teleology which may serve to throw the definition into sharper relief, and which affords inquiries of special interest—the teleology of consciousness. That it is useful to be conscious is palpably evident in spite of the diffi-

culties one may encounter in defining just how thought can change the world. These difficulties cannot obscure the significance to be attached to these moments in the world's history when its teleology becomes a conscious teleology and is reflectively considered. The significance may at first be emotional. Consciousness may be a "lyric cry"—to adapt Professor Santayana's phrase—involving joy over discovered uses or sorrow over frustrated aims. But the deeper significance lies evidently in the direction of foresight and knowledge. To anticipate advantage or disadvantage, and to know the means by which the one may be gained and the other avoided, presents the most signal instance of natural teleology that can be cited.

The conception of a world like ours in all respects save the presence of thought has already been suggested as philosophically warranted. Such a world would have a past and a future, and its history would display the facts of comparative use and progressive adaptation which have been embodied in the general definition of natural teleology. Yet it would appear to be impossible to assign to these facts or to the past and the future any characteristic efficiency. This statement does not mean that such a world would lack continuity in its development, that any given factor in it would be what it is irrespective of its past, or that its future would be out of relation to other future factors. But it does mean that the teleology in such a world would be only a characteristic of it, indicating the appropriation of use, but that this characteristic would not be detached from the specific instances of its operation and thus become itself a factor in that world's processes. This, after all, is but a way of saying that a world so conceived lacks consciousness, that its processes go on uncomplicated by any recognition of their uses, actual, prospective, or retrospective. Yet it may serve to indicate the kind of complication which the presence of consciousness introduces. The spider may spin its web unconsciously and produce thereby a product useful to it; but if it spins consciously, the past and future have entered into its activity in a new and significant manner. It may even be led to contemplate the miserable fate of its prey. Without consciousness, yesterday is only to-day's past, to-morrow only to-day's possible future. With consciousness to-day's changes occur in

view of yesterday and of the possible to-morrow. With consciousness the processes of the world become at once retrospective and prospective in their operation.

There is, therefore, design in the world. Only, as we have seen, that design may not be invoked to explain the world's teleology, because it is one instance of that teleology. But the fact that it is such makes it unnecessary to seek further for the ground of moral distinctions or for a rational confidence that nature is sufficient for the demands design may make upon it. Responsibility is not imposed from without. It arises from no authoritative command. It is, rather, the inevitable consequence of design. For to plan and put the plan in operation is to become the cause of the issuing result, the point where responsibility is definitely lodged. So we do not hold rocks responsible because they fall, but we do hold men responsible because they think. Because they think to-day is changed in view of yesterday and to-morrow, and consciousness being the possibility of such a change takes upon itself the thoughtful construction of the issue in the light of the world's natural teleology. That is the essence of morality. Man was not made moral by the prohibition of an apple. The fruit was good to eat, and the conscious discovery of its use turned man into a designing being. Thereafter he must learn the natural uses of things and turn them to his advantage, but at the risk of reciprocal demands. Thus, with consciousness, the world's teleology is a moral teleology. Given the world, which is not that world unillumined by thought which philosophy in its freedom may imagine, but a world among whose factors conscious beings must be numbered as instances of its productivity, these beings may not be surprised that their world is moral. Its moral character impresses them as again something necessary, something for the absence of which they can discover no reason. What the sun is to the movements of the planets, that justice is to the movements of design.

Perfect justice, like perfect equilibrium, may be unattainable, but justice is not a visionary ideal, unsupported by the teleology from which it arises. For, as we have seen, uses are specific, cumulative, and of comparative value in their operations. Justice has, therefore, for its exercise, not only the distinction of the useful and the useless, the good and the bad, but also the dis-

tion of the better and the worse. Accordingly, while design may despair of success in eliminating evil, it ought not to despair of success in attempting to achieve the better. For these attempts are supported by the world's natural teleology, by the comparative value of the uses of things. Knowledge thus ministers to morality in a twofold manner, by the localizing of responsibility and by the conscious discovering of the more useful. The end of such discovery is most evidently beyond our vision. Every new scrutiny of the world's uses reveals new and unsuspected possibilities, and warrants the conviction that the better is attainable and attainable with a diminution of injustice. The world may not have had its origin in reason, moral progress in it may waver, great gains may there be lost, and civilization go backward, but the world affords of itself the vision of its own rational conquest. To fix responsibility and to promote science appear thus to be the primary essentials of moral progress. To entertain, therefore, the vision of the world's rational conquest is not to be an optimist by temperament, but an optimist by conviction. We may not proclaim out of an abundance of well-being that this is the best possible world and that all things work together for good. For the moral lesson of natural teleology is that the world can be improved. Ours is the best possible world only because it has the capacity to engender and support the effort to make it better.

Yet enthusiasm is not to be denied to philosophy. To envisage the world in the light of reason is to beget emotions for which the impersonal categories of knowledge afford inadequate expression. These emotions, too, are natural, responses to provoking stimuli as much as the vibrating chord to the finger's touch. Man may, therefore, sing the praises of nature and be devout or fearful in her presence, for to personify her is but to accord her the filial recognition that persons are her offspring, born of her body, and nourished at her breasts. To refuse emotional responses to her revelations because they do not involve an explanation of her origin or of her destiny, is not the sign of wisdom, but of insensibility. For the contemplation of the stars has other natural uses besides the advancement of astronomy.

Indeed, man can hardly be indifferent to the fact that nature

evokes from him emotional responses as well as intellectual curiosity. But it is impossible for him so to divorce emotion and reason that his thinking and his feeling may remain unrelated and independent activities. For consciousness is comprehensive in its scope, including in its survey the fact that we live fully as much as the fact that we fall. It is also reflective, embracing, as we are wont to say, its own operations as something of which it also takes cognizance. This is, however, only the affirmation that consciousness is consciousness, that the existence of facts is not the considering of them. But it serves again to render conspicuous the particular use to be assigned to consciousness, the use of rendering the past and the future connectable and continuous now. It is creative of nothing but comprehension, and is subservient to the materials it finds. Its task is thus the rational organization of this material in its entirety. While, therefore, its exercise may discover emotions, we may not say that it is because we are conscious that we rejoice or fear, just as we may not say that it is because we are conscious that we have a certain specific gravity. The emotional life presents itself, thus, as one object for intelligent control and organization. But it does present itself as such an object. To claim, therefore, that teleology is natural and that consciousness is its most signal illustration, is not thoughtlessly to discard the obligation to seek for the emotional life its appropriate support and the befitting sphere of its operation. It is, rather, to urge that the search be conducted with an intensified appreciation of the immediate sources by which that life is quickened and refined.

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CONTAINING A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL WRITINGS OF THE
REV. PROFESSOR CHARLES A. BRIGGS, D.D., D.LITT.

It is not an easy task to make a complete collection of the titles of the writings of a man as prolific as Dr. Briggs, one whose interests are manifold, and whose pen has been active ever since his student days. The list which follows does not lay claim to exhaustiveness. Doubtless some titles have escaped the eye of the compiler. No attempt has been made to include editorial articles contributed to *The Evangelist*, or book-reviews printed in the *Presbyterian Review* and other periodicals, with a single exception. Most of the material has been obtained in the library of the Union Theological Seminary, of which the compiler was librarian for twenty-five years. Even if the list should prove to be defective in some particulars, that which is given will serve to indicate the range of Dr. Briggs's writings, and to show that his studies have covered many fields. This contribution to a memorial volume is submitted with the filial devotion of a former pupil, the admiration of a colleague, and above all the deep love of a personal friend.

CHARLES R. GILLETT.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.
August 29, 1910.

1868

Justification by Faith in Christ. By Dr. J. A. Dorner.
Translated by C. A. Briggs.

In *The American Presbyterian and Theological Review*. New Series: Vol 6,
1868. Pp. 186-214. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

1869

New German Works on Theology.

In *The American Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1869. Pp. 774-780. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

Recent German Works.

In *The American Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1869. Pp. 401-406. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

Theological and Literary Intelligence: Germany. (Notes on German Universities, etc.)

In *The American Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1869. Pp. 419-422; 800-803. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

1870

Biblical Theology, with especial reference to the New Testament.

In *The American Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 2, 1870. Pp. 105-133; 293-306. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

German Theological Literature.

In *The American Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 2, 1870. Pp. 170-176; 364-367; 560-562. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

1872

The Psalms. By Carl Bernhard Moll, D.D. Translated from the German, with Additions, by Rev. Charles A. Briggs, Rev. John Forsyth, D.D., Rev. James B. Hammond, Rev. J. Fred McCurdy; Together with a new Version of the Psalms and philological notes by Rev. Thomas J. Conant, D.D.

In Lange's Commentary: Old Testament series, Vol. IX. New York: Scribner. (1872). 8vo. Pp. ii, 816.

1876

Address (on Exegetical Theology) . . . on occasion of his Inauguration as Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

New York: Rogers and Sherwood. 1876. 8vo. Pp. 30.

1877

The Book of Ezra. Theologically and homiletically expounded, by Fr. W. Schultz, Professor in Ordinary of Theology

in the University of Breslau, Prussia. Translated, enlarged, and edited by —.

New York: Scribner. (1877). 8vo. Pp. (1), 100.

Exegetical Theology, especially of the Old Testament.

In *The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review*. Vol. 6, 1877. Pp. 5-29. 8vo. New York: Sherwood.

The Languages of the Bible.

In "God's Word Man's Light and Guide." New York: American Tract Society. (1877). Pp. 39-76. 12mo.

1879

Origin and History of Premillenarianism.

In *The Lutheran Quarterly Review*. Vol. 9, 1879. Pp. 207-245. 8vo. Gettysburg: Wible.

1880

The Documentary History of the Westminster Assembly.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1880. Pp. 127-163. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

An Exegesis of Exodus xxxiv, 29-35.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1880. Pp. 565-566. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The General Synod of the Evangelical Church of Prussia.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1880. Pp. 169-170. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Robertson Smith Case.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 1, 1880. Pp. 737-745. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

1881

Critical Theories of the Sacred Scriptures in relation to their Inspiration.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 2, 1881. Pp. 550-579. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

Hebrew Poetry.

In *The Homiletic Quarterly*. Vol. 5, 1881. Pp. 398-404; 535-542. 8vo. London: Kegan Paul.

The Provincial Assembly of London, 1647-1660.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 2, 1881. Pp. 54-79. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Second General Council of the "Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the Presbyterian System."

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 2, 1881. Pp. 169-174. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

1882

Argument *e silentio* with special reference to the Religion of Israel.

In *The Journal of Religious Literature and Exegesis*. Vol. 3, 1882. Pp. 3-21. 8vo. Boston: Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

Biblical Theology.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 3, 1882. Pp. 503-528. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America: 1882.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 3, 1882. Pp. 589-601. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Literary Study of the Bible.

In *The Hebrew Student*. Vol. 2, 1882. Pp. 65-77. 8vo. Chicago: Hebrew Book Exchange.

The Recently Discovered Inscription at the Pool of Siloam.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 3, 1882. Pp. 401-404. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

Robertson Smith's Prophets of Israel.

In *The Hebrew Student*. Vol. 2, 1882. Pp. 8-14. 8vo. Chicago: Hebrew Book Exchange.

1883

The Biblical Millennium.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 35, 1883. Pp. 1029-1030. Fol. New York: The Independent.

Biblical Study: its Principles, Methods, and History. Together with a catalogue of Books of Reference.

New York: Scribner, October 11, 1883. Pp. xv, 506. P. 8vo. (Reprinted in April, 1884; April, 1885; February and October, 1887; October, 1889; May and November, 1891; August, 1892; and January, 1894.)

A Critical Study of the History of the Higher Criticism with special reference to the Pentateuch.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 4, 1883. Pp. 69-130. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

Editorial Statement (on Biblical Criticism).

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 4, 1883. Pp. 425-428. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Greater Book of the Covenant.

In *The Hebrew Student*. Vol. 2, 1883. Pp. 289-303. 8vo. Chicago: Hebrew Book Exchange.

The Interpretation of Scripture. Opening Lecture, Union Theological Seminary, September 20, 1883.

Incorporated in "Biblical Study." 1883.

Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 4, 1883. Pp. 638-639. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Little Book of the Covenant.

In *The Hebrew Student*. Vol. 2, 1883. Pp. 264-272. 8vo. Chicago: Hebrew Book Exchange.

The Millennium.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 35, 1883. Pp. 931-932. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Tract Baba Bathra of the Talmud and the Old Testament.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 4, 1883. Pp. 417-420. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

1884

Correspondence between Richard Baxter and Thomas Gataker with reference to the Salvation of Baptized Children.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 5, 1884. Pp. 700-711. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

Edwin Francis Hatfield.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 5, 1884. Pp. 125-131. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

English Puritans in New York City in the Seventeenth Century.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 36, 1884. P. 134. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Hebrew Poem of the Creation.

In *The Old Testament Student*. Vol. 3, 1884. Pp. 273-288. 8vo. Chicago: American Publication Society of Hebrew.

The Principles of Puritanism.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 5, 1884. Pp. 656-675. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

The Third General Council of the Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the Presbyterian System: 1884.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 5, 1884. Pp. 330-337; 690-700. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

Tyndale's Pentateuch.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 5, 1884. P. 131. 8vo. New York: Randolph.

1885

American Presbyterianism: its Origin and Early History. Together with an Appendix of Letters and Documents, many of which have recently been discovered. With maps.

New York: Scribner. April 4, 1885. Pp. xviii, 373, cxlii. P. 8vo.

The Great Awakening.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 37, 1885. P. 323. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The New Organization for Elementary Instruction in Hebrew.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 134-136. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

The Poem of the Fall of Man.

In *The Reformed Quarterly Review*. Vol. 32, 1885. Pp. 311-333. 8vo. Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication Board.

Puritanism in New York: its Origin and Growth until the middle of the XVIII Century.

In *The Magazine of American History*. Vol. 13, 1885. Pp. 39-58. 8vo. New York: Historical Publication Company.

The Revised English Version of the Old Testament.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 486-533. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

Scholarship by Vote.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 37, 1885. P. 1099. Fol. New York: The Independent.

More Scholarship by Votes.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 37, 1885. P. 1258. Fol. New York: The Independent.

A Short Declaration of the Westminster Assembly by way of detestation of the Doctrine that God is the Author of Sin.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 315-318. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

The Song of Hannah.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 112-114. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

Thomas Cartwright's Letter to his Sister-in-law to dissuade her from Brownism.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 101-111. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

The Wiclif Quincentenary.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 6, 1885. Pp. 136-138. 8vo. New York: Presbyterian Review Association.

The Attitude of the Revised Version toward the Textual Criticism of the Old Testament.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 2, 1885-86. Pp. 65-78. 8vo. Chicago: American Publication Society of Hebrew.

1886

The Discussion of the Revised Version of the Old Testament.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 7, 1886. Pp. 369-378. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Evangelization.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 7, 1886. Pp. 161-164. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Hebrew Poetry.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 2, 1885-86. Pp. 164-170. 8vo. Chicago: American Publication Society of Hebrew.

James Eells.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 7, 1886. P. 357. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Messianic Prophecy. The Prediction of the Fulfilment of Redemption through the Messiah. A critical Study of the Messianic Passages of the Old Testament in the Order of their Development.

New York: Scribner. October 28, 1886. Pp. xx, 519. 8vo. (Reprinted in June, 1889; December, 1890; March, 1891; August, 1892; July, 1893; December, 1894; December, 1897; and April, 1902, and translated into Japanese.)

1887

The Barriers to Christian Union.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 8, 1887. Pp. 441-471. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Genesis of the Ten Words.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 29, 1887. Pp. 355-356. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

Rupertus Meldenius and his Word of Peace.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 8, 1887. Pp. 743-746. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Strophical Organization of Hebrew Trimeters.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 3, 1886-87. Pp. 152-165. 8vo. New Haven: Hebraica.

The Ten Words.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 29, 1887. Pp. 338-339. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

Terms of Christian Union.

In *The Christian Union*. Vol. 35, 1887. Pp. 8-9. Fol. New York: Christian Union.

Was Vesey a Puritan Minister?

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 8, 1887. Pp. 491-496. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Westminster Doctrine of the Salvation of Infants.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 8, 1887. Pp. 316-325. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Work of John Durie in behalf of Christian Union in the Seventeenth Century.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 8, 1887. Pp. 297-309. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

An Ancient Type of Presbyterianism.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 40, 1888. Pp. 833-834. New York: The Independent.

1888

The Apocalypse of Jesus.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 263-284. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Christian Evidences: How affected by Recent Criticisms?

In *The Homiletical Review*. Vol. 15, 1888. Pp. 9-14. 8vo. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.

The Hebrew Hexameter.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 4, 1887-88. Pp. 201-205. 8vo. New Haven: Hebraica.

The Hebrew Pentameter.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 4, 1887-88. Pp. 129-139. 8vo. New Haven: Hebraica.

The Hebrew Tetrameter.

In *Hebraica*. Vol. 4, 1887-88. Pp. 65-74. 8vo. New Haven: Hebraica.

The Lambeth Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 657-659. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Messiah of the Gospels.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 30, 1888. Pp. 338-340. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The New Theory of the Apocalypse.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 109-115. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Offerings of the Old Testament.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 30, 1888. Pp. 451-452. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The One Hundredth General Assembly.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 128-136. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

A Plea for an American Alliance of the Reformed Churches.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 306-309. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Thomas Cartwright's Letter to Arthur Hildersam on the Study of Divinity.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 9, 1888. Pp. 116-121. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

Union of Northern and Southern Presbyterians.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 40, 1888. Pp. 515-516. Fol. New York: The Independent.

1889

Biblical History. A lecture delivered at the Opening of the Term of Union Theological Seminary, New York, September 19, 1889. With an Appendix.

New York: Scribner. October 22, 1889. Pp. 45. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, October, 1890.)

Christian Guilds.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 31, 1889. Pp. 99-100. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 10, 1889. Pp. 464-474. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Higher Criticism and its Results.

In *The Congregationalist*. February 21, 1889. Boston: The Congregationalist.

The Lament of David over Saul and Jonathan.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 31, 1889. Pp. 563-564. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The Last Words of David.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 31, 1889. Pp. 961. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

Ministerial Education.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 10, 1889. Pp. 107-115. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The New Creed of the Presbyterian Church of England.

In *The Evangelist*. October 31, 1889. New York: The Evangelist.

Redemption after Death.

In *The Magazine of Christian Literature*. Vol. 1, 1889. Pp. 105-116. 8vo. New York: Christian Literature Company.

Songs of the Angels.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 31, 1889. Pp. 819-820. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The Study of the English Bible in Theological Seminaries.

In *The Presbyterian Review*. Vol. 10, 1889. Pp. 294-300. 8vo. New York: Scribner.

The Terms of Subscription of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 41, 1889. Pp. 1528-1529. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Westminster Confession and the Traditional Dogma.

In *The Christian Union*. Vol. 40, 1889. Pp. 417-418. Fol. New York: Christian Union.

The Westminster Creed. The Difficulty with the Third Chapter.

In *The Christian Union*. Vol. 40, 1889. Pp. 562-563. Fol. New York: Christian Union.

The Westminster Standards. How far they have been revised.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 41, 1889. P. 850. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Westminster Standards: II. The Difficulty.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 41, 1889. Pp. 946-947. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Westminster Standards: III. Methods of Relief.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 41, 1889. P. 979. Fol. New York: The Independent.

What Shall We Revise?

In *The Christian Union*. Vol. 40, 1889. Pp. 525-526. Fol. New York: Christian Union.

Whither? A Theological Question for the Times.

New York: Scribner. September 14, 1889. Pp. xv, 303. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, October, 1889; and February, 1890.)

1890

The Advance Towards Revision.

That Tenth Chapter.

The Confession Tested by Scripture.

In "How Shall We Revise? A Bundle of Papers." New York: Scribner. May 7, 1890. 12mo. Pp. vii, 214.

Church Unity.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 32, 1890. Pp. 386-388. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The Message of John the Baptist.

In *The Sunday School Times*. Vol. 32, 1890. Pp. 67-68. Fol. Philadelphia: Wattles.

The Middle State in the Old Testament.

In *The Homiletical Review*. Vol. 19, 1890. Pp. 20-25. 8vo. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.

The Middle State in the New Testament.

In *The Homiletical Review*. Vol. 19, 1890. Pp. 106-112. 8vo. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.

Have the Quakers Prevailed?

In *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Vol. 47, 1890. Pp. 325-352. 8vo. Oberlin: Goodrich.

Revision of the Westminster Confession. (Address before the Presbyterian Union of New York; enlarged.)

In *The Andover Review*. Vol. 13, 1890. Pp. 45-68. 8vo. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The Votes of the Presbyteries (on Confessional Revision).

In *The Independent*. Vol. 42, 1890. P. 611. Fol. New York: The Independent.

The Westminster Confession and the Old Testament.

In *The Independent*. Vol. 42, 1890. Pp. 689-690, 724-725. Fol. New York: The Independent.

1891

The Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. (Inaugural Address on "The Authority of Holy Scripture".)

Printed for the Union Theological Seminary: New York. MDCCCXCI. Pp. (3), 84. 8vo.

An Answer to Dr. Shedd's Criticism.

In *The New York Tribune*. November 5, 1891. New York: The Tribune.

The Authority of Holy Scripture. An Inaugural Address. Second Edition, with Preface and Appendix containing additional notes and explanations.

New York: Scribner. March 6, 1891. Pp. (1), 111. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, twice in March, April, twice in May, October, 1891; and February, 1893.)

The Authority of Holy Scripture. An Inaugural Address. Third Edition, with Preface, an Appendix containing additional notes and explanations, the Charges of Heresy, and the Response thereto before the Presbytery of New York.

New York: Scribner. 1891. Pp. (5), 161. P. 8vo.

The Higher Criticism. The Old Testament as read in its light. An Address, at the League of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. December 15, 1890.

In *The Christian Union*. Vol. 43, 1891. Pp. 306-307; 338-339. Fol. New York: Christian Union.

Response to the Charges and Specifications submitted to the Presbytery of New York.

No imprint. Dated, November 4, 1891. Pp. 34. P. 8vo. Reprinted in *The Andover Review*. Vol. 16, 1891. Pp. 623-639. 8vo. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Syllabus (of the Inaugural Address on "The Authority of Holy Scripture").

Reprinted in *The Magazine of Christian Literature*. Vol. 3, 1891. Pp. 430-434. 8vo. New York: The Christian Literature Co.

The Theological Crisis.

In *The North American Review*. Vol. 153, 1891. Pp. 99-114. 8vo. New York: North American Review.

1892

The Best Book of the Year.

In *The North American Review*. Vol. 154, 1892. Pp. 103-107. 8vo. New York: North American Review.

The Bible, the Church, and the Reason. The Three Great Fountains of Authority.

New York: Scribner. April 16, 1892. 8vo. Pp. xiii, 298. (Reprinted, March, 1893.)

The Case against Professor Briggs. I. The Charges and Specifications Submitted to the Presbytery of New York, October 5, 1891. II. Response of Professor Briggs to the Charges and Specifications, November 4, 1891. III. Action of the Presbytery of New York in Dismissing the Case. IV. The Complaint to the Synod of New York Against the Presbytery of New York for Its Decision of the Question of the Original Party of Prosecution, November 13, 1891. V. The Appeal of the so-called Prosecuting Committee to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, November 13, 1891. VI. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the General Assembly Against Entertaining the Appeal, May 26, 1892. VII. The Entertainment of the Appeal, May 27, 1892. VIII. The Argument of Professor Briggs Before the General Assembly Against Sustaining the Appeal, May 27 and 28, 1892. IX. The Action of the General Assembly in Sustaining the Appeal and Reversing the Dismissal of the Case.

New York: Scribner. August 27, 1892. Pp. (5), 171. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, January, 1893.)

The Defence of Professor Briggs before the Presbytery of New York, December 13, 14, 15 and 19, 1892.

New York: Scribner. 1892. Pp. xx, 193. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, twice in January, 1893.)

The Evidence Submitted to the Presbytery of New York by Professor Briggs, December 5, 1892.

(New York: 1892). Pp. 1-31, 216-247. P. 8vo.

The Future of Religion in America.

In *The Review of the Churches*. London. July, 1892. Reprinted in *The Magazine of Christian Literature*. Vol. 7, 1892. Pp. 425-432. 8vo. New York: Christian Literature Co.

The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch.

(New York: Jenkins, Printer.) Pp. (1), 238. P. 8vo. (Distributed to Presbytery.)

Professor Briggs on Moderator Young.

In *The Magazine of Christian Literature*. Vol. 7, 1892. Pp. 50-51. 8vo. New York: Christian Literature Co. Reprinted from *The Presbyterian Journal*, Philadelphia, September 8, 1892.

The Proposed Revision of the Westminster Confession.

In *The Andover Review*. Vol. 18, 1892. Pp. 124-138. 8vo. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Theological Education and Its Needs.

In *The Forum*. Vol. 12, 1892. Pp. 634-645. 8vo. New York: The Forum.

Who Wrote the Pentateuch? (Original copy placed before the Presbytery of New York; being the Argument on Charge IV in printed form, December 15, 1892.)

(New York: Scribner. 1892.) P. 238. P. 8vo.

1893

The Alienation of Church and People.

In *The Forum*. Vol. 16, 1893. Pp. 366-378. 8vo. New York: The Forum.

The Bible, the Church, and the Reason. The Three Great Fountains of Divine Authority. Second edition.

New York: Scribner. 1893. P. 8vo. Pp. xiii, 298.

The Case Against Professor Briggs. Part II. I. The Preliminary Objection of Professor Briggs to the Status of the Committee of Prosecution, November 9, 1892; the Action of the Presbytery of New York Thereon; and the Complaint of Professor Briggs to the Synod of New York. II. The Amended Charges and Specifications Submitted to the Presbytery, Novem-

ber 9, 1892. III. The Preliminary Objections of Professor Briggs to the Amended Charges and Specifications, November 9, 1892. IV. The Action of the Presbytery of New York on these Preliminary Objections; and the Complaint of Professor Briggs to the Synod of New York. V. The Evidence Submitted by Professor Briggs. VI. The Exceptions Taken by Professor Briggs to the New Matter Introduced by the Prosecution into Their Argument in Rebuttal. VII. The Final Judgment of the Presbytery of New York, December 30, 1892, and January 9, 1893.

New York: Scribner. February 16, 1893. Pp. (3), 161. P. 8vo. (Reprinted, February, 1893.)

The Defence of Professor Briggs Before the General Assembly. The Case Against Professor Briggs. Part III. I. The Appeal of the so-called Prosecuting Committee to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, January 18, 1893. II. The Argument of Professor Briggs Before the General Assembly Against Entertaining the Appeal, May 24 and 25, 1893. III. The Entertaining of the Appeal, May 26, 1893. IV. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the General Assembly against sustaining the Appeal, May 29 and 30, 1893. V. The Action of the General Assembly in Sustaining the Appeal, May 31, 1893, and the Final Judgment of the General Assembly, June 1, 1893.

New York: Scribner. July 8, 1893. Pp. (3), 311. P. 8vo.

The Future of Presbyterianism in the United States.

In *The North American Review*. Vol. 157, 1893. Pp. 1-10. 8vo. New York: North American Review.

The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch.

New York: Scribner. January 20, 1893. Pp. xii, 259. P. 8vo. (New and revised edition, April 3, 1897.)

Rally About the Constitution.

In *The Evangelist*. June 8, 1893. New York: The Evangelist Publishing Co. Reprinted in *The Independent*. June 15, 1893. P. 822, and in *Public Opinion*. Vol. 15, 1893. June 24, 1893. Pp. 279-280.

The Truthfulness of Holy Scripture.

In "The World's Parliament of Religions"; John Henry Barrows, Editor. Vol. I. Pp. 650-661. Chicago: Parliament Publishing Co. 1893. 8vo.

1894

The Messiah of the Gospels.

New York: Scribner. November 7, 1894. Pp. xv, 337. P. 8vo.

The Salvation Army.

In *The North American Review*. Vol. 159, 1894. Pp. 697-710. 8vo.
New York: North American Review.

The Sunday School and Modern Biblical Criticism.

In *The North American Review*. Vol. 158, 1894. Pp. 64-76. 8vo. New
York: North American Review.

1895

International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.

New York: Scribner. P. 8vo. 1895 ff. (Co-editor with Prof. S. R. Driver and Rev. Alfred Plummer.)

The Messiah of the Apostles.

New York: Scribner. April 6, 1895. Pp. xv, 562. P. 8vo.

1896

The International Theological Library.

New York: Scribner. 1896 ff. P. 8vo. (Co-editor with Prof. S. D. F. Salmond.)

The One Flock of Christ.

In *The Reformed Quarterly Review*. Vol. 43, 1896. Pp. 302-317. 8vo.
Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication House.

1897

Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Its Relation to Church Unity.

In *The New World*. Vol. 6, 1897. Pp. 117-143. 8vo. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch. New Edition, revised and enlarged.

New York: Scribner. 1897. Pp. xii, 288. P. 8vo.

(Orders in the Church of England.) A Review of "The Letter Apostolic of His Holiness Leo XIII," and of "The Answer of the Archbishops of England."

In *The Critical Review*. Vol. 7, 1897. Pp. 387-393. 8vo. Edinburgh: Clarke.

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